

THE
W O R K S

OF

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

VOL. IV.

W O R K

NICHOLAS MACHIAVELL

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T H E
W O R K S
O F
NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of FLORENCE.

Translated from the ORIGINALS;

ILLUSTRATED WITH
NOTES, ANNOTATIONS, DISSERTATIONS,

And several New Plans on the ART of WAR,

By ELLIS FARNEWORTH, M. A.

Late Vicar of Roslern in CHESHIRE,

Translator of the Life of POPE SIXTUS V. and
DAVILLA's History of the Civil Wars of FRANCE.

THE SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

L O N D O N,

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BY
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WITH AN APPENDIX
CONTAINING
A HISTORY OF
THE LITERATURE OF
THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE
IN THE EIGHTEEN
CENTURY.
BY
V. V. VOLKOV.
IN
TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. I.



I O N D I A

T H E
A R T O F W A R.

I N S E V E N B O O K S.

W R I T T E N B Y
N I C H O L A S M A C H I A V E L,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

B O O K I.

VOL. IV.

B

RAVENSBURG

1747

1747

1747

THE
FRENCH TRANSLATOR'S

ADVERTISEMENT to the READER.

ALTHOUGH the manner of making war is very different at present from what it was in Machiavel's days, his Treatise, or rather Dialogues, upon that subject may still be of great use. For in the first place, they are written by a Genius of the highest rank, and founded upon some general Principles which will always hold good: and in the next, (besides the pleasure of seeing what alteration is made in this Science by Time) they may furnish other men of parts and abilities with some useful and improveable hints; especially those that follow the profession of arms. There are further many judicious Reflexions in the course of this Work, which cannot fail of being very agreeable to Connoisseurs: and towards the end of the second Book, the Author launches out into a digression, in which he shews with great perspicuity to what causes it is chiefly owing, that the number of eminent Commanders is greater or less in different times and places.

* * * * *

N. B. *The rest of this Advertisement is wholly taken up in elucidating some military terms and phrases, which shall be explained in their proper places hereafter. But as there was an old English Translation of Machiavel's Art of War, published in the year 1588, by one Peter Whiteborne, who calls himself Student of Gray's Inn, I shall take the liberty of presenting the Reader with his Dedication of it*

to Queen Elizabeth: for though the language is now grown obsolete and uncouth, yet the Sentiments are just and worthy of observation. The Translation indeed is a very bad one, and not intelligible at present: the Dedication is as follows.

To the most high and excellent Princes ELIZABETH, by the grace of God Queene of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, defender of the Faith, and of the Church of England, and Ireland, on Earth next under God, the supreme Governour.

ALTHOUGH commonly every man, most worthy and renommed Soueraigne, seeketh specially to commende and extoll the thing, wherunto he feeleth himselfe naturally bent and inclined; yet all such partialitie and private affection laid aside, it is to be thought (that for the defence, maintenance, and advauncement of a Kingdom, or Common Weale, or for the good and due observation of peace, and administracion of justice in the same) no one thing can be more profitable, necessarie, or more honourable, than the knowledge of Service in warre, and deeds of armes, because considering the ambition of the World, it is impossible for any Realme or Dominion long to continue free in quietnes and savegard, where the defence of the Sword is not alwaies in a readinesse. For like as the Greekes, being occupied about trifling matters, taking pleasure in refiting of Comedies, and such other vaine things altogether neglecting Martiall feats, gave occasion to Philip King of Macedonia, father to Alexander the great, to oppresse and to bring them in servitude under his subjection: even so undoubtedly, libertie will not be kept, but men shall be troden under foote, and brought to most horrible miserie and calamitie, if they giving themselves to pastimes and pleasure, forsake the just regard

regard of their own defence, and savegard of their countrie, which in temporall regiment, chiefly consisteth in warlike skilfulness. And therefore the auncient Captaines and mightie Conquerours, so long as they florished, did devise with most great diligence, all manner of wayes to bring their men to the perfect knowledge of what so ever thing appertained to the warre, as manifestly appeareth by the warlike games, which in olde times the Princes of Grecia ordained upon the mount Olimpus, and also by the orders and exercises, that the auncient Romanes used in sundrie places, and especially in Campo Martio, and in their wonderfull sumptuous Theaters, which chiefly they builded to that purpose. Whereby they not onely made their Soldiours so expert, that they obtained with a few, in fighting against a great huge multitude of enemies, such marvailous victories, as in many credible histories are mentioned, but also by the same meanes, their unarmed rascall people that followed their Campes, got such understanding in the feats of warre, that they in the day of battail, being left destitute of succour, were able without any other helpe to set themselves in good order, for their defence against the enemie, that would seeke to hurt them, and in such dangerous times, have done their countrie so good service, that verie often by their helpe, the adversaries have beene put to flight, and fieldes most happily wonne. So that the antiquitie esteemed nothing more happy in a common weale, then to have in the same many men skilfull in warlike affaires : by meanes whereof their Empire continually enlarged, and most wonderfully and triumphantly prospered. For so long as men for their valiauntnes, were then rewarded and had in estimation, glad was he that could finde occasion to venter, yea and spend his life to benefite his countrie : as by the manly actes that Marcus Curtius, Oratius Cocles, and Gaius Mucius did for the save-

gard of Rome, and also by other innumerable examples, doth plainly appeare. But when through long and continual peace, they began to be altogether given to pleasure and delicatenes, litle regarding Martial feats, nor such as were expert in the practise thereof, their dominion and estates did not so much before increase and prosper, as then by such meanes and oversight, they sodainly fell into decay and utter ruine. For such truly is the nature and condicion, both of peace and warre, that where in government there is not had equall consideracion of them both, the one in fine doth worke and induce the other's oblivion, and utter abbolucion. Wherefore, sith the necessitie of the science of warres is so great, and also the necessarie use thereof so manifest, that even Ladie Peace hir selfe, doth in manner from thence crave hir chiefe defence and preservacion, and the worthinesse moreover and honour of the same so great, that as by prooфе wee see, the perfect glorie thereof, cannot easilie finde roote, but in the hearts of most noble, courageous, and manlike personages. I thought most excellent Princes, I could not either to the special gratefying of your highnes, the universal delight of al studious gentlemen, or the common utilitie of the publique wealth, employ my laboures more profitable in accomplishing of my dutie and good will, then in setting forth something, that might induce to the augmenting and increase of the knowledge thereof: and especially the example of your highnesses most politike government over us, giving plaine testimonie of the wonderfull prudent desire that is in you, to have your people instructed in this kind of service, as well for the better defence of your Highnes, themselves, and their countrie, as also to discourage thereby, and be able to resist the malignitie of the enemie, who otherwise would seeke paraventure to invade this noble realme or kingdome.

When therefore, about ten yeares past, in the
Empe-

Emperour's warre's against the Mores and certain Turkes, being in Barbarie: at the siege and winning of Calibia, Monesterio, and Affrica, I had as well for my further instruction in those affaires, as also the better to acquaint mee with the Italian tongue, reduced into English, the book called The arte of Warre, of the famous and excellent Nicholas Machiavel, which in times past, he being a coun-sailour, and Secretairie of the noble citie of Florence, not without his great laud and praise did write: and having lately againe, somewhat perused the same, the which in such continuall broyles, and unquietnes, was by me translated, I determined with my selfe, by publishing thereof, to bestow as great a gift (since greater I was not able) amongst my countrie men, not expert in the Italian tongue, as in like works I had seene before mee, the French-men, Dutchmen, Spaniardes, and other forreine nacions, most lovingly to have bestowed among theirs: the rather undoubtedly, that as by private reading of the same booke, I then felt my selfe, in that knowledge marvailously holpen and increased, so by communicating the same to many, our English-men finding out the ordering and disposing of exploites of warre therein contained, the aide and direction of these plaine and briefe precepts, might no lesse in knowledge of warres become incomparable, then in prooves also and exercise of the same altogether invincible: which my translacion, most gracious Soveraigne, together with such other thinges, as by mee hath bene gathered, and thought good to adde thereunto, I have presumed to dedicate unto your highness, not onely because the whole charge and furniture of warlike counsailes and preparations, being determined by the arbitremen of Governours and Princes, the treatise also of like effect should in like manner as of right depend upon the protection of a most worthy and noble Patronesse, but also that the discourse it selfe, and the

worke of a foraine author, under the pasport and
safe conduite of your highnes most noble name,
might by speciall authoritie of the same, winne
amongst your Majesties subiectes, much better cre-
dite and estimacion. And if, most mighty Queene,
in this kinde of Philosophie, (if I may so terme it)
grave and sage counsailes, learned and wittie pre-
cepts, or politike and prudent admonicions, ought
not to be accounted the least and basest jewells of
weale publike ; then dare I boldly affirme, that of
many straungers, which from forreine countries,
have heretofore in this your Majesties realme ar-
rived, there is none in comparison to be preferred,
before this worthy Florentine and Italian, who hav-
ing freelye without any gaine of exchaunge (as after
some acquaintance and familiaritie will better ap-
pear) brought with him most ritch, rare and plenti-
full Treasure, shall deserve, I trust of all good
English hearts, most lovingly and friendly to bee in-
tertained, imbraced and cherished ; whose new
English apparel, how so ever it shall seeme by mee,
after a grosse fashion, more fitly appointed to the
Campe, then in nice termes atired to the Carpet,
and in course clothing rather put foorth to battaile,
then in any brave shew prepared to the banquet ;
neverthelesse my good will I trust, shall of your
grace be taken in good part, having fashioned the
phraise of my rude stile, even according to the pur-
pose of my travaile, which was rather to profite the
desirous man of warre, then to delight the ears of
the fine Rethorician, or daintie curious scholeman.
Most humbly beseeching your highnes, so to accept
my labour herein, as the first frutes of a poore
Souldiour's studie, who to the uttermost of his smal
power, in the service of your most gratious majestie,
and of his countrie, will at all times, according to
his boundent dutie and allegiance, promptly yeeld
himselfe to any labour, travaile or daunger, what so
ever shall happen. Praying in the meane season

the

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the almighty God, to give your highnes in a long
prosperous raigne, perfect health, desired tranqui-
litie, and against all your enemies, lucky and joy-
ful victorie.

Your humble Subject and dayly

Oratour,

PETER WHITEHORNE.

THE

T H E

AUTHOR's PREFACE,

ADDRESSED TO

Lorenzo Strozzi, Nobleman of Florence.

MANY are now of opinion, My Dear Lorenzo, that no two things are more discordant and incongruous than a civil and a military Life. Hence we see daily, that when a man goes into the army, he presently changes, not only his dress, but his behaviour, his company, his air, his manner of speaking, and affects to throw off all appearance of any thing that may look like common life and conversation. For a man that is to be ready equipped for any sort of violence, despises the formal garb of a Citizen, and thinks no dress fit for his purpose but a suit of armour : and as to civility and politeness, how can we expect to find any such thing in one who imagines it would make him look effeminate, and rather be a hindrance to his preferment than otherwise ; especially when he thinks it his duty, instead of talking and looking like other men, to fright every body he meets with a volley of oaths, and a terrible pair of whiskers ? This indeed gives some countenance to such an opinion, and makes people look upon a soldier as a different sort of a creature from all other men.

But if we consider the nature of government, and the institutions of the Ancients, we shall find a very strict and intimate relation betwixt these two conditions ; and that they are not only compatible and consistent with each other, but necessarily connected

and

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and united together. For all the arts and sciences which have been introduced into society for the common benefit of mankind, and all the ordinances that have been established to make them live in the fear of God, and obedience to human Laws, would be vain and insignificant, if not supported and defended by a military force; which, when properly conducted and applied, will maintain those ordinances and keep up their authority, though perhaps they may not be altogether perfect and without flaw or defect in themselves. But the best ordinances in the world will be despised and trampled under foot, if not upheld as they ought to be by a military power; like a magnificent Palace that is uncovered at the top, which though full of jewels and costly furniture, must soon moulder into ruin, as it has nothing but its splendor and riches to defend it from the injuries of the weather. The ancient Lawgivers and Governors of Kingdoms and Republics took great care therefore to inspire all their subjects, but particularly their soldiers, with fidelity, love of peace, and the fear of God. For who ought to be more faithful than a man that is entrusted with the safety of his country, and has sworn to defend it to the last drop of his blood? Who ought to be fonder of peace than those that suffer by nothing but war? Who is under greater obligations to worship God than Soldiers, who are daily exposed to innumerable dangers, and have most occasion for his protection? These things being well considered by those who governed States and modelled armies in former times, and strongly enforced upon others that were under their command, had such an effect upon their conduct and behaviour, that the life of a soldier was edifying and served as a pattern for others. But since our discipline is now depraved to such a degree, that it is totally different from what it anciently was, it is no wonder that men have so bad an opinion of a military life, and endeavour,

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as much as they can, to avoid the company and conversation of all such as follow the profession of arms.

As I am of opinion, therefore, from what I have both seen and read, that it is not even yet impossible to revive the discipline of our ancestors, and in some measure to retrieve the reputation of our soldiery, I have written the following treatise concerning the Art of War, as well for the improvements of others who are desirous to imitate the Ancients in warlike exploits, as for my own private satisfaction, and to avoid the imputation of spending my leisure in idleness. Now, though perhaps it may seem a presumptuous undertaking to treat of an Art which I never professed ; yet I cannot help thinking myself more excusable than some other people, who have taken upon them the actual exercise of it : for an error in my writings may easily be corrected, without prejudice to any body ; but an error in their practice may ruin a whole State. Consider the nature of this work then, good Lorenzo, and freely bestow either your censure or commendation upon it, as you think it justly deserves. I inscribe it to you, not only as a testimony of my gratitude, (though conscious to myself how small a return it is for the favours I have received from you) but because it is usual to address things of this nature to persons who are distinguished by their nobility, their riches, their great parts, or munificence ; and I know very well that in birth and fortune you have not many equals, still fewer in parts, and in generosity and liberality, none at all.

T H E

THE ART OF WAR.

BOOK I.

THE CONTENTS.

Fabrizio Colonna refreshing himself in Cosimo Rucellai's gardens at Florence, enters into a conversation concerning the Art of War. That an honest man ought not to make war his only profession. That no Prince or Republic should suffer any of their Subjects to make war their only occupation. In what countries the best Soldiers are to be raised. Whether it is better to take them out of towns, or out of the country. The conveniences and inconveniences of trained Bands, or a settled Militia. Of what sort of men an Army ought to be composed. How the Romans raised their Legions. Whether a Militia should be numerous, or not. How to prevent the inconveniences to which a Militia is subject. Of raising and paying Cavalry.

SINCE it is allowable, I think, to speak well of any man after he is dead, because there can then be no longer any imputation or suspicion of flattery, I willingly take this opportunity of doing justice to the memory of my dear deceased friend Cosimo Rucellai, whose name I never remember without tears; as I knew him to be possessed of every quality that his friends and country could wish for in a worthy man and a good Citizen. For I am very certain he would chearfully have sacrificed

ficed all that he had in the world, and even life itself, for his friends ; and that there was no enter-prize how difficult and dangerous soever, which he would not have undertaken for the good of his country. And I must acknowledge, that amongst all the men I ever was acquainted with, I never met with any one whose heart was more disposed to great and generous actions. The only thing that he lamented at his death, was, that it should be his fate to die so young, and in his own house, without honour, or the satisfaction of having served any man in so effectual a manner as he passionately de-sired to have done ; so that he was afraid (as he told his familiar acquaintance) nothing more could be said of him after he was dead, than that they had lost a good friend. But as his actions are sunk in oblivion, and scarce any of his acquaintance remaining, I think it proper to give this testimony of his virtues, and many amiable accomplishments. Time indeed has spared some small specimens of the sprightless of his Genius, consisting chiefly of love Sonnets, which (though he was not of an amorous turn) he composed at vacant hours in his youth, to avoid being altogether idle, and to entertain himself as well as others, till he should find it necessary to employ his thoughts upon subjects of a higher and more serious nature. But even from these little samples, it appears how happy he was in expressing his conceptions, and what a figure he might have made in Poetry, if he had thought it worth his while to give himself wholly up to it.

Since fortune therefore has deprived us of so valuable a friend, the only remedy we have left, is to console ourselves as well as we can with the remembrance of his company, and the recollection of such things, whether of a pleasant or serious cast, as we have often admired in him whilst he lived. And because the conversation that happened not long ago in his gardens, betwixt him and Fabrizio

Colonna,

Colonna, concerning the Art of War (at which I and some other friends were present) is the freshest upon my memory, I will endeavour to recollect what I can of it, and commit it to writing: for as Fabrizio laid open the mysteries of that art with great perspicuity on one side, and several pertinent questions were proposed, many objections started, and divers arguments supported with no less strength of reason by Cosimo on the other; a summary account of that conference may serve not only to revive the remembrance of his abilities in the minds of such friends as were then met together, but to make those that were absent regret they were not there, and to recapitulate to others the substance of various topics (no less useful in a civil than a military life) at that time handled in a very masterly manner, by a great and experienced man. But to our purpose.

FABRIZIO COLONNA returning from the wars in Lombardy, where he had commanded his Catholic Majesty's forces a considerable time with great reputation, took Florence in his way, with a design to repose himself a few days in that City, and to visit the Duke and some other Gentlemen there, with whom he was acquainted. Cosimo Rucellai therefore invited him to spend a day with him in his gardens; not merely to gratify his natural turn to hospitality and politeness, but in hopes likewise of being indulged in a long conversation with him concerning several things he wanted to know, and of which he thought he could not have a better opportunity of informing himself, than from the mouth of so great a man. The invitation being freely accepted by Fabrizio, he came to the Gardens at the time appointed, where he was received by Cosimo, and some of his most intimate friends, amongst whom were Zanobi Buondelmonti, Battista dalla Palla, and Luigi Alamanni, (all young men, very dear to him, of the same disposition, and engaged

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engaged in the same studies) whose virtues and
good qualities are so well known to every body,
that it would be altogether unnecessary to say any
thing here in praise of them.—To be as brief as
I can, Fabrizio was regaled there with all possible
demonstrations of honour and respect: but after the
entertainment and usual formalities were over (which
generally are few and short amongst men of sense,
who are more desirous of gratifying the rational ap-
petite) the days being long, and the weather intense-
ly hot, Cosimo, under a pretence of avoiding the
heat, took his guests into the most retired and shady
part of the Gardens; and being all sat down, some
upon the grafts (which was very green and pleasant)
and some upon seats placed under the trees; Fa-
brizio said it was a most delightful garden, and look-
ing earnestly at some of the trees, seemed not to
know the names of them; but Cosimo being
aware of it, immediately said, perhaps you may not
be acquainted with this sort of trees; and indeed I
am not at all surprised at it, for they are very old
ones, and were much more in vogue amongst our
ancestors than they are at present. Having then
told him the names of them, and that they were
planted by his Grandfather Bernardo, who was
fond of such amusements: I thought so, replied
Fabrizio; and both the place and the trees put me
in mind of some Princes in the Kingdom of Naples,
who took much delight in planting groves and
shady arbours, to shelter them from the heat.—
Here he stopped short, and after he had paused a
little while, proceeded in this manner.—If I was
not afraid of giving offence (said he) I would tell
you my opinion of these things: and yet I think
none of you will be affronted at what is said
amongst friends in free conversation; not with any
design to vilify or deprecate such a taste, but for
the sake of a little innocent argumentation. How
much better then would those Princes have done

(I)

(I speak it without intending to reflect upon their memories) if they had endeavoured to imitate the ancients in bearing hardships, instead of giving themselves up to ease and indolence, in doing such actions as are performed in the sunshine, and not in the shade; in following their example whilst they continued hardy and honest, and not when they became delicate and corrupt; for after that our country soon fell into ruin and distraction.—

You have now introduced a subject, said Cosimo (but to avoid the frequent and tiresome repetition of “such a one said, such a one answered, and such a one replied,” I shall hereafter only prefix the name of the several speakers, to what they said in the course of this conversation) you have now introduced a subject which I have long wished to hear thoroughly discussed, and therefore should take it as a particular favour, if you would speak your sentiments of it freely, and without reserve, or fear of offending any one here: for my own part, I will take the liberty of proposing some questions and doubts to you, in which I should be glad to be satisfied; but if I shall seem either to impeach or excuse any one’s conduct in my questions or replies, it will not be for the sake of blaming or defending them, but for better information, if I should mistake in my judgment.

FABRIZIO. It will be a great pleasure to me, I can assure you, on the other hand, to give you all the satisfaction I can in such questions as you shall think fit to propose to me; but I will not pretend to obtrude my opinions upon you as decisive and infallible; when you have heard them, I beg you will judge for yourself: perhaps I may now and then ask you a question too in my turn, and make no doubt but I shall receive as much satisfaction at least, in your answers, as you will do in mine: for it often happens that a pertinent question puts a man upon considering some things, and gives him

light into many others, which otherwise he would never have thought of or known.

COSIMO. Let us return then, if you please, to what you said of my Grandfather and some others, who you think would have done better to have imitated the example of the ancients in a hardy and active manner of living, than in making such provisions for ease and luxury. As for my Grandfather, I shall make some sort of apology for him ; and leave the others to be dealt with as you please : for I do not believe there was any man of his time, who detested a soft and delicate way of life more than he did, or was a greater friend to toil and labour. Nevertheless, he found it impossible either for himself or his sons to practise what he most approved ; for such was the corruption of the age he lived in, that if any one had spirit enough to deviate ever so little from the common customs and manner of living in those times, he would have been laughed at and ridiculed by every body. So that if a man should have exposed himself naked upon a sandy beach to the heat of a noon-day sun in the middle of summer, or rolled himself in snow in the depth of winter, as Diogenes did, he would have been looked upon as a madman : if any one had brought up his children, like the Spartans in cottages or farm-houses ; if he had accustomed them to sleep in the open air, to go barehead and barefoot, to bathe in the coldest streams, in order not only to make them bear hardships the better, but to despise both life and death, he would have been accounted a beast rather than a man : if, lastly, he had lived upon pulse and roots and such sort of things, if he had made no account of money, like Frabricius of old, he might perhaps have been admired by some few, but he would have been followed by nobody. My Grandfather therefore was discouraged from imitating the example of the ancients, in those things, by the general practice

of

Book I. THE ART OF WAR. 19

of the times, and forced to content himself with doing it in others, which did not lay him so open to the charge of affecting singularity.

FABRIZIO. You have made a very handsome apology for your Grandfather in that particular, Sir; and there is indeed much truth and reason in it. But in what I said of imitating the ancients in their manner of living, I did not mean to carry matters to such extremities as you seem to think, but to propose some other things of a gentler and more practicable nature, and such as would be more suitable to the present times; which I think might very well be established, if they were introduced and countenanced by some man of authority in the State. And if we consider the practice and institutions observed by the old Romans (whose example I am always fond of recommending) we shall find many things worthy of imitation, which may easily be transplanted into any other state, if it is not become totally corrupt.

COSIMO. Pray what things are those?

FABRIZIO. To honour and reward virtue; not to despise poverty; to keep up good order and discipline in their armies; to oblige their Fellow-citizens and Subjects to love one another; to decline faction; to prefer the good of the public to any private interest; and other such things which would be compatible enough with these times, and may easily be introduced if due means were taken for that purpose: because they appear so reasonable in themselves, and the expediency of them is so obvious to common sense, that nobody could gainsay or oppose them; and he that takes this course, plants trees under the shade of which he may enjoy himself with equal pleasure, and perhaps more security, than we do here.

COSIMO. What you have said of this matter admits of no contradiction, and therefore I shall leave it to the consideration of those whom it

most concerns ; but should be glad to know, why you, who blame others for not imitating the ancients in weighty and important concerns, have not thought fit in any wise to copy them yourself in their military discipline, and the Art of War, which is your Profession, and in which you have gained so much reputation.

FABRIZIO. You are now come to the point I expected : for what I said, must naturally lead you to ask such a question ; and, for my own part, I shall most willingly give you what satisfaction I can. And though I could make a short and ready excuse for my conduct in this respect, yet since we have so much leisure, and so convenient a place for it, I shall discuss the matter at large ; especially as it will give me great pleasure to inform you thoroughly of what you seem so desirous to know. —— Men who have any great design in hand must first make all necessary preparations, that their plan, when a proper opportunity offers, may be ready to be put in execution. Now when these preparations are made with caution and privacy, they are not known or talked of ; so that a man cannot be blamed for negligence or omission in that respect, except some accident happens which shews that he has either not made due preparations for the executions of his design, or never thought of it at all : and therefore, as I never yet had any such opportunity of shewing what preparations I have made to revive the military discipline of the ancients amongst us, nobody can reasonably blame me for not doing it. This might serve for a sufficient answer to your charge.

COSIMO. It might so indeed, if I was sure you never had such an opportunity.

FABRIZIO. Since you seem to doubt of that, I will shew you at large (if you will have patience to hear me) what preparations are necessary for that purpose ; what sort of opportunity is requisite ; what

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what impediments may obstruct the preparations, and prevent those opportunities from happening; and lastly, (which seems a contradiction in terms) that it is at the same time the easiest and most difficult thing in the world to accomplish such a purpose.

COSIMO. You cannot oblige us more: and if you are not tired with speaking, you may assure yourself we shall never be tired of hearing you. But as the subject is copious and much to be said upon it, I must beg leave to call in the assistance of these friends now and then: and both they and I hope you will not be offended if we should now and then happen to interrupt you with any question that may seem unnecessary or unreasonable.

FABRIZIO. You are all heartily welcome to ask what questions you think fit; for I see the ardour and ingenuity of youth incline you to have a favourable opinion of my Profession, and to listen to what I have to say concerning the duties of it: but when men are grown grey-headed, and their blood is frozen in their veins, they generally either hate the very name of a soldier, or become so positive that they can never be argued out of their opinions. Ask freely then and without reserve: for that will give me an opportunity of breathing a little sometimes, as well as satisfaction of answering your questions in such a manner as may leave no doubt or scruple remaining upon your minds.

—To begin then with what you said yourself, that in the Art of War (which is my Profession) I have not imitated the ancients in any respect whatsoever, I answer, that War being an occupation by which a man cannot support himself with honour at all times, ought not to be followed as a business by any but Princes or Governors of Commonwealths; and that if they are wise men they will not suffer any of their Subjects or Citizens to make that their only Profession. Indeed no good man ever did: for surely he cannot be called a good

man, who exercises an employment that obliges him to be rapacious, fraudulent, and cruel at all times, in order to support himself; as all those must be of course (of what rank soever they are) who make a trade of war; because it will not maintain them in time of peace: upon which account, they are under a necessity either of endeavouring to prevent a peace, or of taking all means to make such provisions for themselves in time of war, that they may not want sustenance when it is over *. But neither of these courses is consistent with common honesty: for whoever resolves to heap as much in time of war as will support him for ever after, must be guilty of robbery, murder, and many other acts of violence upon his friends as well as his enemies: and in endeavouring to prevent a peace, Commanders must have recourse to many pitiful tricks and artifices to deceive those that employ them. But if they fail in their designs, and find they cannot prevent a peace, as soon as their pay is stopped, and they can live no longer in the licentious manner they used to do, they set up for Soldiers of fortune, and having got a parcel of their disbanded men together, make no scruple of plundering a whole country without mercy or distinction. You must have heard that when the late wars were over in Italy and the country full of disbanded Soldiers, they formed themselves into several bands, and went about plundering some towns and laying others under contribution. You must likewise have read how the Carthaginian Soldiers (after the first war was ended in which they had been engaged with the Romans) assembled together under the banners of Matho and Spendius (two officers whom they had chosen in a tumultuary manner to command them) and made a more dangerous war upon their own country, than that

* See the History of Florence, *passim*.

which

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which had been just concluded *. In the days of our Ancestors, Francisco Sforza, in order to support himself in splendour and magnificence in time of peace, not only betrayed the Milanese who had employed him in their service, but deprived them of their liberties and made himself their Sovereign. All the rest of our Italian Soldiers, who made war their only occupation, acted the same part in those times: and if they did not succeed in their villanies like Sforza, they were not less blameable; for if we consider their conduct, we shall find their designs were altogether as iniquitous as his. Sforza, the father of Francisco, obliged Jane, Queen of Naples, to throw herself into the arms of the King of Arragon, by suddenly quitting her service and leaving her disarmed, as it were, in the midst of her enemies, with an intention either to deprive her of her Kingdom, or at least to extort a great sum of money from her. Braccio da Montone endeavoured by the same arts to have made himself King of Naples; and if he had not been routed and killed at Aquila, he would certainly have accomplished his design †. Such evils, and others of the like nature, are owing to men who make war their only occupation; according to the proverb, "War makes thieves, and Peace hangs them:" for those that know not how to get their bread any other way, when they are disbanded, finding nobody that has occasion for their Service, and disdaining the thoughts of living in poverty and obscurity, are forced to have recourse to such ways of supporting themselves as generally bring them to the Gallows.

COSIMO. I confess, I thought the Profession of a Soldier the most honourable of all others; but you have set it in such a light, that I am now so much out of conceit with it, that if you have not a great

* See Polit. Disc. book III. chap. xxii.

† See the History of Florence, book I. towards the end.

deal more to say in favour of it, you will leave a doubt upon my mind: for if what you have said be true, how comes it to pass that the memories of Julius Cæsar, Pompey, Scipio, Marcellus, and many other Roman Generals are immortalized?

FABRIZIO. I have not yet finished what I proposed to say concerning the two points I mentioned a little while ago, viz. that a good man could not make war his only profession; and that no wise Prince or Governor of a Commonwealth ought to suffer any of their Subjects or Citizens to do it. As to the first, I have done with it; and will now proceed to the discussion of the second: in which I shall take an opportunity of answering your last question.—I say then, that Cæsar and Pompey, and almost all the Roman Generals who lived after the second Punic war, owed their reputation to their abilities, rather than their virtue: but those that lived before that time acquired their glory by being virtuous as well as able men: for the former made war their sole occupation, but the latter did not. Whilst the Roman Republic continued incorrupt, no Citizen, how powerful soever he might be, ever presumed to avail himself of that profession in time of peace, in such a manner as to trample upon the laws, to plunder Provinces, or to turn tyrant, and enslave his country: nor did any private Soldier dare to violate his oath, to enter into faction and cabals, to throw off his allegiance to the Senate, or to support any tyrannical attempt upon the liberties of the Commonwealth, in order to enable himself to live by the profession of arms at all times. The Commanders, on the contrary, contenting themselves with the honour of a Triumph, returned with eagerness to their former manner of living; and the private men laid down their arms when a war was over, with much more pleasure than they had taken them up, and resumed the calling by which they had got their bread before,

fore, without any hopes of advancing themselves by plunder and rapine. Of this we have a remarkable and evident proof in the example of Attilius Regulus, who being Commander in Chief of the Roman Armies in Africa, and having in a manner subdued the Carthaginians, sent to desire leave of the Senate to return home, that he might put his little farm in order again, which had been neglected by his servants: from whence it plainly appears, that if war had been his only occupation, and he had designed to have made his fortune by it, he would not have desired leave to return to the care of his little estate, when he had so many Provinces at his mercy, and might daily have gained more by plundering them than his whole patrimony was worth*. But as good men who make not war their sole occupation, expect no other reward but glory and honour for their services; so when they have obtained that, they cheerfully return to their former way of life. As for the common Soldiers, we see that they likewise were of the same disposition: for though they entered voluntarily into the service when it was necessary, they were not less glad to return to their families when they were no longer wanted: the truth of which is manifest from many circumstances; particularly from the privilege which the Roman Citizens enjoyed, of not being forced into the army against their inclination. So that whilst that Republic continued well governed (which was till the time of the Gracchi) there never was any Soldier who made war alone his occupation: from whence it came to pass that few of them were dissolute and licentious; and those that were so were severely punished. Every well governed Commonwealth therefore should take care that this Art of war should be practised in time of peace only as an exercise; and in time of war, merely out of necessi-

* See Politic. Diss. book III. chap. xxv.

ty, and for the acquisition of glory ; referring it (when considered as a constant business and employment) to be prosecuted by the Public alone : for if any Citizen has any other end or design in following this profession, he is not a good man : and if any Commonwealth acts otherwise it is ill governed.

COSIMO. I am thoroughly satisfied of the reasonableness of what you have hitherto said concerning this matter, and admit the conclusion you have drawn to be very just as far as it relates to a Commonwealth : but I cannot tell whether it will hold good with regard to Princes ; for I think a Prince should have some such persons about him as make arms their only profession.

FABRIZIO. A Kingdom that is well governed ought to be still more afraid of such persons than a Commonwealth ; because they are the corruptors of Princes, and ministers of their Tyranny. It is vain to urge any Monarchy that now exists, as an instance to the contrary ; for there is not one that is under good regulations. A Kingdom that is well constituted never gives the Sovereign power to its Prince in any thing but the command of its armies ; in which case alone it is absolutely necessary he should have it ; because sudden resolutions are often necessary, and such as cannot be carried into execution so speedily as they ought to be, except the supreme command is lodged in the hands of one man : in other matters, nothing ought to be done without his Council ; and therefore his Counsellors should take particular care not to let such men be too near his person, as would be continually advising him to make war, whether it is necessary or not, because they cannot tell how to support themselves in time of peace. But I will enlarge a little further upon this subject, and not insist merely upon a Kingdom that is perfectly well governed and constituted, but content myself (for argument's sake) with such as we see at this time. I say then that

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even in such Governments those persons are much to be feared who make war their only business; because the strength of all armies, without doubt, consists in their Infantry: so that if a Prince has not power enough over his Infantry to make them disband and return cheerfully to their former occupations when a war is over, he is in a fair way to be ruined. For no sort of Infantry can be so dangerous as that which is composed of people who make war their only calling: because a Prince must either keep them continually engaged in war, or in constant pay during the time of peace, or run the risque of being stripped of his kingdom: but it is impossible for any Prince, either to keep them continually engaged in war, or in constant pay when it is over; and therefore he must run no small risque of losing his Kingdom. Whilst the Romans continued wise and good they never suffered any of their Citizens to make war their only employment, (as I said before) though they were able to keep them in constant pay, because they were continually at war: but in order to avoid the inconveniences which might have ensued from the toleration of such a custom, they changed their forces (as they could not alter the times) in such a manner, that at the end of every fifteen years, their Legions were filled with new men that were in the flower of their youth; for they took none but such as were betwixt eighteen and thirty-five years of age, in full health and vigour; and never kept them till they grew old and infirm, as the same people afterwards did in more corrupt times. For Augustus, and after him Tiberius, more careful to establish and increase their own power than to promote the public good, began to disarm the Roman people (in order to make them more passive under their tyranny) and kept the same armies continually on foot upon the confines of the Empire: but not thinking those sufficient to keep the Senate and people in due awe, they

they raised other forces, called the *Pretorian Bands*, which were always quartered either in the City or near it, and served not only as Guards to the Emperor's person, but to bridle the people. Afterwards, however, when the Emperors suffered the men who composed those Bands to lay aside all other occupations, and to make war their sole Profession, they soon became insolent and formidable, not only to the Senate, but to the Emperors themselves; many of whom they put to death, and then disposed of the Empire as they pleased, taking it from one, and giving it to another: nay it frequently happened that different Emperors were elected by different armies at the same time; which soon occasioned the division of that Empire, and at last the utter ruin of it. A Prince therefore who would reign in security, ought to make choice of such men alone for his Infantry, as will cheerfully serve him in war when it is necessary, and be as glad to come back to their own houses after it is over; which will always be the case with those that have other occupations and employments to live upon: for which purpose, when a peace is concluded, he should order his Generals and great officers to return to their respective charges and Governments; the Gentlemen to the care of their estates; and the private men to their particular callings: that so every one may be ready to enter into a war to procure a good peace, and no man presume to disturb the peace, in order to stir up a war.

COSIMO. Indeed, Sir, I think there is much truth and reason in what you have said; but as the substance of it is so very different from the judgment I had formed to myself of these matters, I cannot say that I am altogether satisfied in some respects: for I know several Lords and Gentlemen who are supported by the profession of arms alone in time of peace; as yourself for instance, and some others of your rank and quality, who receive pensions from

Princes

Princes and states : I see likewise many Soldiers, still kept in pay for the security of fortresses and other Cities ; so that it appears to me that there is sufficient employment and occasion for them all in time of peace.

FABRIZIO. Surely you cannot be of that opinion : for if there was no other reason to convince you of the contrary, the small number of men that is reserved to garrison those places might be a sufficient answer to your objection. What proportion is there betwixt a few regiments of Infantry that are necessary to defend some strong places in time of peace, and those that are to be kept in pay for the prosecution of a war ? Are not many more wanted in time of war to reinforce those garrisons, besides the numbers that are to be employed in the field, which are always disbanded as soon as a peace is concluded ? As to the common standing Guards that are requisite in any State (which need not be many) Pope Julius II. and your own Republic have sufficiently shewn the world how dangerous they thought those people who made war their only occupation, by dismissing them for their insolence, and hiring Swiss Guard in their room, who are not only born and brought up in strict obedience to Laws, but picked and chosen by the State in a proper and regular manner : your objection therefore that Soldiers of every kind are necessary, and may find sufficient employment in time of peace as well as war, must naturally fall to the ground. But why Horse and Gens d'Armes should be kept in pay in times of peace, perhaps may not appear so obvious : nevertheless, if we consider the matter thoroughly, it may easily be accounted for from the corruption of the times. For it is a bad custom introduced by men who make a trade of war, and would be attended with many dangerous consequences in a State, if any considerable number of them was kept in pay ; but as there are seldom enow to make up an army
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of themselves, they can do no great mischief at present; though they have formerly, as I shewed before in the cases of Francisco Sforza, his father, and Braccio da Montone. It is a bad custom however, and such as I approve not.

COSIMO. Would you have none at all then? Or if you would have any, in what manner would you raise and employ them?

FABRIZIO. As a Militia; not like the Gens d'Armes of France (who are as insolent and dangerous as our own) but after the manner of the Ancients, who always raised their Cavalry out of their own Subjects; and after a war was over, sent them home again to support themselves upon their respective occupations, as I shall shew more at large before I have done with this subject. So that if troops of horse are kept together, and receive pay, and live entirely upon it, even in times of peace, it is owing to corruption and bad government. And though indeed I myself and some other Commanders, whom I know, receive pensions and stipends in time of peace, I must confess I think it a very corrupt custom: for a wise and well governed Republic ought never to keep such Commanders in constant pay, but rather to employ its own Citizens in time of war, and afterwards to dismiss them to follow their former occupations. So likewise a Prince, if he would act wisely, should not allow a pension or stipend to any one in time of peace, except by way of reward for some signal piece of service, or in order to avail himself of some able man in time of peace as well as war. And since you have pitched upon me as an example of this kind, I will take the charge to myself and make the best apology I can. I say then, that I never made war my sole business and occupation: my profession is to govern my subjects well, to defend and protect them: for which purpose, I study the arts both of peace and war; and if I am rewarded

ed and esteemed by the Prince whom I have the honour to serve, it is not so much for the experience I have in military affairs, as because he is pleased to retain me as one of his Counsellors in time of peace. A Prince therefore who would govern wisely should admit no other sort of persons into his Confidence: for if his Counsellors are too fond either of peace or war, they will lead him into errors and inconveniences. Thus much I thought myself obliged to say in consequence of what I proposed at first: and if it is not satisfactory, I make no doubt but you will be able to find others who can give you better information in the things you seemed so desirous of knowing. You begin however, I dare say, to be aware how difficult a matter it must be to revive the military discipline of the Ancients at present, what preparations are necessary for that purpose, and what occasions and opportunities are wanting to accomplish it. But if you are not already tired with what I have said, I could throw a little more light upon this subject, by comparing the particulars of our modern practice and institutions with the discipline of the Ancients.

COSIMO. If we were desirous at first to hear you enter into a discussion of these points, we can assure you that what you have already said has redoubled that desire: we thank you therefore most heartily for the satisfaction you have given us, and earnestly desire the favour of you to proceed.

FABRIZIO. Since it is your pleasure then, I will deduce this matter from the fountain-head; that so I may be enabled to explain myself with more perspicuity, and you to understand me the better.

—Whoever engages in a war must endeavour by all means to put himself in a condition to face his enemy in the field, and to beat him there if possible. For this purpose, it is necessary to form an army; and to form an army, he must not only raise men, but arm, discipline, and exercise them frequently, both

both in small and large bodies ; he must teach them to encamp and decamp, and make the enemy familiar to them by degrees, sometimes by marching near them, and sometimes by taking post in a situation where they may have a full view of them. These preparations are absolutely necessary in a field war, which is the most effectual and honourable of all others : and a general who knows how to conduct such a war, to form and draw up an army, and to give an enemy battle in a proper and Soldier-like manner, cannot err much in other respects : but if he is deficient in this part of his profession (though he be ever so able a man in other points) he will never bring a war to a happy conclusion : besides, if he wins a battle, it cancels all other errors and miscarriages ; but if he loses one, it effaces the memory of all his former merits and services. To form an army therefore, it is necessary in the first place to make choice of proper men for that purpose, which the Ancients termed *delectus*, but we call *listing* or *levying*. Those then who have prescribed rules in the Art of War, are unanimously of opinion that such men should be raised in temperate climates, that so they may be both brave and quick of apprehension ; for it has been generally observed that hot countries produce men that are quick and sharp witted, but not courageous ; and on the other hand, that the inhabitants of cold countries are for the most part hardy and brave, but of dull and heavy understandings. This rule indeed might be followed by a Prince who had the whole world at command, and could raise his men where he pleased. But to give a rule which may be observed by any State, I say that every Prince or Republic should raise their men in their own dominions, whether hot, cold, or temperate : for we see by ancient examples, that good discipline and exercise will make good Soldiers in any country, and that the defects of nature may be supplied

plied by art and industry ; which in this case are more effectual than nature itself. Besides, the raising of men in any other country cannot properly be called *delectus*, or *making a choice* ; because that term signifies to pick and cull the best men in a Province, and implies a power to chuse such as are unwilling, as well as those that are willing to serve ; which cannot be done in any country but your own : for in territories that are subject to another State, you must be content with such as are willing to serve you, and not expect to pick and chuse whom you please *.

COSIMO. But you may either take or refuse whom you think fit of those that are willing to serve you ; and therefore that may be called *delectus*.

FABRIZIO. You are right in one respect : but consider the defects to which such a choice is subject, and you will find that it is no choice at all. In the first place, those that are not your own Subjects, but yet are willing to enter into your pay, are so far from being the best men, that they are generally the worst : for if there be any scandalous, idle, incorrigible, irreligious wretches, any run-aways from their parents, any blasphemers, common cheats, or fellows that have been initiated into every kind of villany, those are the people that commonly list under your banners ; and what sort of soldiers they are likely to make I leave every one to judge for himself. Now when they are more of these that offer their service than you want, you may indeed pick and chuse out of them ; but you can never make a good choice, because they are all so bad. It often happens however, that there are not so many, even of these, as you have occasion for to fill up your Regiments : so that you must be obliged to take them all ; and then surely you cannot so properly be said to make a *delectus*, a *choice*, as to raise

* See the Prince, chap. xxii. xxxiii. xiv. and Pol. Disc. book I. chap. xxi.

men at any rate. Of such disorderly people our Italian armies and those of most other nations are composed at present, except in Germany ; because our Princes have it not in their Power to make any man serve in their wars except he is willing. Consider with yourselves therefore whether is is possible to revive the discipline of the Ancients in armies which are raised in this manner.

COSIMO. What other method would you take then to raise them ?

FABRIZIO. That which I recommended before : a Prince should chuse them out of his own subjects, and exert his authority in such a choice.

COSIMO. Do you think any part of the ancient discipline might be revived in an army thus chosen ?

FABRIZIO. Without doubt it might, if such an army was commanded by the Sovereign of a Principality, or by one of the governing Citizens of a Commonwealth, who is appointed Commander in Chief during the time of his office; otherwise it would be a very difficult matter to do it.

COSIMO. Why so ?

FABRIZIO. I will explain that to you more at large hereafter : let it suffice at present to say, that no good can be done any other way.

COSIMO. Well then, since these Levies are to be made in your own dominions ; is it better to draw the men out of the Country or out of Towns ?

FABRIZIO. All authors who have written upon this subject agree, that it is better to take them out of the Country ; because such men are inured to hardships and fatigues, to endure all sorts of weather, to handle the mattock and spade, to throw up ditches, to carry heavy burdens, and are, generally speaking, more temperate and incorrupt than others. But as Horse as well as Foot are necessary in an army, I would advise that the Horse should be taken out of Towns, and the Foot out of the Country.

COSIMO.

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COSIMO. Of what age would you have them?

FABRIZIO. If I was to raise a new army, I would chuse them from seventeen to forty years of age: but, if I was only to recruit an old one, I would have none above seventeen.

COSIMO. I do not well understand the reason of this distinction.

FABRIZIO. I will tell you the meaning of it then. If I was to raise an Army, or establish a Militia, in a State where there was none before, it would be necessary to take the best and most docible men I could find of all ages, (provided they were neither too young nor too old to carry arms) in order to discipline them in such a manner as I shall inform you of in its proper place: but if I was to raise men only to recruit on army that had been long on foot, I would take none above seventeen, because there would be men enow of riper age in such an army.

COSIMO. Then you would put your troops upon the same footing with those in our Country?

FABRIZIO. Yes; but I would arm, and officer, and exercise, and discipline them, in a manner that I fancy is not known amongst yours.

COSIMO. You would have trained bands, I suppose?

FABRIZIO. Why not, Sir?

COSIMO. Because several wise and able men disapprove of them.

FABRIZIO. That cannot well be surely. Some men perhaps may be accounted wise and able, though they really are not so.

COSIMO. The bad proof those bands have always made seems to countenance that opinion.

FABRIZIO. Are you sure it is not owing to your own fault rather than any defect in them, that they have always made so bad proof? Perhaps I may convince you that it is, before we part.

COSIMO. We shall be much obliged to you for

so doing. But in the first place I will tell you upon what accounts these troops are disapproved of, that so you may be the better enabled to refute the objections that are made to them. It is said then, that they are either of little or no service, and if a Prince or State confide in them they are sure to be ruined ; or, if they are good Soldiers, the person that commands them may seize upon the Government himself by their assistance. To confirm this, the example of the Romans is cited, who lost their liberties by keeping up such forces : the case of the Venetians and the King of France is likewise instanced for the same purpose; the former of whom make use of foreign troops only, to prevent any of their own Citizens from seizing upon the Government; and the latter has disarmed all his subjects in order to rule them with more ease. But the unserviceableness of these troops is further urged for the following reasons : the first is, that they are raw and inexperienced ; the second, that they are compelled to serve : for when people are grown up to years of maturity, they seldom learn any thing perfectly ; and surely no material service can be expected from men who are forced into the army whether they will or not.

FABRIZIO. All these objections seem to be made by very short-sighted people, as I shall shew presently. For as to the unserviceableness of these Bands. I say that no troops can be more serviceable than such as are chosen out of one's own subjects; nor can those subjects be raised in a better or more proper manner. And since this will not admit of dispute, I shall not throw away any more time in endeavouring to prove it ; especially as there is sufficient evidence of it in the histories of all nations. What has been said concerning inexperience and compulsion, I allow to be just and reasonable : for inexperience is the mother of cowardice, and compulsion makes men mutinous and discontented : but both expe-

experience and courage are to be acquired by arming, exercising, and disciplining them in a proper manner, as I shall plainly demonstrate to you. As to the matter of compulsion, I answer, that such men as are to be raised by the command of their Prince, should neither be altogether volunteers, nor yet forcibly compelled into the service: for if they were to be altogether volunteers, the mischiefs would ensue which I just now mentioned, it could not properly be called a *delectus*, and few would be willing to serve. Compulsion, on the other hand, would be attended with no less inconveniences; and therefore a middle course ought to be taken, and without either treating men with downright violence, or depending entirely upon their own voluntary offers, they should be moved by the obedience they think due to their Governors, to expose themselves to a little present hardship, rather than incur their displeasure: and by these means (their own will seeming to co-operate with a gentle sort of compulsion) you will easily prevent those evils which might otherwise result from a spirit of licentiousness or discontent. I will not venture however to affirm, that an army composed of such men is invincible; for even the Roman Legions were often routed, and Hannibal himself was at last conquered: so that it is impossible to model any army in such a manner as to prevent it from being ever defeated. The wise and able men therefore of whom you speak, should not be so peremptory in pronouncing such forces altogether unserviceable, because they have sometimes lost a battle; for though they may happen to be defeated once or twice, they may be victorious afterwards, when they have discovered the causes that contributed to their defeat, and provided remedies against them; especially as their disgrace (when the causes of it come to be looked into) may probably be owing rather to bad conduct in the Commanders than any defect in the

institution itself: your acquaintance therefore instead of condemning one, should endeavour to correct the other; and how that is to be done I will shew you as we proceed. In the mean time I shall convince you how little foundation there is for the objection which you urge, that such bands, under the command of an aspiring Subject or Citizen, may deprive a Prince or Republic of their authority and dominions: for it is certain that no Subjects or Citizens, when legally armed and kept in due order by their masters, ever did the least mischief to any state: on the contrary, they have always been of the highest service to all Governments, and have kept them free and incorrupt longer than they would have been without them. Rome continued free four hundred years, and Sparta eight hundred, though their Citizens were armed all that while: but many other States which have been disarmed have lost their liberties in less than forty years. No State therefore can support itself without an army, and if it has no Soldiers of its own, it must be forced to hire foreign troops, which will be much more dangerous; because they are more liable to be corrupted, and become subservient to the ambition of some powerful Citizen, who may easily avail himself of their assistance to overturn the established Government, when he was nobody to deal with but an unarmed and defenceless multitude. Besides, every State must naturally be more afraid of two enemies than one; and that which takes foreign troops into its pay, will be apprehensive of them, as well as of its own forces: for which indeed you will see there is sufficient reason, if you remember what I said just now concerning Francisco Sforza: whereas a State which employs no troops but such as are composed of its own Subjects has only one enemy to fear. But to omit all other proofs which might be adduced to support this point, I shall only lay it down as a certain truth, that no man ever yet founded

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founded a Monarchy or a Republic but he was well assured the Subjects, if armed, would always be ready and willing to defend it : and if the Venetians had acted as wisely in this respect as in others, they might have erected a new Monarchy in the world : for the neglect of which, they are the more inexcuseable, as they had arms put into their hands by their first Legislators : but not being possessed of much territory by land they employed their strength chiefly at sea, where they carried on their wars with great spirit, and made considerable acquisitions. At last, however, when they were obliged to engage in a land war for the relief of Vicenza, instead of trusting some Citizen of their own with the command of their forces, they took the Marquis of Mantua into their pay. Now if this false step, which clipped the wings of their ambition, and put a stop to their further aggrandizement, was owing to an Opinion, that though they knew how to make war at Sea, they did not at land, it was a simple and ill-founded diffidence : for a Sea-commander who has been used to fight the winds and waves, as well as the enemy, will sooner make a good Land-officer where he has nothing to deal with but men, than a Land-officer will make a good Sea-commander. The Romans, who were most expert in Land-wars, but knew little of naval affairs, being engaged in a quarrel with the Carthaginians, who were very powerful at Sea, did not take either Grecian or Spanish forces into their Service, though they were the best Seamen in the world at that time ; but left the command of that expedition to their own Land-officers, who made a descent upon the enemy's coast, and subdued the whole Country. But if the Venetians acted in the above manner out of apprehension that if they did otherwise, some one of their own Citizens might seize upon the Government, it was an unreasonable jealousy : for (not to repeat what has been already said) if none of their Sea-

commanders ever made themselves masters of any town upon their coasts; much less occasion had they to fear that any of their Citizens who commanded their armies should make use of them for such a purpose. If they had considered this, they would have been convinced that tyranny and usurpation are not owing to the Citizens being armed, but to a weak Government; and that whilst a State is well conducted, it has nothing to fear from the arms of its Subjects: the resolution therefore which they took upon that occasion was a very imprudent one, and brought great disgrace and many misfortunes upon them. As to the error which the King of France is guilty of in disarming his Subjects, instead of keeping them well disciplined and ready for war, (an instance which you urge against me) every impartial man must own that it is a great default in judgment, and has much weakened that Kingdom. But I have made too long a digression, and may seem perhaps to have forgot my Subject: yet I was in some measure obliged to do it, in answer to your objections, and to shew you that a State ought by no means to depend upon any troops but such as are composed of its own Subjects; that those Subjects cannot be raised in any manner so well as by way of trained bands: and that there can be no better method devised to form an army, or militia, or to introduce good order and discipline amongst the Soldiers. If you ever read the institutions established by the first Kings of Rome, particularly by Servius Tullus, you most remember that the *Clusses* which he formed, were a sort of trained bands, or bodies of men fit to bear arms, out of which, an army might presently be raised upon any sudden emergency for the defence of the State.

—But to return to your Levies, I say again that if I was to recruit an old army, I would take men of about seventeen years of age; but if I was to raise a new one, and to make it fit for service in a

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short time, I would take them of all ages betwixt seventeen and forty.

COSIMO. Would you have any regard to their respective trades or occupations?

FABRIZIO. Some Authors who have written upon this Subject, will not admit of fowlers, fishermen, cooks, pimps, or any other sort of people who make an occupation of pleasure or sporting; but prefer plowmen, smiths, farriers, carpenters, butchers, hunters, and such like: but, for my own part, I should not so much consider the nature of their profession as the goodness of the men, and which of them would be the most serviceable. For this reason I should sooner make choice of husbandmen, and such as have been accustomed to labour in the fields, as more useful in an army than any other kind of people: next to these, I would take smiths, carpenters, farriers, and stone-cutters, of whom it is necessary to have many; because they are very often wanted, and it is a good thing to have Soldiers that can turn their hands to more services than one.

COSIMO. But how may one distinguish those that are fit for war from those that are not?

FABRIZIO. I will first inform you of the method I would take for raising levies to form a new army; because I shall have an opportunity of mentioning several things at the same time, that are necessary in the choice of men to recruit an old one.

—I say then, we must judge whether a man is fit for service, either from the experience we have had of his former behaviour, or from probable conjecture: but in such as are altogether raw men, and never served before, (of whom we must suppose all new levies chiefly, if not wholly, to consist) we can have no experience of their fitness: upon which account, we must have recourse to such conjectures as we may be able to form from their age, their occupation, and appearance. Of the two first

we have already spoken ; it only remains therefore to say something of the last. Some, like Pyrrhus, would have their Soldiers tall and large of stature ; others, like Julius Cæsar, prefer such as are active and vigorous : of which they form a conjecture from the symmetry of their limbs, and the vivacity of their aspect. Some that have treated of this subject, accordingly recommend those that have quick and lively eyes, muscular necks, wide chests, brawny arms, long fingers, small bellies, round sides, spare legs, and little feet, which are for the most part signs of strength and agility ; two qualities that are principally necessary in a Soldier. But above all, we ought to have strict regard to their morals and behaviour : otherwise we shall make choice of such as having neither modesty nor honesty, will be a scandal to an army, and not only become mutinous and ungovernable themselves, but sow the seeds of corruption amongst others : for it is not to be expected that any virtue or commendable quality can be found in such men. Here perhaps it may not appear impertinent (nay indeed it seems absolutely necessary) to put you in mind of the method taken by the Roman Consuls, as soon as they entered upon their office, to raise the forces that were wanted for the service of that year ; that so you may be more fully convinced of the importance of such a choice. Upon these occasions then, (as their Republic was almost continually engaged in war) being obliged to make choice of some that had served before, and others that were altogether raw men, they had an opportunity in one case of pitching upon such as they knew by experience were fit for their purpose, and were forced in the other to make use of those that seemed to be so from probable conjecture. It should likewise be observed that such Levies are made either for present service, or to be disciplined in order to be employed when occasion shall require. But as I have hitherto spoken of those

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those only that are to be raised and disciplined for future service, in countries where there was no army before, and consequently no proper choice can be made from any experience of such men as are fit for Soldiers, I shall continue that subject : because it is an easy matter either to raise good recruits or form armies for immediate service, in places where a military force has been once established ; especially, if the rulers of the State have sufficient authority to enforce it, as the Romans did of old, and the Swiss do at this day : for though there must of course be many new men, yet there will also be so many veterans, in this sort of Levies, that both together will soon make a very good army. The Roman Emperors, however, when they began to keep up garrisons and standing armies upon the confines of the Empire, thought fit to appoint certain Masters or Instructors to teach and discipline their *Tirunes* (or new raised men) in warlike arts and exercises, as we may see in the life of the Emperor Maximus : an institution observed at home only whilst Rome continued free ; but in such a manner, that the young Romans who had been trained up, and inured to this sort of discipline, made excellent Soldiers when a *deletus* was necessary, and they were called out into the service of their Country : but afterwards, when this custom of training up the youth at home was left off by the Emperors, they were forced to make use of the method I just now mentioned — But to return to the method observed by the Romans in making their Levies. As soon as the Consuls (who always conducted their wars) had entered upon their office, they began to raise forces, each Consul having two legions allotted him, which consisted of Roman Citizens only, and were the main strength and flower of their armies. For this purpose, they first appointed twenty-four military Tribunes, six to each legion ; whose office resembled that of our Lieutenant-Colonels, or Commanders of a battalion. This done

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done, they called all the people together that were able to bear arms, and placed the Tribunes of each legion apart: after which, those Officers cast lots out of which Tribe or Class they should begin their choice; and upon which Tribe soever the lot fell, they took four of the best men out of it, one of whom was made choice of by the Tribunes of the first legion, another by those of the second, another by those of the third, and the last fell to the share of the fourth. After this, they picked out four more, out of whom, the first was chosen by the Tribunes of the second legion, the second by those of the third, the third by those of the fourth, and the fourth by those of the first. When this were thus disposed of, four others were drawn out: the first of whom was taken by the third legion, the second by the fourth, the third by the first, and the fourth by the second; thus varying the turns of their choice out of all the Tribes, till the four legions were all equal and complete. Now these levies might be employed in immediate service, as I said before: and since they consisted of men, many of whom had been tried, and the rest well exercised and disciplined at home, such a choice might be made partly from experience, and partly from conjecture: but where the men are altogether raw and untried, and must be exercised and disciplined from the beginning to make them fit for future service, the choice must be made by conjecture alone, founded upon their age and appearance.

COSIMO. What you have said appears to be very just: but before you proceed any further, I could wish you would gratify my curiosity in one point, which you have put me in mind of by saying, that where the levies that are to be made have not been used to military service before, they must be chosen by conjecture: for I have heard great fault found with our Militia in many respects, especially with regard to their number; some being of opinion that

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if they were fewer, they might be better chosen ; that it would not be so troublesome and inconvenient to the country, nor to the men themselves ; and that they might have larger pay, which would make them more content and ready to obey your commands. I should be glad to know therefore, whether you would have a large or small number of such people, and how you would proceed in the choice of them in either case.

FABRIZIO. Without doubt is it much better to have a large number than a small one ; for where there is not a great number, it is impossible ever to have a good Militia : as to the objections which you say some others have made to it, I shall presently shew you the futility of them.—I say then, in the first place, that the smallness of the number does not make them the better soldiers, especially in a country where there is plenty of men, as in Tuscany ; for if you are to chuse them from experience, you will find very few there that have had any trial, as not many have been in the field ; and of those few, there are hardly any that have given the least mark of worth, or deserve to be preferred to others ; so that whoever wants to raise men in this country can have no assistance from experience, but must depend wholly upon conjecture. Since this is the case, I should be glad to know what I am to do, and by what rules I must make my choice of a certain number, if twenty well-looking young fellows should be brought before me. Surely every body must allow, that it would be the best way to arm and exercise them all (since it will be impossible to judge at first sight which of them will make the best proof) and defer your choice till they have all had the same exercise and instruction : for then you will easily perceive which of them are most spirited and active, and likely to be the most serviceable. Upon the whole therefore, the maxim of chusing but few, that they may be so much the better, is simple

simple and ill grounded. As to a large number being troublesome and inconvenient, both to the country and the men themselves, I answer that no number of such men, whether small or great can be troublesome or inconvenient to any one; for no body is hindered by being a Militia-man from pursuing his usual occupation, or following his necessary affairs; since they are only obliged to meet together, and to be exercised on holidays, which can be of no prejudice either to the country or themselves; on the contrary, it would be a great recreation to both: for young men instead of being idle at those times, or perhaps spending their leisure in something worse than idleness, would go to these exercises with pleasure, and others would not be a little entertained with such a spectacle. In answer to the objection, that a small number may be better paid, and consequently will be better satisfied and more obedient to command, let it be considered that no number of Militia (how small soever) can be kept in continual pay in such a manner as to be always satisfied with it. Let us suppose (for example) a Militia to consist of five thousand men, whose pay (if they are to be paid to their satisfaction) will amount to at least ten thousand ducats *per* month. But in the first place, five thousand foot are not sufficient to make up an army; and in the next, a monthly payment of ten thousand ducats would be an insupportable burden upon most States, and yet not enough to keep their Soldiers in content and obedience: so that though the expence would be extravagant, your army would be so inconsiderable that it would not be able to defend your own dominions, much less to act offensively upon occasion. If you increase their pay or their number, it will still be more difficult to pay them: and if you diminish either, they will become dissatisfied and unserviceable. Those who talk of raising a Militia therefore, and of paying them when they have nothing

thing for them to do, talk of things that are either impossible, or will answer no end : but it is highly necessary, I own, to pay them, and well too, when they are called out to serve their country. If such an Establishment however should happen to occasion any little inconvenience to the Community in time of peace, (which yet can hardly be) surely that must be much over-balanced by the conveniences and advantages which result from it : for without a regular and well-ordered Militia there is no living in security. I conclude then, that those who are for keeping up but a small Militia, that so they may be able to pay them the better, or for any other of the reasons you have alleged, are greatly mistaken : for (which makes still more for my opinion) any number, be it ever so considerable, will be continually diminishing upon your hands through many unavoidable accidents ; and therefore a small one would soon dwindle away to nothing. Besides, when your Militia is numerous, you may employ a considerable force at once, if you see occasion ; which must always have a greater effect than a small one, and be much more for your reputation. I might add, that if you raise but a small number of Militia in a large country, and design to have them well exercised, they must of course be at such a distance from each other, that they cannot all be got together upon the days and at the places appointed for that purpose, without great trouble and inconvenience : and if they ate not duly exercised they will be good for nothing at all, as I shall shew in its proper place.

COSIMO. You have fully refuted the objections I started upon this head, I must confess : but I have another doubt within myself which I should be glad to have solved. The persons I mentioned before seem to think, that a great number of armed men must naturally occasion much confusion and disorder, and frequently tumults in any country.

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FABRIZIO. This notion is altogether as ill grounded as those which have been already discussed, as I hope I shall be able to convince you. For if a Militia can occasion any disorders, it must either be amongst themselves or others ; which may easily be prevented, if such an Establishment is not so badly constituted and regulated as to defeat the end of its institution. For if it is properly conducted, it naturally suppresses all disturbances amongst its own constituents, instead of fomenting them ; because they are under the command of superiors : and if the inhabitants of the country where you raise a Militia are either so little used to war that they are in a manner unarmed, or so united amongst themselves, that they have no factions, it will secure them against the fear of foreign enemies, but cannot in any wise contribute to divide them. For men who are well disciplined will always be as tender of violating the laws when they have arms in their hands, as when they have not ; and will continue so if they are not corrupted by their Commanders ; which it will be no difficult matter to prevent, as I shall shew you presently. But if the people are warlike and yet given to faction, such an establishment is most likely to re-unite them : because, though they may have arms and Chiefs of their own ; yet their arms are such as will be of no service to their country, and their Chiefs only serve to foment divisions and animosities, instead of promoting union and tranquility : whereas this institution furnishes them with arms that will be serviceable to their country, and Chiefs to suppress their differences. For when any man thinks himself injured or offended in a divided country, he immediately applies to the Head of his faction, who, in order to keep up his own interest and reputation, is obliged to assist him in taking revenge, instead of discouraging violence. But a Chief appointed by public authority acts in a quite different manner : so that by establishing a good and well ordered Militia, divisions

sions are extinguished, peace restored, those people that were unarmed and dispirited, but united, continue in union and become warlike and courageous; others that were brave and had arms in their hands, but given to faction and discord before, become united, and turn those arms and that courage upon the enemies of their country, which they formerly used to exert against each other. But to prevent a Militia from injuring others, or overturning the laws and liberties of their country (which yet cannot be effected but by the power and iniquity of the Commanders) it is necessary to take care that the Commanders do not acquire too great an authority over the private men. Now authority of this kind is either natural or accidental: to guard against the one, it should be provided that an Officer should not have any command over the men that were raised in the district where he was born: but over such only as were drawn out of other places where he has no natural interest or connections: as to the other, it may in a great measure be prevented by changing the Officers, and sending them to command in different parts every year: for a long continuation of command over the same people is apt to create too strict an union betwixt them, which may easily be converted to the prejudice of the Government. How serviceable this method has been to those that have followed it, and how fatal the neglect of it to others, plainly appears from the Histories of the Assyrian and Roman Empires; where we find that the former continued above a thousand years without any sedition or civil war; which was entirely owing to the custom which the Government observed of changing the Commanders of their armies every year, and sending them into different Provinces. On the contrary, the omission of this custom in the Roman Empire, (from the time of Julius Cæsar) was the occasion of all the civil wars betwixt the Commanders of

different armies, and of all the conspiracies which those Commanders afterwards formed against the Emperors. But if any of the first Emperors (especially of those that were esteemed the best, as Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, Severus, or some others like them) had been provident enough to have changed their Generals at certain times, that Empire would have enjoyed more tranquility and existed longer : for then those Commanders could not have had an opportunity of rebelling, the Emperors would have lived in greater security, and the Senate (when the throne became vacant) would have had more authority, and consequently have acted with more judgment in the choice of a Successor. But (whether it proceeds from ignorance, or inattention, or indolence in mankind, I know not) it is certain that bad customs are seldom changed, let who will be at the helm, or what example soever may be brought either to discredit them, or recommend an opposite measure.

COSIMO. I am afraid I have broke in upon the order you proposed to yourself, and led you away from your subject, by asking impertinent questions; for behold from talking of Levies we are got to another topic : so that if I had not desired you would excuse my freedom when we began this conversation, I should have thought myself obliged to ask your pardon for it.

FABRIZIO. You need not make any apology for that, Sir, since what has been said is nothing more than was necessary to shew the nature of a Militia: an institution which (as it is condemned by many) I have taken upon me to defend and explain; and therefore it behoved me to point out the best manner of raising one. But before I descend to other particulars, I should say something concerning the choice of Cavalry. These troops were anciently chosen from amongst the richest Citizens (with due regard, however, to their age and other qualifications).

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tions) and there were but three hundred of them in a legion : so that the Romans never had above six hundred horse in a Consular army.

COSIMO. Would you have these troops likewise trained up and disciplined at home, in order to employ them upon occasion ?

FABRIZIO. Most certainly ; and it is absolutely necessary to do so, if you would have Cavalry of your own, and not be obliged to take up with those that make a trade of hiring themselves out to any body that wants them.

COSIMO. In what manner would you chuse them ?

FABRIZIO. As the Romans did. I would take them out of the richest of the people ; I would officer them as others are officered at present : I would have them well-armed, well-exercised, and disciplined.

COSIMO. Would it be proper to allow them any pay ?

FABRIZIO. To be sure : but as much only as would be sufficient to keep their horses : for if you gave them any more, it would be so burdensome to your Subjects that they would murmur at it.

COSIMO. What number would you have ; and how would you arm them ?

FABRIZIO. That is another matter : but I will answer your question after I have told you how the Infantry ought to be armed and prepared for the field.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

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BOOK II.

THE CONTENTS.

What Arms and Armour were chiefly used by the Ancients. Concerning the Arms and Armour made use of at present, and the invention of the Pike. Whether the Ancient or Modern way of arming is the better. How Infantry ought to be armed; and of the necessity of Cavalry. Which of the two are most to be depended upon. How the Ancients exercised their Soldiers: and in what manner they should be exercised at present. How many men a Regiment should consist of: and how they should be disciplined and exercised in Battalions and Companies. Concerning the three principal ways of drawing up a Battalion in order of Battle. Of rallying Soldiers after they have been disordered, and making a whole Battalion face about at a time. How to draw up a Battalion in such order as to face an enemy on any side. How to draw up a Battalion with two horns, and another in a hollow square. Of the baggage and Carriages belonging to a Battalion: of the necessity of many Officers; and the usefulness of Drums and other Military Music. A digression concerning Military Virtue; and to what it is owing that it is now become so rare. What number of Horse is necessary in a Regiment; and how many Carriages ought to be allowed them for their baggage.

FABRIZIO. **N**O W we are provided with men, it is time to arm them; for which purpose, let us see what arms where chiefly used by

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by the Ancients, and chuse the best. The Romans divided their Infantry into heavy and light-armed Companies: the light armed were called *Velites*; under which name were included all those that made use of Slings, Bows, and Darts: the greater part of them wore Casques upon their heads for their defence, and a sort of Targer or Buckler upon their left arm. They fought in no order, and at a distance from the heavy armed foot, who had helmets which reached down to their Shoulders, Cuirasses, and Brigandines, which covered their bodies and thighs, greaves and gauntlets upon their legs and arms, a shield about four feet long and two broad, plated with an iron rim or border at the top to defend it from the edge of sharp weapons, and another at the bottom to keep it from being damaged by frequent rubbing against the ground. Their offensive weapons consisted of a Sword about a yard long on their left side, a dagger on the right, and a dart in their hand (called *pilum*) which they threw at the enemy at the first charge. Such were the arms with which the Romans conquered the world. Some old writers indeed say, that besides these, they had a spear like what we call an *Espoonoon* or *half pike*: but I cannot see how so troublesome a weapon could be made use of by those that carried Shields; which must hinder them from using both hands at once; and for one it must be too unwieldy. Besides, such weapons could be of no service, except in the front of an army where there is room to manage them; which would be impossible in the other ranks: for those (as I shall shew hereafter) must be drawn up thick and close together, since that is the best way of forming an army, though perhaps it may be attended with some inconveniences. All such weapons therefore as exceed the length of four feet are of little or no service in close fight: for if you have one of those Spears, and are obliged to take both

hands to it (admitting that your Shield was no incumbrance to you) you could not annoy an enemy with it that presses hard upon you: but if you make use of one hand only, in order to avail yourself of your Shield with the other, you must take hold of it by the middle of the Staff; and then there will be so much of it behind you, that those who are upon your back, will prevent you from making any use of it. To convince you then that the Romans either never had any such Spears; or that, if they had, they were of little or no service, read the account which Livy gives of their most remarkable battles, and you will find that he very seldom makes mention of any Spears, but tells us, that as soon as they had thrown their darts, they fell upon the enemy with their Swords. I would have nothing at all to do with these Spears then, but trust to the Sword and Buckler, and such other weapons and armour as the Romans made use of.—The armour of the Greeks was not so heavy as that of the Romans: but for offensive weapons, they depended more upon the Spear than the Sword; especially the Macedonian Phalanx, which was armed with Spears above twenty feet long, called *Sarissæ*, with which they broke in upon the enemy, and yet kept good order in their own ranks: and though some authors say they had shields too; yet I cannot see (for the reasons above-mentioned) how they could manage them and the Spears at the same time. Besides, in the battle betwixt Paulus Æmilius and Perseus King of Macedonia, I do not remember any mention made of Shields, but of the *Sarissæ* only, which were very troublesome to the Romans: so that I imagine the Macedonian Phalanx was like the Swiss Regiments at present, whose strength lies wholly in their Pikes. The Roman Infantry, besides their armour, likewise had crests and plumes upon their casques and helmets, which afforded an agreeable spectacle to their

their friends, and served to strike a terror into their enemies. As to the armour of their Cavalry, it consisted at first of a round shield and a helmet; the rest of their body was uncovered. Their arms were a Sword and a long thin Javelin or Lance with an iron head, so that being incumbered with a Shield and a Lance at the same time, they could use neither of them properly; and their bodies being in a great measure uncovered, were not a little exposed to the enemy. But afterwards they were armed like the infantry; excepting that they still carried a small square shield, and a thicker lance, armed at both ends, that so if one should be broken off, they might avail themselves of the other. With these weapons, and this sort of armour for their horse and foot, the Romans subdued the whole World; and it is reasonable to suppose from their success that they were the best appointed armies that ever existed. Livy himself indeed, when he is comparing their strength with that of an enemy, often tells us, that in their armour, their weapons, their discipline and courage, they were much superior: for which reason I have chosen to speak more particularly of the arms and armour of the Conquerors than of the conquered.

— It now remains that I say something of those that are in use at present. The Infantry cover their body with a demi-cuirass, or iron breast-plate which reaches down to their waist; they have a Spear eighteen feet long, called a Pike, and a broad sword by their side: this is their common way of arming themselves: for very few of them have back plates, greaves, or gauntlets, and none at all any casques or helmets; and those few instead of pikes, carry halberds about six feet long with sharp points, and heads something like a battle-axe: they have likewise Musqueteers amongst them, instead of the Slingers and Bowmen employed by the Ancients. These arms and this sort of armour were invented,

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and are still used by the Germans, particularly by the Swiss : for being poor, but desirous at all times to defend their liberties against the ambition of the German Princes, (who are rich and can afford to keep Cavalry, which the poverty of the Swiss will not allow them to do) they are obliged to engage on foot, and therefore find it necessary to continue their ancient manner of fighting, in order to make head against the fury of the enemy's Cavalry. Upon this account they still use the Pike, a weapon that enables them not only to keep off the horse, but very often break and defeat them ; and without which, men of the greatest experience in military affairs say, that Infantry are good for little or nothing. The Germans accordingly put so much confidence in this sort of Infantry, that with fifteen or twenty thousand of them they will attack any number of horse ; of which we have had many instances of late ; and such is the general opinion of their excellence from the many remarkable Services they have done, that since the expedition of Charles VIII. into Italy, all other nations in Europe have adopted the same weapons and manner of fighting ; the Spaniards in particular have got very great reputation by it.

COSIMO. Which method of arming would you recommend, the German, or that of the ancient Romans ?

FABRIZIO. The Romans without doubt ; and I will shew you the advantages and disadvantages of them both. The German Infantry are able not only to sustain the shock of Cavalry, but to break them ; they are more expeditious upon a march and in forming themselves ; because they are not overloaded with arms. On the other hand, they are much exposed to wounds, both at a distance and when they are close engaged, because they are so lightly armed ; they are of no great Service in storming a town, or even in a field battle where they

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they meet with a vigorous resistance. But the Roman Infantry knew how to deal with Cavalry as well as the German; their armour was such that they were not so liable to be wounded either in close fight or at a distance; they both attacked, and sustained an attack much better, on account of their targets; they did more execution with their swords when they fought an enemy hand to hand, than the Germans can do with their Pikes; and though the latter have Swords, they are not capable of doing any great execution with them, because they have no targets. The Romans were so well armed and so secure under the shelter of their targets, that they were very serviceable in storming a breach. So that they laboured under no other inconvenience but the weight of their armour; which yet they got the better of by accustoming themselves to carry heavy burdens, and to endure all other sorts of hardship and fatigue, which made that matter easy and familiar to them. You must consider likewise that Infantry are often obliged to engage other Infantry and Cavalry together: and that if they cannot sustain the shock of Cavalry, (or even if they can) and are yet afraid of facing another body of Infantry that is better armed and disciplined than themselves, they are of little account. Now if you will compare the German Infantry with the Roman, you will find the former very fit to oppose Cavalry (as I said before), but that they would certainly have the disadvantage, if they were to engage other Infantry that were no better than themselves, if they were armed and appointed like the Romans: so that one is to be preferred to the other, because the German are only fit to cope with horse, but the Roman knew how to deal both with horse and foot.

COSIMO. I should take it as a favour if you would give us some particular instance of this by way of illustration.

FABRIZIO.

FABRIZIO. You will find many in history, where the Roman Infantry have beat infinite numbers of horse, and none where they have been worsted by other Infantry, either through any deficiency in their own arms, or advantage of those in an enemy. For if there had been any deficiency in their own, and they had met with other people that armed their Soldiers better than they did, they could not have made such prodigious conquests, without laying aside their own method and arming themselves in the same or a better manner: but as they never did this, we may fairly conclude they never found any other people who excelled them in that respect. But this cannot be said of the German Infantry: for they have always made bad proof when they have been engaged by other Infantry as obstinate and well conducted as themselves: which must be owing to the advantage the enemy had over them in their arms. Philip Visconti, Duke of Milan, being invaded by an army of eighteen thousand Swiss, sent Count Carmignuola against them, who was at that time Commander in chief of his forces. But Carmignuola having no more than six thousand horse and a small body of foot, and coming to an engagement with them, was presently defeated with great losſ. As he was an able Soldier however, he saw what advantage such an enemy had over Cavalry; and having raised another army, he went to look for the Swiss a second time: but when he came near them, he ordered all his Gens d'Armes to dismount and fight on foot; which they did with such success that they killed fifteen thousand of the enemy, and the rest, seeing no possibility of escap-
ing, threw down their arms and surrendered.

COSIMO. How is this to be accounted for?

FABRIZIO. I told you a little while ago: but as you seem either to have forgot, or not to have un-
derstood what I said, I will repeat it. When the

German

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German Infantry, who (as I said before) are but indifferently provided with defensive armour, and make use of the Sword and the Pike for their offensive weapons, come to engage an enemy that is well-armed at all points (as the Gens d'Armes were, whom Carmignuola caused to dismount) they are easily defeated: for the enemy has nothing to do but to receive their pikes upon their targets, and to rush in upon them Sword in hand; after which, the danger is chiefly over: for the German pikes are so long, that they cannot avail themselves of them in close fight, nor will their swords stand them in any great stead, as they are so slightly defended, and are engaged with enemies that are completely armed from head to foot. So that whoever considers the advantages and disadvantages on each side, will see that those who are so poorly armed have no remedy against an enemy that is completely armed, when he charges home, and has sustained the first push of the pikes. For when two armies are resolved to engage, and advance upon each other every moment, they must of necessity soon come close together: and though some of the men in the first ranks on one side, may either be killed or overthrown by the pikes on the other, there will be now left to carry the day: hence it came to pass, that Carmignuola made such a slaughter amongst the Swiss, with little or no loss on his own side.

COSIMO. It must be considered that Carmignuola's men were Gens d'Armes, though they were on foot, and covered all over with armour, which enabled them to do what they did: I should think it would be a good way therefore, to arm Infantry in the same manner.

FABRIZIO. If you would recollect what I said concerning the armour which the Roman Infantry made use of, you would be of another opinion; for men who have casques upon their heads, their bodies

dies defended by shields and cuirasses, their legs and arms covered with greaves and gauntlets, are better able to defend themselves against pikes, and to break in upon them, than Gens d'Armes on foot: of which I will give you a modern example or two. A body of Spanish Infantry being transported from Sicily into the Kingdom of Naples, to relieve Gonsalvo da Cardova, who was shut up in Barletta by the French, Monsieur d'Aubigni was sent to oppose their march with some Gens d'Armes and about four thousand Swiss foot. When they came to engage, the Swiss pressed so hard upon the enemy with their pikes, that they soon opened their ranks: but the Spaniards, under the cover of their bucklers, nimbly rushed in upon them with their swords, and laid about them so furiously, that they made a very great slaughter of the Swiss, and gained a complete victory. Every one knows what numbers of Swiss Infantry were cut to pieces at the battle of Ravenna in the same manner: for the Spanish foot having closed with the Swiss, made so good a use of their swords, that not one of the enemy would have been left alive, if a body of French Cavalry had not fortunately come up to rescue them: after which, the Spaniards, however, drew up close together in good order, and made a handsome retreat with little or no loss. I conclude therefore, that no Infantry can properly be called good, but such as are able not only to make head against Cavalry, but against any other sort of Infantry whatsoever: and this must be entirely owing to their discipline and manner of arming, as I have often said before.

COSIMO. How then would you have them armed?

FABRIZIO. I would take some of the Roman arms and armour, and some of the German; half of my men should be armed with one, and half with the other; for if in every six thousand foot, three thousand

thousand were provided with swords and shields like the Romans, two thousand with pikes, and one thousand with muskets, like the Germans, it would be sufficient for my purpose, as I shall shew you presently. For I would place my Pikemen either in the front of the battle, or where I thought the enemy's Cavalry were most likely to make an impression : and the others I would post in such a manner as to support the Pikemen, and push forwards when a way was opened for them : which I think would be a better method of arming and drawing up a body of Infantry, than any other that is used at present.

COSIMO. So much for Infantry. I should now be glad to know whether you would recommend the ancient or modern way of arming Cavalry.

FABRIZIO. Considering the war saddles and stirrups which are now in use, and were not known to the Ancients, I think men must sit much firmer on horseback at present than they could do formerly. I think likewise, our way of arming is more secure, and that our Gens d' Armes are capable of making a greater impression than any sort of Cavalry the Ancients ever had. I am not of opinion however, that we ought to depend any more upon Cavalry in general than they did in former times : for, (as I said before) we have often seen them shamefully beaten of late by infantry ; and indeed they must always come off with the worst when they engage Infantry that are armed and appointed in the manner abovementioned. Tigranes, King of Armenia, brought an army of an hundred and fifty thousand horse into the field (many of whom were armed like our Gens d' Armes at present, and called *Cataphratti*) against Lucullus the Roman General, whose army consisted only of six thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot : upon which Tigranes said, "they were more like the train of an Ambassador than an army." Nevertheless, when they came

came to engage, the King was routed: and the Historian, who gives us an account of that battle, imputes the defeat entirely to the little service that was done by the Cataphratti, whose faces were covered in such a manner that they could hardly see, much less annoy the enemy, and their limbs so overloaded with heavy armour, that when any of them fell from their horses, they could hardly get up again, or make any use of their arms. I will venture to affirm therefore, that such States as depend more upon Cavalry than Infantry, will always be weak and exposed to ruin; as Italy has been in our times; for we have seen it over-run from one end to the other, and plundered by foreigners, merely because its princes have made little or no account at all of Infantry, and trusted solely to Cavalry. It is right however to have some Cavalry to support and assist Infantry; but, not to look upon them as the main strength of an army; for they are highly necessary to reconnoitre, to scour the roads, to make incursions, and lay waste an enemy's country, to beat up their quarters, to keep them in continual alarm, and to cut-off their convoys; but in field battles, which commonly decide the fate of nations, and for which armies are chiefly designed, they are fitter to pursue an enemy that is routed and flying than any thing else: and consequently are much inferior to foot *.

COSIMO. Here I could wish to have two difficulties resolved. In the first place, every body knows that the Parthians never used any other forces but Cavalry in their wars, and yet they shared the world with the Romans: in the next, I can neither see how Infantry can be able to sustain Cavalry; nor to what the strength of the one, and the weakness of the other is owing.

* See Pol. Disc. Book II. Chap. xviii.

FABRIZIO. I either told you before, or designed to tell you, that what I intended to say concerning the Art of War should be limited to Europe; and therefore shall think myself excused from accounting for the conduct of the Asiatic nations. I cannot help observing to you, however, that the discipline of the Parthians was quite different from that of the Romans: for the former all fought on horseback, in a loose and irregular manner, which is not much to be depended upon: the latter, on the contrary, fought chiefly on foot in close and regular order: and their success was various according to the nature of the countries in which they happened to fight. For in enclosed places, the Romans generally got the better; and the Parthians had the advantage in large open plains; and indeed the nature of the country they had to defend was very favourable to their manner of fighting; for it was flat and open, a thousand miles from any sea-coast, with so few rivers, that they might sometimes march two or three days together without seeing one, and was also very thin of towns and inhabitants: so that the Roman armies which marched but slowly on account of the heaviness of their armour, and the good order they observed, were much annoyed by an active and light-armed enemy, who always fought on horseback, and were at one place over-night, and perhaps fifty or sixty miles off the next day: in this manner the Parthians availed themselves of their horse with so much success, that they ruined the army conducted by Crassus, and reduced that under the command of Mark Anthony to the utmost distress. But (as I said before) I shall confine myself to Europe alone in what I have to say of these matters, and quote only the examples of the Greeks and Romans in former times, and the Germans at present—Let us come now to the other point if you please, viz. what it is that makes Infantry superior to Cavalry.

valry.—I say then, in the first place place, that Cavalry cannot march through all roads, as foot can ; and they are slower in their motions, when it is necessary to change their order: for if there should be occasion to retreat when they are advancing, or to advance when they are retreating; to wheel off to the right or left; to move when they are halting, or to halt when they are in motion, it is certain they cannot do it so soon as Infantry ; and if they are thrown into confusion by some sudden shock, they cannot rally so easily when the shock is over. Besides, it often happens that a brave and spirited fellow is put upon a pitiful horse, and a coward upon one that is unruly and ungovernable; in either of which cases, some disorder must ensue. Why then should it seem wonderful that a firm and compact body of foot should be able to sustain an attack of Cavalry ; especially as horses are sensible animals, and when they are apprehensive of danger, cannot easily be brought to rush into it ? You should likewise compare the force that impels them to advance, with that which makes them retreat, and you will then find, that the latter is much more powerful than the former; for in one case, they feel nothing but the prick of a spur, but in the other, they see a rank of pikes, and other sharp weapons presented to them ; so that you may see both from ancient and modern proofs, that good Infantry will always be able not only to make head against Cavalry, but generally to get the better of them. But if you object, that the fury with which the horses are driven on to charge an enemy, makes them regard a pike no more than a spur ; I answer, that though a horse be upon his career, yet he will bate of his speed when he comes near the pikes ; and when he begins to feel the points of them, he will either stand stock still, or wheel off to the right or left. To convince yourself of this, try if you can ride a horse

a horse against a wall, and I fancy you will find very few, if any, how spirited soever they may be, that can be forced to do it. Julius Cæsar, before an engagement which he had with the Swiss in Gaul, not only dismounted himself, but caused all his Cavalry to dismount, and sent their horses away to a place at some distance from the field of battle, as fitter for flight than to fight upon. Notwithstanding these natural impediments, however, to which Cavalry are subject, a General who commands an army, which consists chiefly of Infantry, should always lead them through roads upon his march, where he cannot be attacked by Cavalry without great trouble and inconvenience; and such roads may easily be found in most countries. If he marches over hills, they will protect him from the fury of their career, which you seem to think irresistible: if he marches through a flat country, the hedges, and ditches, and woods, will generally secure him; every little bank or thicket, how inconsiderable soever, every vineyard or plantation, is sufficient to embarrass Cavalry, and to prevent their acting with any material effect; and if they come to engage, it is probable they may meet with the same impediments in a field of battle as upon a march; for the least obstruction spoils their career, and damps their ardour. The Roman armies, however, I must tell you, put such confidence in their armour and manner of fighting, that if it was in their power to choose one place, that was rough and confined, in order to shelter them from the fury of the enemy's Cavalry, and to prevent them from extending their lines; or another where such Cavalry might act with the greatest advantage, they always made choice of the latter. — But now we have armed our Infantry, it is time to exercise them: let us see therefore in what manner the Romans used to exercise their Infantry before they were suffered to

engage an enemy ; for though soldiers may be well-chosen and armed, they will never be good for anything if they are not diligently exercised. Now this exercise ought to be of three kinds. In the first place, they must be taught to endure all sorts of hardship and fatigue, as well as to be dexterous and agile : in the next, to handle their arms well : and lastly, to observe orders, and obey command, and to keep their ranks and stations, whether it be upon a march, or in battle, or in encamping ; which are the three principal operations of an army, and if they are well executed, a General will come off with reputation even when he loses a battle. The Ancients therefore had very strict laws and ordinances to enforce the constant practice of these exercises in every particular : their youth were accustomed to run races, to leap, to pitch the bar, and to wrestle ; all which are very necessary qualifications in Soldiers : for swiftness of foot will enable them to be before-hand with an enemy in seizing an advantageous post, to come upon them on a sudden, and to overtake them when they are flying : if they are nimble and dexterous, they will know how to avoid a blow, and find no difficulty in getting over a fosse or breast-work : and if they are strong, they will be able to carry their arms with more ease ; to make a greater impression upon the enemy, or to sustain a shock the better. But above all, they should be inured to carry heavy burdens, which is very necessary : for upon some great and pressing occasions, they may be obliged to carry provisions with them for several days, besides their arms, which they could not do if they were not accustomed to such things : and by these means great dangers are often avoided, and sometimes glorious victories obtained. To accustom their young men to their armour, and to teach them how to handle their arms with dexterity, the ancients used to clothe them in armour which was

twice

twice as heavy as that which they were to wear in battle; and instead of a sword, they put a thick cudgel in their hands which was loaded with lead in the inside, and much heavier than a sword: after this, they fixed posts in the earth about six feet high, and so firm that no blows could move them; upon which the young men used to exercise themselves with their cudgel and buckler, as if they had been real enemies, sometimes making a stroke at the top, as if it had been the head or face of a man, sometimes at the right or left side, sometimes at the lower part, sometimes advancing briskly upon it, and at others retreating a step or two; by which means they became dexterous and expert, not only in defending themselves, but annoying an enemy, and the weight of their false arms made their true ones seem light and easy to be wielded. The Romans taught their Soldiers rather to thrust than to cut with their swords, because thrusts are more dangerous, harder to be warded off, and he that makes them does not expose his own body so much, and is sooner ready to repeat a thrust than a full stroke. Do not think it strange, however, that the Ancients were so exact and particular in things, which to you, perhaps, may seem trifling and ridiculous: but consider, that when men come to fight hand to hand, every little advantage is of great importance; and I must beg leave to tell you, that several good Authors have entered into a much more minute and circumstantial detail of these matters than I have done: for the Ancients thought nothing conduced more to the welfare and security of their country, than to have a great number of men well disciplined, exercised, and ready for war; knowing, that neither riches nor magnificence, but the reputation of their arms alone, could keep their enemies in awe and subjection; and that defects in other things may sometimes be remedied, but that in war, where the fatal consequences of

them are immediately felt, they admit of no remedy. Besides, expertness in these exercises makes men bold and courageous in battle; for instead of being afraid, every one is eager to distinguish himself in such points as he knows he excels in. The Ancients therefore, took great care to make their youth perfect in all military exercises: for they likewise accustomed them to throw darts, that were much heavier than those they carried in war, at the posts I mentioned before, which taught them to be very expert in the use of that weapon, and made their arms strong and muscular. They were also taught how to use the cross-bow, the long-bow, and the sling; and in all these things there were masters appointed on purpose to instruct them: so that when they were called out to serve in the wars, they were so well prepared that they wanted nothing to make them excellent Soldiers, but to be taught how to keep their ranks upon a march or in battle, and to obey orders: which they quickly learnt by being incorporated with others who had served a long time, and were thoroughly experienced in that part of discipline.

COSIMO. What exercises would you recommend to such as are to compose our Infantry at present?

FABRIZIO. Most of those which I have already mentioned, as running, wrestling, leaping, carrying heavy arms, the use of the cross-bow, the long-bow, and the musket; which last is a new weapon, you know, but a very useful one. To these exercises I would accustom all the youth in the country, but those in particular who are destined to be Soldiers: and for this purpose, I would set aside all holidays and idle times. I would likewise have them taught to swim, which is very necessary; for all rivers have not bridges over them, nor can they expect to find boats always ready to transport them: so that if your Soldiers cannot swim, you will lose many advantages and opportunities of doing great things.

things*. The reason why the Romans exercised their youth in the Campus Martius was because the Tiber ran close by it; that so when they were fatigued, they might refresh themselves in the river, and learn to swim.— I should also chuse (like the Ancients) to have those properly exercised that are to serve in the Cavalry; because it not only teaches them to ride well, but to avail themselves of their strength in a better manner. For which purpose, they had wooden horses, upon which they exercised themselves, vaulting upon them sometimes with armour on, and sometimes with none, without any assistance, and on either side of the horse: so that upon a signal or word of command from their instructors, they were all either mounted or dismounted in a moment. Now as these exercises both for horse and foot were practised without any difficulty or inconvenience in former times, they might easily be introduced again amongst the youth of any state if the Governors of it so pleased; as in fact they have been in some of the western nations, where they divide the inhabitants into Classes, which take their respective names from the different sorts of arms they make use of in battle: and as these

* When the ancient Greeks would upbraid any one with extreme insufficiency, they told them in a proverbial manner, "that he could neither read nor swim." Julius Cæsar was also of opinion, that swimming was of great use in war, and he himself found it so; for chusing most commonly to march on foot, as Alexander the Great also did, he always swam over the Rivers in his way, when expedition was required. When he was in Egypt, being forced to get into a little boat for his safety, and so many people leaping in with him, that it was in danger of sinking, he chose, though he was of an advanced age, to commit himself to the sea, and swam to his fleet, which lay about two hundred paces off, holding his pocket-book above water in his left hand, and drawing his armour in his teeth. Sueton. in J. Cæsare, Sect. 64. Another time, during the war he was engaged in with Petreius and Afranius, he commanded his whole army to pass a River by swimming, without any manner of necessity.

— rapuitque ruens in prælia miles.
Quod fugiens timuisset iter, mox uida receptis
Membra fovent armis, gelidosque a gurgite, cursu
Restituunt artus. LUCAN. L. iv. v. 151. &c.

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consist of pikes, halberds, muskets, and bows, the
men that carry those weapons are called pikemen,
halberdeers, musketeers, bowmen, or archers. Every
inhabitant is likewise obliged to declare in which
of these Classes he chuses to be enrolled; and as
some of them cannot be fit to bear arms, either on
account of their age or some other impediment,
they make a *deletus* or choice out of each Class,
and call those who are thus chosen *jurati*, because
they make them take an oath of fidelity and obe-
dience. These *jurati* then are called together upon
holidays, and exercised in the use of such arms as
they take their name from; every Class having its
particular place assigned by the Governors of the
State, where it is to rendezvous and be exercised;
and every man belonging to it, as well as the *jurati*,
is to appear and bring his proportion of money
with him to defray the expences that are occasion-
ed by those meetings. What therefore is actually
done by others, I should think might be done by
our countrymen: but they are grown so lazy and
degenerate that they will not imitate any thing that
is good; though it was intirely owing to such exer-
cises that the Ancients had such excellent Infantry,
and that the States in the West, abovementioned,
have much better at present than we have; for the
Romans either exercised them at home during the
time of their Republic, or abroad, under the reign
of their Emperors, as I have said before; but the
Italian States will not exercise them at home, and
abroad they cannot, because they are not their own
Subjects, and therefore will do nothing but what
pleases themselves. Hence it comes to pass, that
these military exercises are now wholly neglected,
and all manner of discipline is at an end; which is
the true reason why many States, especially in this
country, are become so weak and contemptible.—
But to resume our subject. It is not sufficient to
make a good army, that the Soldiers are inured to
hard.

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hardships and fatigue, strong, swift, and expert in the use of their arms : they must likewise learn to keep their ranks, to obey the word of command, and signals by drum or trumpet, and to observe good order, whether they halt, advance, retreat, are upon a march, or engaged with an enemy : for without a strict attention to these points, an army will never be good for any thing : as it is certain that a parcel of disorderly and ill-disciplined men, though ever so brave, are not so much to be depended upon as others who are not so courageous by nature, but orderly and well-disciplined ; for good order makes men bold, and confusion cowards. But that you may better comprehend what I am going to say, it is necessary to premise, that every nation has had particular corps, or bodies of Soldiers in their Armies and Militias, which though differing in their names, varied but little in the number of men they were composed of ; as they generally consisted of six, or at most, of eight thousand. Thus the Romans had their Legions, the Greeks their Phalanxes, the Gauls their Catervæ, and the Swiss at present (who are the only people that have any traces of the ancient military institutions left amongst them) what we should call Regiments in our country : but they all divided them into Battalions or smaller bodies, as best suited their purposes. Let us then call them by the name that is most familiar to us, and form them according to the best dispositions that have been made, either by the Ancients or Moderns. Now as the Romans divided their Legion, which consisted of betwixt five and six thousand men, into ten Cohorts, we will also divide our Regiment, which is to consist of six thousand foot, into ten Battalions of four hundred and fifty men a-piece ; of whom four hundred should be heavy armed, and the other fifty light armed. Of the heavy-armed, let three hundred have swords and targets, and be called Target-

men ; another hundred should have pikes, and be called Ordinary Pikemen ; the other fifty light-armed men must carry muskets, cross-bows, halberds, and targets, whom we will call by the old name of Ordinary Velites ; so that in the ten Battalions there will be three thousand Targetmen, one thousand ordinary Pikemen, and five hundred ordinary Velites ; that is to say, four thousand five hundred. But as our Regiment is to consist of six thousand men, we must add fifteen hundred more ; of whom a thousand must have pikes, and be called Pikemen extraordinary ; the other five hundred should be light-armed, and called Velites extraordinary ; and thus one half of our Infantry would be composed of Targetmen, and the other of Pikemen, and others armed in a different manner. Every Battalion should have a Lieutenant Colonel, or particular Commander of its own, four Captains, and forty Corporals, besides a Captain and five Corporals of the ordinary Velites. Over the thousand Pikemen extraordinary, there should be three Commanders or Lieutenant Colonels, ten Captains, and an hundred Corporals ; in the Velites extraordinary, two Lieutenant Colonels, five Captains, and fifty Corporals. I would then appoint a Colonel or Commander of the whole Regiment, with his Drum and Colours ; which every one of the Commanders abovementioned should likewise have : so that the whole would consist of ten Battalions, composed of three thousand Targetmen, a thousand ordinary Pikemen, as many extraordinary, five hundred ordinary Velites, five hundred more extraordinary, in all six thousand : amongst whom, there would be six hundred Corporals, fifteen Lieutenant Colonels, fifteen drums and colours, sixty-five Captains, and the Colonel with his colours and drum.— You see I have been guilty of some repetition : but it is purely to make you understand me the better, and that you may not be puzzled

puzzled or perplexed when I come to speak of drawing up an army in order of battle.— I say then, that all Princes and Governors of Republics should arm their Militia in this manner, and form them into such Regiments; of which they ought to raise as many as their dominions will admit; after which, having divided them into Battalions according to the directions I have just now given, in order to make them perfect in their discipline, it will be sufficient to exercise them Battalion by Battalion: and though one Battalion has not men enow in it to form a competent army of itself, yet by this means, every man may learn to do his own duty. For two things must be observed in all armies: first, that the men be taught what they are to do in their respective Battalions; and next, how every Battalion is to act when it is joined with others to form an army: and those that are ready and expert in the first, will soon learn the second; but such as are not perfect in one, can never be taught the other. Every Battalion then must first be taught separately to keep good order in its own ranks upon all occasions, and in all places; and afterwards, how to act in conjunction with the rest, to attend to the drums and other instruments, by which all motions are regulated and directed in time of battle; to understand from the difference of sounds, whether it is to maintain its ground, or to advance, or retreat, or wheel off, or face about. So that when the men know how to keep their ranks in such a manner that no sort of ground nor any manœuvre can throw them into disorder; when they understand what they have to do by the beat of the drum or sound of the trumpet, and where to take their station, they will soon learn how to act in concert with the other Battalions of their Regiment, when they are assembled to form an army. But as it is necessary to exercise them all together sometimes, the whole Regiment should be assembled once

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once or twice a year in time of peace, to be formed like an army with front, flanks and rear in their proper places, and to be exercised for some days, as if they were preparing to engage an enemy. Now since a Commander draws up his forces for battle, either upon sight of an enemy, or in apprehension of one that is not far off, his army should be exercised according to the occasion, and shewn in what order it is not only to march, but to engage, if need should require; with particular instructions how to act, if it should be attacked on this or that side. But when he would prepare his men to attack an enemy that is in sight, he should shew them how and where to begin the attack, whither they are to retreat if they should be repulsed, who are to take their places, what signals, sounds, and words of command they are to observe, and inure them to sham fights in such a manner, that they may be rather desirous than afraid to come to a real one. For it is not the natural courage of men that makes an army bold, but order and good discipline: because, when the first ranks know whither to retreat, and who are to advance in their place if they should be worsted, they will always fight with spirit, having relief so near at hand: nor will the next ranks be daunted at the misfortune of the first, as they are prepared for such an event, and perhaps not sorry for it, because they may think it will give them the glory of a victory which others could not obtain. These exercises are particularly necessary in an army newly raised, and they ought not to be neglected in one that is composed of veterans; for though the Romans were trained up to the use of arms from their youth, yet their Generals always exercised them in this manner with great assiduity for some time before they expected to come to an engagement: and Josephus tells us in his history, that even the very sutlers and rabble that used to follow their armies, often did good service in battle by

having seen the Soldiers frequently exercised, and learned to handle their arms, and keep firm in their ranks. But armies composed of new men, which have been raised either for present service, or to be formed into a Militia in order to be employed upon occasion, will be good for nothing at all, if the Battalions are not first exercised separately, and afterwards all together : for as good order and discipline are absolutely necessary, great care ought to be taken to keep them up amongst those that know their duty, and greater still to instruct such as are entirely ignorant of it : to effect which, a wise and able Commander will spare no pains.

COSIMO. You seem to have deviated a little from your point, I think : for before you have told us how a single Battallion ought to be exercised, you talk of exercising a whole army, and preparing it for battle.


FABRIZIO. You say very true indeed ; and I confess my zeal for these exercises and institutions, and my concern at their being now so much neglected, have led me a little out of the way, and occasioned me to break in upon the order I had proposed to myself. But I will return to it.—You may remember that I told you it is of the utmost importance in disciplining a Battalion to make the men keep their ranks well : for which purpose, it is necessary to exercise them in the manner called Snail-fashion * ; and as I said there should be four hundred heavy-armed foot in a Battalion, I will keep to that number. These four hundred men must be formed into eighty ranks, of five in each rank, which should learn both how to extend themselves, and how to reduce themselves into closer order, whether they are moving slowly or briskly : but in what manner this is to be done, is easier to comprehend by seeing it actually performed than from

* That is (I suppose) to teach them how to contract or extend themselves upon occasion, as that animal does.


any description ; which is not absolutely necessary here, because every one who has the least experience in military affairs knows the method of it, and that its chief use is to accustom the men to keep their ranks. But let us now proceed to draw up a Battalion. There are three principal ways then of doing this : the first and best of which is to draw it up close and compact in the form of an oblong square : the second is to form it in a square with two wings * in front : and the third is to throw it into a square with an area or vacancy in the middle, which is commonly called a hollow square. The first may be effected two ways ; one, by doubling the ranks, that is, by receiving the second rank into the first, the fourth into the third, the sixth into the fifth, and so on ; that so where there were eighty ranks before with five men in every rank, they may be reduced to forty with ten in a rank, and by doubling them a second time, to twenty with twenty in a rank. This will make an oblong square : for though there will be as many men in the files as in the ranks, yet the men in the ranks must stand so close together as to touch each other, but those in the files must be at least four feet distant one from another : so that the square will be longer from the front to the rear, than from the extremity of the right flank to that of the left ; that is, the files will be longer than the ranks. The fifty ordinary Velites belonging to the Battalion must not be mixed with the other ranks, but posted on each flank, and in the rear, when it is formed.—The other way of drawing up a Battalion close and compact in the form of an oblong square is better than this, and therefore I will be more particular in describing it. You remember, I take it for granted, of how many private men and what officers it is to consist,

* The original says "con la fronte cornuta, i. e. with a horned front :" the word *corno* in the Italian language, like *cornu* in the Latin, signifying a *horn* as well as the *wing* of an army.

and




Figure



P. Pikemen.
F. Target-men.
+ Corporals.
V Ordinary Velites.
⚡ Colonel of a Battalion.
⚡ The Ensign.
○ The Drum.
□ Captains.



Figure First.



Second. Vol IV, p. 78.



Third Vol IV, p. 82.
Figure



and how they are to be armed: without further repetition then, I say, that the Battalion must be formed into twenty ranks, with twenty men in every rank; that is to say, five ranks of Pikemen in the front, and fifteen of Targetmen in the rear: there must be two Captains in the front, and two in the rear: the Lieutenant Colonel or Commander of the Battalion with his Colours and Drum must take post in the interval betwixt the five ranks of Pikemen and the fifteen of Targetmen: the Corporals are to be placed upon the two flanks, one at the extremity of each rank in such a manner, that every one of them may have his men by his side; those on the right will have them on their left, and those on the left will have them on their right: the fifty ordinary Velites should be posted upon the flanks and in the rear of the Battalion. Now in order to throw it into this form, you must draw it up in eighty ranks, with five men in every rank, and placing the Velites by themselves either in the front or the rear, every Captain must put himself at the head of his Company or hundred men, or twenty ranks of five men in each; of which the five front ranks, or those immediately behind him, must be Pikemen, and the rest Targetmen. The Lieutenant Colonel or Commander of the Battalion with his drum and colours, are to be placed in the interval betwixt the pikes and targets of the second Company, and will take up the room of three Targetmen: twenty Corporals must be placed upon the left flanks of the ranks commanded by the first Captain; and twenty more upon the right flanks of the ranks commanded by the last Captain: and it must be observed that the Corporals of the Pikemen must carry pikes themselves, and those of the Targetmen must have Targets and Swords. Your ranks being thus disposed, if you desire to form them in order of battle to face an enemy, you must cause the Captain of the first twenty ranks to halt

with

with his men, the Captain of the second twenty, to keep advancing, but inclining a little to the right, clothe along the flank of the first twenty, till he comes abreast of their Captain, and there to halt himself: the third is then to advance with his men in the same manner by the right flank of the other two Companies, till he is in a line with the two first Captains, and there to halt as they do: after which, the fourth Captain and his Company are to move forward likewise by the right flank of those that are already joined, and halt when he has advanced as far as the other three: all which being executed, two of those Captains must immediately quit the front rank and take post in the rear; and then the Battalion will be formed in an oblong square as it was by the other method. The Velites must likewise be posted on each flank as they were before: one of these ways is called doubling the ranks in a right line; the other, doubling them by the flanks: the former is the easier of the two; the latter more convenient, and may be better adapted to answer different occasions. For in the former you must conform to the number, because five doubled makes ten, ten twenty, twenty forty; so that if you double your ranks in a right line, you cannot make a front of fifteen, or twenty-five, or thirty, or thirty-five, but must be governed in that by the number in your first rank; and as it is often necessary to form a front of six or eight hundred foot, doubling your ranks in a right line would throw the men into confusion. I therefore like the latter method best: and though perhaps there may be more difficulty in it, yet that will soon be surmounted by frequent practice and exercise. I say then it is a matter of the utmost importance to have Soldiers that know how to take their proper Stations in a moment: for which purpose, it is necessary to form them into such Battalions, to exercise them all together, to teach them to march either quick or slow in all directions,

rections, and to keep such order, that no pass or defile, how rough or difficult soever, can oblige them to break their ranks. For if Soldiers can do this, they are good Soldiers, and may be called Veterans, though they have never seen the face of an enemy: but if they have been in a thousand battles, and are ignorant in this point, they are no better than raw men. What has been said, relates only to drawing up a Battalion in closer order when it is marching in small ranks: but after that has been done, if it should happen to be thrown into disorder, either by the nature of the country through which it is obliged to march, or by an enemy, or by any other accident, and you want to reduce it to its former order immediately; there lies the main point and chief difficulty: to surmount which, much exercise, and practice, and experience are necessary; and therefore the Ancients spared no pains to make their Soldiers ready and expert in rallying whenever they were thrown into confusion. For this purpose, two things, are necessary, viz. that there should be several peculiar marks of distinction in every Battalion; and that the same men should always be placed in the same ranks. For instance, if a man was stationed in the second rank at first, let him continue in it ever after; and not only in the same rank, but in the very same place of it: and that he may not be at a loss how to do that, there must be several peculiar marks to guide and direct him, as I said just now. In the first place, it is necessary the Colours should be such as to be easily distinguished from those of all other Battalions, when several are joined together: in the next, that the Lieutenant Colonels, Captains, and other officers should wear different plumes: and lastly (which is of still more importance) that every Corporal should be distinguished by some particular mark: in which the Ancients were so remarkably careful and exact, that they caused their numbers to be marked upon their

their casques in great figures, as the first, second, third, fourth, and so on: but not thinking that sufficient, every Targetman had the number of his rank and his place in that rank engraved upon his target. When men are thus distinguished from each other, and accustomed to know and keep their respective stations, it is an easy matter to rally them if they are thrown into confusion: for when the Standard is once fixed, the Captains and Corporals will presently know their Stations; and resume them (whether on the right or left) at a due distance from it: the private men likewise, being guided by their usual marks and the difference of Colours, will presently fall into their proper ranks and places: just as when you are to put together the Staves of a barrel, if you have marked them before it was taken to pieces, you may easily do it; but if those Staves have not been marked, you will find it exceeding difficult, if not impossible. These things may soon be learned by frequent practice and exercise, and are not easily forgotten: and thus the new raw men being instructed by the Veterans, a whole Province by such exercise may be made good and experienced Soldiers in time.—It is necessary also to teach your men to move all at a time, when there is occasion, in such a manner as to make either flank or rear become the front, or the front become either the rear or one of the flanks; which may easily be effected by causing every man to face at once towards any particular part, which then will become the front. It is true that when they face to either flank, it will make some alteration and disproportion in the ranks, because the distance which will then be betwixt the front and the rear, will not be so great as that betwixt one extremity of the flanks and the other; which is quite contrary to the form in which a Battalion ought to be drawn up: this however may soon be rectified by well-exercised and experienced Soldiers, and therefore cannot occasion

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casion any great disorder. But there is another manœuvre of great importance, in which still more readiness and expertness are requisite ; and that is, when a whole Battalion is to move all at once like one solid body ; for instance, when it is to wheel to the left about in such a manner as to front on that side where the left flank was before : for then those that are on the left at the extremity of the front rank must stand fast, and those that are nearest them on the right must move so slow, that the rest who are farther from them on the right, and those at the other extremity of that rank, may not be obliged to run ; otherwise, they will be in great confusion.—


Now as it always happens, when a Battalion is attacked on its march from one place to another, that the Companies which are not posted in the front are forced to fight either in one of the flanks or the rear, and the Battalion is under a sudden necessity of making a front where that flank, or perhaps the rear, was before ; in order to form those Companies in due proportion and order ; all the pikes are to be placed in that flank which is to become the front, and the Corporals, Captains, and Lieutenant Colonel must take their respective posts as in the method of forming a Battalion above described. To effect this then, in forming the Battalion into eighty ranks of five men in every rank, you must put all the Pikemen into the twenty first ranks, with five of their Corporals in the front rank, and five in the last of that Company : and then the other sixty ranks, or three Companies, will wholly consist of Targetmen ; in the first and last rank of which there must be five Corporals. The Lieutenant Colonel, with his Standard and Drum, are to take post in the center of the first Company of Targetmen, and the four Captains at the head of their respective Companies. When it is thus formed, if you would have all the Pikemen upon the left flank, you must double the Companies one by one by their right flanks :


but if you would have them on the right flank, you must double them by the left: and thus the Battalion will have all its Pikemen upon one flank, the Corporals in the front and rear, the Captains in the front, and the Lieutenant Colonel in the center. This is the order it is to observe whilst it is marching: but upon the approach of an enemy, if you would have its front where one of the flanks was before, you have nothing to do but to order your men to face to that flank where the Pikemen are, and then the whole Battalion, with all its ranks and officers, are presently changed, and in the order I described before: for every man will be in his proper station, except the Captains, and they will soon take their posts.—But when a Battalion is marching forwards, and apprehensive of being attacked in the rear, the ranks must be so disposed that the Pikemen may be posted there: for which purpose, five ranks of them should be placed in the rear of every Company, instead of its front where they are usually stationed: in all other respects let the ordinary disposition be observed *.

COSIMO. If I remember right, you told us that this manner of exercise is calculated to reduce all the Battalions of a Regiment into the form of an army; and that it was sufficient for such a purpose. But if it should happen that this Battalion of four hundred and fifty men should be obliged to fight by itself, how would you draw it up in that case?

FABRIZIO. The Lieutenant Colonel shou'd consider in the first place, where it will be most necessary to place his Pikemen, and to post them there accordingly; which may easily be done without breaking in upon the above mentioned disposition: for though that is the order which should be observed by a Battalion when it acts in conjunction with others against an enemy; yet it may serve upon all other

* The Velites then, we are to suppose, must be stationed as before.






Heavy Horse

Heavy Horse

Figure Six. Vol III p. 84.



Light Horse

Heavy Horse

Heavy Horse


Light Horse

500 Vétues Extraordinary

P

Figure Fourth.

150 Light Horse	150 Heavy Horse	500 V
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1000 Pikemen Extra. 7 in each Rank.

B. Battalions, the shaded part

is occupied by 300 Target-Men.

the part not shaded by 100 Pike-men.

V. Velites Extraordinary.

Colonel of a Regiment.

Captain General.

P. Pikemen extraordinary.

V.O. Ordinary Velites.


Figure Five. Vol. IV p. 84.

Light Horse	Light Horse
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1000 Pikemen Extra. 7 in each Rank.

500 V	150 Heavy Horse	150 Light Horse
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occasions. However, in shewing you the two other methods of drawing up a Battalion, which I promised you a little while ago, I will answer your question more particularly : but they are seldom used ; and if ever, it is when a Battalion is to act alone and independent upon all others.—In order then to form a Battalion with two wings (or two horns) in the front, you are to dispose your eighty ranks of five men in a rank in this manner. In the first place, you must post a Captain at the head of twenty-five ranks, which are to consist of two Pikemen on the left, and three Targetmen on the right. Next to the five first ranks, let there be twenty more, with twenty Corporals posted in them ; all of them betwixt the Pikemen and the Targetmen, except the five which carry pikes ; for they must be placed amongst the Pikemen. After these twenty-five ranks thus drawn up, let there be posted another Captain at the head of fifteen ranks of Targetmen. In the interval betwixt this Company and the third, the Lieutenant Colonel, with his Colours and Drum, is to post himself at the head of the third Company, consisting of fifteen ranks more of Targetmen. The third Captain is to take post at the head of the fourth Company, which is to consist of twenty-five ranks, every one of which is to have three Targetmen on the left, and two Pikemen on the right : and after the five first ranks there must be twenty more with Corporals in them posted betwixt the Targetmen and the Pikemen ; in the rear of this Company the fourth Captain is to take his Station. If then you would form these ranks thus drawn up into a Battalion with two wings, you must order the first Captain to halt with his twenty-five ranks, and the second to make a motion to the right, and then to advance with his fifteen ranks of Targetmen to double the right flank of the twenty-five ranks that have halted, till he comes a-breast of the rank that is the fifteenth from their rear, and there to halt himself.

himself. After this, the Lieutenant Colonel, with his fifteen ranks of Targetmen, is to do the same on the right flank of the two first Companies. Last of all, the third Captain, with his twenty-five ranks, and the fourth Captain in the rear of them, is to move to the right, and then advance along the right flank of the other three Companies, but not to halt till his rearmost rank is in a line with their rearmost rank : all which being done, the Captain of the first fifteen ranks of Targetmen must quit his Station, and repair to the left of the rearmost rank, and the fourth Captain to the right of it. In this manner you will have a Battalion of twenty-five ranks, some consisting of five, and others of twenty men : with two wings (one at each angle of the front) each of which will consist of ten ranks of five men a-piece, and a space betwixt the wings large enough to receive ten men a-breast. The Colonel takes post in this open, a Captain at the front of each horn, and another at each angle in the rear of the Battalion ; two files of Pikemen and twenty Corporals are placed on each flank. The wings may serve to secure the carriages and baggage, as well as the artillery, if there be any : the Velites may be ranged along the flanks, on the outside of the Pikemen.—Now in order to reduce this horned Battalion into a Hollow Square, you need only to take eight of the rearmost of those fifteen ranks that have twenty men a-piece in them, and place them immediately in the front of the two wings, which will then become the flanks of the Hollow Square. In the Area left in the middle, the Lieutenant Colonel is to take place with his Colours and Drum : and it may likewise receive the carriages and baggage, but not the Artillery, which is to be planted either in the front or on the flanks.—

These are the methods that may be taken to form a single Battalion when it is to pass alone through dangerous and suspected places: but the solid Battalion,

talion, without wings or area in the middle of it, is certainly the best : nevertheless, either one or other of those forms may be necessary sometimes to secure the carriages, baggage, &c. The Swiss have likewise several forms of drawing up their Battalions : one of them is in the shape of a Cross ; in the spaces betwixt the arms of which, they place their musketeers to shelter them from the first shock of an enemy ; but as such Battalions are only fit to engage separately, and it is my intention to shew in what manner several Battalions united must fight, I shall not give myself the trouble of describing the order they observe.

COSIMO. I think I sufficiently comprehend the method that is to be followed in exercising the men of whom your Battalion consists ; but if I mistake not, you said you would add a thousand Pikemen extraordinary, and five hundred Velites extraordinary, to the ten Battalions of which your Regiment is to be composed. Would you not cause them also to be exercised ?

FABRIZIO. Certainly, and very well too : for I would exercise the extraordinary Pikemen, by Companies at least, if not altogether, in the discipline of the Battalion : for I should employ them more than the ordinary Pikemen, especially upon particular occasions, as in convoys, escorts, plundering, and the like. As to the Velites, it may suffice to exercise them separately at home in their particular method of fighting, without bringing them into the field : for as they are to fight in a loose and detached way, there is no occasion to call them together when the rest of the Battalion is assembled to be disciplined in their own manner. You must therefore (as I said before, and beg leave to say again) take great care to exercise your Battalions in such a manner, that the men be taught to keep their ranks, to know their proper stations, to rally or alter their disposition in a moment, when they are either

got into troublesome defiles, or are apprehensive of being attacked, or disordered by an enemy : for when they are perfect in these things, they will easily comprehend their duty when joined with others to form an army. So that if any Prince or Republic would be at the trouble of establishing this discipline and these exercises, they would always have good Soldiers enow in their dominions to make them superior to their neighbours, and put them in a condition to give law to others, instead of receiving it from them. But such is the degeneracy of the times we live in, and these things are so far from being in any esteem at present, that they are totally neglected and laughed at : which is the reason that our armies are now good for nothing ; and that if there be yet any officers or private men amongst us who have the least share of experience, courage, or abilities of any kind, they have no opportunity of shewing them.

COSIMO. How many carriages would you assign to a Battalion ?

FABRIZIO. In the first place, no Captain or Corporal should be suffered to ride upon a march ; and if the Colonel desired to ride, it should be upon a mule, and not upon a horse. I would allow him two baggage horses, one to every Captain, and two betwixt three Corporals ; because I would lodge three of them together when they are in camp, as I shall shew in its proper place. So that every Battalion should have six and thirty horses to carry its tents, kettles, hatchets, mattocks, spades, with other such implements and utensils as are necessary in an encampment, and any thing else that may be useful or convenient, if there is room for it.

COSIMO. Though I believe all the officers in your Battalion may be necessary, yet I should be afraid that so many would create confusion.

FABRIZIO. That might be the case if they were not all under the command of one person ; but as they

they are, they rather serve to preserve and promote good order ; and indeed it would be impossible to keep it up without them : for a wall that is weak and tottering in every part, may be better supported by many props and buttresses, though they are but feeble ones, than by a few, be they ever so substantial ; because their strength cannot be of much service at any considerable distance. For this reason, there ought to be a Corporal over every ten Soldiers in all armies, who should be a man of more spirit and courage, at least of greater authority, than the rest, in order to animate them both by his words and example, and exhort them continually to keep firm in their ranks, and behave themselves like men. How necessary these things are, may plainly appear from the example even of our own armies, all which have their Corporals, Drums, and Colours, though none of them do their duty. As to Corporals, if they would answer the end for which they were first appointed, every one of them should have his particular men under him, should lodge with them, should charge with them, and always be in the same rank : for then they might keep them so regular and compact in their several stations, that it would be almost impossible for any enemy to break or disorder them ; and if that should ever happen, they might presently be rallied : but in these times they are employed in other purposes of a different nature, and do nothing as they ought to do, though their pay is considerable. It is the same with regard to Colours, which are still continued, rather to make a fine shew, than for any other use that is made of them. Whereas the Ancients availed themselves of them as guides and directions in case of disorder : for as soon as the Colours were fixed, every man knew his post, and immediately returned to it. They likewise knew how and when to move, and when to halt, by the motion or halting of the Colours : and there-

fore it is necessary there should be many different Corps in an army, and that every Corps should have its particular Ensign, and marks of distinction: for then it will know what it has to do, and act with spirit. The Soldiers then are to observe the motion of their Ensigns, and the Ensigns the beat of the Drum; for that, when rightly managed, is a direction to the whole army, which is to act and move in a certain measure and pace, according to its different sounds, that so it may know how to keep due time and order. For this purpose, the Ancients had their pipes and fifes, and other sorts of military music, perfectly adapted to different occasions: and as a man that is dancing, and keeps time with the music, cannot make a false step; so an army that properly observes the beat of its Drums cannot easily be disordered. The Ancients, therefore, used to vary the sounds and notes of their military music according to the occasion, and as they wanted either to excite, or abate, or confirm the ardour of their Soldiers: and as their tunes and marches were different, they gave them different names: the Doric was calculated to inspire men with resolution and firmness; the Phrygian excited martial ardour, or rather fury: for Alexander the Great (as it is said) being at dinner one day, and hearing a Phrygian march sounded, was so transported with it, that he leaped up from the table and drew his sword, as if he had been going to charge an enemy. It would be very useful then, either to revive these measures, or invent new ones for such purposes; but if that cannot be done, those at least should not be neglected or laid aside, which teach Soldiers to obey command: and these may be varied and adapted in such a manner, that by frequent use and exercise, they may learn to distinguish them, and know their signification; but at present our Drums are chiefly employed to make a noise and parade.

COSIMO.

COSMO. I should be very glad to be informed (if you have ever considered the matter) how it comes to pass that we are so degenerated, and that not only these exercises, but all manner of military discipline, are now fallen into such neglect and disuse amongst us.

FABRIZIO. I will give you my opinion of the matter very freely, Sir. You know then, there have been many renowned Warriors in Europe, but few in Africa, and fewer still in Asia: the reason of which is, that the two last mentioned quarters of the world have had but one or two Monarchies, and very few Republics; and that Europe, on the contrary, has had several Kingdoms, but more Republics. Now men become great and excellent, and shew their abilities accordingly as they are employed and encouraged by their Sovereigns, whether they happen to be Kings, Princes, or Republics: so that where there are many States, there will be many great men; but where there are few of the one, there will not be many of the other. In Asia, there were Ninus, Cyrus, Artaxerxes, Mithridates, and some few others like them. In Africa (without having recourse to the early times of the ancient Egyptians) we read of Massinissa, Jugurtha, and some Carthaginian Commanders of eminent note; the number of whom, however, is very small in comparison of that which Europe has produced: for in this quarter of the world, there have been numbers of great men that we know of, and many more without doubt, whose memories are now extinguished by the malevolence of time: because every State being obliged to cherish and encourage men of merit and abilities, either out of necessity or for other reasons, where there are many different States, there must of course be many great men. Asia, on the contrary, has not produced many extraordinary men: because that quarter of the globe being subject in a great measure to one Monarchy,

of so large an extent that most parts of it languish in continual inactivity, cannot form any considerable number of men for great and glorious enterprises. The same may be said of Africa; though indeed there have been more able Commanders in that Country than in Asia; which was owing to the Republic of Carthage: for there will always be a greater number of such men in Republics than in Monarchies; because merit is generally honoured in the former, but feared in the latter: from whence it comes to pass, that able men are cherished and encouraged in one, but disconcerted and suppressed in the other. If we consider Europe in the next place, we shall find that it was always full of Principalities, Kingdoms, and Republics, which lived in perpetual jealousy of each other, and being obliged to keep up good discipline in their armies, were under a necessity of honouring and encouraging military merit. For in Greece, besides the Macedonian Monarchy, there were several Republics, every one of which produced many great and eminent men. In Italy, there were the Romans, the Samnites, the Tuscans, and the Cisalpine Gauls: France, Germany, and Spain abounded with Republics and Principalities: and if we do not read of so many great men in any of them as amongst the Romans, that is owing to the partiality of Historians, who generally follow the stream of fortune, and content themselves with praising the Conqueror. It is but reasonable however to suppose, there were a great many illustrious men amongst the Samnites and Tuscans, as they supported themselves against the Romans an hundred and fifty years. The same may be supposed of France and Spain: but the merit which most authors are so shy of allowing to particular men, they are forward enough to celebrate in whole nations, when they tell us, with what bravery and resolution they exerted themselves in defence of their liberties. Since

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it is manifest then, that where there are many States there will always be many able men, it is certain, that when the number of those States is diminished, the number of such men will likewise decrease by degrees, as the effect must cease when the cause is taken away. Thus, when the Roman Empire had swallowed up all the Kingdoms and Republics in Europe and Africa, and most of those in Asia, merit and abilities met with no countenance anywhere but at Rome : so that great men began to grow scarcer and scarcer in Europe, as well as in Asia, till at last, there were hardly any to be found ; for as all manner of spirit and worth was extinguished, except amongst the Romans, so when they became corrupt, the whole world in a manner was corrupted, and the Scythians poured by swarms into an Empire, which, having extinguished the virtue of most other nations, was not able to preserve its own. And though that Empire was afterwards dismembered by those Barbarians, yet the several parts into which it was cantoned never recovered their pristine vigour ; for, in the first place, it is a very difficult matter, and requires a long course of time, to revive good order and discipline when it is once abolished : and in the next, the Christian Religion has wrought such a change in the manners and customs of mankind, that they are now no longer under a necessity of defending themselves with such a degree of obstinacy and despair as they did in former times. For then, all such as were vanquished in battle, where either put to death, or carried into perpetual slavery in the enemy's country, where they spent the remainder of their lives in labour and misery. If a town was taken, it was either demolished, or the inhabitants were stripped of their goods, dispersed all over the world, and reduced to the last degree of poverty and wretchedness : so that the dread of these evils obliged them to keep up good discipline in their armies, and to honour

honour all those that excelled in the Art of War. But at present, these terrible apprehensions are in a great measure dissipated and extinguished : for after an army is defeated, those that fall into the hands of the Conqueror are seldom or never put to death ; and the terms of their ransom are made so easy, that they do not long continue prisoners. If a town has changed sides an hundred times, it is not demolished, nor are the inhabitants either dispersed or stripped of their possessions : the worst they have to fear is being laid under contribution : so that men now no longer care to submit to the rigour and continual hardships of military discipline, to ward off evils which they are but little afraid of. Besides, the Provinces of Europe are subject to few Heads at present, in comparison of what they were formerly : all France is under the dominion of one King ; all Spain under that of another ; and there are not many Principalities or Republics in Italy ; so that the petty States find protection under the wings of the strong, and those that are more powerful are not afraid of utter ruin, even if they should be conquered, for the reasons already given.

COSIMO. But we have seen many towns sacked, and some Kingdoms entirely ruined within these last five and twenty years : examples, which ought to serve as warnings to others to provide for their security by reviving the ancient military discipline and institutions.

FABRIZIO. You say very true : but consider what towns those were which suffered in that manner, and you will find they were not States, but inferior members of States : if Tortona was sacked, Milan was not ; Capua suffered, but Naples escaped ; Brescia and Ravenna felt the lash of the Conqueror, but Venice and Rome came off with impunity : so that these examples are not sufficient to make a State change its purpose ; but rather determine it to persevere in its resolution, when it sees

it can at any time redeem itself from destruction by a ransom; for it will not expose itself and its subjects to the continual fatigues of military discipline and exercises, when they seem not only unnecessary, but attended with much trouble and inconvenience. As for the dependent members which ought to be most affected with these examples, it is not in their power to save themselves; and those States which have already been ruined, see their error when it is too late to correct it, whilst others, which have not yet shared the same fate, take no pains to prevent it; chusing to live a lazy indolent life, free from trouble and inconvenience, and to rely upon fortune rather than their own virtue: for seeing there is so small a proportion of virtue now left amongst mankind, that it has but little influence in the affairs of the world, and that all things seem to be governed by fortune, they think it better to follow her train, than contend with her for superiority. To evince the truth of what I have said, if further proof is wanting, let us consider the state of Germany at present, which being full of Principalities and Republics, abounds with great and able Commanders; and indeed, whatsoever is worthy imitation in the military discipline of these times, is owing to those States, which being jealous of their neighbours, and abhorring the thoughts of slavery (a condition which seems not much dreaded in some other countries) take all proper means to defend their liberties, and therefore continue free and respectable.—This, I think, may suffice to shew the causes of our degeneracy, and the present neglect of military discipline amongst us; but I cannot tell whether you are of the same opinion: perhaps what I have said has either not given you the satisfaction you wanted, or not been thoroughly understood, and consequently may have left some doubts upon your mind.

COSIMO.

COSIMO. None at all, Sir, I assure you : on the contrary, I perfectly comprehend what you have said, and am very well satisfied with it ; but beg the favour of you to resume our subject, and to let us know in what manner you would dispose your Cavalry in these Battalions, what number of them you would have, and how they should be armed and officered.

FABRIZIO. You might think, perhaps, I had forgot that, but I have not ; though I have but little to say of Cavalry, for two reasons. In the first place, because the main strength of an army consists in its Infantry ; and in the next, Cavalry, even in these times, are much better disciplined than Infantry ; and if they are not superior, they are equal however to the Cavalry of the Ancients. I have already shewn how they ought to be exercised ; and as to their arms, I would arm both the Gens d'Armes and the light horse as they are armed at present, but the light horse should mostly consist of Crois bow men, with some musketeers amongst them which, though of little service in other respects, are yet very necessary to frighten the country people and drive them from passes, which perhaps they may have undertaken to defend : for they are more afraid of one Musketeer, than of twenty men that are armed in any other manner. With regard to their number (as I proposed at first to take a Roman legion for my model) I should think three hundred good horse in a Regiment would be sufficient of which an hundred and fifty should be Gens d'Armes, and the rest light horse; with a Captain, Cornet, fifteen Corporals, and a Drum to each troop every ten Gens d'Armes should have five baggage horses, and every ten light horsemen, two, which (like those belonging to the Infantry) should carry their tents, kettles, horse-furniture, and other implements and utensils. Do not think this out of

complaisance,

compass, for every one of our Gens d'Armes have four horses allowed them for that purpose ; but that is an abuse; for in Germany they have no other horse than that which they are mounted upon, and only one carriage to every twenty for their baggage. The Roman heavy-armed horse had no more ; but the Triarii indeed were always quartered near their Cavalry, and obliged to assist them in dressing and taking care of their horses : an example which might easily be followed in these times, as I shall shew more particularly, when I come to speak of encampments : for surely what was formerly done by the Romans, and is still practised by the Germans, may be effected at present, and therefore those that omit or neglect these things are much to be blamed. These Squadrons being raised and enrolled in the same manner with the rest of the Regiment, should sometimes be reviewed with the other Battalions, when they are assembled, and exercised in skirmishes and sham-fights with them, to make them well acquainted with each other, and perfect in those exercises. So much for this head. Let us now proceed to draw up an army in such an order of battle, as is most likely to ensure us a victory, when we come to engage an enemy ; for this is the end for which all armies are raised, and that so much care and pains are to be taken in disciplining them.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

T H E

THE
ART OF WAR.

BOOK III.

THE CONTENTS.

The order of battle observed by the Romans. Of the Roman Legion, the Macedonian Phalanx, and the Swiss Regiments. That it is the best way to use part of the Roman arms and armour; and part of the Grecian. Of what number of men the Roman armies generally consisted. A method of drawing up a Regiment or army recommended. A description of a battle. Reasons for the several manœuvres in it. Concerning the general exercises of an army.

COSIMO. SINCE we are going to vary the Subject, I beg leave to resign my Office of Interrogator in this conversation; for, as I hate presumption in others, I would not willingly seem guilty of it myself. I therefore lay down the Dictatorship, and give up my authority to any other person in company, that will please to accept of it.

ZANOB. It would have been very grateful to us all, if you would have continued in that office; but since you decline it, be pleased at least to say, which of us you depute to succeed you in it.

COSIMO. I desire to leave that to Signor Fabrizio.

FABRIZIO. I freely accept it: and think we should

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should follow the example of the Venetians, who always appoint the youngest to speak first in their Councils and Assemblies; especially as the art of speaking well is properly the exercise of youth, and therefore we may suppose young men the best qualified to talk of the several duties and exercises of war, as well as the fittest to put them in execution.

COSIMO. The lot then falls upon you, Luigi : and as I myself am much pleased with my Successor, I make no doubt but he will be equally agreeable to you all. Let us lose no more time however, but return to our Subject.

FABRIZIO. I know very well, that in order to shew how an army ought to be drawn up in order of battle, it would be necessary to describe the method in which the Greeks and Romans formed their troops for that purpose : but as this is done at large by ancient Historians, I refer you to them, and omitting several other particulars, shall speak only of such as are absolutely necessary to be adopted by those that would improve our present System of military discipline : for which purpose, I will shew you at the same time, how an army ought to be formed in order of battle at present, how it is to be exercised in sham fights, and in what manner to behave in real engagements. The greatest error then that a General can be guilty of in drawing up an army for battle, is to give it but one front : because in so doing, he commits himself and his fortune entirely to the event of the first conflict : and this is the effect of having lost the method, observed by the Ancients, of receiving one line into another : for without that, those in the front can neither be supported nor relieved in the time of action ; both which, were effectually performed by the Romans. Now to point out the method by which these things were effected, I must tell you that they divided their Legion into the Hastati, the Principes, and Triarii ; the first were

placed in the front or first line of the army in thick and close array ; the Principes in the second line, but in looser order ; and the Triarii in the third, with still larger intervals betwixt the men in their ranks, into which they could admit both the Principes and Hastati upon occasion. Besides these, they had their Slingers, Bow-men, and other light-armed Soldiers, who were not incorporated with these ranks, but posted on the right and left betwixt the Cavalry and Infantry in the front. These light-armed forces used to begin the engagement, and if they made any impression upon the enemy (which seldom happened) they pursued their advantage : but if they were driven back, they retreated either along the flanks of the army, or through certain intervals of it left open for that purpose, to cover the Sutlers and Servants, and other unarmed people that followed the camp. After this, the Hastati advanced against the enemy, and if they were repulsed, they retreated leisurely into the spaces left for them amongst the Principes, and again advanced with them to renew the battle : but if this line also was over-powered, it fell back into the Triarii, and all three, being thus joined together, made their third attack with greater vigour and strength than ever ; and if that miscarried, the day was lost, because they had no other resource or means of relief left *. The Cavalry were stationed on each side of the Infantry, in the form of two wings, and sometimes engaged the enemy's Cavalry, and sometimes supported their own Infantry, as occasion required. This method of renewing the attack three several times, with a continual increase of strength and vigour, can hardly be withstood, except either your fortune be very bad indeed, or the resolution of the enemy much greater than that of your own forces.—The Greeks were strangers to this method of renewing

* See Pol. Disc. Book II. Chap. xvi.

the front of their Phalanxes; and though they were very well officered, and consisted of many ranks, yet they made but one body, or rather one front. To relieve each other, one rank did not retire into another (as the Romans did) but one single man advanced into another's place when it was vacant; which was effected in this manner. When their Phalanx was drawn up in files (which we will suppose to consist of fifty men a-piece) with its front towards the enemy, all the six first ranks might engage at once: for their lances (which they called *Sarissæ*) were so long, that those of the sixth rank reached over the shoulders of the men in the first. In the time of action therefore, if any man in the first rank was either killed or disabled, the man that was next behind him in the second rank presently stepped into his place; the person immediately behind him in the third rank filled the vacancy in the second, and so on; the ranks in the rear continually filling up the deficiencies of those in the front: so that all the ranks were constantly kept full and entire, except the rearmost, which was exhausted at last, because there was no other to reinforce it. These Phalanxes therefore might be wasted away and annihilated by degrees, but seldom could be broken; as the close order and grossness of their body made them in a manner impenetrable.—

The Romans at first formed their Legions in this manner, in imitation of the Grecian Phalanx: but growing out of conceit with it at last, they divided them into more corps, as Cohorts and Manipuli, or Companies, being convinced that such bodies have most life and vigour in them, as have the most Officers to animate and inform them, and are divided in such a manner that each division can act separately and support itself. The Swiss Regiments at present, are likewise formed upon the model of the ancient Phalanxes, and follow their method both in closeness of order and relieving their ranks: and

when they come to engage, they are placed on the flanks of each other, but not in a parallel line. They have no method of receiving the first into the second, if it should be repulsed; but in order to relieve each other, they place one Regiment in the front, another a little behind it on the right; so that if the first is hard pressed, the second may advance to its assistance: a third is placed behind both these, and on the right too, at the distance of a musket-shot; that so, if the other two should be driven back, it may advance to relieve them, and all of them have sufficient room either to retreat or advance without falling foul upon one another; because great bodies cannot be received into each other like little ones; and therefore the little distinct corps, of which the Roman Legions were composed, are the most proper both to receive and relieve each other: and that the method observed by the Swiss is not so good as that which was taken by the ancient Romans, appears very plainly from the Success of the Roman Legions, which always got the better of the Grecian Phalanxes whenever they happened to engage them; because both their arms and armour, and their way of receiving one rank into another, were much better than the arms and discipline, and close order, of the Phalanx.—Now, in order to form an army upon the model of both, I would make the Grecian Phalanx my pattern in some respects, and the Roman Legion in others: and therefore, as I told you before, I would have two thousand Pikemen in my Regiment, armed after the manner of the Macedonian Phalanx, and three thousand men with Swords and Targets like the Roman Legion. I have divided my Regiment into ten Battalions, as the Romans did their Legion into ten Cohorts: like them too, I have appointed Velites to begin the Battle: and as I have retained the arms of both Nations, I would likewise in some measure imitate the order

and

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and discipline of each : for which reason I have taken care that the five first ranks of every Battalion should consist of Pikemen, and the rest of Targetmen ; that so it might be enabled not only to sustain the shock of the enemy's Cavalry in the front, but to make an impression upon their Infantry, and to open it in such a manner to the right and left that the Targetmen may come in to complete the victory. Now if you consider this method, and the nature of these arms, you will find how well they are calculated for that purpose : because the pikes are of admirable service against horse, and amongst Infantry they do no small execution before they come to fight hand to hand : for after that, they are of no use at all : upon which account, the Swiss place one rank of Halberdiers behind every three ranks of Pikemen, to give them room to make use of their pikes ; but that room is not sufficient. Placing our Pikemen then in the front, and the Targetmen behind them, they serve both to sustain the enemy's horse, and open and disorder their foot : but after the battle is joined, and they become useless, the Targetmen advance with their Swords, which are weapons that may be managed in the closest fight.

LUIGI. We are impatient to hear how you would draw up an army, thus armed and appointed, in order of battle.

FABRIZIO. I was just going to do it. You must know then, that a Consular army amongst the Romans did not exceed two Legions ; that is to say, about eleven thousand foot, and six hundred horse ; but they were composed wholly of their own Citizens. Besides these, they were furnished with as many more of both sorts by their friends and allies, which they divided into two bodies, called the right and left wing, and stationed them on each flank of their Main battle ; but they never suffered the number of these auxiliaries to surpass

that of their Legions ; though there was generally a larger proportion of Cavalry amongst them than in their own forces. With such an army, consisting of about twenty-two thousand foot, and two thousand good horse, a Consul went upon most expeditions : but when the enemy was very formidable, they sent out two Consuls with two such armies united. — You must know likewise, that in the three principal operations of an army, viz. upon a March, in an Encampment, and in Battle, they constantly posted their Legions in the center, rightly judging that the forces in which they reposed the greatest confidence should always be compact and united ; as I shall shew you when I come to speak more particularly and distinctly of these three operations. But these auxiliary Infantry, by their union and daily conversation with the legionary Infantry, soon became as serviceable as they were : for they were exercised and disciplined in the same manner, and formed in the same order before an engagement : so that when we know how the Romans drew up one Legion for that purpose, we know in what manner they drew up a whole army : and as I said they formed their Legion in three lines, in such a manner that one line might receive another, I have consequently told you how they drew up their whole army in the day of battle.

To form an army then in order of battle after the manner of the Romans, as they had two Legions, I will take two Regiments ; by the arrangement of which, you may see how a whole army is to be drawn up : for if you would add any more, there is nothing further to be done but either to multiply or enlarge the ranks. It will be needless, I suppose, to put you in mind of how many foot a Regiment consists, that there are ten Battalions in it, what sort of arms and armour they have, how many Companies there are, and what Officers in each, what number of Velites and Pikemen both

ordinary

ordinary and extraordinary, how many Targetmen, &c. for when I spoke of these things a little while ago, I desired you to take particular notice of them, and to remember them as absolutely necessary to give you a clear idea of the whole arrangement : and therefore, without any repetition of that kind, I shall proceed to draw up my army. For this purpose, I would place the ten Battalions of one Regiment on the left, and the ten of the other on the right. Those on the left are to be formed in this manner.

— Post five Battalions on the flank of each other in the front, with an interval of eight feet betwixt every one of them ; and let the space which they occupy be two hundred and eighty two feet in breadth, and eighty in depth. In the rear of these five I would place three others, at the distance of eighty feet, one of which should be in a right line with the Battalion that is on the left flank of those in the front ; the second with that on the right flank ; and the third with that in the center : so that these three will take up as much ground both in breadth and depth as the other five : but though the space betwixt every one of those five is but eight feet, I would have the space betwixt these three to be sixty-six. In the rear of these I would post the two remaining Battalions at the distance of eighty feet, one of them in a right line with that on the left of the three last mentioned, and the other with that on the right ; with an interval betwixt one and the other of ninety-two feet. The ground therefore which all these Battalions, thus formed, take up, will be two hundred and eighty-two feet in breadth, and four hundred in depth. The Pikemen extraordinary I would range along the left flank of these Battalions at the distance of forty feet, and I would make an hundred and forty ranks of them of seven men in every rank : so that they would cover the whole left flank of the Battalions draw up in the manner I have described,

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and there would be forty ranks remaining to guard
the baggage, Suttlers, and other unarmed people
who follow the camp in the rear of the army, after
posting the Captains and Corporals in their proper
places. Of the three Lieutenant Colonels belonging
to them, I would place one at the front, another in
the center, and another in the rear. But to return
to the front of the army ; next to the Pikemen
extraordinary, I would place the five hundred
Velites extraordinary, and allow them to take up a
space of eighty feet. Next to them on the left, I
would place my Gens d'Armes, and allow them
a space of four hundred and fifty feet : and next
to them, my light horse, whom I would allow the
same space. The ordinary Velites I would leave
with their respective Battalions in their proper
places, (that is, in the intervals betwixt one Batta-
lion and another) to be attendants as it were upon
them ; unless I should think fit to put them under
the cover of the Pikemen extraordinary ; which I
would do sometimes, and sometimes I would not,
according as it was most for my advantage. The
Colonel of the Regiment, with his Colours and
Drum, I would place either in the center of that
space which is left betwixt the first and second lines
of the Battalions, or in the front of them, or in the
interval betwixt the last of the first five and the
Pikemen extraordinary, as I saw most convenient ;
with sixty, or at least thirty picked men about him,
who should not only carry his orders properly and
distinctly to the different parts of the army, but
be able to repel the enemy if he should be attack-
ed.—In this manner I would form the Regiment
on the left, which would be just one half of the
army, and will occupy a space of five hundred and
seventy-two feet in breadth, and four hundred in
depth, exclusive of the space taken up by the forty
ranks of Pikemen extraordinary that are to guard
the baggage, &c. in the rear, which will be two
hundred

hundred feet. The other Regiment I would draw up in the same manner on the right of this, with an interval betwixt them of sixty feet: and at the head of this interval I would place some pieces of Artillery, behind which, the General of the army should take post with his Standard and Drum, and two hundred picked men at least, most of them on foot; of whom there should be ten or more fit to carry any orders; and he himself should be mounted and armed in such a manner that he might command either on horseback or on foot, as occasion required. As for Artillery, ten fifty pounders would be sufficient for the reduction of a town; and I would make use of them rather to defend my Camp than in a field engagement; for my field pieces should be ten or fifteen pounders, and these I would place along the front of the whole army, except the ground was such that I could place them conveniently and safely in the flanks where the enemy could not come at them. This method of drawing up an army may answer the end both of the Grecian Phalanx and the Roman Legion: for you have the Pikemen in the front, and all the rest of the Infantry are so formed in their proper ranks, that either in charging an enemy, or sustaining the charge, they may (like the Phalanx) recruit their front ranks out of those in the rear. On the other hand, if they are so hard pushed that they are obliged to give way, they may retreat into the intervals of the second line, and advance again in conjunction with it to face the enemy: and if they are repulsed the second time, they may retire into the spaces betwixt the Battalions in the third line, and renew the battle with still greater vigour: so that, according to this method, you may reinforce your ranks either in the Grecian or the Roman manner. As to the strength of such an army, no Body can be more compact: for each wing is perfectly well fortified in every part, both with officers and private men

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men properly armed, and appointed in such a manner, that if there is any apparent weakness in it, it must be in the rear where the carriages and Sutlers, &c. are stationed ; and even those are covered by the Pikemen extraordinary. Being so well fortified therefore on all sides, an enemy cannot attack it any where but it will be ready to receive him : for the rear is in no danger ; because if the enemy be so strong that he is able to attack you on every side at once, it must be madness in you to take the field against him. But supposing he should be superior to you in number by one third, and his army as well armed and drawn up as your own ; if he weakens it in order to attack you in several parts at the same time, and you happen to break in upon him in any one, the day is your own. As to Cavalry, you have nothing to apprehend from them ; for the Pikemen which environ you on all sides will sufficiently secure you against their fury, even though your own should be repulsed. Your officers are so conveniently posted, that they may do their duty with ease ; and the spaces betwixt one Battalion and another, and betwixt every rank, not only serve to receive each other upon occasion, but give the officers sufficient room to go backwards and forwards with orders from the General. Now as I told you before, that the Romans had about twenty-four thousand men in their armies, I would have our army consist of the same number : and as their auxiliaries learnt their discipline and order from their Legions, I would have our auxiliaries likewise formed upon the model of our Regiments. These things may easily be effected by a little practice : for in adding two other Regiments to the army, or the same number of men that it consists of (let it be what it will) you have nothing to do but to double your ranks by placing twenty Battalions on the left, instead of ten, and as many more on the right ; or to extend or contract them,

according

according to the nature of the ground, and the posture of the enemy.

LUGI. I perfectly understand you, Sir. Me-thinks I see your army drawn up for battle. I am impatient to have it begin. For Heaven's Sake do not turn Fabius Maximus upon us : if I do, I am afraid I shall be tempted to abuse you as the Romans did that great man.

FABRIZIO. I am ready. The signal is given. Do not you hear our Artillery ? It has fired and done but little execution amongst the enemy. The Velites extraordinary and light horse have set up a great shout and begun the attack with the utmost fury. The enemy's Artillery has made one discharge ; and being ill-pointed, their balls have gone over the heads of our Infantry without doing them any hurt : but to prevent it firing a second time, our Velites and light horse endeavour to make themselves masters of it : a Body of the enemy post themselves before it ; so that the Artillery on both sides is become useless. See with what courage and dexterity our men charge them : the expertness they have acquired by long exercise and discipline, inspires them with confidence : the Battalions move forward in regular pace and good order, with the Gens d'Armes on their flanks to attack the enemy : our Artillery draws off through the space that was left vacant by the Velites to make room for it. See how the General encourages his men, and assures them of victory. Observe our Velites and light horse returning, and extending themselves along the flanks of our army, to see if they can meet with any of the enemy's light-armed forces there.— The two armies are now engaged : see with what firmness and silence our men receive the charge : do not you hear the General giving his orders to the Gens d'Armes to maintain their ground, and not to advance upon the enemy, nor desert the Infantry upon any account whatsoever ? You see a party

party of our light horse have now detached themselves to charge a Body of the enemy's Musketeers that were coming to take us in flank ; and how the enemy's Cavalry are advancing to support them : but the Musketeers, to avoid being entangled betwixt them, are retiring to their own army. See with what resolution and dexterity our ordinary Pikemen handle their weapons : but the Infantry on each side are now come so close together that our Pikemen can no longer make any use of their pikes ; and therefore, according to their usual discipline, they retreat by degrees till they are received by the Targetmen. You see how a large Body of the enemy's Gens d'Armies have in the mean time disordered our Gens d'Armes on the left, who retire (as they had learnt before) into the Pikemen extraordinary, and being supported by them, not only make head against the enemy again, but repulse them with great slaughter. Now the ordinary Pikemen of the first Battalions have retreated amongst the Targetmen ; they leave them to maintain the battle, and behold what havock they make amongst the enemy ; with what confidence and security they press upon them ; see how close they are engaged with them, they hardly have room to manage their Swords. The enemy are embarrassed and falling into confusion : their pikes are too long to do any further execution, and their swords are of no service against men that are so well secured by their armour. What a carnage ! what a number of wounded men ! They begin to run away. See, they are flying on the right and on the left. The battle is over ; we have gained a glorious victory.—It might have been more complete however, if we had exerted our whole strength. But you see we were under no necessity of employing either our second or third line, as the first was sufficient to do the business : so that I have nothing more to add upon this occasion ; except it be to

answer any objection or doubt you may have to propose.

LUIGI. You have carried every thing before you with such amazing rapidity, that I cannot well tell whether I ought to start any objection or not. With submission however to your superior judgment, I will make bold to ask you a question or two. Be so good therefore to tell me, in the first place, why you would suffer your Artillery to fire no more than once: and why you ordered it to be drawn off so soon, without making any sort of use of it afterwards. In the next place, you managed that of the enemy just as you pleased, and had it pointed so ill, that it could do no execution: which indeed I suppose may be the case sometimes; but if it should happen (as I believe it often does) that the shot should take place, what remedy would you prescribe? And since I have mentioned artillery, I will here propose all that I have to say upon that subject, that so we may have no occasion to return to it hereafter. I have heard many people laugh at the arms and armour, and military discipline, of the Ancients, and say they would be of little or no service at all now, since the invention of Artillery, which would break all their ranks, and beat their armour to pieces: so that it would be folly to draw up a body of forces in such order as cannot be maintained, and undergo the fatigue of carrying armour, which can be no means secure them.

FABRIZIO. Your objections are of several kinds; and therefore you must have patience if you expect a particular answer to them all. It is true our artillery made but one discharge, and I was in some doubt whether I should suffer even that; because it is of more importance to keep one's self from being hurt, than to annoy the enemy. Now in order to secure yourself from Artillery, you must either keep out of the reach of its shot, or place yourself behind a wall, or a bank, or some fence of that

that kind ; there is no other cover that I know of, and that must be very strong. But when an army is drawn up in order to engage, it cannot skulk behind a wall or a bank, nor yet keep at such a distance as not to be annoyed by the enemy's Artillery. Since there is no method then to shelter one's self from it, the General must have recourse to such means as will expose him and his men to the least danger, for which purpose, the best, and indeed the only way, is to make themselves masters of it, if possible, and as soon as they can. To do this, it is necessary that a body of your men should march up, and rush suddenly upon it ; but not in close order : because the suddenness of the attack will prevent it from firing more than once ; and when your men are thus drawn up, it cannot do much execution among them. Now a compact body of regular forces is not at all proper for this service : for if it moves fast, it must naturally fall into disorder of itself, and if it extend and weakens its ranks, it will presently be broken by the enemy : upon which considerations, I drew up my army in a manner that was most proper for such an attempt ; for having placed a thousand Velites in the wings of it, I ordered them to advance, together with the light horse, as soon as our Artillery had fired, to seize upon that of the enemy. This is the reason why I would not suffer our own to make a second discharge, lest the enemy should have time to do the same, as they easily might have done, and perhaps before our Artillery was loaded again, if I had not taken these means to prevent it. So that the only way to make the enemy's Artillery of no service, is to attack it as soon as possible : for if they defend it, it falls into your hands of course ; but if they defend it, they must place a body of forces before it, and then they will not dare to fire it again, because their own men must be the chief sufferers by it.— These reasons, I think, might be sufficient of themselves

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selves, without quoting any examples to support them : but as antiquity furnishes us with many, I will give you one or two.—When Ventidius had resolved to come to an engagement with the Parthians (whose strength consisted chiefly in their bows and arrows) he suffered them to advance almost to the very entrenchments of his camp before he drew out his army : and this he did, that he might fall suddenly upon them, and before they could make use of their arrows. Cæsar tell us, that in a battle with the Gauls, they made so sudden and furious an attack upon him, that his men had not time to throw their darts at the enemy, as the Romans always used to do. Now from these instances, we see, that in order to secure an army in the field from the effects of any weapons or engines that annoy them at a distance, there is no other way, but to march up to them as fast as possible, and get possession of them, if you can, or at least to prevent their effects. Besides all these, I had still another reason which determined me to fire my Artillery no more than once : perhaps it may seem trifling to you ; but with me it has much weight. There is nothing that occasions greater confusion and embarrassment amongst a body of men, than to have their sight dazzled or obstructed : a circumstance which has been the ruin of many gallant armies that have been blinded either by the sun or clouds of dust : and what can contribute more to that than the smoke of Artillery ? It would be more prudent therefore to let the enemy blind themselves, than to go blindfold yourself to seek them : for which reason, I would either not make any use of Artillery at all, or if I did (to avoid censure now great guns are in such credit) I would plant it in the flanks of my army ; that so when it was fired, the smoke might not blind the men in my front, where I would have the flower of my army. The effects of that may be seen from the conduct of Epaminondas,

who going to engage the enemy, caused all his light horse to trot backwards and forwards a great pace in the front of their army, which raised such a dust that it threw them into disorder, and gave him an easy victory over them.—As for my seeming to have pointed the enemy's Artillery as I pleased, and made the shot fly over the heads of our Infantry ; I answer, that it much oftener happens so than otherwise : for Infantry stands so low, and it is so nice a matter to manage heavy pieces of cannon well, that if you either elevate or lower them ever so little too much, in one case the balls will fly quite over their heads, and in the other, they strike into the earth, and never come near them : the least inequality of ground likewise is a great preservation to them ; for any little bank or brake betwixt them and the Artillery, serves either to intercept the shot, or divert their direction. And as to Cavalry, especially Gens d'Armes (because they are drawn up in a closer order, and stand so much higher than light horse, that they are more exposed to danger) they may continue in the rear of the army till the Artillery has fired. It is certain that small pieces of Cannon and musket-shot, do more execution than heavy Artillery ; against which, the best remedy is to make a resolute attack upon it as soon as possible : and if you lose some of your men in it, (which must always be the case) surely a partial loss is not so bad as a total defeat. The Swiss are worthy of imitation in this respect : for they never decline an engagement out of fear of Artillery ; but always punish those with death who offer to stir out of their ranks, or shew the least sign of being frightened at it. I caused my Artillery therefore to be drawn off as soon as it had been discharged, in order to make room for the Battalions to advance ; and made no further mention of it, as a thing of no consequence after the two armies had joined battle.—You say likewise, that many people laugh at the arms and armour,

mour, and military discipline of the Ancients, as good for nothing since the Invention of Artillery : from whence one would be apt to imagine the Moderns had made effectual provision against it. If so, I should be glad to hear what that provision is ; for I confess I know of none, nor do I think it possible to make any, but what I have already mentioned. Why do our Infantry at present wear corslets ? and why are our Gens d'Armes covered with armour from head to foot ? If they despise this manner of arming among the Ancients, as of no service against Artillery, whey do they continue to use it themselves ? I could likewise wish to be informed, why the Swiss, (like the ancients) form their Regiments of six or eight thousand foot, drawn up in close order ; and for what reason all other nations have began to imitate them ; since that method exposes their armies to no less danger, (with regard to Artillery) than many other institutions that were in vogue amongst the Ancients, but are neglected and laid aside at present ? These are questions, which I fancy the people whom you mention cannot easily answer : but if you would propose them to Soldiers of judgment and experience, they would tell you, that they arm themselves in that manner, not because they think such armour will effectually secure them against Cannon balls, but because it will defend them against croſs-bows, pikes, swords, and many other offensive weapons, which an enemy may make use of. They will tell you further, that the close order observed by the Swiss, is necessary to make an impression upon the enemy's Infantry, to sustain their Cavalry, and to prevent themselves from being easily broken : so that we see Soldiers have many other things to dread besides Artillery, against which this order, and this ſort of arms and armour, ſerve to ſecure them. Hence it follows, that the better an army is armed, and the closer and stronger it is drawn up, the leſs it has to fear :

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and therefore the persons whose opinion you alledged not long ago, must either have had very little experience, or not have considered the matter in the light they ought to have done. For since we find that only the pikes and close order of the Ancients, (still in use amongst the Swiss) have done such wonderful service, and contribute so much to the strength of our armies at present ; why may we not conclude, that the rest of the military Institutions observed by the Ancients (but now entirely laid aside and neglected) might be equally serviceable ? Besides, as the fury of Artillery does not make us afraid of drawing up our Battalions in close order, like the Swiss ; certainly there can be no other disposition contrived that can make us more apprehensive of its effects. Further, if we are not terrified at the enemy's Artillery in laying siege to a town, when it may annoy us with the greatest security, and we can neither come at it, nor prevent its effects, because it is covered by walls ; but must endeavour to dismount it with our own Cannon, which perhaps may require much time, and expose us to a continual fire all the while ; why should we so much fear it in the field, where we may presently either make ourselves masters of it, or put a stop to its firing ? The invention of Artillery therefore, is no reason, in my opinion, why we should not imitate the Ancients in their military discipline and Institutions, as well as their courage : and if this matter had not been thoroughly discussed in a piece lately published, I would have dwelt longer upon it at present : but for brevity's sake I refer you to that discourse*.

LUIGI. I have read it, and am of opinion upon the whole, that you have sufficiently shewn, that the best remedy against Artillery, is to seize upon it as soon as you can ; that is, in a field battle. But suppose the enemy should place it in the flanks

* See Politic. Disc. book II. chap. xvii.

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of their army ; where it would still gall you, and yet be so well secured, that you could not make yourself master of it. For in drawing up your army, you may remember that you left an interval of eight feet betwixt every Battalion, and of forty betwixt the Battalions and the Pikemen extraordinary : now if the enemy should form their army in the same order, and place their Artillery deep in those intervals, I should think it would annoy you very much, without any risque of being taken, because you could not come at it there.

FABRIZIO. Your objection carries much weight with it ; and therefore I will endeavour either to take it off, or to find some remedy in that case. I told you before, that the Battalions, when engaged with an enemy, are in constant motion, and of consequence must draw closer and closer to each other ; so that if you leave but small intervals betwixt them for the Artillery, they will soon be filled up in such a manner, that it cannot be of any service : but if you make them large, in order to avoid that inconvenience, you must naturally run into a much greater ; because you then leave room enough for the enemy to rush into them, and not only seize upon your Artillery, but throw your whole army into confusion. But to make short of the matter, I beg leave to tell you once for all, that it is impossible to place your Cannon betwixt your Battalions, especially such as are fixed upon carriages : for as they are drawn one way, and point another, they must all be turned into a different direction before they can be fired ; and to do that, will require so large a space, that fifty pieces would disorder any army : so that they must of necessity be placed somewhere out of the Battalions ; and then they may be come at in the manner I have already prescribed. Let us suppose however, that they could be placed within the Battalions, and that we could hit upon some medium, which on one hand would prevent the Battalions

from frustrating the effects of the Artillery when they drew closer together ; and on the other, not leave the intervals betwixt them so large, that the enemy might push into them : I say, that even then a method might be found to elude its force, by opening counter-intervals in the enemy's army, to let your shot pass through without doing any execution. For to secure your Artillery effectually, perhaps you would place it at the very bottom of the intervals betwixt your Battalions ; in which case, (to avoid killing your own men) it must be pointed in such a manner, as to throw its shot directly and continually through the interval it is planted in ; and therefore, by opening such another interval right over-against it in the enemy's army, they will pass through it without doing them any damage at all : for it is a general rule, always to give way to such things as cannot be opposed ; as the Ancients used to do when they were attacked by Elephants and armed Chariots.——You see I gained a victory with an army formed and appointed in the manner I recommended ; and I must beg leave to repeat (if what I have already said be not sufficient) that such an army must of necessity defeat any other, at the very first onset, that is armed and drawn up like ours at present, which, for the most part can make but one front, is entirely unprovided with Targets, and not only armed in such a manner, that they cannot defend themselves against an enemy that closes with them, but so formed, that if they post their Battalions flank to flank, they make their lines too thin and feeble ; and if they place them in the rear of each other, not having any method of receiving one another, they soon fall into confusion, and are easily broken. And though indeed they are divided into three bodies, called the Van-guard, the Main-battle, and the Rear-guard ; yet this division is of no use, except upon a March, or to distinguish them in an encampment :

ment : for in engagement they are combined, and therefore all liable to be defeated at once by the first shock.

LUIGI. I further observed in your late Battle, that your Cavalry were repulsed, and forced to take cover under the Pikemen extraordinary, by whose assistance, they not only made head against the enemy a second time, but repulsed them in their turn. Now I am persuaded that Pikemen may support Cavalry in a thick and close drawn-up body like the Swiss Regiments : but in your army there are but five ranks of Pikemen in the front, and seven on the flanks ; so that I cannot see how they can keep off a body of horse.

FABRIZIO. Though I told you before, that six ranks of Pikemen might charge at a time in the Macedonian Phalanx, yet I must now add, that if a Swiss Regiment consisted of a thousand ranks, no more than four or five of them at most could charge at one : for their Pikes being eighteen feet long, three feet we may imagine must be taken up betwixt one hand and the other : so that the first rank would have but fifteen feet to make use of : in the second, besides the three feet betwixt the mens hands, as much more must be taken up by the distance betwixt one rank and another, and then there would be but twelve feet of the pike that could be of any service : the third, for the same reasons, would have but nine feet ; the fourth but six ; and the fifth but three : the other ranks behind could make no use at all of their pikes, but serve to recruit and support the first five ranks, as we have shewn before. If then five of their ranks could keep off the enemy's Cavalry, why cannot our five do the same, as they likewise have other ranks in their rear to support them, though they have not pikes like the others ? And if the ranks of Pikemen extraordinary, which are placed upon the flanks of our army, may seem to you too thin, they may be reduced into a square,

and posted on the flanks of the two Battalions in the rear; from which place they may succour either the front or rear, and assist the horse upon occasion.

LUIGI. Would you always then make use of this form and order of battle, whenever you are to engage an enemy?

FABRIZIO. No. I would always suit my order of battle to the nature of my ground, the quality and number of the enemy, as I shall shew you before we part. But I recommended this order not only as the best, (as it certainly is) but as a rule to direct and assist you in forming others: for every art has its general rules and principles upon which it is founded. One thing however, I would have you remember, and that is, never to draw up an army upon any occasion in such a manner, that the front cannot be relieved by the rear: for whoever is guilty of that error, prevents the greatest part of his army from doing him any service at all, and will never gain a victory over an enemy that has the least degree either of courage or conduct.

LUIGI. I confess I have still another objection to the order in which you disposed your army. You made your front consist of five Battalions, posted on the flank of each other: your second line of three: and your third of two. Now I should think it would be better to invert that order: for surely it must be more difficult to break that army which is stronger and stronger the farther you penetrate into it, than another that is weaker and weaker.

FABRIZIO. If you will please to recollect that the third line in the Roman Legions was composed of six hundred Triarii only, and that they were placed in the rear, you would drop your objection: for you see that, according to that model, I have placed but two Battalions in the rear, which yet consists of nine hundred men: so that if I have been guilty of any error in following the example

of the Romans in that respect, it is by making my rear stronger than they did. Now though the authority alone of such an example might serve for a sufficient answer to your objection, yet I will give you my reasons for what I have done. — The front ranks of an army ought always to be thick and compact, because they are so sustain the first shock of the enemy, and have no friends to receive into them : for which reason, they should be close and full of men ; otherwise they will be loose and feeble. But as the second line is to receive the first into it upon occasion before it is to engage, there should be large intervals left in it for that purpose ; and therefore it must not consist of so many men, as the first : for if the number of them was either larger, or but barely equal, you must either leave no intervals in it, (which would occasion confusion) or if you do, it will be longer than the first, which would be out of proportion, and make a strange appearance. As to what you say of the enemy finding our army weaker and weaker the farther they penetrate into it, it is a manifest error : for they cannot come to engage the second line, till it has received the first into it : so that they will find the second line much stronger than the first was, when they are both united, and the third line still stronger than either of the other two, because they will then have the strength of the whole army to cope with at once : and as the third line is to receive more men than the second, it is necessary it should have larger intervals in it, and consequently consist of fewer men of its own.

LUIGI. I am thoroughly satisfied in this point. But if the five Battalions in the front retire into the three that are in the second line; and afterwards those eight into the two that are in the rear, it does not seem possible that the eight Battalions in the second line, much less the ten in the third, can be

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contained in the same space of ground that the first
five were.

FABRIZIO. To this I answer in the first place, that the space of ground is not the same in that case : for there were intervals betwixt the first five, which are filled up when they retire into the second line, and the second into the third : there was likewise an interval betwixt the two Regiments, and betwixt them and the Pikemen extraordinary, which all together afford them room enough. Besides, the Battalions take up different spaces of ground whilst they keep their ranks, and when they are disordered : for in the latter case, the men either get closer together, or extend themselves. They extend themselves when they are so hard pressed, that they are going to run away ; and they keep closer together when they are determined to make an obstinate resistance. I might add, that when the five ranks of Pikemen in the front have done their business, they retire through the intervals betwixt the Battalions, into the rear, to make way for the Targetmen to advance upon the enemy ; where they will be ready for any service, in which the General shall think fit to employ them : for in the front they could be of no further use after the two armies were close engaged : and thus the space allotted will be sufficient to contain the whole army. But if it should not, the flanks being composed of men, and not stone walls, can easily open and extend themselves in such a manner as to make room enough.

LUIGI. When the five first Battalions retire into the three in the second line, would you have the Pikemen extraordinary, whom you place in the flanks of your army, stand fast in their ranks, and form two horns as it were to the army ? or would you have them likewise retire with the Battalions ? In the latter case, I cannot imagine whither they are

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are to retire, as they have no Battalions in their rear with proper intervals to receive them.

FABRIZIO. If the enemy does not attack them at the same time that the Battalions are forced to retire, those Pikemen may continue firm in their station, and take the enemy in the flanks, as they are pressing upon the Battalions in their retreat: but if they are attacked at the same time (as most likely they will be) they also must retire; which they may do very well, though they have no battalions in their rear to receive them, by doubling their ranks in a right line to the center, and receiving one rank into another, in the manner I shewed you a while ago. But to double them in order to retreat, you must observe a different method from that which I then spoke of: for in that case, I told you the first rank must receive the second, the thirth the fourth, and so on: but in this you must begin in the rear instead of the front, that so the ranks may retreat, and not advance in doubling each other. But to answer the whole of what may be objected to the manner in which I conducted the late battle, I must beg leave to tell you again, that I drew it up and caused it to engage, in the first place, to shew you how an army ought to be formed in order of battle; and in the next, how it should be exercised. The order, I make no doubt, you now perfectly comprehend; and as to the exercise, I say that the Regiments ought to be joined together, and exercised in this manner as often as possible; that so the officers may learn to post their Battalions in their proper places: for as every private man should know his own rank, and place in that rank, so every Lieutenant Colonel should know where to station his Battalion in the army, and all of them learn to obey their General. They should likewise know how to join one Battalion with another, and to take their respective posts in an instant: for which purpose, the Colours of every Battalion should have their number marked upon

upon them in such a manner as to be visible to every one, not only to distinguish the Battalions from one another, but that the Lieutenant Colonel of every Battalion, and his men, may the more easily know where to find each other. The Regiments ought likewise to be numbered, and their numbers marked upon the Colonel's Colours, in order to know which Regiment is posted on the right, and which on the left; what Battalions are placed in the first, second, or third line, &c. There should likewise be regular steps and gradations to preferment in our army: for instance, the lowest officer should be a Corporal, the next above him, a Captain of fifty ordinary Velites, the next, a Captain of a Company in the Battalions, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the tenth Battalion, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the ninth, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the eighth, and so on in succession, till you come to the Lieutenant Colonel of the first Battalion, who should be next in command to the Colonel of the Regiment; to which post no-body should be advanced, till he had passed through all the subordinate degrees just now mentioned. But as there are also three Lieutenant Colonels of the Pikemen extraordinary, and two of the extraordinary Velites, I would have them rank with the Lieutenant Colonel of the tenth Battalion: for I see no absurdity in having six officers of equal rank in the same Regiment, as it may serve to create an emulation amongst them, and excite every one of them to behave himself in such a manner, as to be thought worthy of being preferred to the command of the ninth Battalion. Every one of these officers then knowing where his Corps is to be posted, the whole army will presently be in proper order, as soon as the General's standard is erected. This is the first exercise an army should be accustomed to; that is, to range itself immediately in order of battle upon occasion: for which purpose, it should

ould be drawn up and separated again, not only every day, but several times in the day.

LUIGI. What other marks of distinction would you have upon the Colours besides their particular number?

FABRIZIO. The General's Standard should have the arms of his Prince upon it: the others may have the same, with some variation of the field or colours, as the Prince shall think fit: for that is a matter of no great moment, provided they are sufficient to distinguish one Corps from another. But let us now pass on to another sort of exercise, in which an army ought to be very ready and expert; and that is, the learning to move in due pace and distance, and to keep its ranks when it is in motion. The third kind of exercise is to teach the men to act as they should do, when they are actually engaged with an enemy; to discharge the Artillery, to draw it off; to cause the Velites extraordinary to begin the attack, and then to retire; to make the first line fall back into the second, as if it was hard pressed, and then the second into the third; and afterwards to resume their first Stations; and to use them so frequently to these and other such things, that every man may know every part of his duty, which will soon become easy and familiar to him by practice. The next exercise is to instruct your men in the nature of signals, and how to act by beat of drum, sound of trumpet, or particular motion of the Colours: for such orders as are given by word of mouth, they will easily understand. And as different notes and sounds are of great importance, and have various effects, I will tell you what sorts of military music were used by the Ancients. The Lacedæmonians, as Thucydides informs us, made use of Flutes in their armies, as the most proper instrument to make them move regularly and resolutely, but not with precipitation. The Carthaginians, for the same reason, used harps in their first attack:

attack : Halyattes, King of Lydia, made use of both : but Alexander the Great, and the Romans, used horns and trumpets, which they thought the fittest instruments to rouse the courage of their men, and inspire them with martial ardour. But as we have imitated both the Greeks and Romans in arming our men, we will also borrow our military music from each of those nations. The General then should have its trumpets about him, as the properest instruments to animate his army, and such as may be heard farther than any other. The Lieutenant Colonels and other officers of the Battalions should have small drums and flutes, not to be played upon as they commonly are, but in the same manner that they are sounded at great banquets and other festivities. With these trumpets the General may presently make his army understand when he would have it either halt, or advance, or retreat ; when he would have the Artillery discharged, and the Velites extraordinary move forwards ; and by various notes and sounds acquaint them with all the different manœuvres he thinks necessary to be made : which Signals should afterwards be repeated by the drums : and in this the whole army should frequently be exercised, because it is of the utmost consequence. As to the Cavalry, they may have trumpets too, but of a smaller size and different sound. This is all that occurs to my memory at present, as necessary for the forming and exercising an army.

LUIGI. I have but one question more to propose, and hope it will not tire your patience if I ask why the Velites extraordinary and light horse in the late battle began the attack with a great shout ? whereas there was a dead silence when the rest of the army began to engage. I confess I am at a loss to account for this, and therefore beg the favour of you to explain it to us.

FABRIZIO. Various are the opinions of ancient authors concerning this matter ; that is, whether

those

those that begin the battle should rush on with furious shouts and outcries, or march up to the attack with silence and composure. The latter way is certainly the most proper to preserve good order, and for hearing words of Command more distinctly; the former, to animate your own men, and dismay the enemy: and as I think some regard ought to be had to all these circumstances, I made one part of my army begin with a great shout; the other with profound silence. But I do not think a continual shout can be of any service, but quite the contrary; because it will prevent the General's orders from being heard, which must be attended with terrible consequences; nor it is reasonable to suppose the Romans used any such shouts after the first onset; as we read in many parts of their History, that when their armies were beginning to give way, it was often prevented by the exhortations and reproaches of their Commanders; and that their order of battle was sometimes changed even in the heat of action; which things could not have been done, if the Voice of the officers had been drowned in the shouts of the Soldiers.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

T H E

THE

ART OF WAR

BOOK IV.

THE CONTENTS.

Of several precautions and artifices that are to be made use of both in drawing up an army for battle, and in the action, and after it is over. The other ways of forming an Army. That a General ought never to hazard an engagement, except either he has an advantage over the enemy, or is compelled to it. Some rules to be observed by a General. How to avoid a Battle when the enemy is determined to engage at all events. In what manner Soldiers are to be animated to fight: and how their ardour is to be abated when it runs to high. That a General ought to be an Orator as well as a Soldier, and to harangue his men sometimes, in order to mould them to his particular purposes. That Religion animates Soldiers, and keeps them in their duty. That it is proper to inspire them with contempt of the enemy; and sometimes to lay them under a necessity of fighting bravely.

LUIGI. SINCE we have gained one glorious victory under my auspices, I do not care to tempt so fickle and inconstant a Deity Fortune any further: upon which account I desire to give up my post to Zanobi Buondelmonti (the young

youngest man in company who has not yet filled it) according to the order agreed upon ; and dare say he will accept that honour, (or rather trouble) both out of complaisance to me, and because he has naturally more courage and spirit than falls to my share, and will not be afraid of risquing another battle, in which he has a chance to be beaten as well as to conquer.

ZANOBI. Sir, I shall willingly accept whatever you think fit to confer upon me ; though I confess I had much rather have continued an Auditor : for the questions you proposed, and the objections you started, whilst you was in the post you now desire to resign, were much more pertinent and necessary than any that occurred to me. But not to throw away any more time in ceremonies, which perhaps may be disagreeable to Signor Fabrizio, let us intreat him to proceed, if we have not already trespassed too much upon his patience.

FABRIZIO. That I will do with great pleasure, especially as this change of persons will give me an opportunity of seeing the difference of your respective judgments and dispositions. But I should be glad to know whether you have any more questions to ask relating to the matter we were last engaged in.

ZANOBI. I could wish to be informed of three things before we quit it : in the first place, whether there be any other way of forming an army in order of battle that you can think of at present ? in the next, what precautions are necessary before a General leads his army on to engage the enemy ; and if any accident or disorder should happen during the battle, in what manner it is to be remedied ?

FABRIZIO. I will endeavour to give you what satisfaction I can in these points. But I shall not answer your questions separately and distinctly : because what I shall say in answer to one question may sometimes possibly serve likewise as an answer

to another.—I told you before, that I gave you a general order of battle, which you might easily change into any other, as the number and quality of the enemy, and the nature of your ground, shall require: for you must always act according to those circumstances. But let me desire you to remember that you cannot be guilty of a greater or more fatal error than in making a large extensive front, except your army be very numerous: for if it is not, you ought by all means to form it in such a manner that it may be deeper than it is wide. For when your army is not so large as that of the enemy, you must have recourse to other expedients, such as drawing it up so that it may be flanked by some river or morass, or securing it in that part by ditches and entrenchments to prevent it being surrounded, as Julius Cæsar used to do in his wars with the Gauls. But you must make it a general rule in such cases to contract or extend your front according to the number of your own men and those of the enemy; and when you are superior to them in that respect, you should endeavour to draw them into plains and open places, especially if your army is well disciplined, that so you may extend your front and surround them: for in rough and narrow places your superiority of number will not be of any great advantage to you, because you cannot give your ranks their due extent: upon which account, the Romans always made choice of clear open ground, and avoided such a field of battle as was rough and confined. On the contrary, if you have but a small army and ill-disciplined, you must seek out for an advantageous situation to shelter your men, and where their inexperience cannot be of much prejudice to you: it will be better still if it be upon an eminence, from whence you may fall down upon the enemy with greater weight. You should take care however not to draw up your army either upon the declivity of a hill, or any place near the skirts

of it, where an enemy may get above you : for in that case you will be much annoyed by their Artillery, and your men so embarrassed that you cannot annoy the enemy again with your own Cannon. Great regard is likewise to be had to the wind and sun in forming an army for battle : for if you have them in your face, one will dazzle your sight with its rays, the other will blind you with dust. Besides, when the wind is against you, it will diminish the force of your blows : and as to the sun, you must not only take care that it is not in your face when the battle begins, but that it may not afterwards be troublesome to you. For which purpose, you should contrive to have it full upon your back at first, if possible ; that so it may be a great while before it comes upon your face : as Hannibal did at Cannæ, and Marius when he defeated the Cimbrians. If you are inferior to the enemy in horse, post your army amongst vineyards and hedges, and other such impediments, when you have an opportunity ; as the Spaniards did not long ago, when they beat the French at Cirignuola in the Kingdom of Naples. It has likewise often happened that the same armies which have been beaten by others, have beat them again in their turn, only by changing their order and their ground : the Carthaginians, for instance, having been several times defeated by Marcus Regulus, in rough and narrow defiles, were at last victorious by the conduct of Xantippus the Lacedæmonian, who advised them to come down into the plains, where they availed themselves of their Elephants and Cavalry in such a manner, that they fairly beat the Romans. I have observed from the conduct of many great Generals amongst the Ancients, that when they knew where the enemy placed the main strength of their army, instead of employing the flower of their own forces, they appointed the worst they had to oppose them in that quarter, and the best of their

troops to oppose the worst of the enemy : but afterwards, when the battle was begun, they ordered their choicest troops not to press upon the enemy, but only to sustain the charge, and the weakest to retire by degrees into the rear of the army : for by these means the best part of the enemy's army is insensibly surrounded, and whilst they think themselves sure of a victory, they are presently thrown into confusion and routed. Thus, when Cornelius Scipio was sent into Spain against Asdrubal the Carthaginian, being aware that Asdrubal thought he would place the Legions (which were his best troops) in the center of his army, and that Asdrubal would therefore do the same ; when they came to an engagement, he changed his usual order of battle, placing the Legions in the two wings, and the worst of his forces in the center of his army. But just before the battle began, he ordered the center to move forwards very slowly, and the two wings to advance briskly : so that the wings only of both armies were engaged, whilst the center of each was at such a distance from one another, that they could not come together in due time ; and the strongest part of Scipio's army being engaged with the weakest of Asdrubal's, the latter was entirely defeated. This method might be practised in those times, but it cannot at present, now Artillery is in use : for the distance which must be left betwixt the center of each army would give the Artillery time to fire again and again, which would do as much mischief as if they were close engaged. It is time therefore lay it aside, and to have recourse to the method I prescribed a little while ago ; that is, to let the whole army engage, and the weakest part of it give way.—If your army is larger than that of the enemy, and you want to surround them without discovering your design, let your own be drawn up with a front equal to their's ; and afterwards, when the battle is begun, let your main body retire

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by little and little, and the wings extend themselves: by which the enemy will find themselves surrounded and entangled before they were aware of it. When a General would secure his army in such a manner that he may be almost certain of not being routed if he comes to an engagement, he should post it in some place from whence he may easily and presently retreat into a safe and defensible situation, as behind a morass, or amongst mountains, or into some strong fortress, whither the enemy cannot pursue him, though he may pursue them upon occasion: as Hannibal used to do in the ebb of his fortune, when he began to be afraid of Marcus Marcellus. Some Generals, in order to disturb and disconcert the enemy, have ordered their light-armed troops to begin the battle, and then to retire into their proper station again; and after both armies were warmly engaged, to sally out from the flanks again and make a second attack, which has sometimes succeeded so well, that the enemy has been thrown into disorder and routed by it. If you are inferior to the enemy in Horse (besides the methods already recommended) you should place a body of Pikemen in their rear; and in the heat of action, let the Horse open to the right and left to make way for the Pikemen to advance upon the enemy, which will certainly give you the advantage over them: some have accustomed part of their light-armed Infantry to mingle with their Horse, and to fight in conjunction with them, which has been of very great service to them. But of all those that have excelled in drawing up armies in order of battle, without doubt Hannibal and Scipio shewed the most consummate skill and abilities in the African wars: for as Hannibal's army consisted not only of Carthaginians, but Auxiliaries of various nations, he placed eighty Elephants in his front; next to them his Auxiliaries; behind them, his Carthaginians; and last of all, his Italians,

lians, in whom he put but little confidence. His design in this disposition was, that his Auxiliaries having the enemy in their front, and the Carthaginians in their rear, should not have an opportunity of running away if they were so inclined; but being under a necessity of fighting, he hoped they might either break or disconcert the Romans in such a manner, that when he advanced with a fresh body of his best troops, he might entirely defeat them. Scipio, on the other hand, drew up his three lines of Hastati, Principes, and Triarii (after the usual manner of the Romans) in such order that they might easily support or receive each other. In the front of his army, he left several intervals over against Hannibal's Elephants: but to make it appear close and united, he filled them up with Ve-
lites, whom he ordered to give way as soon as the Elephants advanced upon them, and retire through the ordinary spaces into the Legions, in order to leave a free passage for the Elephants: by which means he evaded the fury of those beasts, and coming to a close engagement with the enemy, entirely defeated them.

ZANOB. Now you mention that battle, I remember to have read in some account of it, that Scipio did not suffer the Hastati to retire into the line of the Principes, but caused them to file off to the right and left, and take post in the flanks of his army, to make room for the Principes to advance. Now I should be glad to know for what reason he deviated from the usual order and discipline of the Romans upon this occasion.

FABRIZIO. I will tell you. Hannibal had placed the strength of his army in the second line: Scipio therefore, in order to oppose him with equal force, joined his Principes and Triarii together, so that the intervals amongst the Principes being taken up by the Triarii, there was no room left to receive the Hastati: upon which account, he caused

caused them to open to the right and left, and wheel off to the flanks. But remember that this method of opening the first line to make room for the second to advance, cannot be made use of but when you have the advantage over the enemy; for then it may easily be put in practice, as it was by Scipio: but if you have the worst of the battle, and are repulsed, you cannot do it without exposing yourself to the danger of a total defeat: and therefore it is necessary to have intervals in the second and third lines, to receive your men upon such occasions.—But to return to our subject. The ancient Asiatics, amongst other inventions to annoy the enemy, had chariots with scythes fixed to their axletrees, which served not only to open the enemy's ranks, but to mow them down as they drove, through them. Now there were three ways of guarding against these dangerous machines: for the enemy either drew up in such close order, that they could make no impression upon them; or received them in the intervals betwixt the Battalions, as Scipio did the Elephants; or made some strong fence against them, as Sylla did in the battle he fought with Archelaus, who had a great number of these armed chariots: for he fixed several rows of sharp-pointed stakes or palisadoes in the ground before his first line, which stopped the career of the chariots, and prevented the execution they must otherwise have done. The new method which Sylla used in drawing up his army at that time, is likewise worthy of notice: for he placed his Velites and light horse in the rear, and all his heavy-armed men in the front, leaving several intervals in it, through which those in the rear might advance when occasion required; by which means he gained a complete victory.—In order to throw the enemy into confusion after the battle is begun, it is necessary to have recourse to some invention that may strike a terror into them: which may be done

either by spreading a report that you have succours coming up, or making a false shew of such supplies at a distance; which has often occasioned such a consternation in an army, that it has been presently defeated. This stratagem was put in a practice by the Roman Consuls, Minucius Ruffus and Accilius Glabrio: Caius Sulpicius likewise mounted a great number of sutlers and servants that followed his camp, upon mules, and other beasts that were of no service in battle; and having drawn them up and accoutred them like a body of horse, he ordered them to make their appearance upon a neighbouring hill, as soon as he was engaged with the Gauls; which had such an effect, that he soon routed them. The same was done by Marius, in a battle which he fought with the Germans.—If then these false alarms have such consequences in the heat of an action, what may not be expected from a real one; especially if the enemy is suddenly and unexpectedly attacked either in the flank or in the rear, when they are engaged in the front? But this is no easy matter to effect, except you are favoured in it by the nature of the country: for if it be plain and open, you cannot conceal such a body of your forces as is necessary upon such occasions*; but if it abound with woods or mountains, you may lie in ambush and fall suddenly upon an enemy, when he least expects it, and be assured of success.—It is sometimes likewise of great service in time of battle, to raise a report that the enemy's General is killed, or that one part of their army is giving way: and it has been no unusual thing to throw Cavalry into disorder by strange noises, and uncommon appearances: thus Cræsus brought a great number of Camels against the enemy's horde: and Pyrrhus

* And yet Hannibal found means to draw the Romans into a sort of an ambush in the middle of a plain, at the famous battle of Cannæ. See the account of that battle by Sir W. Raleigh, in his History of the World, book V. chap. 3.

made use of Elephants against that of the Romans, which occasioned great confusion and disturbance amongst them. The grand Signor, not long ago, routed the Sophi of Persia and the Sultan of Syria, merely by the use of muskets; the explosion of which struck such a terror into their Cavalry, that they ran away. The Spaniards, in their battles with Hamilcar, used to place carriages full of flax, and drawn by oxen, in the front of their armies; and setting fire to the flax as soon as the battle begun, the oxen were so frightened at it, that they rushed in amongst the enemy, and opened their ranks.—Where the nature of the country is such, that you cannot well draw the enemy into an ambush, you may however dig ditches and pit-falls in the plains, and cover them lightly over with brush wood and clods, leaving intervals of solid ground, through which you may retire yourself in the heat of the battle; and if the enemy pursues you, he is undone. If you are aware of any accident that happens during the action, which you think may dispirit your men, it is the best way either to conceal it, if you can, or to give it such a turn as may serve to produce a quite different effect, as Tullus Hostilius did, and after him Lucius Sylla, who seeing a body of his forces go over to the enemy he was engaged with, and that it had greatly discouraged his own men, immediately spread a report through his army, that it was done for a secret purpose, and by his own order: so that, instead of being daunted, they fought with more courage, and beat the enemy. The same Commander having sent a party of Soldiers upon some attack, in which they were all killed, and being afraid it might discourage the rest of his army, said in public, that he had sent them upon that errand on purpose to be cut off, because he knew they were a parcel of rascals and traitors. Sertorius, in a battle with the Spaniards, killed one of his own men

who brought him word that one of his Generals was slain; imagining that if he published it, it would strike a damp into his army.—It is a very difficult matter to stop an army that is beginning to run away, and to make it charge again: but here we must make a distinction betwixt one that is actually running, and another that is only inclining; for in the first case, it is almost impossible; in the second, there may be some remedy found. Some of the Roman Generals have done it by reproaching their Soldiers, and upbraiding them with cowardice, as we may instance in the conduct of Sylla, who seeing part of his Legions begin to fly before the army of Mithridates, rode up to the head of them with a drawn sword in his hand, and cried out, “If any body should enquire after your General, tell them you left him fighting in the plains of Bœotia.” Attilius the Roman Consul detached a body of his best troops to stop the flight of some others that were running away, and told them that if they did not turn back, they should be attacked by their own friends, as well as by the enemy. Philip of Macedon finding some of his troops were afraid of the Scythians, posted a body of Cavalry, in which he most confided, in the rear of his army, with orders to kill any man that offered to quit his rank: upon which, the rest chusing rather to hazard their lives in battle, than to be killed without mercy, if they fled, exerted their courage, and fought so manfully that they beat the Scythians *.

* Memorable was the behaviour of two Lacedæmonian Matrons to their Sons, when they had fled from battle, as it is recorded in two Greek Epigrams, of which the following are literal translations.

Fugiebat Lacon olim pugnam; obviam vero facta mater
Dixit, in pectus ense sublato,
Vivus quidem tuæ matri usque dedecus injungis,
Et Strenuæ Spartæ patrias leges solvis.
Si vero occideris meis manibus, mater quidem audiam
Infelix, sed in meâ patriâ conservatâ,

—Several

— Several of the Roman Generals have taken a pair of Colours out of the hands of an Ensign, in the heat of battle, and thrown it into the midst of the enemy, with a promise of a reward to those that should retake it : but this was done not so much to prevent their running away, as to create an emulation amongst their Soldiers, and encourage them to fight with great ardour. Having now spoken of such things as are necessary to be done, not only before a battle, but in the time of action, it may not be amiss perhaps to say something of what ought to be done after it is over ; especially as I shall be very brief in this point, which yet should not be omitted, because it is a part of our System.—I say then, that when you have gained a victory, you ought by all means to pursue it, and to imitate Julius Cæsar rather than Hannibal in that respect ; the latter of whom lost the Empire of the World, by trifling away his time at Capua, after he had routed the Romans at the battle of Cannæ. Cæsar, on the other hand, never rested after a victory, but always pursued and harassed the enemy after they were broken and flying, with greater vigour and fury than he attacked them at first.—But when a General happens to lose a battle, he is to consider in the first place, how to make the best of his loss ; particularly if he has any considerable force left. Perhaps he may reap some advantage, either from the neglect, or tardiness, or inadvertency of the enemy : for after a victory, Soldiers often grow too remiss and secure, and give the army they have beaten an opportunity of beating them in their turn ; as L. Marcius did the Carthaginians, who having slain the two Scipio's in battle, and defeated their armies, made little account of the forces that were

Mater filium desertorem pugnæ post mortem Sociorum
Occidit, partus-dolorum recordationem aspernata :
Legitimum etenim Sanguinem discernit Lacedæmon
Virtute prælantium, non genere infantium.

left

left under the command of Marcius, till they were attacked and routed by him. Hence we see, that nothing is so easy to effect, as what the enemy imagines you will never attempt; and that men are frequently in the greatest danger, when they think themselves most secure. But if a General can reap no sort of advantage from his first loss, he should by all means endeavour at least to make it as light and supportable as he can, and to prevent any further damage: for which purpose, he ought to use every method either to divide or retard the enemy, if they pursue him. In the first case, some, when they were aware they could stand their ground no longer, have ordered their inferior Commanders to separate and retreat with their forces by different ways to some appointed rendezvous; which has made the enemy afraid of dividing his forces, and suffer all or most of them to escape: in the second, many have suffered the best of their baggage and effects to fall into the enemy's hands upon the road, that so whilst they were busy in plundering and ransacking that, they might have time to save themselves. The artifice made use of by Titus Dimius, to conceal the loss he had sustained in battle, is not unworthy of notice: for after he had fought from morning till night, and had a great number of his men killed, he caused most of them to be buried in the night: so that the next day, when the enemy saw so many of their own men, and so few of the Romans killed, they looked upon themselves as worsted, and immediately began to retreat.—And now I think I have in a great measure answered your questions; though not so distinctly and particularly perhaps, as you expected. It is true, I have something yet to add concerning the method of forming armies in order of battle: as some Generals have drawn up their forces in the shape of a wedge, with its edge in the front; imagining that form to be the best adapted to penetrate and open

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the ranks of an enemy. To provide against this, the other side commonly drew up their army in the form of a pair of open shears, to receive the wedge in the vacuity, and so to surround and attack it on every side. Upon this occasion, let me recommend a general rule to you : which is, that in order to frustrate any of your enemy's designs, it is the best way to do that of yourself, which he endeavours to force you to : for then you may proceed in a cool and orderly manner, and turn that to your advantage, which he intended as the means of your ruin : but if you are compelled to it, you will surely be undone. To confirm the truth of this, it is needless to repeat what I have said before : for when the enemy advances in a wedge, with a design to open, and as it were to cleave your army asunder, if you open it yourself in the form abovementioned, it is certain you must cut him to pieces, and he cannot much hurt you. Hannibal placed Elephants in the front of his army, to break in upon that of Scipio : but Scipio having opened a way for them himself, gained a complete victory by it. Asdrubal likewise posted the flower of his army in the center of his front, for the same purpose : but Scipio ordering his front to open and file off, disappointed his intention, and defeated him : so that when such designs are known, they are generally frustrated, and prove the ruin of the contrivers,

I think I have likewise something left to say, relating to the precautions which a General should make use of before he leads on his army to battle : for, in the first place, I am of opinion, that he should never come to engagement, except he either has an advantage over the enemy, or is compelled to it. Now the advantage may arise from the nature of the ground, the order, superiority, or bravery of his army : and he may be compelled to engage, by a conviction, that if he does not, he must inevitably be ruined : which may happen, either when he has

no money to pay his troops, and they begin to mutiny and talk of disbanding ; or when he has no provisions left, and must otherwise be starved ; or when he knows the enemy daily expects to be reinforced : for without doubt, in such circumstances, he ought always to engage ; because it is better to try your fortune whilst there is any chance of victory (though ever so small) than to sit still and be sure to be undone. It is therefore as great a fault in a General not to hazard an engagement upon such occasions, as if he had a fair opportunity of gaining a victory, and neglected it, either out of ignorance or cowardice. Some advantages may result from the negligence and misconduct of the enemy ; and others from your own vigilance and good conduct : many armies have been routed in passing rivers, by an enemy, who has waited till one half of them have been transported, and then fallen upon them ; as Cæsar did upon the Swiss, when he cut off a fourth part of their army, which was separated from the rest by a river they had passed. Sometimes an enemy is so jaded and fatigued by too rash and hasty pursuit, that if your men have had a little time to rest and refresh themselves, you have nothing to do but to face about and gain a victory. If an enemy offers you battle early in the morning, you ought not to draw out your army to fight him immediately ; but rather to let his men wait under arms for some hours, till their ardour is abated, and then to come out of your entrenchments and engage him, as Scipio and Metellus did in Spain ; the former, when he had Asdrubal upon his hands, and the latter Sertorius. If the enemy has diminished his strength either by dividing his army (as the Scipios did in Spain) or upon any other occasion, you ought by no means to omit that opportunity of fighting him. Most prudent Generals have chosen rather to receive the enemy, than to attack them : because the fury of the first shock is easily sustained by men

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that stand firm and resolute, and ready prepared in their ranks : and when that is over, their fury commonly subsides into languor and despair.

By proceeding in this manner, Fabius routed both the Samnites and the Gauls : but Decius, his Colleague, taking the other course, was defeated and slain *. Some Generals, who have thought the enemy superior to them, have chosen to defer a battle till the evening ; that so if they should be worsted, they might save themselves under shelter of the night : others who have known that the enemy would not fight at particular times, out of reverence to the laws of their Religion, have taken that opportunity to attack and defeat them : of which advantage Julius Cæsar availed himself against Ariovistus in Gaul, and Vespasian against the Jews in Syria. But above all things, a General shoud take care to have men of approved fidelity, wisdom, and long experience in military affairs, near his person, as a sort of Council ; from whom he may learn, not only the state of his own army, but that of the enemy's ; as which of them is superior to the other in number ; which of them is the better armed and disciplined ; which of them is the stronger in Cavalry ; which of his own troops are fittest to undergo hard service and fatigue ; and whether his Infantry or Cavalry are likely to be of most service. Let them well consider the nature of the country where they are ; whether it be more advantageous to the enemy or themselves ; which of the two can be most conveniently furnished with provisions and other supplies ; whether it be better to come to an engagement directly, or to defer it ; and what advantage or disadvantage may accrue from time : for it sometimes happens, that when Soldiers see a war protracted, and a battle put off from time to time, they lose their ardour, and become so weary of hardships,

* See Pol. Disc. Book III. Chap. xlvi.

that

that they grow mutinous and desert their Colours. It is likewise of great importance to know the qualities and disposition of the Enemy's General, and of those that are about him; for instance, whether he is bold and enterprizing, or cautious and timid. He should next consider how far he can confide in his Auxiliaries; and be particularly careful not to bring his army to an engagement, if he perceives his men are in the least dispirited or diffident of victory: for it is a bad omen indeed, when they think an enemy invincible. In such circumstances, you must either endeavour to avoid a battle, by following the example of Fabius Maximus (who always took the advantage of situations where Hannibal durst not attack him) or, if you think the enemy will attack you, how advantageous soever your situation may be, you must entirely quit the field, and canton your forces in different towns and fortresses, to tire him out with sieges and blockades.

ZANOB. Is there no other way of avoiding an engagement?

FABRIZIO. I think I told some of you in a conversation we once had before upon this very point, that an army in the field cannot possibly avoid an engagement, if the enemy is determined to fight it at all events; except it suddenly decamps, and removes to the distance of fifty and sixty miles, and always keeps retreating as they advance *. Fabius Maximus never refused to fight Hannibal: but did no chuse to do it without an advantage; and Hannibal, considering the manner in which he always took care to fortify himself, was too wise to force him to it: but if Fabius had been attacked, he must either have fought him at all events, or run away.

Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus, being at war with the Romans, encamped upon the top

* See Pol. Disc. book III. chap. x.

of a very high hill, to avoid coming to an engagement with them: but they attacked and routed him there. Cingetorex*, General of the Gauls, retreated to a considerable distance, that he might not be obliged to fight the Roman army, commanded by Julius Cæsar, who had suddenly passed a river that was betwixt them, contrary to his expectation. The Venetians in the late wars, might have avoided a battle with the French, if they had marched away from them (as Cingetorex did from Cæsar) instead of waiting till they passed the Adda: but they neither took the opportunity of attacking them whilst they were passing that river, nor could they afterwards retreat; for the French were then so close at their heels, that as soon as the Venetians began to decamp, the French fell upon them and defeated them. In short, there is no other way of avoiding a battle, if the enemy is fully determined to bring you to one: and therefore it is to no purpose to alledge the example of Fabius Maximus; for in that case, Hannibal avoided an engagement as much as Fabius.—It often happens, that Soldiers are eager to engage, when (considering the superiority of the enemy, the nature of the ground, or some other circumstances) you are convinced you cannot do it without disadvantage, and therefore would willingly decline a battle: it may likewise happen, that either necessity may oblige, or opportunity invite you, to engage when you find your Soldiers dispirited and adverse to it; in one of which cases, it is necessary to repress their ardour, and in the other to excite it. In the first, when persuasion and exhortations have no effect, it is the best way to let some part of them be roughly handled by the enemy; that so, both those who have suffered, and those who have not, may learn to be more tractable and conformable to

* The Author is guilty of a little mistake here; it was not Cingetorex, but Vercingetorex. See Cæs. Com. de Bello Gallico. lib. VII. cap. xxxv.

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your will another time: for what was the effect of chance in the army of Fabius Maximus, may be done on purpose by any other Commander, upon a like occasion. It happened, that not only the General of his Cavalry, but all the rest of his army, were very impatient to fight Hannibal; though Fabius himself was utterly against it: which dissension grew to such a height, that at last they divided the army betwixt them. Fabius, with his troops, kept close in his entrenchments; the other went out and engaged the enemy, but would have been entirely defeated, if Fabius had not at last marched out to his succour: from which example, both the General of his Cavalry, and all the rest of the army, were convinced, that it would have been wiser to have submitted to the opinion of Fabius.—As to the means of animating your men, and inflaming them with a desire to engage, it would be a good way, in the first place, to exasperate them against the enemy, to tell them they are despised, to insinuate that you have corrupted some of their officers, and hold a private correspondence with them, to encamp in a situation where you may daily see what they are doing, and now and then take an opportunity of skirmishing with them: for things that are often seen, at last become familiar, and are but little regarded *. If these measures fail, you should treat them with disdain, and harangue them in a weighty and pathetic manner, upbraiding them with cowardice, and endeavouring to make them ashamed of themselves, by telling them, that if the rest have not courage enough to follow you, you will take such or such a Regiment, which you know you can depend upon, and fight the enemy with that alone †. But to make your men the bolder and more courageous and resolute, you ought above all things, to take care that they may neither send any

* See Pol. Disc. book III. chap. xxxvii.

† As Cæsar and Alexander did.

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of their money or plunder away to their own houses, or deposite it in any other place of safety, till the war is over: that so they may be assured, that if they run away, they may save their lives perhaps, but must certainly lose their treasure; the love of which most commonly operates as strongly upon men as that of their life.

ZANOBI. You say that Soldiers should be animated to fight by haranguing them: would you harangue the whole army then, or the officers only?

FABRIZIO. It is an easy matter to induce a few people either to do a thing or to let it alone; for if arguments are not sufficient, you make use of force and authority: but the great difficulty is to make a whole army change their resolution, when the execution of it must either be of prejudice to the public, or thwart your own private schemes and designs; because in that case, you can avail yourself of nothing but words, which must be heard and considered by the whole army, if you would have the whole army affected by them. For this reason, it is necessary that a General should be an Orator as well as a Soldier: for if he does not know how to address himself to the whole army, he will sometimes find it no easy task to mould it to his purposes. But there is not the least attention shewn to this point at present. Read the Life of Alexander the Great, and you will see how often he was obliged to harangue his troops; which otherwise he should never have conducted (rich and loaded with spoil) through the desarts of India and Arabia, where they underwent every sort of hardship and fatigue. Many things may prove the ruin of an army, if the General does not frequently harangue his men: for by that, he may dispel their fears, enflame their courage, confirm their resolution, point out the snares that are laid for them, promise them rewards, inform them of danger, and the way to escape it, rebuke, entreat, threaten,


praise, reproach, or encourage, and avail himself of all other arts that can either excite or allay the passions and appetites of mankind. If any Prince or Republic, therefore, would make their armies respectable, they should accustom their Generals to harangue the men, and the men to listen to their Generals.—Religion likewise, and the oath which Soldiers took when they were enlisted, very much contributed to make them do their duty in former times: for upon any default, they were threatened not only with human punishments, but the vengeance of the Gods *. They had also several other religious ceremonies, which had a very good effect in all their enterprizes; and would have still in any place where Religion is held in due reverence. Sertorius well knew this, and used to have conferences with a Hind, which he said was sent by the Gods to assure him of victory. Sylla pretended to converse with an image he had taken out of the temple of Apollo; and several have given out that some God or other has appeared to them in dreams and visions, and commanded them to fight the enemy. In the days of our Ancestors, when Charles VII. of France was at war with the English, he pretended to be advised in every thing by a Virgin sent from Heaven, commonly called *the Virgin of France*†; which gained him many a victory.—It is proper also to teach your men to hold the enemy in contempt, as Agesilaus the Spartan did: who having taken some of the Persians caused them to be stripped naked and shewn to his Soldiers, that so when they had seen the delicacy of their bodies, they might despise them. Some Commanders have laid their men under a necessity of fighting, by depriving them of all means of saving themselves, except by victory, which is certain

* See Politic. Disc. book I. chap. xi. xii. xiii. xiv. xv.

† Or the Maid of Orleans.

ly the best method of making them fight desperately : and this resolution is heightened, either by the confidence they have in themselves, their arms and armour, their discipline, good order, and the victories they have lately gained, or by the esteem they have for their General, which arises rather from the opinion they have of his valour and conduct, than from any particular favour they have received of him *; or by the love of their country, which is natural to all men. There are various other methods of laying them under the necessity of fighting, but that is the strongest and most powerful, which leaves men no other alternative but either to conquer or die.

* See Pol. Disc. book III. chap. xii. xxxiii. xxxviii.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK,

THE
ART OF WAR.

BOOK V.

THE CONTENTS.

In what order the Romans used to march through an enemy's country; and how an army ought to be drawn up for that purpose. How to reduce an army into order of battle immediately: and to form it in such a manner that it may be able to defend itself on any side, in case of a sudden attack. Concerning orders that are to be given by word of mouth, beat of drum, or sound of trumpet. Of Pioneers, and the Provisions that are necessary for an army. In what manner the Ancients divided the spoil taken from the enemy amongst their Soldiers. How to discover Ambuscades upon a march. That a General ought to be well acquainted with the country through which he is to pass; and to keep his design secret. What means are to be taken for that purpose. Some other precautions that are necessary upon a march. How to avoid an engagement, if the enemy presses hard upon you, as you are going to pass a river; and in what manner rivers may be passed with safety. How some Generals have escaped when they have been shut up in a pass, or surrounded by the enemy.

FABRIZIO. **I** Have shewn you how an army ought to be formed that is going to engage, how an enemy may be defeated, and many other

other circumstances on this subject which may happen through various accidents and occurrences. It is now time therefore, I think, to inform you in what manner I would have an army drawn up, which has not an enemy actually in sight, but expects to be attacked on a sudden ; particularly when it is marching either through an enemy's country, or one that is suspected of favouring the enemy.—

You must know then, in the first place, that the Roman Generals usually sent some troops of horse before their armies to reconnoitre the country, and scour the roads : after them came the right wing, with the carriages and baggage belonging to it in its rear : then followed one of the legions with its carriages ; and next to that, the other in the same manner : last of all, came the left wing with its baggage, and the rest of the horse in the rear of all. This was the order which they commonly observed upon a march ; and if they were attacked either in the front or rear, they immediately caused all the carriages to be drawn off to the right or left, as best suited their convenience, and the nature of the ground would admit ; after which, the whole army, being freed from that incumbrance, faced about to the enemy. If they were attacked on the right flank, they drew off the carriages to the left, and vice versa, converting the flank that was attacked into a front. This being a very good method, in my opinion, I think it is worthy of imitation ; and therefore, upon the like occasions, I would always send my light horse before the army to reconnoitre the country, and scour the roads : the four Regiments of which it consists should march next, one after another ; every one of them having its own baggage in its rear. And as there are two sorts of baggage, viz. that which belongs to individuals, and that which is for the use of the army in general, I would divide the latter into four parts, and assign one fourth of it to the care of every Regiment: the

Artillery, Sutlers, and others who attended the camp, should also be distributed amongst them in the same manner; that so every Regiment might have an equal share of these impediments. But as it sometimes happens, that you march through a country, which instead of being suspected, is professedly your enemy, and where you hourly expect to be attacked, you will then be obliged to change the form and order of your march for greater security; and to draw up your men in such a manner that neither the peasants nor the enemy's army may find you unprepared to receive them on any side, if they should make a sudden attack upon you. In such cases, the Roman Generals used to form their armies into an oblong square, so that they might defend themselves on every side, and be ready to fight as well as to march: and I confess I like that disposition so well, that I would follow their example in drawing up the two Regiments I have taken for the model of an army, in the same manner upon the like occasions: that is, in an oblong square with a hollow in the middle of it, or four hundred and twenty-four feet on every side. My flanks then would be that distance from one another; in each of which, I would place five Battalions in the rear of each other, with an interval of six feet betwixt every one of them: so that these Battalions would take up the space of four hundred and twenty-four feet in depth, including the intervals betwixt them; every Battalion being supposed to take up eighty feet. In the front and rear of the hollow square, I would place the other ten Battalions; that is, five of them in the front of it, and five in the rear; in such a manner that four of them abreast of each other should be next to the front of the right flank, and four drawn up in the same manner next to the rear of the left, with an interval of eight feet betwixt every one of them: another I would post next to the front of the left flank, in a line

line with the four first, and another next to the rear of the right, in a line also with the four others there. Now as the distance from one flank to another is four hundred and twenty-four feet, and the Battalions posted in front of the square (including the intervals betwixt them) will take up no more than two hundred and seventy-four feet, there will remain a vacant space of one hundred and fifty feet betwixt the four Battalions on the right, and the single one on the left. There will also be the same room left betwixt the Battalions in the rear without any difference ; except that the space in the front will be near the left flank, and that in the rear near the right. In the former of these, I would place my ordinary Velites, and my extraordinary in the latter, which would not amount to quite a thousand in each space.—But to order it so that the hollow square in the middle of the army should be completely four hundred and twenty-four feet on every side, care must be taken that neither the five Battalions that are posted in the front, nor the other five in the rear may take up any part of the space that is included betwixt the flanks : for which purpose, the last men on the right and left of the first rank of the Battalions in the rear should be close (not in a right line, but rather obliquely) with the innermost man in the last rank of each flank : and the last man on the right and left of the last rank of the Battalions in the front, should be close (in the same manner) with the innermost man in the first rank of each flank ; and then there will be a space left at every angle of the army large enough to receive a body of three hundred and thirty-three Pikemen extraordinary : but as there would still be two more corps of Pikemen extraordinary left, each consisting of three hundred and thirty-four men, I would draw them up in a square form in the middle of the area within the army ; at the head of which, the General himself, with his proper Officers

ficers and attendants, should take post. Now though these Battalions thus drawn up march all in one direction, but may be obliged to fight on any side, you must take care to qualify them properly for that purpose : and therefore the five first Battalions being secured on all sides but in their front, must be formed with their Pikemen in their foremost ranks. The five last Battalions are likewise covered on every side, except their rear ; and therefore they must be formed with their Pikemen in their rearmost ranks. For the same reason each flank should also have its Pikemen in the outermost ranks. The Corporals and other Officers should take their proper posts at the same time ; that so when the enemy comes to engage, every corps, and every member of that corps, may be in its due place, according to the order and method I described before, when I was speaking of ranging an army in order of battle. The Artillery I would distribute along each flank ; the light horse should be sent before to reconnoitre the country and scour the roads : and the Gens d'Armes I would post in the rear of each flank, at the distance of eighty feet from the Battalions. For it should be a general rule in drawing up an army, always to post your horse either on the flanks or in the rear : because, if you post them in the front, you must either do it at such a distance from the army, that if they should be repulsed by the enemy, they may have time and room enough to wheel off without falling foul upon your Infantry, or you must leave proper intervals in the front to receive them in such a manner as not to disorder the rest of your forces. This is a matter that deserves to be well remembered ; for many who have neglected these precautions have been thrown into disorder, and routed by their own men. The carriages, sutlers, and other unarmed people who follow the camp, should be placed in the hollow square, and so ranged that any person

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upon occasion may have a free passage through them, either from the front to the rear, or from one flank to another. The depth of the whole army, when the Battalions are thus disposed, will be five hundred and eighty-four feet from front to rear, exclusive of the horse and artillery : and as it is composed of two Regiments, it must be considered how each of them is to be posted. Now since the Regiments are distinguished by their respective marks and numbers, and each of them consists of ten Battalions and a Colonel, the five first Battalions of the first Regiment should be posted in the front of the army, and the other five in the left flank ; in the angle of which, on the inside, the Colonel of it should take his station : after which, the five first Battalions of the second Regiment should be placed in the right flank, and the other five in the rear, with their Colonel in the angle which they make there. When the army is thus formed, you are to put it in motion, and to observe this order during your whole march ; which will effectually secure you against any tumultuary attack from the people of the country. All other provisions for that purpose are unnecessary, except you shall think fit now and then to send a troop or two of light horse, or a party of Velites to drive them away : for such sort of disorderly people are so afraid of regular forces, that they will never come within reach of their pikes, much less of their swords ; but may set up a great shout perhaps, and make a feint of attacking you, like a parcel of curs barking at a mastif which they dare not venture to come near. Thus Hannibal all the while he was traversing Gaul to invade Italy, made little or no account of the country people.—For the sake of convenience and expedition upon a march, you should send Pioneers before the army to make a clear passage for it : and these Pioneers should be covered by the light horse that are sent forwards to reconnoitre

noitre the country. In this order an army will march ten miles in a day with great ease, and have time enough to encamp and refresh itself before it is dark; for the usual march of an army is about twenty miles a day.—If you should happen to be attacked by a regular army, it cannot be so suddenly but you will have sufficient time to put yourself in a proper posture of defence: because such an army must move in an orderly manner, and therefore you will be able to draw up your forces, either in the form I have been describing, or in some other of the like nature. For if you are attacked in the front, you have nothing to do but to draw your Artillery from the flanks, and your horse out of the rear, and to post them in the places and at the distances I just now recommended. The thousand Velites in the front may advance; and having divided themselves into two bodies of five hundred in each, let them take place betwixt the horse and each wing of the army. The void which they leave may be filled with the two Corps of Pikemen extraordinary, which were posted in the middle of the hollow square. The Velites extraordinary, which were in the rear, may divide into two bodies, and range themselves along each flank of the Battalions to strengthen them; and all the carriages, sutlers, &c. may draw off through the open space, which will then be left into the rear of the Battalions. The hollow square being thus left empty, let the five Battalions, which were in the rear, march up through the vacancy betwixt each flank towards the front; three of them advancing till they come within eighty feet of those in the front, and the other two halting at the same distance in their rear, with proper intervals betwixt them all. All this may be done in a very little time; and then your order of battle will much resemble the first and principal of those which I recommended some time ago: and if it be closer in the front, it is likewise grosser in the flanks,

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ranks, which will make it so much the stronger. But as the five Battalions in the rear had posted their Pikemen in their last ranks for the reasons abovementioned, it will be necessary upon this occasion to place them in their foremost ranks, in order to support the front of the army: for which purpose, they must either wheel to the right or left about (Battalion by Battalion) all at once, and like one solid body, or the Pikemen must pass through the ranks of the Targetmen, and place themselves in the front of them, which is a much more expeditious way than the other, and subject to less disorder. The same must be done upon any attack, in all parts of the army where the Pikemen are in the rear of the Targets, as I shall shew you. If the enemy presents himself in the rear, you have nothing more to do than to make your whole army face about to that part, and then your rear immediately becomes the front, and your front the rear: after which, you must observe all the directions in forming that front, which I gave you before. If the enemy is likely to fall upon your right flank, the whole army must turn its face that way, and make the front there, as I have already said; taking care to place your Cavalry, Velites, and Artillery according to that disposition; in which alterations there is but little difference, excepting in the distance betwixt each flank, and that which there is betwixt the front and the rear. It is true, that in converting the right flank into the front, the Velites which are to fill the space betwixt the horse and the wings of the army, should be those that are nearest the left flank; and the two corps of Pikemen in the area should advance to fill their places: but before they do that, the carriages, &c. should quit the area, and retire through the open left by the Velites behind the left flank, which will then become the rear of the army. The other Velites, which were posted in the rear, should keep their place,

place, that so no opening may be left, because that which was the rear before, will now become the right flank : all the other necessary manœuvres in this case must be conducted in the manner already prescribed. What has been said of making a front of the right flank may be applied to the left ; the like manœuvres and disposition are to be made upon that occasion. If the enemy be so numerous and drawn up in such a manner that he may attack you on two sides at once, you must strengthen them from those quarters which are not attacked, by doubling their ranks, and dividing all the Artillery, Velites, and Cavalry betwixt them. But if he attacks you on three or four sides at the same time either he or you must be very imprudent; for surely no wise General would ever expose himself to be attacked on so many sides at once by a powerful and well-ordered army ; and on the other hand, the enemy cannot do it with success, except his army be so numerous that he can spare almost as many men as your whole army consists of to attack you on every side. If then you are so indiscreet as to venture yourself in an enemy's country, or any other place where you may be attacked by an army three times as strong, and as well-disciplined as your own, you have nobody to blame but yourself, if any misfortune happens to you : but if the misfortune be not owing to your own imprudence, but to some strange and unexpected accident, you may save your reputation, though you are totally ruined by it, which was the case of Scipio in Spain, and Asdrubal in Italy. But if the enemy is not much stronger than you are, and attacks you on two or three sides at once, in hopes of throwing you into disorder, this is his error and your advantage : because in this case, he must weaken himself so much, that you may easily sustain the charge in one place, and attack him vigorously yourself in another ; by which he must of consequence be defeated.—This method

of drawing up an army therefore, against an enemy who is not actually in sight, but may yet attack you on a sudden, is very necessary; and it is of great importance to accustom your Soldiers not only to be formed and to march in this order, but to prepare themselves for battle, as if they were going to be attacked in the front, and then to fall into their former order again, and move forwards: after which, they should be shewn how the rear or either of the flanks may be converted into the front, and then reduced into their first arrangement: all which must be often practised, if you would have your army ready and expert in these exercises. This is a point which all Princes and Commanders should carefully attend to: for military discipline consists chiefly in knowing how to command and execute these things; and that only can be called a good and well-disciplined army, which is perfect in the practice of them: and if such a one was now in being, I think it would not be possible to find another that could beat it. If it be said that the forming an army in these squares is attended with a good deal of trouble and difficulty, I allow it; but as it is very necessary, the difficulty must be got over by frequent exercise; and when that is one done, all other parts of military discipline will seem light and easy.

ZANOB. I agree with you that these things are highly necessary, and think you have explained them so well, that nothing material has either been omitted, or can be added. There are two other points however, in which I should be glad to be satisfied: in the first place, when you would convert either the rear or one of the flanks into the front of your army, and the men are to face about to that part, are they to do it by word of command, or by beat of drum, or some other signal? In the next, whether those whom you sent before your army to clear the roads and make a free passage for it, should

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be Soldiers belonging to your Battalions, or other sort of people appointed on purpose for that service?

FABRIZIO. Your first question is very pertinent; for many armies have been thrown into great confusion, when the General's orders have either not been heard, or mistaken: such orders therefore should be very clear and intelligible, especially upon important occasions: and if they are signified either by beat of drum or sound of trumpet, it should be done in so distinct a manner, that one note or sound cannot be mistaken for another: but if they are delivered by word of mouth, you should take great care not only to avoid general terms, and to make use of particular ones, but even in those, not to hazard any that may admit of a double interpretation. Some armies have been ruined by their Officers crying out, Give way, give way, instead of Retreat; which should be a sufficient warning never to make use of that expression again. If you want to convert either the rear or one of the flanks into the front, and would have your men turn their faces that way, do not say Turn ye, but Face about to the right, the left, or the rear, as the occasion requires. In like manner all other words of Command should be plain and simple, as, Charge home, Stand fast, Advance, Retreat, &c. and if orders can be delivered clearly and distinctly by word of mouth, let them be given that way; if not, make use of a drum or trumpet.—As to Pioneers, I would depute some of my own Soldiers for that service; not merely because the Ancients used to do so, but that I might have the fewer unarmed people, and consequently the fewer incumbrances in my army: for which reason, I would take as many as I wanted out of every Battalion, who should leave their arms and accoutrements to be taken care of by the men in the next ranks to them, and be furnished with axes, mattocks, spades, and other necessary implements of that kind: so that when the enemy approached the

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might presently return to their respective ranks in the army, and take up their arms again.

ZANOB. But who must carry their pioneering implements?

FABRIZIO. The carriages appointed for that purpose.

ZANOB. I doubt you would not be able to make your Soldiers do that sort of work.

FABRIZIO. Very easily, as I will convince you before we part : but let us wave that matter at present, if you please, because I will tell you in the first place, how I would supply them with provisions : for as we have pretty well fatigued them I suppose with so much exercise, it is now high time to give them a little refreshment.—All Princes and Commanders should take particular care that their armies may be as light and little encumbered as possible ; that so they may be at all times fit and ready for any enterprize or expedition. Now the difficulties occasioned either by the want or too great plenty of provisions, may be reckoned amongst the most considerable that are incident to an army.

The Ancients did not give themselves much trouble about furnishing their troops with wine : for when they came into countries where there was none to be had, they drank water with a little vinegar in it to give it a taste : so that instead of wine, they always carried vinegar along with them. They did not bake their bread in ovens, as is usual in towns : for every Soldier had a certain allowance of meal or flour, and lard, which being kneaded together, made a very good and nourishing bread. They used likewise to carry a sufficient quantity of oats and barley for their horses and other cattle : for they had herds of oxen, and flocks of sheep and goats, which were driven after the army, and therefore did not occasion any great embarrassment. To these precautions it was owing that their armies would sometimes march for many days together, through

through desert countries and rugged defiles, without distress or difficulty. On the contrary, our modern armies, which can neither live without wine nor eat any bread but what is baked and made as it is in towns (of which they cannot carry a quantity sufficient for any long time) must often either be reduced to great distress, or obliged to provide themselves with those necessaries in a manner that must be very troublesome and expensive. I would therefore re-establish this method in my army, and not suffer any sort of bread to be eaten by the Soldiers but what they make themselves: as to wine I should not prohibit the use of it, if any was brought into the camp; but I would not take the least pain to procure it for them: in all other things likewise relating to provisions, I would follow the example of the Ancients, by which many difficulties and inconveniences might be avoided, and many great advantages gained in an expedition.

ZANOBIA. We have beat the enemy in a field battle, and afterwards marched our army into his territories, it is but reasonable now that we should make our advantage of it by plundering his country laying the towns under contribution, and taking prisoners. But first I should be glad to know how the Ancients proceeded upon such occasions.

FABRIZIO. I take it for granted (as we had some conversation upon this matter once before) that you will allow that wars, as they are conducted at present, impoverish not only those that are beaten, but those also that are conquerors; for if one side loses its territories, the other is at an immense expense in gaining them: which was not the case former times, when the Conqueror was always enriched by the victory. The reason of this is, that the plunder is not now brought to account, as used to be formerly, but left wholly to the discretion of the Soldiers, which occasions two very great disorders, one of which I have already mentioned

the other is; that it makes the Soldiers so greedy of spoil; that they lay aside all regard to order and military discipline: from which it has often happened, that the Conqueror has had the victory snatched out of his hands. The Romans, however, who were very attentive to this point, provided against both these inconveniences, by ordering that all the plunder should belong to the public, who should afterwards dispose of it as they thought fit. For this purpose, they had public officers attending their armies, whom they called Questors or Treasurers, in whose hands all the booty taken in war was deposited; out of which, the Consul paid the Soldiers, defrayed the expences of the sick and wounded, and all other necessary charges of the army. The Consul indeed had a power of distributing some part of the plunder amongst the Soldiers, and he often did; but this was not attended with any ill consequence: for when the enemy was conquered, all the spoil that had been taken from them was placed in the middle of the army, and a certain proportion of it given to the Soldiers, according to their rank and merit. This custom made them more intent upon victory than plunder: for after the legionary Soldiers had defeated the enemy, they never pursued them, nor even so much as stirred out of their ranks, the Cavalry, and other light-armed forces, being employed for that purpose: for if the plunder was to have been the property of the first men that laid hold of it, it would neither have been reasonable or possible to have kept the Legions firm and quiet in their ranks; and therefore such a measure must have been of very bad consequence. Hence it came to pass that the public was enriched by a victory, as every Consul, when he entered Rome in triumph at his return from the wars, always brought with him the greatest part of the treasure which he had amassed by contributions

and plundering the enemy, into the common Stock.—The Ancients acted very wisely in another point relating to this matter: for they ordered the third part of every man's pay to be lodged in the hands of the Standard-bearer of his Corps, who were not to be accountable for it till the end of the war. This seems to have been done for two reasons: the first place to save their money, which they otherwise might have squandered away in idle and unnecessary expences, as most young men are apt to do when they have too much in their pockets: and the next, to make them more resolute and obstinate in defending their Colours, as they must know that if the Standard was taken, they should lose all their arrears.—A due observation of these Institutions, I think, would very much contribute to revive the ancient military discipline amongst us.

ZANOB. When an army is upon a march, it must certainly be exposed to many dangerous accidents, to obviate and avert which, the utmost sagacity and abilities of the General, as well as the most determined bravery of the Soldiers, are necessary to be exerted. You would much oblige us, Sir, if you would point out those occasions.

FAERIZIO. I shall very willingly comply with your request, since these things are absolutely necessary to be known by one that is desirous of being perfectly instructed in the Art of War. A General then ought above all things to beware of Ambuscades, whilst his army is upon a march; into which he may either happen to fall, or be cunningly drawn by the enemy before he is aware. To prevent this, he should send out strong parties to reconnoitre the country, and be particularly circumspect if it abounds with woods and mountains, because these are the fittest places for Ambuscades, which sometimes prove the destruction of a whole army, without

the General is not aware of them ; but can do him no harm when he is. Flights of birds, and clouds of dust, have frequently discovered an enemy : for whenever the enemy approaches they must of course raise a great dust, which should serve you therefore as a sufficient warning to prepare for an attack. It has often happened likewise, that when Generals have observed a great number of pigeons or other birds, that usually fly together in flocks, suddenly take wing, and hover about in the air a great while without lighting again, they have suspected there was an Ambuscade thereabout ; in which case, by sending out parties to discover it, they have sometimes escaped the enemy, and sometimes defeated them. — To avoid being drawn into an Ambuscade by the enemy, you must be very cautious of trusting to flattering appearances : for instance, if the enemy should leave a considerable booty in your way, you should suspect there is a hook in the bait ; or if a strong party of the enemy should fly before a few of your men, or a few of their men should attack a strong party of your army ; or if the enemy runs away on a sudden, without any apparent cause, it is reasonable to imagine there is some artifice in it, and that they know very well what they are about : so that the weaker and more remiss they seem to be, the more it behoves you to be upon your guard, if you would avoid falling into their Snares. For this purpose, you are to act a double part ; and though you ought not to be without your private apprehensions, yet you should seem outwardly to undervalue and despise them : the one will make you more vigilant, and less apt to be surprized ; and the other, inspire your Soldiers with courage and assurance of victory. You should always remember likewise, that an army is exposed to more and greater dangers in marching through an enemy's country, than in a field battle : upon

which account, it concerns a general to be doubly circumspect at such times. The first thing he ought to do is, to get an exact map of the whole country through which he is to march; that so they may have a perfect knowledge of all the towns, their distance from each other, the roads, mountains, rivers, woods, morasses, and the particular situation and nature of them. For this purpose, it is necessary to procure several persons by different means and from different parts, who are well acquainted with those places, whom he should examine separately, and compare their accounts, that so he may be able to form a true judgment of them: beside which, he should send out parties of horse under experienced Commanders, not only to discover the enemy, but to observe the quality of the country and to see whether it agrees with his map, and the information he has received. He must likewise keep a strict eye over his guides, whom he should encourage to serve him faithfully, with promises of great rewards, if they did their duty, and threaten them with the severest punishment, if they deceive him. But above all things, he ought to keep his designs very secret; which is a matter of the utmost importance in all military enterprizes: and to prevent his army from being thrown into disorder by any sudden attack, he should order his men to be constantly prepared for it: for if a thing of that kind is foreseen and expected, it is neither so terrible nor prejudicial when it happens, as it otherwise might have been. Many, in order to prevent confusion upon a march, have placed their carriages and unarmed people near the standard, and ordered them to follow it as close as possible; that so there should be occasion either to halt or retreat, they might do it with greater ease and readiness, which, I think, is a custom not unworthy of imitation. A General should also be very careful neither

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to suffer one part of his forces to detach itself from the other whilst they are upon a march, nor to let any of the Corps move faster or slower than the rest: for then his army would become weak and unconnected, and consequently exposed to greater danger. It is necessary, therefore, to post officers along the flanks, to keep an uniform pace amongst them, by restraining those that march too fast, and quickening others that move too slow; which cannot be done more properly than by beat of drum, or sound of some musical instrument. The roads should also be laid open, and cleared in such a manner, that one Battalion at least may march through them at a time, in order of battle. The quality and customs of the enemy are to be considered in the next place, and whether they usually make their attack in the morning, or at noon, or in the evening, and whether they are more powerful in horse or foot: according to which circumstances, you are to regulate your own proceedings and preparations. But let us suppose some particular case. It happens sometimes that a General is obliged to decamp before the enemy, because he is not able to cope with them, and endeavours to avoid an engagement: but as soon as the enemy are aware of it, they likewise decamp, and press so hard upon his rear, that they must probably come up with him, and force him to an engagement before he can pass a river that lies in his way. Now, some who have been in this dangerous situation have thrown up a deep ditch in the rear of their army, and filled it with fagots, and other combustible matter, which they have set fire to, and thereby gained time to pass the river in safety, before the enemy could get over the ditch.

ZANOB. I can hardly think such an expedient as this could be of much service, because I remember to have read, that Hanno the Carthaginian be-

ing surrounded by the enemy, set fire to a parcel of fagots on that side where he designed to make his push ; which had such an effect, that the enemy thinking him sufficiently secured from escaping in that quarter, drew off their guards to another ; but as soon has he was aware of that, he ordered his men to throw their targets before their faces, to defend them from the flames and smoke, and to push through the fire ; by which means, he got clear with his whole army.

FABRIZIO. Very true ; but recollect what I said, and compare it with what Hanno did : I told you that the others caused a deep ditch to be thrown up, and filled with combustibles, which they set on fire : so that the enemy had not only the fire but the ditch to pass before they could come at them. Now Hanno had no ditch, and therefore as he designed to pass through the fire, he took care it should not be a very fierce one : otherwise, that alone would have stopped him, without any ditch. Do not you remember that when Nabis was besieged in Sparta by the Romans, he set fire to that part of the town in which he was himself, to prevent the enemy, who had already got possession of some streets, from advancing any farther ? by which, he not only stopped them where they were, but drove them entirely out of the town again. But to return. Quintus Luctatius, the Roman, having the Cimbrians close at his rear, and coming to a river which he wanted to pass, seemed determined to halt there and fight them ; for which purpose, he fixed his standard, threw up entrenchments, erected tents, and sent out parties of horse to forage : in short, he acted in such a manner, that the Cimbrians being fully persuaded he designed to encamp there, entrenched themselves, and sent out several parties into the country as he had done ; which Luctatius being aware of, immediately struck his tents, and passed

passed the river without any molestation. Some have diverted the course of a river, when they had no other means of passing it, and drawn off one part of the stream other way, till the other has become fordable. When the current is very rapid, the strongest and heaviest horse should be placed higher up the stream than the foot, to break the force of it, and facilitate their passage; and the light horse rather lower than the foot, to pick up any of them that may happen to be carried away by it; but rivers that are not fordable must be passed by the help of bridges, pontoons, and other such conveniences; and therefore it is necessary to carry proper materials and implements for the construction of them along with an army. It happens sometimes that you find the enemy posted on the other side to oppose your passage: in which case, I would recommend an expedient made use of by Julius Cæsar in Gaul, who coming to a river, and finding Vercingetorex posted with an army on the opposite bank, marched down one side of it for several days, whilst Vercingetorex marched down the other. At last, Cæsar having encamped in a woody part of the country, where he could conceal part of his men, drew three cohorts out of every Legion, and left them there, with orders to throw a bridge over the river, and to fortify it as soon as he could when he was gone: after which, he pursued his march. Vercingetorex, in the mean time, observing the number of his legions was the same, and not suspecting that any part of them were left behind, attended his motions as he had done before, on the other side; but when Cæsar thought the bridge was finished, he made a sudden counter-march, and finding every thing executed according to his orders, immediately passed the river without any opposition.

ZANobi. What rule or mark is there by which one may discover a ford with any certainty?

FABRIZIO. A river is always the shallowest and most fordable where you see a sort of a ridge or streak across it, betwixt the tail of a pool and the head of a stream; because there is more gravel and sand left there than in any other place: the truth of which observation has been confirmed by long experience, and therefore it may be depended upon.

ZANOBI. But suppose the bottom should either be so rough and broken, or so soft and full of holes, that Cavalry cannot pass with safety; what remedy is there in that case?

FABRIZIO. I would make hurdles and sink them; over which they might pass with ease.—But to proceed. If a General and his army happen to be inclosed in a pass betwixt two mountains, out of which there are but two ways of extricating himself, one in his front, the other in his rear, and they are both occupied by the enemy, there is still a method left to get clear of them, which has been practised by others with success in such circumstances; and that is, to throw up a very deep and large ditch in his rear, with an intent, as it may seem, to secure himself effectually on that side, and to take all other methods to make the enemy believe he designs to exert his whole strength in the front, in order to force his way out on that side, if possible, without apprehending any danger in his rear. The enemy, therefore, in the like cases, having been deceived by these appearances, have naturally turned their whole force from the rear where they thought they had him safe, to block him up more securely in the front: upon which, he has taken an opportunity of suddenly throwing a draw-bridge over the ditch, and escaped that way out of the hands of the enemy. Lucius Minucius, the Roman Consul, and his army, being shut up by the enemy in the mountains of Liguria, and seeing no other means to get clear of them,

them, sent a body of Numidians which he had with him, very badly armed, and mounted upon poor lean horses, towards the pass that was blocked up by the enemy, who immediately doubled their guards, and took all necessary measures to defend it with vigour upon their first appearance: but perceiving, as they came nearer, what a pitiful figure they made, they drew off part of their guards. The Numidians being aware of this, presently set spurs to their horses, and made so furious an attack upon those that were left, that they broke through them, and afterwards made such havock and devastation in the adjacent country, that the enemy were forced to quit their posts, and leave the pass open for Minucius and his whole army to come out of the mountains where they had been shut up. Some Generals, when they have been attacked by a much superior force, have drawn up their men very close together, and suffered themselves to be surrounded by the enemy; in order to make their way by one resolute push through that part of their army which they saw was the thinnest and weakest; and this method has sometimes succeeded very well. Mark Anthony, in his retreat out of Parthia, observing the enemy attacked him early every morning when he was decamping, and harassed his rear all day long, resolved afterwards not to decamp till noon: upon which, the Parthians concluding he would not move at all that day, returned to their own Camp, and left him to continue his march all the rest of the day, without any disturbance. The same Commander, to guard against the arrows of the Parthians, ordered all his men to kneel down when the enemy drew near, and the second rank to cover the heads of the first with their targets, the third of the second, the fourth of the third, and so on: by which means the whole army was under a roof as it were, and safe from their arrows.—

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This is all that occurs to my memory at present concerning the accidents that may happen to an army upon a march : if you have no other questions to ask relating to this matter, I will pass on to another part of our Subject.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

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BOOK VI.

THE CONTENTS.

What sort of Situations the Romans and Greeks made choice of for their encampments. The form of an Encampment. Concerning the Centinels and Guards that are posted about a Camp: and the necessity of observing who goes out and comes into it. Of Military Justice, and the method taken by the Ancients in punishing offenders. That the Ancients allowed neither Women nor Gaming in their Armies. Their method of decamping. That they used to encamp in healthful situations, and where they could neither be surrounded by an enemy, nor cut off from Provision. Directions concerning Provisions. How to encamp more or less than four Regiments or Legions; and what number of men is sufficient to fight an Enemy. What means some Generals have used to get clear of any Enemy. How to make a Prince become suspicious of his Counsellors and Confidants, and to divide his forces. How to suppress Mutiny and Discord in an army. In what manner the Ancients interpreted bad Omens and other sinister events. That an enemy should not be reduced to despair: and of several artifices that may be used to decoy and over-reach them. In what manner a suspected town or country is to be secured; and how to gain the affections of a people. That a War should not be carried on in Winter.

ZANONI. SINCE we are going to vary our Subject, I beg leave to lay down my office, and hope Battista della Palla will take it

it up : in some doing, we shall in some measure imitate the example of experienced Commanders, who in time of battle (as Signor Fabrizio has informed us) generally place the best of their men in the front and rear of their armies ; that the former may begin the attack with vigour, and the latter support it with resolution : Cosimo Rucellai therefore was wisely pitched upon to lead the van (if I may use the expression) in this conversation, and Battista della Palla to bring up the rear : Luigi Alamanni, and I, took upon us to conduct the second line : and as we all readily submitted to the charge assigned us, I dare say Battista will do the same.

BATTISTA. I have hitherto suffered myself to be governed entirely by the company, and shall do so for the future. Let us intreat you then, Signor Fabrizio, to proceed in your discourse, and to excuse this interruption.

FABRIZIO. If it is any interruption, it is an agreeable one I assure you ; for this change of officers, as I told you before, rather refreshes my recollection than otherwise.—But to resume our Subject. It is now time to encamp and repose our army in security : for all creatures, you know, naturally require due intervals of rest from their labour, and nobody can properly be said to rest, that does not enjoy security at the same time. You might except perhaps that I should have first encamped my army, and then shewn the order of a march, and last of all, how it should be formed to engage an enemy. But I have done quite the contrary ; and indeed I was obliged to it : for as I was to shew what an army upon a march had to do, when it was forced on a sudden to prepare for action, it was necessary to tell you first in what order of battle it should be drawn up.—Now to lodge your men in security, your camp ought to be strong and well governed : the former of which points depends either upon art, or the nature of its situation ; the latter, upon care and

and good discipline in the Commander. The Greeks used to look out for a situation that was strong by nature ; and never would encamp in any place that was not fortified either by a mountain or a river, or wood, or some other defence of that kind : the Romans, on the contrary, not depending so much upon nature as art and good discipline in their encampments, constantly made choice of situations where they could range their forces in their usual order, and exert their whole strength upon occasion. Hence it came to pass that the form of their encampments was always the same ; because they never swerved from their established discipline, but pitched upon a situation which they could make conformable to it : whereas the Greeks were often obliged to vary the form and manner of their encampments, because they made their discipline give way to the situation of the place, which could not always be the same, or similar.—When the situation therefore was but indifferent, the Romans used to supply that defect by art and industry : and since I have hitherto proposed the conduct of that people as a model in most cases, I would likewise recommend their method in the encampment of their armies : not that I would follow it exactly in every particular, but in such only as may best suit the circumstances of the present times. I have told you more than once already, that they had two Legions of their own Citizens in their Consular armies, amounting to about eleven thousand foot and six hundred horse ; besides which, they had eleven thousand more foot composed of the auxiliaries furnished by their friends and confederates : but they never had a greater number of auxiliaries than of their own Citizens in those armies ; except in their horse, in which they were not so scrupulous. I told you likewise, that they always posted their Legions in the center, and their auxiliaries in each wing, whenever they came to an engagement ; which custom

tom they also observed in their encampments, as you must have read, I dare say, in ancient History; and therefore I shall not trouble you now with a circumstantial detail of the method they followed upon such occasions, but content myself with informing you in what manner I would chuse to encamp an army at present; from whence you will easily perceive what I have borrowed from the Romans.

You know that as they had two Legions in a Consular army, I have likewise composed mine of two Regiments, each consisting of six thousand foot and three hundred horse: you remember into how many Battalions I divided them, in what manner they are armed, and by what names the different forces which they consist are distinguished: you know lastly, that in drawing them up either for battle or a march, I have made mention of no other troops but only shewn that when their number is doubled, there is nothing more to be done than double the ranks.—But now I am to shew you the method of encamping, I shall not confine myself to two Regiments only, but inform you how a whole army should be disposed of, consisting (like those of the Romans) of two Regiments of our own force and the same number of Auxiliaries: and this I do to give you a clear idea of a complete encampment for in the exercises and operations which I have hitherto described and recommended, there was occasion to bring a whole army into the field at once.

In order then to encamp an army of twenty-four thousand foot and two thousand horse, divided into four Regiments, two of our own Subjects and two of Auxiliaries, I would observe this method. After I had pitched upon a convenient situation, I would erect my Standard in the middle of a Square, one hundred feet deep on every side; one of which sides should face the east, another the west, another the north, and another the south: and in this square the General should fix his quarters. In the ne-

place, (as it was generally the practice of the Romans, and seems worthy of imitation) I would separate my Soldiers from the people who do not carry arms, and such as ought to be ready and fit for action, from those that are loaded and encumbered in another manner: for which purpose, I would quarter either all or the greater part of my Soldiers on the east side of the camp, and the others on the west; making the east side the front, the west the rear, and the north and south the flanks of my camp. To distinguish the quarters of my Soldiery I would draw two parallel lines thirteen hundred and sixty feet in length, and at the distance of sixty from each other, from the General's Standard towards the east; at the extremity of which, I would have the eastern gate of my camp. By these means, a passage would be formed directly from that gate to the General's quarters of twelve hundred and sixty feet in length, (for the distance from the Standard to the extremity of his quarters on every side is an hundred feet) and this interval should be called the Main Passage. In the next place, let another passage be drawn from the south to the north gate across the Main Passage, and close by the east side of the General's quarters, which should be two thousand five hundred feet in length (as it is to reach from one flank of the camp to the other) and sixty in breadth: and let this be called the Cross-way. Having thus marked out the General's quarters, and drawn these two passages, I would proceed to provide quarters for the two Regiments of my own Subjects: one of which I would lodge on the right hand, and the other on the left of the Main Passage. For this purpose, I would place thirty-two lodgments on the left, and as many more on the right of that passage, leaving a space betwixt the Sixteenth and Seventeenth lodgment of Sixty feet in breadth for a Traverse-way to pass through the midst of the quarters of these two Regiments, as you may see it marked out in the plan.

plan of an encampment which I luckily happen to have in my pocket. In the front of these two lodgments, on each side of the Main Passage where they border upon the Cross-way, I would quarter the Commanders of my Gens d'Armes, and their private men in the fifteen lodgments next adjoining to them: for as I have allowed an hundred and fifty Gens d'Armes to each Regiment, there would be ten private men in every one of these compartments. The tents of the Commanders should be eighty feet broad and twenty deep; and those of their private men thirty in depth and sixty in breadth. But I must here desire you to remember once for all, that whenever I make use of the word breadth, I mean the space that is extended from north to south; and when I speak of depth, I would be understood to design that which ranges from east to west.—In the next fifteen compartments which are to be on each side of the Main Passage, and on the east of the Traverse-way (and to take up the same space with that occupied by the Gens d'Armes) I would quarter my light horse; which being a hundred and fifty in each Regiment, would likewise amount to ten in every tent: and in the remaining sixteenth I would lodge their Commanders assigning them the same room with that taken up by the Commanders of the Gens d'Armes. The Cavalry then of both Regiments being thus provided with quarters of each side of the Main Passage will direct us how to dispose of our Infantry, as shall shew you in the next place.

You have observed how I have quartered the three hundred horse belonging to each Regiment, and their officers, in thirty-two lodgments on each side of the Main Passage, beginning from the cross-way and that I have left a void space, sixty feet in breadth, betwixt the sixteenth and seventeenth lodgment for a traverse-way. I order then to quarter the twenty Battalions, of which the two Regi-

men

ments consist, I would appoint lodgments for two Battalions behind the Cavalry on both sides of the Main Passage; each of which should be thirty feet in length and sixty in breadth, like the others, and so close to those of the horse that they should join together. In every first lodgment, beginning from the Cross-way, I would quarter the Lieutenant Colonel of the Battalion, who would then be in a line with the Commander of the Gens d'Armes: and this lodgment only should be forty feet in breadth, and twenty in depth. In the next fifteen lodgments reaching to the traverse-way, I would quarter a Battalion of foot on each side of the Main Passage; the number of which amounting to four hundred and fifty, there would be thirty in every lodgment. The other fifteen lodgments I would place contiguous to the light horse on each side of the Main Passage, and on the east of the traverse-way, allowing them the same dimensions with those on the west: and in each range of these I would quarter one Battalion, assigning the sixteenth, which should be twenty feet in length, and forty in breadth, for the Lieutenant Colonel of the two Battalions, who would then be close a-breast with the Commanders of the light horse. The two first ranges of lodgments being thus occupied, would consist partly of Cavalry, and partly of Infantry: but as the Cavalry should always be clean and ready for action, and the horsemen have no Servants allowed to assist them in dressing and taking care of their horses, the foot of the two Battalions that are quartered next to them should be obliged to wait upon them for that purpose: in consideration of which, they should be excused from all other duty in the camp, according to the practice of the Romans.

Leaving a void space then of sixty feet wide, on the back of the lodgments on each side of the Main Passage, one of which may be called the first way

on the right, the other, the first way on the left, I would mark out another range of thirty-two double lodgments parallel to the others, and with their back parts close together; allowing the same dimensions with an interval likewise betwixt the sixteenth and seventeenth for the traverse-way: and in each of these I would quarter four Battalions, with their Commanders in the first and last of them. In the next place, I would leave another space of sixty feet wide on the back of these two lodgments, for a way which should be called the second way on the right, on one side the Main Passage; and the second way on the left, on the other: close to which, I would have another range of double lodgments on each side of the Main Passage, in every respect like the other two; in which I would quarter the four remaining Battalions, and their Lieutenant Colonels: so that all the Cavalry and Infantry of our own two Regiments would be disposed of in six ranges, or lines of double lodgments, with the Main Passage betwixt them.—As to the two auxiliary Battalions (supposing them to consist of the same number and sort of forces) I would place them on each side of our own, in the like order and number of double lodgments: the two first lines of which should be partly horse, and partly foot, and at the distance of sixty feet from the two third lines of our own on each side the Main Passage, to make room for a way betwixt them, which should be called on one side, the third way on the right; and on the other, the third way on the left. After this, I would mark out two other lines of lodgments, parallel to the first on each side of the Main Passage, and divided like those of our own Battalions, with spaces of sixty feet betwixt them for other ways, which should be numbered and denominated from their situation and distance from the Main Passage: and then all this part of the army would be quartered in twelve ranges or lines of double lodgments,

with

with thirteen ways or passages betwixt the several divisions of it, including the Main Passage, Traverse, and Cross-ways.—Besides this, I would have a void space left of two hundred feet in width, betwixt the lodgments and the fosse which should encompass them: so that computing the whole distance from the center of the General's quarters to the eastern gate, you will find that it amounts to thirteen hundred and sixty feet.—There are still remaining two vacant intervals, one from the General's quarters to the South, an the other from thence to the North gate of the Camp; each of which (reckoning from the center) is twelve hundred and fifty feet in length. Deducing then from each of these spaces an hundred feet, which are taken up by the General's quarters on each side, and ninety feet on each side for an Area or Piazza, and sixty for a way to divide the two above mentioned spaces in the middle, and two hundred more for the interval betwixt the lodgments and the fosse, there will be a space left of eight hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred in depth, for a line of lodgments on each side; the depth being the same with that of the General's quarters. These spaces being properly divided, will make forty lodgments on both sides of the General's quarters, each of which will be an hundred feet long, and forty broad: and in these I would quarter the Colonels of the several Regiments, the Paymasters, the Quartermaster-General, and in short, all those that had any particular charge or business in the army; leaving some of them vacant for the reception of strangers or volunteers, and attendants upon the General. On the backside of the General's quarters I would make a passage from north to south sixty-two feet wide, and call it the HEAD-WAY, which should run along the west side of the eighty lodgments just mentioned: and then those lodgments, and the General's quarters, would be included betwixt that passage and

the cross-way. From the head-way I would draw another passage directly from the General's quarters to the western gate of the camp, which should be sixty feet wide, and of the same length with the Main Passage; and this should be called the Market-way. These two passages being drawn, I would make a market-place, or square, at the beginning of the market-way, over against the General's quarters, and joining to the head-way, which should be two hundred and forty feet on every side. On the right and left of the market-place, I would have a row of quarters, each of which should contain eight double lodgments, which should be thirty feet in depth, and sixty in breadth; that is, sixteen on each hand of the market-place. In these I would lodge the supernumerary horse belonging to the auxiliary Regiments: and if there should not be room enough for all of them there, I would quarter those that were excluded in some of the eighty lodgments next to the General's quarters, but chiefly in those that lie nearest the fosse.

It now remains that we should quarter our Pikemen and Velites extraordinary; for you know there are a thousand of the former, and five hundred of the latter in every Regiment: so that our own two Regiments having two thousand Pikemen, and one thousand Velites extraordinary, and those of the Auxiliaries as many more, we have still six thousand foot to dispose of; all of whom I would quarter on the three sides of the fosse, in the western part of the camp. For this purpose, I would have a row of five double lodgments, an hundred and fifty feet long, and an hundred and twenty wide, on the west side, of the north end of the head-way, leaving a vacant space of two hundred feet betwixt them and the fosse: which row consisting of ten single lodgments, and every lodgment being thirty feet deep, and sixty wide, would contain three hundred foot; that is, thirty in every one of them. Next

to these (but with an interval of sixty-two feet betwixt them) I would place another row of five double lodgments of the same dimensions ; and after that, another ; and so on till there were five rows of five double lodgments of the same size, and with the same intervals betwixt them, all in a right line one with another, at the distance of two hundred feet from the fosse on the west of the head-way, and on the north side of the camp : so that there would be fifty lodgments in all, which would contain fifteen hundred men. Turning then from the left towards the western gate, I would mark out five other rows of double lodgments in the space betwixt the last of the other five and that gate, of the same contents and proportion, but with intervals of only thirty feet betwixt one row and the other ; in which I would likewise quarter fifteen hundred men : and in this manner, all the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary belonging to our own two Regiments would be disposed of in ten rows of double lodgments, that is, an hundred single ones, (reckoning ten in a row) along the range of the fosse from the north to the west gate. In the like manner I would provide for the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary belonging to the auxiliary Regiments ; quartering them all in ten rows of double lodgments of the same dimensions, and with the same intervals betwixt them, along the range of the fosse, from the west to the south gate ; allowing their Colonels and other officers to take up such quarters there as should be most convenient for them.

My Artillery I would plant all along the banks on the inside of the fosse : and in the vacant space, which would be still left on the west side of the Head-way, I would lodge all the unarmed people, and impediments belonging to the camp. Now you must know by the word Impediments, the Ancients meant all the baggage, and people, and stores that are necessary in an army, except the Sol-

diers ; as Carpenters, Joiners, Smiths, Stone-cutters, Masons, Engineers, Cannoneers (though indeed these last may properly be reckoned Soldiers) Herdsmen, Oxen and Sheep for the sustenance of the army, Cooks, Butchers ; in short, all manner of Artificers and implements, together with proper vehicles and beasts of burden to carry the ammunition, provisions, and other requisites. However, I would not assign separate and distinct lodgments for all these things ; but content myself with ordering that some passages should be left entirely clear and unoccupied by them. Of the four void spaces which would be left betwixt these passages, I would appropriate one to the Herdsmen and their cattle ; another to the Artificers of every kind ; another to make room for the carriages that contain the provisions ; and the last to receive those that are loaded with arms and ammunition. The passages which I would have left quite open, should be the market-way, the head-way, and another called the Middle-way, to be drawn across the camp from north to south, which should cut the market-way at right angles, and answer the same purposes on the western side of the camp, as the traverse-way does in the eastern. Besides this, I would have still another passage drawn behind the lodgments of the Pike-men and Velites extraordinary, which are ranged on three sides of the fosse ; and every one of these passages should be sixty feet wide.

BATTISTA. I confess my ignorance in these matters, and think I have no reason to be ashamed of it, as the Art of War is not my profession. The disposition however, which you have made, pleases me very much ; and I have but two questions to ask relating to it, which I beg the favour of you to resolve : the first is, why you make the ways and passages about the lodgments so broad ? The second (which perplexes me the most) is, in what manner

manner the spaces you allow for the lodgments are to be occupied?

FABRIZIO. The reason why I have made all the passages sixty feet wide, is that a whole Battalion at a time, drawn up in order of battle, may pass through them: for I told you before, if you remember, that every Battalion takes up a space of fifty or sixty feet in width. It is necessary also, that the interval betwixt the lodgments and the fosse should be two hundred feet wide, in order to draw up the Battalions there in a proper manner upon occasion, to manage the Artillery, to make room for booty or prisoners taken from the enemy, and for throwing up new banks and ditches, if it should be requisite. It is likewise proper to have the lodgments at a good distance from the fosse, that they may be more out of the reach of fireworks, and other offensive things, which an enemy might otherwise throw in amongst them.—In answer to your second question, I must tell you, it is not my intention that every space which I have laid out for lodgments should be wholly covered by one great tent only, but that it should be divided, and occupied in such a manner as may best suit the convenience of those for whose use it is designed, and have more or fewer tents in it as they please, provided they did not exceed the limits prescribed them.

But in order to lay out these lodgments, there should always be able and experienced Engineers, Quarter-masters, and Builders, ready to mark out a camp, and distinguish the several passages and divisions of it with stakes and cordage, as soon as the General has fixed upon a proper situation for it: and to prevent confusion, the front of the camp should always look the same way; that so every man may know near what passage, and in which quarter, he may find his tent. This rule being constantly observed, the Camp will be a sort of a moving

Town, which carries the same streets, the same houses, and the same aspect with it wherever it goes ; a convenience which those must not expect, who make choice of such situations only as are naturally strong and advantageous ; because they must always change the form of their camp according to the nature of the ground. The Romans (as I said before) made their Camps strong in any situation, by throwing up a ditch and rampart about them, and leaving a vacant space betwixt their lodgments and the ditch, which was generally twelve feet wide, and six deep ; though they sometimes made it both wider and deeper, especially if they either designed to continue long in the same place, or expected to be attacked. For my own part, I would not fortify a Camp with a Palisade, except I intended to winter in it ; but content myself with a rampart and a ditch, not of less width or depth than what has been just now mentioned, but greater, if occasion required : besides which, I would have an half moon at every angle of the Camp, with some pieces of artillery in it, to take the enemy in flank, if the trenches should be attacked. In this exercise of encamping and decamping, the army should frequently be employed, in order to make the several officers ready and expert in laying out the distinct lodgments in a proper manner, and to teach the Soldiers to know their respective quarters ; nor is there any great difficulty in it, as I shall shew elsewhere ; for I will now proceed to say something concerning the guards that are necessary in a Camp, because if that point is not duly attended to, all the rest of our labour and care will be to no purpose.

BATTISTA. Before you do that, I wish you would inform me what is to be done when you would encamp near an enemy ; for surely there cannot be time enough, upon such an occasion, to dispose things in this regular order, without exposing yourself to great danger.

FABRIZIO.

FABRIZIO. No General will ever encamp very near an enemy, except he is in a condition to give them battle whenever they please: and if the enemy be likewise disposed to engage, the danger cannot be more than ordinary; because he may draw out two thirds of his army, and leave the other to form his Camp. The Romans, in such cases, committed the care of throwing up entrenchments, and laying out their Camp, to the Triarii, and caused the Principes and Hastati only to stand to their arms: for as the Triarii, were the last line of their army that was to engage, they might leave their work if the enemy advanced, and draw up under arms in their proper station. So that if you would imitate the Romans in the like case, you should leave the care of laying out and fortifying your Camp to the Battalions in the rear of your army, which resemble the Triarii in those of the Romans.

But to return to what I was going to say concerning the Guards of a Camp. I do not remember to have read that the Ancients used to keep any Guards or Centinels on the outside of their entrenchments in the night-time, as we do at present. The reason of which I take to be, that they thought their armies were exposed to much danger by making use of them; as perhaps they might either betray or desert them of their own accord, or be surprised or corrupted by the enemy: and therefore they did not think fit to put any confidence in them. Upon these considerations, they trusted wholly to the Guards and Centinels that were stationed within their entrenchments; which were kept with such order and exactness, that the least failure in that duty was punished with death. I shall not trouble you however, with a long and circumstantial detail of the order and method which they observed in this matter, because you very likely have read it in their histories, or if you have not, you may meet with it there whenever you please. For the sake

of brevity then, I will only tell you what I would do myself upon such occasions. I would cause one third of my army to continue under arms every night: and one fourth of this to be upon guard along the entrenchments and other proper places of the camp, allowing a double guard at every angle of it; one part of which should constantly remain there, and the other be patrolling all night from that angle to the next, and back again: and this method should be observed in the day-time also, if the enemy lay near me. As for giving out a Parole, or Watch-word, and changing it every night, and other such circumstances belonging to Guards and Centinels, I shall say nothing of them, because they are known by every one. But there is one thing of the utmost importance, the practice of which will be attended with much advantage, and the neglect of it with great prejudice; and that is, to observe strictly who lies out of the Camp at night, and what strangers come into it: which is a very easy matter to be done by such as observe the manner and order of encamping I have recommended; because every lodgment having a certain number of men belonging to it, you may presently see if there be more or fewer in it than there should be: if any are absent without leave, they should be punished as deserters; and if there are more than there ought to be, you should diligently enquire who they are? what business they have there? and of other circumstances relating to them. This precaution will make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy to hold any secret correspondence with your Officers, or to penetrate into your designs: and if the Romans had not carefully attended to this point, Claudio Nero could not have left his camp in Lucania, and gone privately into the territories of Picenum, and returned from thence to his former quarters, whilst Hannibal knew

knew nothing of the matter all the while, though the two Camps lay very near each other *.

But it is not sufficient barely to give out good and wholesome orders for this purpose, if the observance of them is not enforced with the utmost severity : for there is no case whatsoever in which the most exact and implicit obedience is so necessary as in the government of an army : and therefore the laws that are established for the maintenance of it ought to be rigorous and severe, and the General a man of inflexible resolution in supporting them. The Romans punished with death, not only those that failed in their duty when they were upon guard, but all such as either abandoned their post in time of battle, or carried any thing by stealth out of the Camp, or pretended they had performed some exploit in action which they had not done, or engaged without the orders of their General, or threw away their arms out of fear : and when it happened that a Cohort or a whole Legion had behaved ill, they made them cast lots, and put every tenth man to death, which was called Decimation : this was done to avoid shedding too much blood, and that though they did not all suffer, every man might be under an apprehension that the lot might fall upon him. But where there are severe punishments, there should likewise be proportionable rewards, to excite men to behave themselves well by motives both of hope and fear ; and therefore they always rewarded those that had distinguished themselves by any meritorious action ; especially such as had either saved the life of a Fellow-citizen in battle, or been the first in scaling the walls of an enemy's town, or storming their Camp, or had wounded, or killed, or dismounted an enemy. In this manner every man's desert was properly taken notice of, and recompensed by the Consuls, and publicly ho-

* See Livy, Lib. xxvii. chap. 44.

noured :

noured: and those that obtained any reward for services of this kind (besides the reputation and glory which they acquired amongst their brother Soldiers) were received by their friends and relations with all manner of rejoicings and congratulations, when they returned from the wars. — It is no wonder then that a people, who are so exact in rewarding merit, and punishing offenders, should extend their Empire to such a degree as they did; and certainly they are highly worthy of imitation in these respects. Give me leave therefore to be a little more explicit in describing one of their punishments.— When a delinquent stood convicted before his General, the latter gave him a slight stroke with a rod; after which, he might run away if he could: but as every Soldier in the army had liberty to kill him, he no sooner began to run but they all fell upon him with their swords, or darts, or other weapons; so that he seldom escaped: and if he did, he was not allowed to return home, except under heavy penalties, and such a load of infamy, that it would have been much better for him to have died. This custom is in some measure still kept up by the Swiss in their armies, who always cause a convicted offender to be killed by the rest of the Soldiers: and I think it is a very good one; for in order to prevent others from supporting or protecting an offender, it is certainly the best way to leave the punishment of him to themselves; because they will always look upon him with a different eye in that case, from what they would if he is to be punished by any body else. This rule will also hold good in popular Governments, as we may learn from the example of Manlius Capitolinus, who being accused by the Senate, was strenuously defended by the People, till they were left to judge him themselves: after which, they presently condemned him to die. This then is a good method of punishing delinquents, and of causing justice to be executed

executed upon them in security, without fear of exciting mutiny or sedition. But as neither the fear of laws, nor reverence to man alone, are sufficient to bridle an armed multitude, the Ancients used to call in the aid of Religion, and made their Soldiers take a very strict oath to pay due obedience to military discipline with many awful ceremonies and great solemnity : besides which, they used all other methods to inspire them with a fear of the Gods ; that so if they violated their oaths, they might have not only the asperity of human laws, but the vengeance of Heaven to apprehend.

BATTISTA. Did the Romans ever suffer women or gaming in their Camp, as we do at present ?

FABRIZIO. They prohibited both : nor was the restraint very grievous ; for their Soldiers were so constantly employed either in one sort of duty or other, that they had no time to think either of women or gaming, or any other of those vile avocations which commonly make Soldiers idle and seditious.

BATTISTA. They were in the right of it.— But pray tell me what order they observed when they were going to decamp.

FABRIZIO. The General's trumpet was sounded three times : at the first sounding, they struck their tents and packed them up ; at the second, they loaded their carriages ; and at the third, they began their march in the order I have described before, with their Legions in the middle of the army, and their baggage in the rear of every particular corps. For which purpose, it is necessary that one of the Auxiliary Regiments should move first with its own baggage, and a fourth part of the public impediments in its rear, which was placed in one or other of the four divisions in the western part of the camp that I spoke of not long ago : and therefore every Legion should have its particular division assigned to its charge ; that so when they are about to march,

every

BATTISTA. Did the Romans use to make any other provisions in laying out their Camps besides those which you have already mentioned ?

FABRIZIO. I must tell you again that they always kept to the same form in their encampments, which was their first and principal consideration. Besides this, they had two other great points in view : the first of which was a wholesome situation ; and the next, to encamp where the enemy could neither surround, nor cut them off from water or provisions. To prevent sickness in their army therefore, they always avoided marshy grounds, and such as were exposed to noxious winds : of which they formed their judgment not so much from the quality of the place, as from the constitution and appearance of the people who lived thereabout : for if they either had sickly complexions, or were subject to asthmas, or dropsies, or any other endemic disorder, they would not encamp there. As to the other point of not being liable to be surrounded by an enemy, they considered where their friends and where their enemy lay, and judged from thence of the probability or possibility of their being surrounded or not : upon which account, it is necessary that a General should be very well acquainted with the nature and situation of the country he is in, and that he should have others about him who are as knowing in these respects as himself. There are other precautions also to be used in order to prevent distempers and famine in an army ; such as restraining all manner of excess and intemperance amongst the Soldiers, by taking care that they sleep under cover, that your Camp may be near trees that will afford them shade in the day-time, and wood enough for fuel to dress their victuals, and that they do not march when the heat of the Sun is too intense. For this reason, they should decamp before

fore day-light in the Summer, and take care not to march through ice and snow in the winter, except they have frequent opportunities of making good fires, and warm cloathing to guard them again the inclemency of the weather. It is necessary likewise to prevent them from drinking stagnated and fetid water : and if any of them happen to fall ill, you should give strict orders to the Physicians and Surgeons of the army to take great care of them : for bad indeed is the condition of a General, when he has a sickness amongst his men and an enemy to contend with at the same time. But nothing conduces so much to keep an army in good health and spirits as Exercise : and therefore the Ancients used to exercise their troops every day. Due exercise then is surely of great importance, as it preserves your health in the Camp, and secures you victory in the field.

As to guarding against famine, it is only necessary to take timely care that the enemy may not be able to cut you off from provisions, but to consider from whence you may be conveniently supplied with them, and to see that those which you have are properly distributed and preserved. You should therefore always have a month's provisions at least beforehand, and afterwards oblige your neighbouring friends and allies to furnish you daily with a certain quantity : you ought likewise to establish Magazines and Storehouses in strong places, and above all to distribute your provisions duly and frugally amongst your men, giving them a reasonable proportion every day, and attending so strictly to this point that you may not by any means exhaust your stores, and run yourself a-ground : for though all other calamities in an army may be remedied in time, famine alone grows more and more grievous the longer it continues, and is sure to destroy you at last ; nor will any enemy ever come to an engagment with you when he is sure to conquer

conquer you in such circumstances without it : for though a victory obtained in this manner may not be so honourable as one that is gained by dint of arms, it is certain however, and not attended with any risque. An army then cannot possibly escape famine which wantonly and extravagantly wastes its provisions without foresight, or regard to rule or measure, or the circumstances of the times : for want of timely care will prevent its having supplies, and profusion consumes what it already has to no purpose : upon which consideration, the Ancients took care their Soldiers should eat no more than a daily and reasonable allowance, and that too only at stated times ; for they never were suffered either to breakfast, or dine, or sup, but when their General did the same. How well these excellent rules are observed in our armies at present, I need not tell you ; for every one knows that our Soldiers, instead of imitating the regularity and sobriety of the Ancients, are a parcel of intemperate, licentious, and drunken fellows.

BATTISTA. When our conversation first turned upon Encampments, you said you would not confine yourself to two Regiments only, but take four, the better to shew how a complete army should be encamped. But I should be glad to know in the first place, how you would quarter your army if it consisted of a greater or smaller number of men than that ? and in the next, what number you would think sufficient to engage any enemy ?

FABRIZIO. To your first question, I answer, that if your army has five or six thousand, more or less than that number, in it, you have nothing to do but either to add or to diminish your rows of lodgments accordingly : and this you may do in what proportion you please. The Romans however had two different camps when they joined two Consular armies together, the rear quarters of which (where the impediments and unarmed people were) faced each

each other. As to your second question, the common armies which the Romans brought into the field usually consisted of about twenty-four thousand men, and upon the most pressing occasions they never exceeded fifty thousand. With this number they made head against two hundred thousand Gauls who invaded them after the conclusion of the first Carthaginian war : with the same number they opposed Hannibal : indeed, both the Romans and Greeks, depending chiefly upon their discipline and good conduct, always carried on their wars with small armies ; whereas both the eastern and western nations had vast and almost innumerable hosts : the latter trusting wholly to their natural ferocity, and the former availing themselves of the implicit submission which their subjects shew to their Princes. But neither the Greeks nor Romans being remarkable either for natural ferocity, or implicit submission to their Princes, were obliged to have recourse to good discipline ; the power and efficacy of which were so great, that one of their small armies often defeated a prodigious multitude of the fiercest and most obstinate people. In imitation then of the Greeks and Romans, I would not have about fifty thousand men in an army, but fewer if I might chuse : for more are apt to create discord and confusion, and not only become ungovernable themselves, but corrupt others that have been well-disciplined : Pyrrhus therefore used to say, that "with an army of fifteen thousand good Soldiers he would fight the whole world *."

* "At the Siege of Alexia, the Gauls having drawn all their powers together to fight Cæsar, after they had made a general muster of their forces, resolved in a council of war to dismiss a good part of that great multitude, that they might not fall into confusion. And indeed it stands to reason that the body of an Army should consist of a moderate number, and restrained to certain bounds, both in regard to the difficulty of providing for them, and the difficulty of governing and keeping them in order : at least it is very easy to make it appear by example, that armies so monstrous in number have seldom done any thing to the purpose.

But let us now proceed to other matters. You have seen our army gain a battle, and the accidents which may occur in the time of action : you have likewise seen it upon a march, and been acquainted with the dangers and embarrassments it is subject to in those circumstances : and lastly, you have seen it regularly quartered in camp, where it ought to stay awhile, not only to enjoy a little rest after its fatigues, but to concert proper measures for bringing the Campaign to a happy conclusion : for many things are to be considered and digested in camp, especially if either the enemy still keeps the field, or there are any towns belonging to them not yet reduced, or any in possession of people whose fidelity and affection you have reason to suspect ; because in these cases you must make yourself master of the one, and secure the attachment of the other. It is necessary therefore to shew in what manner, and by what means, these difficulties are to be surmounted with the same reputation with which we have hitherto carried on the war.—To descend to particulars then, I say, that if several different persons, or different States, should think of doing any particular thing which may tend to your advantage and their own prejudice, such as dismantling some of their towns, or banishing a great number of their inhabitants, you should encourage them in it in such a manner that none of them may suspect that it will prejudice their interest ; by which you may amuse them so effectually, that instead of confederating

According to the saying of Cyrus in Xenophon, "it is not the number of men, but the number of good men, that gives the advantage ;" the remainder serving rather to embarrass than assist : and Bajazet principally grounded his resolution of giving Tamerlane battle, contrary to the opinion of all his Captains, upon this, that the numberless host his enemy had brought into the field, gave him assured hope of their falling into confusion. Scanderbeg, a good and expert judge in these matters, used to say, "that ten or twelve thousand faithful fighting men were sufficient for a good Leader to secure his reputation on all military occasions." See *Montaigne*, book II. chap. xxxiv.

together

together for their own safety, they will not think of giving each other the least assistance, and then you may suppress them all without any material opposition. But if this method will not succeed, you must order every one of them to execute what you desire on the same day ; that so each State imagining that no other has any orders of the same kind, may be obliged to obey, because it has no support from its neighbours to depend upon ; and thus you may succeed in your designs without any resistance or combination being formed against you.—

If you should suspect the fidelity of any State, and would secure yourself by falling upon them unawares, in order to disguise your intentions the more effectually, it is the best way to pretend a perfect confidence in them, to consult them in some design which you seem to have upon others, and to desire their assistance, as if you had not the least doubt of their sincerity, or thought of molesting them ; which will put them off their guard, and give you an opportunity of treating them as you please.—

If you suspect any person in your army of giving the enemy intelligence of your designs, you cannot do better than avail yourself of his treachery, by seeming to trust him with some secret resolution which you intend to execute, whilst you carefully conceal your real design : by which, perhaps, you may discover the traitor, and lead the enemy into an error that may possibly end in their destruction.—

If, in order to relieve some friend, you would lessen your army so privately that the enemy may not be aware of it (as Claudius Nero did) you should not lessen the number of your lodgments, but leave the vacant tents standing, and the colours flying, making the same fires and keeping the same guards that you did before. In like manner, if you receive fresh supplies, and would not have the enemy know that you have been reinforced, you must not increase the number of your tents ; for nothing is of

greater importance than to keep these and other such transactions as secret as possible. When Metellus commanded the Roman armies in Spain, a certain person took the liberty of asking him what he intended to do the next day; upon which, he told him that "if he thought the Shirt upon his back knew that, he would immediately take it off and burn it." Marcus Crassus being likewise importuned by one of his officers to let him know when he designed to decamp, asked him "if he thought he should be the only one in the camp that would not hear the sound of the trumpets." — In order to penetrate into the secret designs, and discover the condition of an enemy, some have sent Ambassadors to them with skilful and experienced officers in their train, dressed like the rest of their attendants; who have taken an opportunity of viewing their army, and observing their strength and weakness in so minute a manner that it has been of much service. Others have pretended to quarrel with and banish some particular Confidant, who has gone over to the enemy, and afterwards informed them of their designs. The intentions of an enemy are likewise sometimes discovered by the examination of the Prisoners you take. — When Marius commanded in the war against the Cimbrians, and wanted to try the fidelity of the Gauls, who at that time inhabited Lombardy, and were in confederacy with the Romans, he wrote some Letters to them which were left open, and others that were sealed; in the former of which, he desired they would not open those that were sealed till a certain day; but before that time he sent for them again, and finding they had been opened, he perceived there was no confidence to be put in that people. — Some Princes have not immediately sent an army to oppose the enemy when their territories have been invaded, but made an incursion into their country, and thereby obliged them to return to defend themselves;

a method which has often succeeded : for in such cases, your Soldiers being elated with victory, and loaded with plunder, fight with spirit and confidence ; whilst those of the enemy are dejected at the thoughts of being beaten instead of conquering : so that a diversion of this kind has frequently been attended with good consequences. But this you must not attempt, except your country is better fortified than that of the enemy : for if you do, you will certainly be ruined.—If a General is block-ed up in his camp by an enemy, he should endea-vour to set a treaty of accommodation on foot with them, and to obtain a truce for a few days ; during which, they are apt to be so careless and remiss that he may possibly find an opportunity of slipping out of their hands. By these means, Sylla twice eluded the enemy ; and in this manner Asdrubal got clear of Claudius Nero when he had surrounded him in Spain. Besides these expedients, there are other methods likewise of extricating yourself from an enemy ; as either by attacking them with one part of your forces only, that so while their attention is wholly turned upon that side, the rest of your army may find means to save themselves ; or by some un-common Stratagem, the novelty of which may fill them with terror and astonishment at the same time, so that they cannot resolve how to act, or whether to act at all ; as Hannibal did, when he was sur-rounded by Fabius Maximus : for having a great number of oxen in his camp, he fastened lighted torches to their horns in the night-time and let them loose to run about the country ; at the strangeness of which spectacle Fabius was so perplexed that he could not prevent their retreat.—But above all things, a General ought to endeavour to divide the enemy's strength, either by making him suspicious of his Counsellors and Confidants, or obliging him to employ his forces in different places and detach-ments at the same time, which consequently must

very much weaken his main army. The first may be done by sparing the possessions of some particular men in whom he most confides, and not suffering their houses or estates to be damaged in a time of general plunder and devastation ; or by returning their children and other relations when they are taken prisoners, without any ransom. Thus when Hannibal had ravaged and burnt all the towns and country round about Rome, he spared the estate of Fabius Maximus alone : Coriolanus likewise, returning at the head of an army to Rome, carefully preserved the possessions of the Nobility, and burnt those of the Plebeians. When Metellus commanded the Roman army against Jugurtha, he tampered with the Ambassadors who were sent to him by that Prince, to deliver up their master prisoner to him, and kept up a correspondence with them for the same purpose after they had left him, till Jugurtha discovered it, and grew so jealous of his Counsellors, that he put them all to death upon one pretence or other : and after Hannibal had taken refuge with Antiochus, the Roman Ambassadors managed so artfully that Antiochus became suspicious of him, and would neither take his advice, nor trust him again in any matter whatsoever.—As to dividing the enemy's strength, there can be no better way of doing it than by making incursions into their country, for that will oblige them to abandon all other enterprizes, and return home to defend their own. This was the method which Fabius took when he had not only the Gauls, but the Tuscans, the Umbrians, and the Samnites to deal with at the same time. Titus Didius having but a small army in comparison of the enemy, and expecting to be reinforced by another Legion from Rome, was apprized that the enemy had formed a design to cut it off upon its march : to prevent which, he not only caused a report to be spread through his camp that he would engage

engage the enemy the next day, but suffered some prisoners he had taken to escape, who informed their General of the Consul's intentions ; which had such an effect, that he did not think fit to diminish his own forces by detaching any part of them to oppose the march of that Legion ; so that it joined the Consul in safety : and though this Stratagem indeed did not divide the enemy's army, yet it proved the means of reinforcing his own.—Some, in order to diminish the strength of an invader, have suffered him to enter their country, and take several towns : that so when he has weakened his main army by putting garrisons into them, they might fall upon him with a greater probability of success. Others, who have had a design upon one Province, have made a feint of invading another : after which, turning their forces suddenly upon that where they were not at all expected, they have made themselves masters of it before the enemy could send any relief : for in such cases, the enemy, being uncertain whether you may not return to attack the Province first threatened, is obliged to maintain his post, and not to leave one place to succour another : so that (as it often happens) he is not able to secure them both.

—It is of great importance to prevent the spreading of mutiny or discord in an army : for which purpose, you should punish the Ringleaders in an exemplary manner, but with such address that it may be done before they imagine you intend it. If they are at a distance from you, it is the best way to call both the innocent and the guilty together, lest (if you summon the offenders alone) they should suspect your design, and either become contumacious, or take some other method to elude the punishment that is due to them : but if they are within your reach, you may avail yourself of those that are innocent, and punish the others by their assistance. As to private discords amongst your Soldiers, the only remedy is to expose them to some

danger, for in such cases fear generally unites them: but what most commonly keeps an army united is the reputation of the General; that is, his courage and good conduct; for without these, neither high birth nor any sort of authority are sufficient. Now the chief thing incumbent upon a General, in order to maintain his reputation, is to pay well, and punish severely: for if he does not pay his men duly, he cannot punish them properly when they deserve it. Supposing, for instance, a Soldier should be guilty of a robbery; how can you punish him for that when you give him no pay? And how can he help robbing when he has no other means of subsistence? But if you pay them well, and do not punish them severely when they offend, they will soon grow insolent and licentious: for then you will become despised, and lose your authority; after which, tumults and discords will naturally ensue in your army, which probably will end in the ruin of it.

The Commanders of armies in former times had one difficulty to struggle with, from which our Generals at present are in a great measure exempt; and that was the interpreting bad omens and auguries in such a manner, that instead of seeming adverse, they might appear to be favourable and propitious. For if a Storm of thunder and lightning* fell upon the camp, or either the Sun or Moon was eclipsed, or there was an Earthquake, or the General happened to get a fall in mounting or dismounting his horse, the Soldiers looked upon it as an unhappy presage, and were so dismayed, that they made but a faint resistance against any Enemy that attacked them. Upon any accident of that kind therefore, they either en-

* The words of the Author are, "perche se cadeva una saetta in uno esercito." Now the word *saetta* most here mean a stroke of lightning, must probably, or what the country people call a *thunder-bolt*. The old Translation renders it thus: For if an arrow fell down in an army, &c. which I confess I do not understand.

deavoured to account for it from natural causes, or interpreted it to their own purpose and advantage. When Julius Cæsar landed in Africa, he happened to get a fall as soon as he set his foot on Shore, upon which, he immediately cried out, "Teneo te, O Africa, i. e. Africa, I take possession of thee." Others have explained the reasons of Earthquakes and Eclipses to their Soldiers. But such events have little or no effect in these times : for men are not so much given to Superstition since the Christian Religion has enlightened their minds, and dispelled these vain fears : but if they should ever happen to return, we must imitate the example of the Ancients upon such occasions.

If famine or any other kind of distress has reduced an enemy to despair, and they advance furiously to engage, you should keep close in your entrenchments, and avoid a battle, if possible ; as the Lacedæmonians did when they were provoked to fight by the Messenians, and Julius Cæsar by Afranius and Petreius.—When Fulvius the Consul commanded the Roman army against the Cimbrians, he caused his Cavalry to attack the enemy several days successively, and observing that they always quitted their camp to pursue his troops when they retreated, he at last placed a body of men in ambush behind their camp, who rushed into it, and made themselves masters of it the next time they sallied out to pursue his Cavalry.—Some Princes, when their dominions have been invaded, and their army has lain near that of the enemy, have sent out parties under the enemy's colours to plunder and lay waste their own territories : upon which, the enemy imagining them to be friends who were coming to their assistance, have gone out to join them ; but upon discovering their mistake, have fallen into confusion, and given their adversary an opportunity of beating them. This Stratagem was practised by Alexander of Epirus against

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the Illyrians, and Leptenes the Syracusan against the Carthaginians, and they both found their account in it.—Many have gained an advantage by pretending to run away in great fear, and leaving their camp full of wine and provisions, with which when the enemy have gorged themselves, the others have returned and fallen upon them whilst they were drunk or asleep. In this manner Cyrus was deceived by Tomyris, and the Spaniards by Tiberius Gracchus. Others have mixed poison with the meat and drink they left behind them.—I told you a little before that I did not remember to have read that the Ancients placed any Centinels on the outside of the ditch that surrounded their camp in the night; and that I supposed it was to prevent the mischiefs they might occasion: for it has often happened that Centinels, who have been stationed at out-posts, even in the day-time, to observe the motions of an enemy, have been the ruin of an army; as they have sometimes been surprised and forced to make the signals for their friends to advance, who have thereby been drawn into a snare, and either killed or taken prisoners.—In order to deceive an enemy, it may not be amiss either to vary or omit some particular custom or signal that you have constantly made use of before, as a certain great General did of old; who having caused some of his advanced parties always to give him notice of the enemy's approach by fires in the night, and smoke in the day-time, thought proper to vary that custom at last, and ordered those parties to keep constant fires all the night long, and to make a smoke every day, but to extinguish them when they perceived the enemy in motion: upon which, the enemy advancing again, and not seeing the usual signals made to give notice of their approach, imagined they were not discovered, and pushed on so precipitately to the attack, that they fell into disorder, and were routed by their adversary, who was

prepared

prepared to receive them.—Memnon the Rhodian, in order to draw the enemy out of a strong and advantageous situation of which they had possessed themselves, got one of his own men to pass over to them as a deserter, with intelligence that his army was in a mutiny, and that the greater part of it was going to leave him: to confirm which, he caused a great uproar and commotion to be counterfeited every now and then in his camp; by which the enemy were so imposed upon that they quitted their entrenchments to attack him, and were entirely defeated.—Great care is likewise to be taken not to reduce an enemy to utter despair. Julius Cæsar was always very attentive to this point in his wars with the Germans, and used to open them a way to escape, after he began to perceive that when they were hard pressed, and could not run away, they would fight most desperately; thinking it better to pursue them when they fled, than to run the risque of not conquering when they defended themselves with such obstinacy.—Lucullus observing that a body of Macedonian horse, which he had in his army, were going over to the enemy, caused a Charge to be sounded immediately, and ordered all the rest of his army to advance: upon which, the enemy supposing he designed to attack them, presently fell upon the Macedonians with such fury, that they were obliged to defend themselves, and fought bravely, instead of deserting him as they designed.

It is of great importance also to secure a town, when you suspect its loyalty, either before or after a victory.—Pompey suspecting the fidelity of the Catilinenses, desired them to let him send the sick men whom he had in his army into their town, to be taken care of till they were well again: but instead of sick men, he sent a parcel of the stoutest and most resolute fellows he had in his army in disguise, who made themselves masters of the town
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and kept it for him.—Publius Valerius having been offended by the Epidaurians, and mistrusting their sincerity, caused a pardon to be proclaimed for all such as would come to accept of it at a certain Temple without the gates of their town: upon which, all the inhabitants repairing thither for that purpose, he shut the doors of the Temple upon them, and suffered none to return to the town but such as he could confide in.—Alexander the Great, in order to secure Thrace when he was upon his march into Asia, took all the Nobility and leading men of that Province along with him, and allowing them pensions, left the common people to be governed by men of their own condition: by which, the Nobility being content with their appointments, and the common people having no leading men to oppress, or instigate them to rebel, the whole Province continued quiet. But of all the methods that can be taken to gain the hearts of a people, none contribute so much as remarkable examples of continence and justice; like that of Scipio in Spain, when he returned a most beautiful young Lady, safe and untouched, to her husband and relations; a circumstance which conduced more to the reduction of Spain, than any force of arms could ever have done.—Julius Cæsar acquired such reputation for his justice in paying for the wood which he cut down to make palisades for his camps in Gaul, that it very much facilitated the conquest of that Province. I think I have now nothing more to add to these particular documents, or the Subject in general; except it be to say something concerning the nature of attacking and defending towns; which I will do as briefly and clearly as I can, if I have not already trespassed too much upon your patience.

BATTISTA. You are so very complaisant and obliging, Sir, that we shall desire you to indulge our curiosity in these points, without any apprehension

ension of being thought troublesome to you ; since you are so good to make a free offer of what we should otherwise have been ashamed to ask. We shall esteem it a very great favour therefore, as well as a pleasure, if you will be so kind to go on with the Subject. But before you proceed to what you were speaking of, let us entreat you to inform us whether it is better to continue a war all the winter (according to the custom of these times) or to keep the field in the summer only, and put your troops into quarters before the winter comes on, as the Ancients used to do.

FABRIZIO. Indeed, Sir, if you had not asked this timely and pertinent question, I believe I should have forgot to have said any thing of a matter which yet deserves much consideration and attention.—I must therefore beg leave to tell you again, that the Ancients were wiser, and conducted their affairs with more prudence, than we do at present ; but especially their wars : for though we are guilty of great errors in many other respects, we certainly are guilty of more and greater in this. Nothing can be more dangerous or indiscreet in a General than to carry on a war in winter-time : for in that case, the aggressor is sure to run a greater risque of being ruined than those who act upon the defensive. For as the main end and design of all the care and pains that are bestowed in keeping up good order and discipline, is to fit and prepare an army to engage an enemy in a proper manner, a General ought always to have that point in view ; because a complete victory commonly puts an end to a war. He therefore, who has an orderly and well-disciplined army under his command, will certainly have an advantage over another General who has not, and be more likely to come off with victory. Now it must be considered, that nothing is a greater impediment to good order and discipline than rough situations, and wet or cold weather :

ther : for in a bad situation you cannot range your forces according to your usual order, and hard weather will oblige you to divide them : in which case you cannot act with your whole force against an enemy, as they are cantoned in villages and towns, and fortresses, at a distance from each other without any order or regularity, and in such a manner as necessity prescribes : so that all the pains you have taken to discipline your men, and make them observe good order, will signify nothing in such a season. But it is not much to be wondered that the Generals of our times carry on their wars in the winter : for as they are strangers to all sort of discipline and military knowledge, they are neither sensible of the losses and inconveniences which must necessarily result from dividing their forces, nor do they trouble their heads in endeavouring to establish that discipline and good order amongst their men, which they never learnt themselves.—They ought to reflect, however, upon the numberless hardships and losses occasioned by a winter-campaign, and to remember that the defeat of the French near the Garigliano, in the year 1503. was owing, not so much to the bravery of the Spaniards as to the rigour of the season. For as I told you before, those that resolve to carry on a war in an enemy's country during the winter, must of necessity have the worst of it : because, if they keep their men all together in a camp, they must suffer much from rain and cold ; and if they divide them into different cantonments, they must greatly weaken their army. Whereas, those that wait for them at home may presently unite their forces, and not only chuse their time and place of attack, but keep their men safe and fresh under cover, till they have an opportunity of falling upon some of the enemy's quarters, who being divided and dispersed cannot be supposed to make any great resistance. In this manner we may account for the defeat of the

the French, which I just now mentioned; and this will always be the fate of those who invade an enemy in the winter, that has any conduct or knowledge in military affairs. If a General therefore would plunge himself into such circumstances, that neither the number, discipline, good order, nor bravery of his troops, can be of any service to him, let him carry on a field war in the winter. The Romans, however, in order to make the most of those qualifications which they took so much pains to acquire, always avoided winter-campaigns with as such care as they did rough, confined and inconvenient situations, or any other impediment that might prevent them from availing themselves of their valour and good discipline. This is all that I have to say at present in answer to your last question. Let us now proceed, if you please, to the method of attacking and defending towns, and the manner of building and fortifying them.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

THE

THE

ART OF WAR.

BOOK VII.

THE CONTENTS.

In what manner Towns and Fortresses are to be built and fortified. Rules to be observed by those that are to defend a Town that is threatened with a Siege. Advice to such as are in want of provisions, when they are besieged; and to the besiegers. That appearances are not to be trusted to. How to draw a Garrison out of a town that is besieged. That some towns may be corrupted, and others taken by surprize. That good guards should be kept at all times and places by the besieged. Different methods by which they may convey private intelligence to their friends. How to repair a breach, and defend it. Of Mines. That the besieged should take care to divide their forces as little as possible. That when a Town or Camp is surrounded on every side, it is sometimes necessary to expose it to an assault on one side. General rules to be observed in military discipline. The method of raising plenty of horses in any country. That a General ought sometimes to strike out new inventions of his own. The Conclusion.

FABRIZIO. **T**O WNS and Fortresses may be strong either by nature or art. Those are strong by nature that are either surrounded

rounded by rivers or morasses, or situated upon a rock or steep hill, like Monaco and Sanico : for such as are situated upon hills that are not difficult of ascent, are looked upon as weak since the invention of mines and artillery : upon which account, those that build fortresses in these times often chuse a flat situation, and make it strong by art. For this purpose, their first care is to fortify their walls with angles, bastions, casemates, half moons, and ravelines ; that so no enemy can approach them without being taken both in front and flank. If the walls are built very high, they will be too much exposed to artillery, if very low, they may easily be scaled : if you throw up a ditch on the outside of them to make a scalade more difficult, and the enemy should fill it up, (which may easily be done by a numerous army) they will presently become masters of them. In my opinion therefore, (with submission to better judges) the best way to prevent that would be to build the walls pretty high, and to throw up a ditch rather on the inside than on the outside of them. This is the strongest method of fortifying a town : for it not only covers the besieged from the fire of the artillery, but makes it a very difficult matter for the besiegers either to scale the walls or fill up the ditch. Your walls then should be of a due height, and two yards thick at least, to stand the fire of the enemy's batteries : there should likewise be towers all along them, at the distance of four hundred feet from each other. The ditch on the inside ought to be no less than sixty feet wide and twenty-four deep, and all the earth that is dug out of it should be thrown up on that side which is next the town, and supported by a wall built in the ditch, and carried up the height of a man above the ground, which will make the ditch so much the deeper. In the bottom of the ditch I

would have casemates * about four hundred feet from each other, to take those that might get down into it. The heavy artillery that is made use of for the defence of the town should be planted on the inside of the wall that supports the ditch: for as the other wall is to be a high one, you cannot make use of very large pieces there without much difficulty and inconvenience. If the enemy attempts a scalade, the height of the first wall secures you: if they batter you with artillery, they must beat down that wall in the first place; and when it is beat down (as a wall always falls towards that side from whence it is battered) the ruins of it having no ditch to bury them in, the outside must naturally add to the depth of the ditch behind them: so that the enemy cannot well advance any further, being stopped there not only by those ruins, but the ditch on the inside of them, and the artillery planted on the other side of that ditch. The only expedient they have left upon such occasions, is to fill up the ditch, which is a very difficult matter on account of its great width and depth, the danger of approaching it from the bastions and other fortifications with which it is flanked, and the labour of climbing over the ruins with burdens of fascines upon their backs: so that I think a town fortified in this manner may be looked upon as impregnable†.

BATTISTA. Would not the town be stronger do you think if there was another ditch on the outside of the wall?

FABRIZIO. Most certainly. But I meant that if there was to be one ditch only, it would be the best way to have it on the inside.

BATTISTA. Would you chuse to have water in the ditches, or would you rather have them dry?

* Vaults of mason's work in the flank of a Bastion next the Curtain, to fire upon the enemy.

† Not since the invention of bombs.

FABRIZIO.

FABRIZIO. People differ in their opinions of that matter : because ditches with water in them secure you against mines, and those that have none are harder to be filled up. But upon the whole, I should rather prefer dry ditches, because they are a better security than the other : for ditches with water in them have sometimes been frozen over in such a manner in winter-time, that the towns they were designed to secure, have been taken without much difficulty ; as it happened to Mirandola, when Pope Julius laid siege to it. But to guard against Mines, I would make my ditches so deep, that if any one should attempt to work under them, they must be prevented by water. I would likewise build a Castle, or any kind of fortress, with the same sort of walls and ditches ; which would make them very difficult, if not impossible to be taken.

In the next place, I would advise those that have the charge of defending a town that is going to be besieged, by no means to suffer any bastions or other works to be thrown up on the outside of the walls, or at a little distance from the town : and I would also advise those that build fortresses, not to make any place of retreat in them, whither the besieged may retire when the walls are either beat down or in possession of the enemy. The reason of my first caution is, that the Governor of a town that is besieged, ought not to do a thing which will lessen his reputation at the very beginning of the siege : for the diminution of that will make all his orders but little regarded, and discourage the Garrison. But this will always be the case, if you build little forts out of the town you are to defend : because they are sure to fall into the enemy's hand, it being impossible in these times to maintain such inconsiderable places against a train of artillery : so that the loss of them will be the loss of your reputation, and therefore most probably

of the town itself. When the Genoese rebelled against Lewis XII. King of France, they built some trifling redoubts upon the hills that lie round about Genoa, which being presently taken by the French, occasioned the loss of that City. As to the second piece of advice, in relation to fortresses, I say, that nothing can expose a fortress to greater danger, than to have places of retreat into which the garrison may retire when they are hard pressed: for if it was not for the hopes of finding safety in one post, after they have abandoned another, they would exert themselves with more obstinacy and resolution in defending the first; and when that is deserted, all the rest will soon fall into the enemy's hand. Of this we have a recent and memorable instance in the loss of the Citadel at Forli, when the Countess Catharine was besieged there by Cæsar Borgia, son to Pope Alexander VI. at the head of a French army. That fortress was so full of such places of retreat, that a Garrison might retire out of one into another, and out of that into many more successively upon occasion: for in the first place, there was the Citadel; and in the next, a Castle, separated from it by a ditch, with a draw-bridge upon it, over which you might pass out of one into the other; and in this Castle there were three divisions separated from one another by ditches full of water, with draw-bridges over them. The Duke therefore having made a breach in the wall of one of these divisions with his artillery, Giovanni da Casala, who was the Governor, instead of defending the breach, retreated into another division: upon which, the Duke's forces immediately entered that division without opposition, and having got possession of the draw-bridges, soon made themselves masters of all the rest. The loss of that fortress then, which was thought inexpugnable, was owing to two great errors; the first in making so many conveniences of retreating from

one place to another ; and the second, in that none of those places could command their bridges : so that the ill contrivance of the fortress, and the want of conduct in the garrison, defeated the magnanimous resolution of the Countess, who had the courage to wait for an army there, which neither the King of Naples nor the Duke of Milan durst face : however, though her efforts did not succeed, she gained much reputation by so generous a stand, as appears from many copies of verses made in her praise upon that occasion.—If I was to build a fortress then, I would make the walls of it very strong, and fortify it with such ditches as I have just now described : but I would have no retreating places, nor any thing in the inside but dwelling-houses, and those too too low, that the Governor seeing every part of the walls at one glance of the eye from the middle of it, might know where to send relief immediately upon occasion, and the garrison be convinced that when the walls and ditch were lost, they had no other refuge left : but if I should by any means happen to be prevailed upon to make places of retreat, I would contrive them in such a manner, that every one of them should be able to command its own draw-bridge, which I would build upon piles in the middle of the ditches that separated them from each other.

BATTISTA. You say that small forts are not defensible in these times : but if I mistake not, I have heard others assert that the less any fort was, the better it might be defended.

FABRIZIO. Their assertion is ill-grounded, because no place can be called strong at present where the besieged have not room to secure themselves by throwing up other ditches and ramparts when the enemy has got possession of the first : for such is the force of artillery, that whoever depends upon one wall and one ditch only will have reason to lament his error.

And since forts and bastions (provided they do not exceed the common dimensions, for then they may be deemed castles and fortresses) have no room for raising new works, they must presently be taken when they are assaulted. It is therefore the best way not to build any such forts at a distance from a town, but to fortify the entrance into it, and cover the gates with ravelines in such a manner that no person can either come in or go out of them in a right line; besides which, there should be a ditch betwixt the raveline and the gate, with a draw-bridge upon it. It is a good way to have a Portcullis likewise at a every gate to let in your men again after they have made a sally, and to hinder the enemy from entering with them if they should be pursued. This is the use of Portcullises: (which the ancients called Cataractæ) for upon such occasions you could not receive any benefit either from the draw-bridge or the gate, both of them being crowded with men.

BATTISTA. I have seen Portcullises in Germany made of wooden bars in the form of an iron grate; but those that are used in Italy are all made of whole planks: pray what is the reason of this difference? and which of them are most serviceable?

FABRIZIO. I must tell you again, that the ancient military customs and institutions are almost abolished in every part of the world; but in Italy they seem to be totally extinct; and if we have any good thing to boast of, it is entirely borrowed from the Ultramontanes. You must have heard, and perhaps some of the company may remember, in how feeble and slight a manner we used to fortify our towns and castles before the coming of Charles VIII. King of France, into Italy in the year 1594. The merlons or spaces in the walls betwixt the embrasures were not above a foot thick; the embrasures themselves were made very narrow on the out-side, and wide within, with many other defects

defects which it would be too tedious to enumerate; for when the merlons are made so slight they are soon beat down, and embrasures of that construction are presently laid open. But now we have learnt from the French to make our merlons strong and substantial: and though our embrasures are still wide within, and grow narrower and narrower to the middle of the wall, after which they begin to open again and grow wider and wider to the outside, the artillery cannot be so easily dismounted, nor the men driven from the parapets. The French have likewise many other improvements and inventions which our Soldiers have never seen, and therefore cannot imitate: amongst these I might mention the portcullisses you just now spoke of, made in the form of an iron grate, which are much better than ours: for if you make use of one that is made of whole planks for the defence of a gate, when it is let down you shut yourself close up, and cannot annoy the enemy through it; so that they may either hew it down with axes, or set fire to it without any danger: but if it is made like a grate, you may easily defend it against them, either with spikes or firing shot through the interstices of the bars.

BATTISTA. I have observed another Ultramontane invention which has been imitated of late in Italy, which is, to make the spokes of the wheels of our artillery-carriages incline obliquely from the fellies to the nave. Now I should be very glad to known the reason of this, because I always thought straight spokes had been stronger than any others.

FABRIZIO. You must not look upon this deviation from common custom as either the effect of whim or caprice, or for the sake of ornament: for where strength is absolutely necessary but little account ought to be made of beauty. The true reason then of what you have observed, is that such wheels are safer and stronger than our own; for

when the carriage is loaded it either goes even or inclines to one side: when it goes even, each wheel sustains an equal share of the weight, and is not too much oppressed by it: but when it inclines to either side, the weight lies wholly upon one of the wheels. If the spokes therefore are straight they are soon broken in that case; because if the wheel inclines, the spokes must incline also, and cannot support the weight that presses upon them. So that the French judge rightly in setting the spokes of their wheels obliquely to the nave: for when the carriage inclines to one side, and the weight bears directly upon them, instead of oblique they will then become straight in a line with it, and consequently better able to support the whole than they were to bear one half of the load when the carriage went even. But to return to our towns and fortresses:

The French have likewise another method of securing the gates of their towns, and of letting their men in and out of them with more ease and convenience when they are besieged, which I have not yet seen practised in Italy. They erect two perpendicular piles or pillars at the end of the drawbridge on the outside of the ditch; upon each of which they balance a beam in such a manner that one half of it hangs over the bridge, and the other on the outside of it. Those parts of them which hang on the outside are joined together with cross bars like a grate, and at that end of each beam which hangs over the bridge they fix a chain and fasten it to the bridge; so that when they have a mind to shut up that end of the bridge they loose the chains and let the grate fall; and when they would open it they draw home the chains and hoist the grate up again: by these means they can raise it up to such a height that either foot only, or horse, if it is necessary, may pass under, or may shut the passage up so close that no body at all can get through;

through ; as the grate is raised and lowered like the port of an embrasure. This I take to be a better contrivance than the Portcullis ; because the grate does not fall perpendicularly like a Portcullis ; and therefore is not so liable to be obstructed by an enemy. Those then that would fortify a town in a proper manner, should observe these directions : besides which, they should not suffer any lands to be tilled nor buildings to be erected within a mile at least of it : the whole country round it should be quite clear and open, free from all thickets, or banks, or plantations, or houses, which may hinder the prospect of the besieged, and afford shelter to an enemy in his approaches.—Remember likewise that a town, where the banks of its outside ditch are higher than the common surface of the earth, may be accounted very weak : for instead of doing you any good, they only serve to cover the enemy, and mask their batteries, which they may easily open upon you from thence.—But let us now proceed to shew what is to be done within a fortified town, for its greater security against an enemy.

I will not trespass so much upon your time and patience as to tell you that besides the directions already given, it is absolutely necessary to be well furnished with ammunition and provisions for the garrison ; because every body must know this, and that without such stores all other precautions and preparations are to no purpose. I shall only say in general, that there are two rules which should never be forgotten upon such occasions : the first is, to provide yourself with every thing that you think you may want ; and the next, to prevent the enemy from availing themselves of any thing that may be of service to them in the country round about you : for which purpose, if there be any forage, or cattle, or any thing else, that you cannot carry off into the town, you ought by all means to destroy it.

it. You ought likewise to take care that nothing be done in a tumultuous or disorderly manner; and that every man may know his station, and what part he has to act upon any occasion. It is necessary therefore to give strict orders that all the old men, women, children, and sick people, should keep close in their houses, in order to leave every passage clear and open for those that are young and fit for action; some of whom should always be under arms on the walls, others at the gates, and others at the principal passes in the town, to be ready upon any sudden emergency: there should be particular parties also which should not be confined to any certain station, but appointed to succour any quarter where there should be occasion for it: so that when such a disposition is made, it is hardly possible that any tumult should happen which can throw you into confusion.—There is another thing to be remembered both in besieging and defending a town; which is, that nothing encourages an enemy so much as their knowing that it has not been used to sieges: for it often happens that a town is lost through fear alone, without waiting for an assault. The besiegers therefore should endeavour by all means to appear as powerful and formidable as they can, and take every opportunity of making the most ostentatious display of their strength: the besieged, on the other hand, ought to post the stoutest of their men in places where they are attacked with the greatest fury, and such as are neither to be imposed upon by appearances, nor driven from their posts by any thing but downright force of arms: for if the enemy fails in the first attempt, the besieged will take courage; and the enemy perceiving they are not to be dismayed by shew alone, must be obliged to have recourse to other methods.—The engines which the Ancients made use of in the defence of a town were many; the chief of which were such as threw darts and huge stones to a great distance,

distance, and with astonishing force : they made use of several likewise in besieging towns, as the battering ram, the tortoise, and many others * : instead of which, great guns are now used both by besiegers and those that are besieged. But to return.

A Governor of a town must take care neither to be surprised by famine, nor forced by assault : as to famine, I told you before that he ought to lay in a plentiful stock of provisions and ammunition before the siege begins : but if the siege should prove a very long one, and they should fail, he must then devise some extraordinary method of procuring supplies from his friends and allies, especially if a river runs through the town, as the inhabitants of Casilinum did from the Romans : for when that place was so closely invested by Hannibal that they could send them no other provisions, they threw great quantities of nuts into a river that ran through the middle of their town, which being carried down by the stream escaped the enemy's notice, and supplied the besieged with food for a considerable time. The inhabitants of some towns which have been besieged, in order to make the enemy despair of reducing them by famine, have either thrown a great quantity of bread over their walls, or gorged an ox with corn, and then turned it out to fall into the enemy's hand ; that so when they killed it, and found its stomach so full of corn, they might imagine they had abundance in the town.—On the other hand, some great Generals have used as many artifices and expedients to distress a town. Fabius Maximus suffered the Campanians to sow their fields before he invested their city, in order to diminish their Stores. When Dionysius lay before Rhegium, he offered the people terms of accommodation, and during the treaty

* The Reader may see an account and description of them all in Danet's Dictionary, under the word Arma.

prevailed

prevailed upon them to furnish him with a large quantity of provisions : but when he had thus lessened their stock and increased his own, he immediately blocked up the town so straitly on every side, that he soon obliged them to give it up. Alexander the Great having a design upon Leucadia, first made himself master of the neighbouring towns, and turned all the inhabitants into that place; which at last filled it so full of people, that he presently reduced it by famine.—As to assaults, I told you before that it is of the utmost importance to repel the first attack: for the Romans took many towns by suddenly assaulting them on every side, (which they called *aggredi urbem coronat*) as Scipio did when he made himself master of New Carthage in Spain. If such an assault therefore can be sustained, the enemy will find it a difficult matter to succeed afterwards: for though they should get into a town, the inhabitants may find some remedy, if they are not wanting to themselves; and it has often happened even in that case, that the assailants have either been all slain, or driven out again; especially when the inhabitants have got into garret windows, or upon the tops of houses and turrets, and fought them from thence. To prevent this, the assailants commonly either set open the gates to make way for the others to escape with safety, or gave orders loud enough to be heard by every one not to hurt any body but such as were in arms, and to spare all those that would lay them down: and this has frequently been of great service upon such occasions.—It is an easy matter likewise to make yourself master of a town if you come suddenly and unexpectedly upon it; that is, if you are at such distance from it with your army, that the inhabitants do not suspect you of any design of that kind, or imagine they shall have sufficient notice of your approach: so that if you can make a long and hasty march or two, and fall unawares upon it, you are almost

almost sure to succeed.—I would willingly pass over some transactions in silence that have happened in our own times, as it would be disagreeable to talk of myself and my own exploits; and what to say of others I cannot well tell. Nevertheless, I cannot help proposing the example of Cæsar Borgia (commonly called Duke Valentine) in this respect, as worthy of imitation: for when he lay with his army at Nocera, and pretended a design upon Camerino, he suddenly invaded the Duchy of Urbino, and made himself master of a state in one day without any difficulty, which another man could not have reduced without bestowing much time and expence upon it, if at all. It behoves those that are besieged likewise to beware of tricks and stratagems in the enemy, and therefore they ought not to trust to any appearance, though ever so usual and familiar to them, but to suspect there is some mischief lurking under it. Domitius Calvinus laying siege to a town, used to march round it every day with a good part of his army: so that the besieged, imagining at last he did it only for exercise, began to grow remiss in their guards; which Domitius perceiving, made an assault upon the town, and carried it. Some Generals who have had intelligence of troops that were upon their march to relieve a place they had invested, have dressed a body of their own Soldiers in the enemy's livery, and furnished them with the same colours, who being admitted into the town have presently made themselves masters of it. Cimon, the Athenian, set fire to a Temple one night that stood without the gates of a town he designed to surprize: upon which, all the people running out of it to extinguish the flames, left the town to the mercy of the enemy. Others, having met with a party of forragers who were sent out of a fortress, have put them all to the sword, and disguised some of their own men in their cloaths, who have afterwards given up the place to them.—Besides

these artifices, the Ancients used some others to draw the garrison out of a town they had a design upon. When Scipio commanded the Roman armies in Africa, he was very desirous to make himself master of some strong places which were well garrisoned by the Carthaginians : for which purpose, he made a feint of assaulting them, but soon desisted from the attempt, and marched away again to a great distance, as if he was afraid of the enemy. Hannibal therefore being deceived by appearances, immediately drew all the garrisons out of them, in order to pursue him with greater force, in hopes of entirely crushing him : but Scipio being informed of this, sent Maslinissa with a sufficient number of men by another route, who presently got possession of them. Pyrrhus laying siege to the Capital of Illyria (now Sclavonia) where there was a very strong garrison, pretended at last to despair of reducing it, and turning his arms against other towns which were not so well defended, obliged the enemy to draw the greater part of the garrison out of the Capital to relieve them : after which, he suddenly returned thither with his army, and took it without any difficulty. Many have poisoned wells and springs, and diverted the course of rivers, to make themselves masters of a town ; but have not always succeeded in that : others have endeavoured to dismay the inhabitants, by causing a report to be spread that they have lately gained some considerable advantage, and daily expect a powerful reinforcement. Some Generals have made themselves masters of towns by holding a private correspondence with, and corrupting one party of the inhabitants ; for which purpose they have made use of several methods : others have sent one of their chief Confidants amongst them, who, under the pretence of desertion, has gained great credit in the town, and afterwards betrayed it, either by giving intelligence to his friend in what manner the guards were posted,

or by preventing a gate being shut by the breaking down a carriage in it, or by some other means facilitating the entrance of the enemy. Hannibal prevailed upon an officer to betray a garrison to him belonging to the Romans, which was effected in this manner: the officer got leave to go a-hunting in the night, under a pretence that he durst not do it in the day-time, lest he should be taken by the enemy; and returning before morning, contrived matters so well that he got several of Hannibal's men admitted with him in disguise, who immediately killed the guards, and delivered up one of the gates to Hannibal. Some towns have been taken by suffering their garrison to make a sally upon the enemy, and then to pursue them to too great a distance when they pretended to fly before them: by which they have been drawn into an ambush and cut off. Many Generals (and Hannibal among the rest) have let a besieged enemy get possession of their camp, in order to throw themselves betwixt them and the town, and so prevent their retreat. Others have imposed upon them by pretending to raise the siege, as Phormio the Athenian did: for after he had lain some time before the city of Caledon, and ravaged all the country round about it, the inhabitants sent ambassadors to him, whom he received with much courtesy, and made them so many fair promises, that having lulled them into security, he decamped and marched away to a distance from the city; but whilst they were weak enough to imagine they had got entirely quit of him, and had laid aside all care of their defence upon the strength of his promises, he suddenly returned, and falling upon them when they did not expect such a visit, presently took the city. The inhabitants of a besieged town ought likewise to secure themselves by all means against any of their own townsmen whose fidelity they have reason to suspect: but they may sometimes work upon them more effectually by

by kindnesses than severity and harsh treatment. Marcellus knew that Lucius Bancius of Nola was inclined to favour Hannibal ; yet he behaved to him with so much generosity, that instead of an enemy he became his firm friend. They should also be at least as much upon their guard when the enemy is at some distance as when he is near at hand ; and to be particularly careful in guarding those places which they think are least exposed to danger : for many towns have been lost by being assaulted in a part which has been thought the most secure. The reason of this is, either because that part has been really strong of itself, and therefore neglected ; or because the enemy has artfully made a shew of storming one part with great noise and alarm, whilst he was assaulting another in good order and silence. The besieged therefore above all things should take the utmost care to have their walls always well guarded, but especially in the night-time ; and not only to post men there, but fierce and quick-nosed dogs also, to smell out an enemy at a distance, and to give an alarm by their barking : for dogs and geese too have sometimes been the preservation of a fortress, as they were of the Capitol at Rome when it was besieged by the Gauls. When the Spartans laid siege to Athens, Alcibiades ordered that whenever he should hoist a light in the night, every guard shoud do the same, upon pain of severe punishment in case of neglect. Iphicrates the Athenian, finding a Centinel asleep at his post, immediately killed him, and said he had only left him as he found him.

Some who have been besieged have found out different methods of conveying intelligence to their friends ; as in the first place, by writing letters to them in cyphers, when they durst not trust the messenger with a verbal errand, and concealing the letters in some manner or other. The nature of the cyphers hath been devised and agreed upon by the par-

ties before-hand ; and the methods of concealing them various. Some have written what they had to say in the scabbard of a sword : others have put their letters into paste, which they have baked and given to the bearer for food upon the road : others have concealed them in their private parts : and others again under the collar of the messenger's dog. Some have written letters about common business, and interlined them with their main purpose written in a certain composition, which will not appear till they have been dipped in water, and held to a fire. This method has been very artfully practised in our own times by a person, who having occasion to communicate a secret to some of his friends that lived in a town which was besieged, and not daring to trust any messenger with it, sent letters of excommunication written in the usual stile, but interlined in the manner I have been speaking of ; which being fixed to the doors of the Churches, were soon taken down, and the contents of them perfectly understood by those who knew from whom they came by some particular marks : and this is a very good way ; for those that carry such letters cannot know the secret contents of them, nor can there be any danger of their being discovered by an enemy. In short there are a thousand other methods of giving and receiving secret intelligence, which any man may either invent himself, or learn from others : but it is a much easier matter to convey intelligence to those that are besieged, than for them to send any to their friends ; because none can be carried out of a town, except by such as pretend to be deserters ; which is a very uncertain and hazardous method, especially if the enemy be vigilant and circumspect : whereas those that want to carry intelligence to the besieged have nothing more to do than to get into the enemy's camp (which they may do under almost any pretence) and take their opportunity of slipping from thence into the town.

But let us now proceed to the present method of repairing and defending a breach in the walls of a town.—If you should happen to be blocked up in a place where there is no ditch on the inside of the walls, in order to prevent the enemy from entering at a breach that may be made by their artillery, you must make a ditch behind that part which they are battering, at least sixty feet wide, and throw up all the earth that is dug out of it towards the town, to form a good rampart, and add to the depth of the ditch: and this you must carry on with such diligence, that when the wall is beat down, the ditch may be at least ten or twelve feet deep. It is necessary likewise to flank the ditch with a cale-mate at each end of it, if you have time: and if the wall be substantial enough to hold out till these works are finished, you will be stronger on that side than in any other part of the town: for then you will have a complete ditch of that sort which I recommended above; but if the wall be so weak that you cannot have time to do all this, you must then depend upon your men, and exert your utmost vigour to defend the breach. This method was pursued by the Pisans when the Florentines laid siege to their city: and indeed they were very well able to do it; for their walls were so strong that they had time enough, and the soil upon which their city is built, is very proper for making ditches and ramparts: but if either of those conveniences had failed them, they must inevitably have been undone. It is the best way, however, as I said before, to have such ditches previously made all round the walls, for then you need not be afraid of any enemy.

The Ancients sometimes made themselves masters of a town by mining: and this they did either by working a passage privately under ground into the middle of the place, and entering their men that way, as the Romans did at Veii; or by undermin-

ing the walls only in such a manner as to make them tumble down. The latter method is now most in use ; which is the reason that towns that stand high are accounted weaker than others, because more subject to be undermined : and when they are so, if the mines are filled with gunpowder, and a lighted match put to a train that leads to them, they not only blow up the walls, but split the rocks upon which they are built, and tear a whole fortress to pieces at one. The way to prevent this is to build upon a plain, and to make the ditch that surrounds your fortress so deep that an enemy cannot work under it without coming to water, which is the best defence against mines. But if you are in a town which stands upon a rock or hill, the only remedy is to dig several deep wells along the foot of the wall on the inside, which may serve to give vent to the powder when a mine is sprung. There is indeed another expedient, and a very good one too, which is to countermine the enemy, provided you can discover their mines ; but that is a very difficult matter, if they take proper care to conceal them.

The Governer of a town that is besieged ought likewise to take great care that he be not surprized whilst the garrison are reposing themselves ; as after an assault, or when the guards are relieved, (which is generally at the break of day in the morning, and by twilight in the evening) but especially whilst they are at their meals : for at those time many towns have been surprized, and many sallies made which have proved fatal to the besiegers : upon which account, it is highly necessary to keep a strict guard always in every quarter, and the greater part of the garrison under arms. Another thing I must not forget to tell you, which is, that the chief difficulty in defending either a town or a camp is occasioned by your being obliged to divide your men : for as the enemy may assault you at any

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time, or any place he thinks proper, with all his forces at once, you must keep a constant guard at every place : so that when he attacks you with his whole strength, you can only defend yourself with part of your own *.—The besieged are likewise often in danger of being totally ruined at one stroke ; whereas the besiegers have nothing to fear but a repulse : upon which consideration, some who have been blocked up either in a town or in a camp, have made a sudden sally with all their forces, though they were inferior to the enemy, and utterly dispersed them ; as Marcellus did at Nola, and Julius Cæsar in Gaul ; the latter of whom being attacked in his camp by a very powerful army, and finding he was neither able to defend himself there, nor fall upon the enemy with his whole strength, because he was forced to divide it to secure every part of his camp, threw open the entrenchments on one side, and facing about that way with all his men, exerted himself with such vigour and courage that he totally defeated the enemy. The constancy and resolution of the besieged likewise often dismay and weary out the besiegers. In the wars betwixt Pompey and Cæsar, their two armies lying near each other, and Cæsar's being in great want of provisions, a piece of the bread which his men were forced to eat was brought to Pompey ; who finding that it was made of herbs, gave strict orders that none of own Soldiers should see it, lest they should be daunted when they perceived what an enemy they had to deal with. Nothing did the Romans so much honour in their wars with Hannibal as their unshaken firmness and constancy : for they never sued for peace, nor shewed the least signs of fear even in the lowest ebb of their fortune : on the contrary, when Hannibal was almost at their gates, they sold the ground upon which he was encamped at a much

* See Pol. Disc. Book II. Chap. xxxii.

greater price than they would have asked for it at any other time ; and were so inflexible in the prosecution of the enterprizes they had in hand, that they would not raise the siege of Capua to defend Rome itself at a time when it was daily threatened with a siege.

I am sensible, that I have mentioned many things which some of you must have known before, and perhaps may have considered as well as myself : but this I did (as I told you) that you might more perfectly comprehend the nature of true military discipline and the Art of War, and for the instruction of such of the company who may not have had the opportunity of learning them.—And now, Gentlemen, I think I have but little more to add to what I have said upon this subject, except it be to lay down some general rules in military discipline, which yet you probably may think very obvious and common.

You must know then, that whatsoever is of service to the enemy, must be prejudicial to you ; and every advantage you gain is detrimental to them.—He that is most careful to observe the motions and designs of the enemy, and takes most pains in exercising and disciplining his army, will be least exposed to danger, and has most reason to expect success in his undertakings.—Never come to an engagement till you have inspired your men with courage, and see them in good order and eager to fight ; nor hazard a battle till they seem confident of victory.—It is better, if you can, to subdue an enemy by famine than the sword : for in battle, Fortune has often a much greater share than either prudence or valour.—No enterprize is more likely to succeed than one which is concealed from the enemy till it is ripe for execution.—Nothing is of greater importance in time of war than to know how to make the best use of a fair opportunity when it is offered.—Few men are brave

by nature : but good discipline and experience make many so.—Good order and discipline in an army are more to be depended upon than courage alone.—If any of the enemy's troops desert them, and come over to you, it is a great acquisition, provided they prove faithful : for the loss of them will be more felt than that of those who are killed in battle ; though deserters indeed will always be suspected by their new friends, and odious to their old ones.—In drawing up an army in order of battle, it is better to keep a sufficient reserve to support your front line upon occasion, than to extend it in such a manner as to make but one rank as it were of your army.—If a General perfectly knows his own strength and that of the enemy, he can hardly miscarry.—The goodness of your Soldiers is of more consequence than the number of them : and sometimes the situation of the place is of greater advantage and security than the goodness of your Soldiers.—Sudden and unexpected accidents often throw an army into confusion ; but things that are familiar, and have come on by slow degrees, are little regarded : it is the best way therefore when you have a new enemy to deal with, to accustom your men to the sight of them as often as you can by slight skirmishes before you come to a general engagement with them.—He whose troops are in disorder whilst they are pursuing a routed enemy, will most probably lose the advantage he had gained before, and be routed in his turn.—Whoever has not taken proper care to furnish himself with a sufficient stock of provisions and ammunition, bids fair to be vanquished without striking a stroke.—He that is either stronger in Infantry than Cavalry, or in Cavalry than Infantry, must chuse his ground accordingly.—If you would know whether you have any Spies in your camp in the day-time, you have nothing more to do than to order every man to his tent.—When you are aware that the en-

my self is acquainted with your designs, you must change them.—After you have consulted many about what you ought do, confer with very few concerning what you are actually resolved to do.—Whilst your men are in quarters, you must keep them in good order by fear and punishment; but when they are in the field, by hopes and rewards.—Wise Generals never come to an engagement but when they are either compelled by downright necessity, or can do it with great advantage.—Take great care that the enemy may not be apprized of the order in which you design to draw up your army for battle: and above all things, make such a disposition that your first line may fall back with ease and convenience into the second, and both of them into the third upon occasion.—In time of action be sure not to call off any of your Battalions to a different service from what they were destined to at first, lest you should occasion disorder and confusion in your army.—Unexpected accidents cannot well be prevented; but those that are foreseen may easily be obviated or remedied.—Men, arms, money, and provisions, are the sinews of war; but of these four, the two first are most necessary: for men and arms will always find money and provisions; but money and provisions cannot always raise men and arms.—A rich man without arms, must be a prey to a poor Soldier well armed.—Accustom your men to abhor a soft and effeminate way of life, and to despise all manner of luxury, extravagance, and delicacy, either in their diet, or dress.

Let these general rules suffice at present as most necessary to be remembered, though I am sensible I might have introduced several other topics in the course of this conversation, which would have fallen in properly enough with our subject; for instance, I might have shewn in how many different dispositions the Ancients drew up their armies, in what

manner they cloathed their Soldiers, and how they employed them at different times ; with several other particulars, which I thought might be omitted, not only because you may have various other means of informing yourselves of these things, but because I did not propose to myself at first to enter into a minute detail of ancient military discipline, but only to point out the methods by which much better order and discipline might be established in our armies than there is any where to be found at present : upon which account, I thought I had no occasion to make any further mention of ancient rules and institutions than what was absolutely necessary for the introduction of such an establishment. I know very well that I might likewise have taken an opportunity of enlarging more copiously upon the method of exercising and disciplining Cavalry, and of discoursing upon the nature of Sea-service : for those who write upon the Art of War tell us, there is a Sea-army, and a Land-army, an army of Infantry, and an army of Cavalry. Of naval affairs, however, I shall say nothing, because I do not pretend to have any knowledge of them, but leave that to the Genoese and Venetians, who have done such wonderful things by their experience in those matters : nor shall I say any more of Cavalry, because (as I told you before) that part of our Soldiery is the least corrupted : for if your Infantry (in which the strength of an army chiefly consists) be well-disciplined, your Cavalry be must of necessity be so too. I would advise every one, however, who is desirous to raise and keep up a good body of Cavalry, in the first place, to fill his country with Stallions of the best breed that can be procured, and to encourage the farmers to rear colts as they do calves and mules ; and in the next, (in order to promote the sale of them) to make every one that keeps a mule keep a horse also ; and to oblige him that will keep but one beast to make use of a horse :

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besides which, he should oblige all those that wear garments made of fine cloth to keep one horse at least. This method was taken by a certain Prince in our own memory, and in a very little time he saw his country abound with excellent horses. As to any thing else relating to Cavalry, I must refer you to what I have said before upon that Subject, and the present established discipline.

But you may desire perhaps to know, before we part, what qualifications a General ought to be possessed of, and I will satisfy you in a few words; for I cannot make choice of a more proper man than such a one as is master of the qualifications I have already particularized and recommended: and * yet even those are not sufficient, except he has abilities to strike out something new of his own upon an emergency: for no man ever excelled in his profes-

* The Ancients, in reckoning up the qualities of a good General, gave Fortune a place by itself, and distinguished it from Knowledge in the Art of War. "Ego sic existimo, says Tully, in summo imperatore quatuor has res inesse oportere, scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem." He shews afterwards that these four qualities met eminently in Pompey. "Reliquum est ut de felicitate quam praestare de seipso nemo potest, meminisse, & commemorare de altero possumus; sicut æquum homini de potestate Deorum timide & pauca dicamus. Ego enim sic existimo: Maximo, Marcello, Scipioni, Mario, & cæteris Magnis Imperatoribus, not solum propter virtutem, sed etiam propter fortunam, saepius imperia mandata, atque exercitus esse commissos. Fuit enim perfecto quibusdam summis viris quædam ad amplitudinem, & gloriam, & ad res magnas bene gerendas divinitus adjuncta fortuna." Pro lege Manil. cap. x. xvi.—One might add another qualification that is requisite in a General, and a very necessary one too, viz. that he should be perfect in his bodily senses, such as seeing, hearing, &c. The great and decisive battle of Yvry in France was lost by the short-sightedness of one of the Generals. The Viscount Tavannes being extremely short-sighted, had placed the several divisions of horse so close to one another, that there was not only no space left through which they might retire to rally in the rear of the army, after they had wheeled according to their orders: but even the very divisions themselves had no intervals, by means of which they might extend themselves when they moved. So that if they stirred ever so little, they jostled and crowded each other. An error, which not being observed by any body, and therefore left without remedy, very much distressed the army of the League, and put it into great confusion.—Nay indeed, it entirely occasioned the loss of the battle. See Davila's Hist. of the Civil Wars of France, book XI.

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sion that could not do that ; and if a ready and quick invention is necessary and honourable in any occupation, certainly it must be so in that of War above all others. Thus we see that any invention or new expedient, how trifling soever it was, is celebrated by Historians. Alexander was admired only for causing a cap to be held up at the point of a lance as a signal for decamping (instead of sounding a trumpet as usual) in order to decamp in silence and unobserved. The same Prince is likewise commended for ordering his men to kneel down on the left knee to receive the enemy upon a certain occasion, that so they might be able to sustain the attack with greater firmness : by which means, he not only gained a victory, but such a degree of reputation that Statues were erected to him in that attitude. But as it is now high time to put an end to this conversation, I will conclude it with returning to the point from whence we set out ; lest I should expose myself to the ridicule which is usually and justly bestowed upon such as make long digressions, and wander from their subject till they are lost.—If you remember, Cosimo, you seemed to wonder that I who professed to hold the Ancients in such admiration, and so liberally bestowed my censure upon others for not imitating them in matters of the greatest consequence, have not copied their example myself in the Art of War, which is my profession, and in which I have spent so much of my time and studies. In answer to this, I told you that men who have any great design in view, ought in the first place to make due preparations, and qualify themselves in a proper manner to carry it into execution when they have a fair opportunity of so doing. Now I must leave you to judge from the long conversation we have had to-day, whether I am master of sufficient abilities to reduce our present military discipline to the standard of the Ancients, or not ; and

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how often I must have revolved this matter in my mind: from whence you will be able to form a pretty good conjecture how much I have it at heart, and whether I would not actually have attempted to execute my design, if ever I had been favoured with a proper opportunity. For your further satisfaction, and my own justification, and to discharge my promise in some measure, I will shew you how difficult a matter it is in some respects, and how easy in others, to copy the Ancients in this point at present.

I say then that nothing can be more easy, than to reduce military discipline to the standard of the Ancients, if a Prince or State be able to raise an army of fifteen or twenty thousand young men in their own dominions: on the other hand, nothing can be more difficult, if this power be wanting. Now to explain myself more fully, you must know that some Generals have done great things, and gained much reputation, with armies ready formed and well-disciplined to their hands, as we might instance in several of the Roman Citizens, and others who have commanded armies which they found ready disciplined, and therefore had nothing more to do but to keep them so, and to conduct them like able Commanders. Others, who have been no less renowned for their exploits, have not only been obliged to discipline their armies, but even to raise them out of the earth as it were, before they could face an enemy: and these certainly deserve a much greater degree of applause than those who had the command of veteran and well-disciplined troops. Amongst such, we may reckon Pelopidas, Epaminnondas, Tullus Hostilius, Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, Cyrus King of Persia, and Gracchus the Roman, who all had their armies to raise and discipline before they could lead them into the field: and yet they were enabled to effect these things by their own abilities, and by having

having subjects of such a disposition, that they could discipline and train them up as they pleased. But it would have been utterly impossible that any one of them, how great soever his merit and qualifications might have been, should ever have performed any thing memorable in a foreign country, the inhabitants of which were corrupt and adverse to all good order and subordination. It is not sufficient therefore in Italy to know how to command an army already raised and disciplined ; a General must first raise and discipline it himself, before he puts himself at the head of it : but nobody can do that except a Prince who is possessed of large territories, and has a great number of subjects, which I am not ; nor did I ever yet, or ever can command any but foreign armies, composed of Soldiers who owed me no natural obedience : and whether it is possible to establish such discipline as I have been recommending amongst troops of that kind, I submit to your consideration. Do you think I could ever make these men carry heavier arms than they have been used to ; and not only arms but provisions for two or three days, and a spade or mattock into the bargain ? Could I ever make them dig, or keep them whole days together at their exercise, in order to fit them for the field ? Could I keep them from gaming, drinking, whoring, swearing, and those other vices which are got to such a head amongst the Soldiery of these times ? How long must it be before I could establish such order, discipline, and obedience amongst them, that if there should happen to be a tree full of ripe fruit in the middle of the camp, not one of them should dare to touch it ; of which sort we meet with several instances amongst the Ancients ? What rewards could I promise them of sufficient weight to make them love me ? or what threats could I use to make them fear me, when they know that when the war is over I shall have nothing more to do with them ? How could

I ever make those ashamed of any thing, who have no shame in them? How can they respect me, when they hardly know my face? By what God or what Saint must they swear? by him whom they worship, or those whom they blaspheme? What God they worship I know not; nor do I know what Saint they do not blaspheme. How could I hope they would ever observe any promise, when I saw they did not pay the least regard to their word; or imagine they would reverence man, when they shew so much dishonour to God? What good impression then could I stamp upon so rotten and corrupt a mass?—If you object that the Swiss and Spaniards are good Soldiers, I freely confess that I think them much better than the Italians; but if you have attended to what I have been saying, and consider the discipline of both those nations, you will find they fall very far short of the Ancients in many respects. The superiority of the Swiss is owing to their ancient institutions, and the want of Cavalry, as I told you before; and that of the Spaniards, to necessity: for as they generally carry on their wars in foreign parts, they cannot hope to escape if they lose a battle, and therefore must either conquer or die. This it is that makes them resolute Soldiers; but they are very deficient however in several other respects: for their chief, if not their only excellence, consists in standing firm to receive a charge from the push of a pike, or the point of a Sword: and should any man attempt to instruct them in what they are still wanting, especially if he be a foreigner, he would find all his endeavours to no purpose.—As to the Italians, their Princes have been so weak and pusillanimous for a long time, that they were not able to introduce any good military institution; and not being reduced to it by necessity like the Spaniards, they have attempted nothing of themselves; so that they are now become the scorn and derision of the world. The people indeed are not to be blamed for this, but their Princes,

Princes, who have been justly punished for it, and lost their dominions without being able to strike a stroke in their defence. To confirm what I have said, let me desire you to recollect how many wars there have been in Italy since it was invaded by Charles VIII. of France: and though wars generally make men good Soldiers, yet the longer these wars lasted, the worse were our officers and private men. This was owing to the nature of their military discipline and institutions, which have long been very bad, and still continue so: and what is still worse, there is no person that is able to reform them. It is in vain therefore to think of ever retrieving the reputation of the Italian arms by any other method than what I have prescribed, and by the co-operation of some powerful Princes in Italy: for then the ancient discipline might be introduced again amongst raw honest men who are their own Subjects; but it never can amongst a parcel of corrupted debauched rascals and foreigners. No Sculptor, how skilful soever in his art, can hope to make a good Statue out of a block of marble that has been mangled and spoiled before by some bungler; but he will be sure to succeed if he has a fresh block to work upon.

Before our Italian Princes were scourged by the Ultramontanes, they thought it sufficient for a Prince to write a handsome letter, or return a civil answer; to excel in drollery and repartee; to undermine and deceive; and to set themselves off with jewels and lace; to eat and sleep in greater magnificence and luxury than their neighbours; to spend their time in wanton dalliance and lascivious pleasures; to keep up a haughty kind of State, and grind the faces of their Subjects; to indulge themselves in indolence and inactivity; to dispose of their military honours and preferments to Pimps and Parasites; to neglect and despise merit of every

kind: y thing that was salutary or praise-worthy; to have their words and sayings looked upon as oracles;

cles; not foreseeing, (weak and infatuated as they were) that by such a conduct they were making a rod for their own backs, and exposing themselves to the mercy of the first invader. To this were owing the dreadful alarms, the disgraceful defeats, and the astonishing losses they sustained in the year one thousand four hundred and ninety-four: and hence it came to pass that three of the most powerful States in Italy were so often ravaged and laid waste in those times. But it is still more deplorable to see that those Princes, who are yet left in possession of any dominions, are so far from taking warning from the downfall of others, that they pursue the same course, and live in the same sort of misrule and fatal security; not considering that Princes in former times, who were desirous either to acquire new dominion, or at least to preserve their own, strictly observed all those rules which I have laid down and recommended in the course of this conversation, and that their chief endeavours were to inure their bodies to all manner of hardship and fatigue, and to fortify their minds against danger and the fear of death. Thus Julius Cæsar, Alexander of Macedon, and many other great men and heroic Princes whom I have mentioned before, always fought at the head of their own armies, always marched with them on foot, and carried their own arms; and if any of them ever lost their power, they lost their life with it at the same time, and died with the same reputation and glory which they had always maintained whilst they lived. So that, how much soever we condemn the inordinate thirst of dominion in some of them, we cannot reproach any of them with softness and effeminacy, or accuse them of having lived in so delicate or indolent a manner, as to enervate and make them unfit to reign over mankind. If then our Princes would read and duly consider the lives and fortunes of these great men, one would think it impossible they should not alter their conduct, or that their dominions should long con-


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tinue in the feeble and languishing condition they
are in at present.

But as you complained of your Militia in the beginning of this conversation, I must beg leave to tell you, that if you had formed it upon the model, and exercised it in the manner I have recommended, and it had not answered your expectation, you would then indeed have just reason for your complaint: but as you have neither formed nor disciplined it in that manner, you yourself are more properly to be blamed, if it has proved an abortion instead of a perfect birth. The Venetians, and the Duke of Ferrara also, made a good beginning, but they did not persevere: so that if they likewise miscarried, it is to be imputed to their own mismanagement, and not the defects of their men: for I will venture to affirm, that the first State in Italy that shall take up this method, and pursue it, will soon become master of the whole Province, and succeed as Philip of Macedon did; who having learnt from Epaminondas the Theban the right method of forming and disciplining an army, grew so powerful, whilst the other States of Greece were buried in indolence and luxury, and wholly taken up in plays and banquets, that he conquered them all in a few years, and left his Son such a foundation to build upon, that he was able to subdue the whole world. Whoever therefore despises this advice (whether he be a Prince or Governor of a Commonwealth) has but little regard for himself or his country: and for my own part, I cannot help complaining of Fortune, which should either not have suffered me to have known these things, or given me power to put them in execution; which is a thing I cannot hope for now I am so far advanced in years. For which reason, I have freely communicated my thoughts to you of this matter, as young men and well qualified not only to instil such advice into the ears of your Princes, if you approve of it, but to assist them in carrying into execution whenever a proper opportunity.

tunity shall offer : and let me conjure you not to despair of success, since this Province seems destined to revive Arts and Sciences which have seemed long since dead ; as we see it has already raised Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture as it were from the grave. As to myself indeed, I cannot expect to see so happy a change at my time of life : but if fortune had indulged me some years ago with a territory fit for such an undertaking, I think I should soon have convinced the world of the excellency of the ancient military discipline ; for I would either have encreased my own dominions with glory, or at least not have lost them with infamy and disgrace*.

* "After all, (says Dr. Leland in a Note upon his Life of Philip of Macedon) a scrupulous regard to systematical rules, and pedantically reducing war to a Science, sometimes proves a fatal enemy to that enthusiastic ardour, some spark of which must necessarily have a share in greatness of all kinds, and particularly in military greatness. Where the lively sense of honour, and the true patriot Spirit which should animate a Soldier, are wanting, it may serve to extinguish the sense of shame, and the fear of disgrace, by affording a fair pretence for justifying an instance of inactive conduct, or the declining an hazardous and dangerous enterprize. But when an exact knowledge of the military art is united with more elevated qualities, then it becomes really valuable. Of this, the present age hath an illustrious instance in a Prince, who must be acknowledged to bear a strong and striking resemblance to the Macedonian, in all the bright and glorious parts of his Character ; to possess the same exalted genius, the same penetration, the same indefatigable vigour, the same firmness and greatness of mind, the same boldness in enterprize, the same taste for the polite arts, and the same regard to Learning and its Professors. Like Philip, in his most distressed condition, his abilities have been employed in bearing up with an unconquered spirit against the united power of many different enemies surrounding him with their formidable numbers. But as his difficulties have been infinitely greater ; so his abilities in triumphing over them, have hitherto appeared unparalleled : the present age beholds them with astonishment ; posterity must speak of them with delight and admiration." Such is the magnanimous Prince whom we may justly call the greatest Hero (in the true sense of the word) that this or any other age has ever produced. As a Soldier, a Politician, a Legislator, a Philosopher, a Poet, he leaves Julius Cæsar, Alexander, Charles XII. of Sweden, &c. at a long interval behind him.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH AND LAST BOOK OF
THE ART OF WAR.



T H E

MARRIAGE of BELPHEGOR.

A N O V E L.

The A R G U M E N T.

Belphegor, an Arch-devil, is sent into this World by Pluto, and obliged to marry. He takes a wife, but not being able to support her insolence and extravagance, chuses rather to return to Hell than to live any longer with her.

IT is recorded in the old histories of Florence, that a certain devout person, who was held in great veneration for the sanctity of his life, being one day at prayers in his closet, had a vision, in which he saw numbers of Souls descending into hell: the much greater part of which complained it was owing to their wives that they were sent thither: at which, Minos, Æacus, Rhadamanthus, and the rest of the infernal Judges were not a little astonished. But though they looked upon it for some time only as a malicious slander raised upon married women; yet, as the complaint grew more and more frequent every day, they at last acquainted Pluto with it: upon which, he resolved to have the matter thoroughly discussed in his Privy Council, and, after mature deliberation, to take such measures as should seem most expedient, to discover whether there was any truth in the complaint, or whether it was a mere calumny. The Council

therefore being assembled, Pluto harangued them in this manner.

" Although, right trusty and well-beloyed, we hold our dominions by the decree of Heaven and irrevocable destiny ; and therefore are accountable to no other power for our actions : nevertheless, as it is a point of wisdom even in the greatest potentates to rule according to law, and to take the opinion of able Counsellors, especially in matters of high concern ; we are determined to be advised by you in what manner we ought to conduct ourselves in an affair, which otherwise perhaps may bring infamy and reproach upon ourselves and our Government. For though, indeed, the Souls of almost all married men which descend into these realms complain that it is owing to their wives ; yet are we unwilling to be too hasty in giving credit to so strange a report, lest we should expose ourselves to censure, as either too merciful and indulgent in sparing offenders who justly deserve punishment, or too rigid and severe in condemning the innocent. For as one extreme argues weakness, and the other injustice, and we are equally desirous to avoid the scandal that may result from either (if we could hit upon any proper expedient) we have called you together to demand your advice and assistance in making due provision that our Government, which hitherto has been renowned throughout all ages for the justice and impartiality of its decrees, may for ever enjoy the same unspotted reputation."

The matter seemed of the utmost importance to the whole Council, and worthy of the maturest deliberation : but though they all agreed that it was absolutely necessary to sift out the truth, yet they differed in the means which ought to be taken for that purpose : some thought it would be the best way to send a Devil in human shape into this world,

to inform himself personally of the truth or falsity of so common a report; others said it would be better, in their opinion, to send more than one, that so they might form a true judgment from their several accounts; a third party were of opinion they might spare themselves the trouble of sending any at all, by torturing the Souls of married men till they told the whole truth: the majority however agreeing in the first opinion, the rest acquiesced in it, and it was resolved accordingly to send some one particular Devil upon that errand: but as none of them appeared to be very fond of such an expedition, nor offered their service as volunteers, it was determined that the affair should be decided by lot; and the lot fell upon Belphegor, one of the Arch-devils, but once an Arch-angel and spirit of light before his fall from Heaven. Belphegor however did not much relish the employment that had fallen to his lot: but as it was the unanimous decree of Pluto and the whole Council, he submitted to the commands they laid upon him, and to take up with such appointments as they should think proper: which were, that he should have an hundred thousand ducats paid him down in ready money as soon as he entered upon his Commission; to introduce him into this world with a handsome equipage in the form of a man, and to enable him to marry such a wife as he pleased, with whom he was to live ten years: at the expiration of which term he was to return to Hell, to give Pluto a true account from his own experience of the happiness or unhappiness of a matrimonial life. It was likewise another condition annexed to his commission, that he should be subject, as long as he was a sojourner upon earth, to all the misery, distress, affliction, and passions that are the lot and inheritance of mortal man; such as sickness, and pain, and poverty, and exile, and imprisonment, and sorrow of

all sorts, except he could find means to elude them by artifice.

Belphegor then having received the money and engaged to submit to these conditions, set out for the upper world with a train of devils in the disguise of Servants, and soon after his arrival upon earth made a magnificent entry into Florence (a city which he chose to live in above all others for the sake of improving his fortune) where he assumed the name of Don Roderigo of Castile, and took a very fine house in the suburbs of All Saints. But to conceal his real quality, he gave out that he left Spain when he was but a boy to make a voyage into the Levant, and having resided at Aleppo ever since, had acquired a considerable fortune there; but that he had now retired from business with a design to marry and settle in Italy, as a country which he had heard much celebrated for the humanity and politeness of the people, and thought he should like it better than any other in the world. Now Roderigo seemed a very handsome man about thirty years of age, and as he lived in great splendour and magnificence, the Florentines were soon convinced he must be exceeding rich: upon which account, several of the nobility, who had many daughters and but small estates, courted his alliance. After some time therefore he made choice of a most beautiful young lady, whose name was Honesta, the daughter of Amerigo Donati, who also had three other daughters and three sons, all grown up: but notwithstanding the Donati were one of the noblest and most honourable families in Florence, yet Amerigo having so many children, besides the dignity of his rank to support in a proper manner, was poor and could give his daughter little or no fortune. Roderigo however married the young Lady, and celebrated his nuptials in the most splendid and ostentatious manner, being subject to vanity and all other human

human passions by the conditions he had submitted to before he left the infernal regions. Soon after his wedding, he likewise entered into all the pleasures and follies of the age, and spent vast sums of money to make himself popular and much talked of: besides which, he grew so passionately fond of his wife, that he was almost distracted whenever she happened to be either indisposed or displeased at any thing. But Madam Honesta, besides the rest of her fortune, which consisted chiefly, if not altogether, in her beauty and the nobility of her blood, brought likewise such a portion of pride and insolence with her, that Roderigo, who was a competent judge (as he was well acquainted with both parties) thought she excelled Lucifer himself in those amiable qualities: for when she found he was so enamoured of her that she could make him jump over a straw if she pleased, she laid aside all manner of affection and regard, and would call him the most opprobrious and provoking names she could think of whenever he denied her any thing, how unreasonable soever it was to ask it; which kind of treatment at last made poor Roderigo almost weary of his life: nevertheless, the respect he had for her father, her brothers, and the rest of her relations, the consideration of his marriage vow, and above all, the tenderness he still had for her, made him resolve to bear all with patience, and to keep her in temper if possible. For this purpose, he not only spent immense sums to gratify her vanity with the richest cloaths that could be got for money, and to indulge her in every new fashion that came up in a city where fashions change as often as the wind; but gave handsome marriage-portions to all her Sisters, sent one of her brothers with a cargo of fine cloath into the Levant, another with Silks into France and Spain, and set up the third in a Goldsmith's Shop at Florence. Besides this, in the time

of Carnival, and at the Festival of St. John, when all the nobility and rich Citizens made great feasts and entertainments for their friends, Madam Honesta took special care to see that her husband should exceed all others in luxury and profusion. Yet all these expences, heavy as they were, he bore with patience to keep peace at home; nor would he ever have repined at them, if he could but have lived quietly in his own house, till all was spent. But vain were his endeavours; for such was her extravagance and insolent behaviour that brought him into many distresses and inconveniences, and they were so insupportable, that neither man-servant nor maid-servant could bear to stay in the house above two or three days at most: so that Roderigo was almost at his wits end, when he saw that not only his hired servants, but even the very devils themselves whom he had brought with him into this world in the shape of men, deserted him, and chose rather to return to hell, and endure any sort of torment there, than to live upon earth under the hatches of such a vixen.

In these comfortless circumstances, Roderigo having at last got almost to the bottom of his purse by the assistance of his good wife, began to feed himself with the hopes of having some returns from the cargoes he had sent into France, Spain, and the Levant: but as his credit was still good, he resolved to keep up to his rank and usual manner of living. For this purpose, he borrowed money of the merchants and bankers, and gave them notes and bonds for it: but as many of them were circulating round the city, this transaction was publicly known; and to complete his ruin, when his credit was become low, he received intelligence by the same post that his wife's brother, whom he had sent into the Levant, having sold his cargo, had lost all the money at play; and also that the Ship in which the other brother

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brother was returning with a cargo of merchandize he had received in exchange for his own, had founder'd at Sea, without having been insured, and that is brother-in-law was drowned. As soon therefore as this came to be publicly known, Roderigo's creditors met privately ; but not daring to arrest him before his notes became payable, though they looked upon him as utterly ruined, determined to have him narrowly watched lest he should shew them a light pair of heels. Roderigo, on the other hand, seeing his affairs in so desperate a situation that there was no remedy left, and remembering the rigorous conditions of his commission, resolved to run away at all events ; and mounting his horse early one morning, immediately fled out of the city, through the gate of Prato near which he lived ; but as soon as his creditors heard he was gone off, they took the alarm, and having obtained leave from the Magistrates to seize him wherever he should be found, they not only sent bailiffs to pursue him, but rode after him themselves as fast as they could.

Roderigo had not got above a mile from the city when he perceived they were coming full cry after him, and seeing himself in great danger, resolved to leave the high road, and traverse the country to seek his fortune, if he should be happy enough to make his escape. But when he got into the fields, he found himself so entangled amongst the ditches and enclosures, that he was forced to quit his horse and take to his heels ; and skulking about from one field to another, under the cover of the vines and reeds with which that country abounds, he at last arrived at the house of one Giovanni Matteo del Bricca, a farmer and tenant to Messer Giovanni del Bene, whom he found in the yard giving fodder to his cattle ; and recommending himself to his protection, promised him a great reward, and that he would make him a rich man, if he would conceal

him

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him from his creditors, who were pursuing him in order to throw him into jail, where he might lie rotting all the days of his life if they should catch him : to gain credit to which promises he assured him he would give him such proof of his ability to perform them, that if he was not sufficiently convinced of it before they parted, he would freely give him leave to deliver him up into the hands of enemies.—Now this Matteo, though a peasant, was a sharp, sensible fellow ; and has he thought he should be wanting to himself and his family if he lost so fair an opportunity of making his fortune, and could come to no harm if he did not succeed by charitably endeavouring to shelter a man in distress; after a short pause told Roderigo he would afford him protection : for which purpose he covered him up close in a heap of straw that lay before the barn door, and threw a parcel of brushwood and reeds over it, which he had brought out of the fields for fuel. Roderigo was scarcely concealed when his creditors arrived ; but though they made a very strict enquiry after him, they could get nothing more out of Matteo than that he had neither seen nor heard of any such person : so that they soon went a way ; and having searched for him all over the country for the space of two or three days to no purpose, they at last returned to Florence. Matteo, as soon as the storm was blown over, took his guest out of the straw and demanded the performance of his promise : upon which, Roderigo said he was truly sensible of the great obligations he lay under to him, and would certainly be as good as his word ; and to convince him of his sincerity, he told him who he was, upon what errand he came into this world, and what sort of a wife he had been blessed with : adding that (as he designed to make him a rich man) whenever he heard of any woman in the neighbourhood that was possessed with a

Devil,

Devil, he might be assured that he was the Devil that possessed her, and would never quit her till his friend Matteo came to drive him away ; which would give him an opportunity of making his own terms with her relations : after which promise, he immediately took his leave and went about his business.

Not many days after it happened that the daughter of Ambrogio Amadei, and wife of Buonaiuto Tebalducci, citizens of Florence, was possessed with a Devil : upon which, her husband and parents had recourse to all the remedies that are generally made use of upon such occasions : and amongst the rest, they not only applied St. Zanobi's skull to her head, but wrapped her up in St. Gaulbert's cloke : at all which Roderigo laughed in his sleeve. Every body, however, was fully convinced that the woman was really possessed with a Devil, and that her distemper was not owing to vapours, or any whim of that sort : for she talked Latin, disputed in Philosophy, and discovered the private frailties and infirmities of several godly people : particularly those of a righteous Monk, who, amongst the rest of his peccadilloes, had kept a handsome girl above four years in his cell, under the disguise of a young lay-brother : all which things afforded matter of great surprize to every body that heard her. In the mean time her father Amadei was in great affliction, and having tried all remedies to no purpose, began to despair of a cure, when Matteo, luckily hearing of her case, came to wait upon him, and assured him he would dispossess his daughter if he would give him five hundred florins to buy a little bit of land at Peretola. These terms being readily accepted by her father, Matteo having in the first place caused two or three Masses to be sung, and gone through certain other devout ceremonies to give a good colour to the matter, put his mouth

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mouth close to the Lady's ear and said in a low voice; "Roderigo, I am come to desire you will perform the promise you made me :" "That I will do most willingly, answered Roderigo ; but this job will not be sufficient to make you so rich as I would have you ; and therefore as soon as I go out of this woman I will enter into King Charles's daughter of Naples, and never leave her till you come to beat up my quarters : for this service you may make your own conditions, and when you have done your business there, pray give me no further trouble :" after which, he immediately quitted the Lady, to the great joy and astonishment of the whole city. Not long after, the above mentioned Princess was in the same condition ; and though the King her father had recourse not only to all manner of physical remedies, but the assistance of the most pious and able Divines, it signified nothing : but hearing what feats Matteo had done, he sent for him to Naples. Matteo now thinking his fortune made, joyfully obeyed the summons, and arriving in that city, soon drove the Devil entirely out of the Princess ; for which the King made him a present of fifty thousand ducats : but before he took his leave of Matteo, he told him, that as he had honestly fulfilled his promise, he no longer thought himself under any obligation to him ; and therefore hoped for his own sake he would trouble him no more : for if he did, he would be a greater enemy to him than ever he had been a friend. Matteo then returned to Florence, and flattered himself with the hopes of enjoying his riches in peace all the rest of his life, without any thoughts of ever offending his friend Roderigo. But it seems he reckoned without his host : for soon after, a daughter of Lewis VII. King of France was likewise possessed with a Devil ; the news of which greatly disturbed Matteo, when he considered the King's authority

uthority on one hand, the threats of Roderigo on the other, and took it for granted that he should be applied to upon the reputation of his late success. The King of France finding all other means were of no service, and being informed of Matteo's abilities in matters of exorcism, first dispatched one of his Messengers to desire he would repair to his Court : but Matteo pretending to be dangerously ill and not able to travel so far, his Majesty sent to request the Signiory of Florence would force him to come. Being thus obliged to set out for Paris much against the grain, he represented to his Majesty upon his arrival at Court, that though indeed he had met with some success in ejecting Devils out of such as were possessed, he could not answer for doing the same in all cases, as some of them were so stubborn and contumacious that they neither regarded threats, nor charms, nor any kind of religious ceremonies : But that since it was his Majesty's pleasure, he would use his best endeavours to serve him ; and hoped if he failed he would impute it to nothing but absolute inability. The king, however, in answer to this speech, told him in plain terms that since he had cured others, he was sure he could cure his daughter ; and if he did not, he should certainly be hanged : at which Matteo fell into a fit of trembling, and was ready to sink into the earth. But collecting his spirits, he desired he might be introduced to the Princess ; and approaching gently to her ear, recommended himself to Roderigo's mercy in the most humble terms, conjuring him to remember the services he had formerly done him, and consider how ungrateful it would be to abandon his old friend in such distress. You covetous rascal, said Roderigo, how dare you come near me any more after the caution I gave you when we parted last ? Have you not been already well paid for the services you upbraid me with ? am I to help

help you out of every scrape you get into? Indeed, Sir, I shall convince you that I can be an enemy as well as a friend; for I will take care you shall be decently tucked up before I leave this place. Poor Matteo seeing himself thus left in the lurch, resolved to try some other method; and having desired the Princess might withdraw, told the King there were some Spirits, as he said before, of so obstinate and refractory a turn that there was no way of dealing with them, and that this was one of them; that however he had one expedient left, and if it succeeded, he hoped he should be entitled to his Majesty's favour: if not, he was at his mercy, and humbly implored him to spare a man who had been guilty of no crime: after which, he desired the King would be pleased to cause a very large Stage to be erected in the Church of Nôtre Dame, capable of holding all the Nobility and Clergy in the City, and to have it covered with cloth of gold: that he would likewise order an Altar to be set up in the middle of it, and condescend to come thither himself with all his Clergy and Nobles richly habited, and in royal procession, on the next Sunday morning: and lastly, that after a Solemn Mass had been celebrated, he would graciously be pleased to send for the Princess thither. He also desired there might be twenty persons at least placed on one side of the Church-yard with trumpets, drums, horns, hautboys, and all sorts of musical instruments ready to strike up and advance towards the Stage when he threw up his hat into the air; all which, with some other secret remedies he was in possession of, he hoped would not fail to send the Devil packing. Every thing then being in readiness on Sunday morning (as he had requested), the Stage full of the Clergy and Nobility, the Church-yard of common people, and Mass sung, the Princess was conducted thither by two Bishops and a magnificed

ficient train of Nobles. But when Roderigo saw such a multitude got together, and all the rest of the apparatus, he began to wonder what was the matter, and muttered to himself, "What the plague is this Scoundrel about? Does he think to fright me with a Mob and a parade of Bishops? Surely he must know I have seen all the pomp of Heaven, and the confusion of Hell, and am not to be scared out of my wits in this manner. But I will swinge the rogue for it." Matteo, however, drawing up to the Princess's ear, humbly besought him to quit her. "Quit her, said Roderigo, this is a pleasant conceit indeed! Pray what is all this apparatus for? Dost think to elude my power and the King's resent-
ment by these gim-cracks? But I will surely have thee hanged, ungrateful wretch as thou art."—

After repeated supplications on one side, and variety of hard names on the other, Matteo finding there was no more time to be lost, threw up his hat into the air: upon which, the musicians immediately struck up, the drums beat, the trumpets sounded, the mob shouted, and advanced all together towards the Stage, to the great astonishment of Roderigo, who began to tremble like an aspin leaf, and softly said to Matteo, "What is the meaning of this?" "Alas, answered Matteo, seemingly much frightened, your wife is coming!"—No sooner did Roderigo hear the name of Wife but he lost all presence of mind, and without staying to reflect that what Matteo said could not possibly be true, he quitted the Princess in a moment and ran away as fast as his legs could carry him; chusing rather to go back again to Hell for ease, than to return to the thralldom of Matrimony, in which he had experienced such torment and so many heart-breaking sorrows.—

In this manner Belphegor having luckily escaped from his wife, made what haste he could to the infernal Regions, to inform Pluto of what he had both

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both seen and felt himself ; and assure him he might depend upon the truth of what he had so often heard from the Souls of married men, but could not believe : and Matteo having thus outwitted the Devil, joyfully returned to his house at Perettola,

POSTHUMOUS WORKS

O F

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

C O N T A I N I N G

I. A Discourse concerning the proper ways and means of reforming the Government of Florence, written by the command of Pope Leo X.

II. Letters written by him in the name of that Republic, upon different occasions, whilst he was Secretary of State to it.

VOL. IV.

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ADVERTISEMENT to the READER.

THAT nothing might be omitted which could in any wise contribute to make this work useful and agreeable to the Public, the Editor has added a Translation of some Posthumous writings before-mentioned in the Life of Machiavel, and published in Italian at London in 1760, under the title of *Opere Inedite di Niccolò Machiavelli*; of which the Reader will meet with a more particular account in the following Preface to the original.

T H E

P R E F A C E.

A BOUT ten years ago an English Gentleman travelling through Tuscany, had the good fortune to meet with the following valuable pieces in manuscript, which had never been published, though long and earnestly sought for, and desired by the curious and learned. Phillipo Nerli had seen and read the Discourse concerning the Ways and Means of reforming the Government of Florence whilst he lived, as appears from a passage in the seventh book of his Commentaries, p. 137. Jacopo Nardi mentions it in the seventh book of his History, p. 382. of the Florence Edition: it is taken notice of likewise by Jacopo Gaddi in his book De Scriptoribus non Ecclesiasticis, par. II. p. 9; and indeed almost all those that have spoken of the Life and Writings of Machiavel, have said something of it. The Manuscript however lay hid in a private corner of the famous Gaddian Library above two hundred and forty years, and till very lately eluded the most diligent searches of the Literati, who justly set the highest value upon the productions of so great a genius.—The Reader will here also find thirty-nine Letters, written by Machiavel, in the name of the Republic of Florence, whilst he was Secretary

of State there : but these are only a part of a large volume in his own hand-writing, still preserved in the Chancery of the City, as appears from an authentic Document which I have subjoined to the end of them.

How the English Gentleman above mentioned came at these Manuscripts, I know not, because he is now dead : but this I know, that the spirit and genius of the Author is easy to be distinguished both in the Discourse and in the Letters. In the former, we discover the honest boldness of a free Republican ; in the latter, all the marks of justice, prudence, humanity, and mercy ; and in both, that sagacity and penetration which manifestly shew him to have been a man of the most consummate knowledge and abilities in Civil Government. Had Machiavel never written the Prince, or if that piece had had the good fortune either to have been interpreted with more judgment, or not been fallen upon by the most virulent adversaries, he would have escaped that infamy and reproach which are now thrown upon him by the greater part of mankind : for these writings evidently demonstrate that he was not only a most strenuous defender and asserter of the liberties of his country, but a lover of justice and humanity, and eminently endowed with all other social virtues. But could such a man as he was, a man born, educated, and advanced to great and honourable preferments in a free State, who was afterwards reduced to extreme poverty and distress by the machinations of the Medici and their party, who was engaged in one conspiracy with Agostino Capponi and Pietro Paolo Boccoli against Giuliano and Lorenzo de Medici, and in another with Luigi Alamanni and Zanobi Buondelmonte against Cardinal Giulio ; could such a man ever think of writing a book with a design to enslave his country, when it had heaped honours

and

and preferments upon him without end or measure, and that only to make Lorenzo de Medici, Duke of Urbino, Sovereign Lord over it, against whom he had entered into a Conspiracy not long before? Could a man who used to frequent the celebrated Assemblies in Cosimo Rucellai's Gardens, who constantly associated with young men of great and generous minds, who made it his only study to maintain the liberties of his country, who in his Discourses upon the first Decad of Livy has painted Tyranny in the most odious colours, and taught his Fellow-citizens how to live and die like true Republicans, who was continually extolling the generosity and magnanimity of Brutus and Cassius; could such a man ever be thought in earnest to have taught Lorenzo de Medici the way to oppress his country, and reduce it to the most abject and infamous state of Slavery? "Itaque Tyranno non favet; (says Albericus Gentilis to this purpose, *de Legationibus*, Lib. III. cap. ix.) sui propositi non est Tyrannum instruere, sed arcanis ejus palam factis ipsum miseris populis nudum ac conspicuum exhibere."—"Conatus scriptoris est (adds Gaspar Scioppius Pæd. Politic.) certum aliquem Tyrannum patriæ infestum describere, eoque pacto partim populare odium in eum commovere, partim artes ejus detegere."—But the limits of a bare Preface are too narrow for such an apology as so great a man deserves.

As to the Discourse, it was written soon after the death of Lorenzo de Medici, Duke of Urbino, and Nephew to Leo X. who died the fourth of May 1519, and left no legitimate Children, but Catherine, afterwards Queen of France, a Princess of rare abilities and more than masculine courage, who will ever be renowned in History for having maintained her Sons in the possession of that Kingdom as long as she lived, in the most troublesome and

dangerous times. Philippo Nerli and Jacopo Nardi indeed have fixed the date of this Discourse something later: but the Reader will easily perceive it must have been written about the time I mention.

Upon the death of the Duke of Urbino there arose great dissensions in Florence; some who were friends to liberty being desirous to extend the plan of their Government, and fix it upon a bottom as remote from Monarchy as they could; whilst the party of the Medici used their utmost endeavours to throw the Sovereign power into the hands of that family. But Cardinal Giulio de Medici, (natural Son to Giuliano, and Cousin to the Pope) who had come to Florence two days before the death of Lorenzo, endeavoured to prevent any tumult or commotion amongst the people, by giving out that his Holiness designed to reform the State to the satisfaction of every one, and to restore their liberties: after which, having composed all differences for the present, he set out for Rome in September 1519, leaving Silvio Passerini, Cardinal of Cortona, at Florence, a man of great prudence and address, to keep the citizens in good temper, if possible. It was at that time therefore, according to all appearances, that Leo X. being informed of the discords that were ready to break out in the City of Florence, laid his commands upon Machiavel to draw him up a Plan for the Reformation of that State: a Commission which gave birth to the following Discourse, wherein he has sufficiently displayed the greatness of his abilities, as well as the exquisite adroitness and subtlety of his genius: for under the appearance of establishing and securing the Sovereign power in the House of Medici, he has given a model of a most perfect Commonwealth; in which the attentive Reader will perceive that the Sovereign power is lodged both of right, and in fact, in the Citizens themselves, and that

that the power of the Medici, though apparently very great, is in reality nothing more than a shadow.

The Reader will likewise be surprized perhaps to see all the essential qualities, as well as the principles and fundamentals of the several different forms of Government, sketched out and comprized in so narrow a compass; and cannot well help feeling himself sensibly affected by the love and regard which this illustrious Republican expresses towards his Country.

The Letters were written before the Discourse, and are dated in the year 1510 and 1511, before the exaltation of Leo X. to the Pontificate, which did not happen till 1513: but I thought proper to leave them in the order in which they were arranged in the Manuscript, as a supplement to the Discourse, which is the principal part of it. These may serve to mark out the true character of Machiavel, and shew the goodness of his heart: since it is evident from them, that he must have been a man of extreme good nature, humanity, and justice. Natural equity and clemency, in preference to rigid justice, are the Virtues which distinguish themselves throughout the greater part of these Letters, and which he there constantly recommends to the different States and persons to whom they were written. The impartiality he inculcates in composing private animosities and civil dissensions in a summary manner; his lenity and compassion to poor people, even in collecting the public Taxes; his regard for decency and modesty; his reverence for the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction; and his extreme care for the honour of Almighty God, will, at last, surely undeceive the malevolent and unwary, who upon the bare word of others have been persuaded to think of Machiavel as a wicked and violent man both in his principles and practice. It might be

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added, by way of conclusion to this Preface, that particular notice ought to be taken of the inviolable regard to Public Faith which he never fails to prescribe, as well as of several other Maxims full of justice and political prudence ; but above all, of his manner of writing, which carries with it an air of Majesty, and commands respect.

A D I S.

A

DISCOURSE

UPON THE

Proper ways and means of reforming
the Government of Florence.

Written by NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,
at the Command of Pope Leo X.

THE reason why Florence hath so often changed its form of Government is, because there never was yet either a Commonwealth or Monarchy established there upon true principles : for that Monarchy cannot be called perfect and stable where the business which should be transacted according to the direction of one person only, is submitted to the determination of many : nor can that be said to be a true and durable Commonwealth where certain humours and inclinations are not gratified, which otherwise must naturally end in its ruin. To evince the truth of which, let us examine the several forms of Government which Florence has been subject to from the year 1393 to this time.

If we begin with the Reformation conducted at

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at that time by Maso degli Albizi *, we shall see that he moulded the Republic into a sort of Aristocracy; in which there were so many defects that it did not continue above forty years: and indeed it would not have lasted so long, had it not been for the wars with the Visconti, Dukes of Milan, which happened in that period, and kept it united. The chief defect was, that the power was continued too long in the same persons, and that the Elections were subject to fraud and underhand practices, which might throw the Government into the hands of bad men: besides which, as mankind are liable to be corrupted, and good men too often become bad by a long continuance of power, it might happen that though the Election was a fair one at first, and upright men had been made choice of, it might prove a bad one in the end by the change of their manners. There was likewise no check upon the Grandees to deter them from forming Parties and Factions, which generally are the destruction of a State: and it might be added, that the Signiory had but little reputation, whilst they had too much authority; for they had a power of taking away the life and property of any Citizen without appeal, and of calling the People together to a conference whenever they pleased: so that instead of being a defence and protection to the State, they were rather an instrument of its ruin, when they were under the influence of any popular and ambitious man. On the other hand, they had but little reputation, as I said before; for as it often happened that raw young men, of little experience, and abject condition (and therefore incapable of supporting their dignity in a proper manner) were introduced into the Signiory, it was not possible they should have any considerable degree of weight. There was still another imper-

* See the History of Florence, book III.

fection in this form of Government of no small consequence, namely, that certain private men were admitted into the public Councils, which gave great reputation to them, whilst it diminished that of the body, and took away from the authority of the Magistrates; a circumstance contrary to all civil establishment. But what was of the last importance, was, that the People had no share at all in the Government: all which defects joined together occasioned infinite disorder and confusion; and if the wars above mentioned had not happened to have kept the State united, it must have been dissolved long before it was.

This form of Government was succeeded by that of Cosimo de Medici, which inclined more to Monarchy than a Republic: and if it was of longer duration than the preceding, it was owing in the first place to the favour of the people, by whose consent and approbation it was established; and in the next, to the uncommon prudence of two such men as Cosimo and his grandson Lorenzo, who are at the head of it. Nevertheless, it was so weakened by their being obliged to submit their measures to the deliberation of many, that it was often in great danger; which occasioned many Ballias and the frequent Banishments which happened under that Government, and at last its utter dissolution when Charles VIII. of France invaded Italy. After this, the City endeavoured to resume the form of a Republic; but the measures which were taken for that purpose made it of short duration, because they were neither calculated to gratify the humours of all the Citizens, nor had sufficient force to correct them: and it was so far from being a true and perfect Commonwealth, that a Gonfalonier for life, if he had been an able and bad man, might easily have made himself absolute Lord over it; but if he had been a weak and good man, he might soon have been pulled from his seat, and that establishment

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blishment entirely overturned. But as it would be endless to adduce reasons for the confirmation of this assertion, I shall only mention one, which is, that there was not strength enough in that Government to support the Gonfalonier if he was a good man, nor to check and controul him if he was a bad one : to which let me add likewise, that the reason why all these Governments were deficient, was, that the Reforms which were made were not with any view to the Public good, but to strengthen and support different factions in their turns ; which ends however were not accomplished, because there was always a discontented Party, which proved a very powerful instrument in the hands of those that were desirous to effect any change or innovation in the State.

It now remains that I should say something of the Administration of the Twelve from its first establishment to this time, and to point out its strength and imperfections : but as these things are already well known, and fresh in every one's memory, I shall here omit all mention of them. It is certain however, that as things are circumstanced since the Death of the Duke of Urbino, it is necessary to think of some new form of Government : and I hope I shall be excused, if, in obedience to the commands of your Holiness, I venture to deliver my opinion upon the matter. But first I beg leave to lay that of others before you, according to what I have collected in conversation, and then to subjoin my own : in which, if I should err, I trust your Holiness will pardon a man who has shewn his zeal to your person, though he may have failed in his judgment and abilities.

I say then that some think a better kind of Government cannot be devised than that which was established in the times of Cosimo and Lorenzo de Medici : others wish for one settled upon a broader bottom. The former alledge that things easily return

return into their old channel; and that the Florentines having been used to honour your family, to shelter themselves under its favour and protection, to delight in whatsoever was most agreeable to it, and indeed habituated to these things for the space of sixty years, it must naturally happen that when they see the same plan of Government restored, the same degree of affection and respect will revive in them. They affirm likewise that very few would be adverse to it; and that those few might easily be brought over by different methods. To all which, they add the evident necessity of the matter, and say that as the State of Florence cannot possibly subsist without a head, it is much better to chuse one out of that family which used to be so much beloved and revered there, than either to live in confusion and disorder for want of such a head, or to take one out of some undistinguished family, which would of course excite the disgust and indignation of the whole City.

In answer to this, it is asserted by others, that such an Administration must be dangerous, because it would be weak: for if that of Cosimo was feeble and infirm from the causes already assigned, one of the same stamp must be doubly so at present; when not only the form of Government, but the temper of the Citizens, and the circumstances of the times, are totally different from what they were in those days. So that it would be utterly impossible to contrive any establishment in Florence which should resemble that of the Medici, and be of long duration. In the first place (say they) that form of Government was then universally approved; but now it would be as much disliked: the Citizens of those times thought they could not have one founded upon a better bottom; but the present Generation imagine there has been since found out one that is more compatible with liberty, and gives no less satisfaction than the other. There
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was then (continue they) no army, nor any power in Italy, which the Florentines were not able to cope with, and that too without the least assistance; but now France and Spain have got footing in it, there is a necessity for joining one of them; and if the side which the Florentines join should happen to be overpowered by the other, they can afterwards expect nothing but to be swallowed up by the Conqueror; which was not the case in those times. The Citizens had likewise been long accustomed, under that Government, to submit to the burden of heavy taxes and impositions: but now they have been freed from it, either from their inability to pay them, or long disuse, it must be an odious as well as dangerous attempt to revive them. The Medici too, who then governed Florence, having been born and educated amongst their Fellow-citizens, afterwards kept up a sort of familiarity with them, which wonderfully conciliated their affections to that family: but now the family is grown so great, all that familiarity is dropped, and consequently the edge of their affections taken off: so that considering the dissimilitude of the times and men, any one must be fatally deceived who expects to make the same impression upon so different a mass: and if the Medici were every ten years in danger of losing their power in those days (as I said above) they would now be quickly displaced. It is ridiculous therefore to imagine that men under such circumstances will easily return to their former manner of living: for though indeed this may be brought about when they are more inclined of themselves to that than to any new form of Government; yet when it happens otherwise, they will conform to it no longer than they are forced: and whenever that force ceases, their conformity will vanish into the air. Besides, though it may be true that the State of Florence cannot subsist without some head; and that if the

Citizens

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Citizens were disposed to chuse one out of some particular family, they would sooner take one out of the family of the Medici than any other: yet if it should be proposed to vest the supreme power in several persons of any condition whatsoever, they would prefer such a head to a single one.

Some are of opinion that such a Government could not be shaken without some external force; and that there would always be time enough to accommodate matters with those that should make any attempt upon it. But in this they are much mistaken: for it often happens that you must be obliged to patch up a Treaty of friendship, not with those that are actually your most formidable enemies, but with those that either have it most in their power at that juncture to annoy, or are more agreeable to you than any others: and it may come to pass that both you and such an ally may not only be overpowered by the enemy, and left at his discretion, but that he will not listen to any terms of accommodation; either because you did not court his friendship in time, or out of the disgust he may have conceived against you for entering into an alliance with his enemies. Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, would gladly have made his peace with Lewis XII. of France, if he could have found means: Frederic King of Naples would have done so likewise with the same Prince; but they were both disappointed in their endeavours: for a thousand accidents may happen to prevent and frustrate such designs. So that, all these things being duly weighed, it seems as if such an establishment could be neither secure nor permanent, when it has so many seeds of weakness in it; and therefore that it cannot be wished for either by your Holiness or your friends.

As for those that would have the Government settled upon a broader bottom, I say, that if it is not modelled in such a manner as to become a regular and well-ordered Commonwealth, the breadth
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of its bottom will only serve to accelerate its ruin: if they would be particular, however, in telling me into what form they would have it moulded, I would also descend to particulars in answering them; but as they deal altogether in generals, I can only answer them in the same manner. Let this suffice with regard to them: and in order to evince the weakness of Cosimo's establishment the more fully, in as few words as possible, it is only necessary to add, that no form of Government can be devised that will be firm and lasting, which is not either a true Principality, or a true Commonwealth; and that all intermediate forms betwixt these two extremes, (if I may so call them) will be defective. The reason is plain: for a Principality can only be ruined one way; and that is, by descending into a Commonwealth. The same may be said of a Commonwealth also: for the only way by which it can be ruined, is by ascending to a Principality. Whereas all intermediate forms may be ruined two ways, i. e. either by ascending to a Principality, or descending into a Commonwealth; and this is the cause of their instability.

If then your Holiness would establish such a Government at Florence as will be firm and durable, and redound to your own glory, as well as the security of your friends, it must be either a true Principality, or a Commonwealth which has all its due qualities: for all other forms will be tottering and short-lived. As to a Principality, I shall say but little in this place, both on account of the great difficulty of establishing one in our City, and because the most proper instrument for effecting it is now no more: for your Holiness must understand, that in all States where there is a great equality amongst the Citizens, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to erect a Principality. If any one should go about to found a Commonwealth at Milan, where there is a great inequality amongst the Citizens, he must first reduce all the Nobility, who

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are there very numerous, to a level with others : for they are so powerful that they trample upon the laws, and nothing but Royal authority can birdle and controul them. On the contrary, whosoever would establish a Principality at Florence, where there is a remarkable equality amongst the Citizens, must in the first place destroy that equality, by creating many Noblemen and building them Castles, and Villas, and strong-holds, who, in conjunction with the Prince, may serve to keep not only the City, but whole Provinces in Subjection by the terror of their arms and dependants * : for a Prince alone, unsupported by Nobility, cannot sustain the weight of Royalty ; and therefore it is necessary there should be some middle State betwixt him and the Commonalty to aid and assist him. This is observable in all Principalities ; especially in France, where the Gentry lord it over the people, the Nobles over the Gentry, and the King over the Nobles. But since it is so difficult a matter to found a Principality where a Commonwealth might easily be established, and *vice versa* ; and as the difficulty must lay the undertaker under the necessity of committing great violence, and doing many things unworthy of a good and virtuous man, I will say no more of a Principality, but proceed to lay the plan of a Commonwealth ; because your Holiness is known to be more inclined to that form of Government, and has only deferred the establishment of it at Florence, till such a model could be thought of as might at the same time secure your own authority there, and contribute most to the peace and welfare of your friends. And now I am vain enough to conceive that I have hit upon such a one, I humbly submit it to your consummate wisdom ; that so if there should happen to be any thing worth your notice in it, it may be carried into execution ; if not, that your Holiness may at least be convinced of my perfect devotion and obedience to your commands.

* See Pol. Disc. upon Livy, book I. chap. iv.

But I am not altogether without hopes, I confess, that you will find that by this plan your own authority is not only firmly supported, but increased, that your friends will still enjoy their honours in security, and that the rest of the Citizens will have the highest reason not barely to be satisfied, but to be pleased and delighted with it. Let me entreat your Holiness, however, neither to approve, nor condemn this Discourse till you have read it quite through, nor yet to be surprized at some alterations that are proposed to be made in the Magistracy : for where a Government was not well regulated before, the less there is retained of the old form, the better it must naturally be supposed to be afterwards.

I say then, that those who model a Commonwealth, must take such provisions as may gratify three sorts of men, of which all States are composed ; that is, the high, the middle sort, and the low : and though there is a great equality amongst the Citizens of Florence, as hath been said before; yet there are some there who think so highly of themselves that they would expect to have the precedence of others : and these people must be gratified in regulating the Commonwealth ; for it was owing to the want of this that the last administration was ruined. These people then will never be satisfied if they have not the first rank and honours in the Commonwealth ; which dignity they ought to support by their own personal weight and importance. But it is impossible to entail this dignity upon the first order in the Commonwealth, whilst Signiory and Councils continue upon the same footing they have been of late : for as it must happen from the manner in which the members of them have been elected, that men of weight and reputation will seldom be made choice of, there is no other remedy but to lodge that dignity either in the next rank, or in the lowest of all ; which is contrary to all good order and civil polity. It is absolutely necessary therefore to alter the manner of elections,

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elections, and at the same time to gratify the ambition of all the three several ranks of people; which may be done by dissolving the Signory, the Council of Eight, and the twelve *Buonhamini*; and by electing sixty-five Citizens of not less than forty-five years of age (in order to give dignity to the Government), fifty-three out of the highest Class, and twelve out of the next, who should continue in the Administration for life, subject to the following restrictions. In the first place, one of them should be appointed Gonfalonier of Justice for a term of two or three years, if it is not thought proper to appoint one for Life; and in the next, the other sixty-four Citizens already elected should be divided into two distinct bodies, each consisting of thirty-two; one of which divisions, in conjunction with the Gonfalonier, should govern the first year, and the other the next: so that they would be changed alternately every year, and altogether should be called the Signiory.

After this, let the thirty-two be divided into four parts, eight in each; every one of which should reside three months in its turn with the Gonfalonier in the Palace, and not only assume the Magistracy with the usual forms and ceremonies, but transact all the business which before passed through the hands of the Signiory, the Council of Eight, and the other Councils; all which must be dissolved, as I said before. This should be the first member, or rather the Head of the State; and by this provision, when it is well considered, your Holiness will see the Dignity of the Signiory will be restored: for as none but men of gravity and authority will ever sit there, it will be no longer necessary to employ private men in the affairs of State, (which, as I observed before, is always of prejudice to any Republic) since the thirty-two who are not in office that year may be advised with upon occasion, sent upon Embassies, and made useful in other functions. And this first Signiory your Holiness may easily find

means to fill with your most intimate friends and confidants, as I shall shew presently ; but in the mean time let us come to the second order in the State.

Since there are three orders of men in every State, as I said before, there should also be three ranks or degrees in a Republic, and no more ; upon which account, it is necessary to prevent the confusion occasioned of late by the Multiplicity of Councils in our City ; which have been established, not because they were conducive to good order, but merely to create friends and dependants, and to gratify the humour and ambition of numbers in a point which yet was of no service to liberty or the public ; because they might all be corrupted and biased by party. In order therefore to reduce the Commonwealth to such a form, the Council of Seventy, that of an hundred, and that of the People and Commonalty, should all be abolished ; and in the room of them I would appoint a Council of two hundred, every member of which should be not less than forty years of age ; an hundred and sixty of them to be taken out of the middle class, and the other forty out of the lowest, but not one out of the Sixty-five. They should likewise continue for life, and be called the Council Elect : which Council, in conjunction with the Sixty-five, should transact all the affairs that used to be transacted by the above mentioned Councils, (now supposed to be abolished) and be vested with the same degree of authority, and all the members of it appointed by your Holiness. For which purpose, as well as to maintain and regulate these provisions, and others that I shall mention hereafter, and for the further security of your power and friends, it is necessary that a degree of authority, equal to that of the whole collective body of the people of Florence, should be vested by a Balia in your Holiness, and the most Reverend Cardinal de Medici, during the lives of both : and that the Magistracy of the Eight di Guardia, as well

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as the Balia *, should be appointed from time to time by your Holiness. It is likewise expedient, for the support of your authority and your friends, that your Holiness should divide the Militia into two distinct Corps, over which you may appoint two Commissaries, one for each.

By these provisions your Holiness will see that two out of the three classes may be thoroughly satisfied, and that both your own authority, and that of your friends, will be effectually confirmed and corroborated; as you will have the Militia and Courts of Justice in your hands, the laws in your own breast, and the Heads of the State entirely at your devotion.

It remains now to satisfy the third and lowest rank of the Citizens, which constitutes the greater part of the People. But these will never be satisfied, (and whoever thinks otherwise will find himself mistaken) except their authority is either actually restored, or they are made easy by a promise that it shall be. And since it might endanger your authority as well as that of your friends to restore it all at once, it would be better for your Holiness to restore part of it only at first, and give them such assurances of restoring the rest in due time as they may fully confide in: for which purpose, I conceive it will be necessary also to revive the Council of a thousand, or at least one of six hundred Citizens, who should nominate all the Magistrates and officers in the same manner they used to do formerly, except the above mentioned Sixty-five, the Council of Two hundred, the Eight di Guardia, and the Balia, who should be appointed by your Holiness and the Cardinal, during the lives of you both.

And that your friends when going to be ballotted for in the Council, may be certain of being imbor-

* These Magistrates, Officers, &c. as well as several other things which occur in these pieces, have been so often mentioned in the History of Florence, that it would be needless here to add any thing to what has been already said of them, by way of explaining the nature of their respective duties and functions.

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ed*; your Holiness ought to depute eight assessors, who being in the secret, may make the election fall upon whom they please, without power of wronging any of them ; and that the generality may believe that the candidates names have been imborosed, the Council, for their security, may send two Citizens, put into a joint Commission by itself, to be witnesses of the imborisation.

Without satisfying the common people, no Republic ever yet stood upon a stable foundation ; and it is certain those of Florence will never be satisfied, except the Hall of a Thousand be opened again, and the distribution of offices restored to it. Your Holiness should likewise be further informed, that whoever meditates any revolution in the State will certainly endeavour above all things, in the first place, to open that Hall ; and therefore it must surely be the best way to do it yourself in such a manner as may leave no opportunity for any one to make an attempt which must end in the downfal of your authority, and the ruin of your friends.

The State being thus modelled, no other provisions would be wanting for its security, if your Holiness and the most Reverend Cardinal were to live for ever : but as you are subject to mortality, it is necessary (if you would have the Republic continue firm and strongly supported on every side, in such a manner that every one may see himself perfectly secure, when the generality are satisfied by restoring part of their authority, and an assurance of

* It appears from this passage, that though the method of electing the Florentine magistrates by imborisations, or putting the names of the candidates into purses, was plausible, yet it might be defeated ; because it was in the power of the returning officers, whom Machiavel here calls Accoppiatori, or affillors, to make the election fall upon whom they pleased, by pretending that their friends had the majority. The methods of imborisations in Florence differed as the aristocratical or democratical powers prevailed. That which is here recommended by Machiavel, was practised under the Medici family, who did no violence to the forms of the democratical constitution, but abolished its spirit, by always having the returning officers in their interest ; so that in fact, they, instead of the people, named the magistrates and servants of the public, or had it in their power to do so.

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the rest) that there should also be Sixteen Gonfaloniers appointed over the Companies of the Citizens, in the same manner and for the same time that they have been hitherto appointed: which may be done either by your own authority, or by leaving the appointment of them to the great Council, as your Holiness shall think most proper; remembering only to increase the number of the Divieri*, that so they may be more spread over the City; and that none of the Gonfaloniers should be of the Sixty-five. After their appointment, four Prevôts should be drawn out of them by lot, and continue in office one month; so that at the end of four months they will all have been Prevôts. Out of these four, one should be drawn to reside for a week only with the eight Signiors and the Gonfalonier in the Palace; by which rotation all the four will have kept their residence there at the end of the month. Without the presence of this officer, the said resident Signory should not be allowed to pass any act, nor should he himself have any vote there, but only be a witness and inspector of their proceedings; to which he may be suffered to put a stop till he has asked the opinion of all the Thirty-two, together, and had the matter fully discussed by them. But even the Thirty-two, when all together, should not have power to resolve upon any thing, except two of the said Prevôts were present, who should have no further authority than to put a stop to their resolutions for that time, and report them to the Council elect: nor should that Council have a power of resolving upon any thing, except six at least of the sixteen Gonfaloniers, and two Prevôts, where there, who should only have the liberty of taking the matter out of the hands of that Council, and referring it to the great Council, provided that any three of them should think it necessary so to do: and as to the great Council, it should

* The Divieri were assistants to the Gonfalonier, and commanded detachments of the people under him.

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not be allowed to meet, unless three of the *Prevôts* at least were there, who might give their votes in it like the other *Citizens*.

This order should be observed after the death of your Holiness and the most Reverend Cardinal, for two reasons: in the first place, that if the *Signiory* or other Council should either disagree in their resolutions, or attempt any thing against the public good, there might be somebody vested with a power to take the matter out of their hands, and refer it to the people: for it would be a great defect in the Constitution, that any one set of Magistrates, or single Council, should have a power to pass a law by its own authority alone; and that too without any remedy or appeal: upon which account, it is highly necessary that the *Citizens* should have some proper officers, not only to inspect their proceedings, but even to put a stop to them, if they seem to be of pernicious tendency. The other reason is, that when the present *Signiory* is dissolved, and the privilege of being admitted into the new one is taken away from the common people, it will be expedient to give them some degree of rank and authority, which may in such measure resemble that of which they have been deprived: now that which I have recommended will be still greater, more serviceable, and more honourable than what they have lost. The *Gonfaloniers* therefore should be appointed as soon as possible, to reduce the City into the aforementioned classes and degrees: but they should not be suffered to exercise any other functions of their Office without a licence from your Holiness, of which you may avail yourself, (by causing them to report the proceedings of these several orders to you) to support your dignity with so much the more state and authority.

Besides this, in order to give such a degree of stability and perfection to the Commonwealth, that no part of it may shrink or fail after the decease of your Holiness and the most Reverend Cardinal, it is necessary

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necessary that a Court should be erected upon occasion, consisting of the Eight di Guardia, and a Balia of thirty Citizens, to be chosen by lot out of the Council of Two hundred and that of Six hundred together : which Court should have a power, in criminal cases, of summoning the Accuser and the Accused to appear face to face before it in a certain time : but it should never be suffered to assemble during the lives of your Holiness and the Cardinal, without your special licence. Such a Court is of great use in a Commonwealth : for a few Citizens are afraid to call great and powerful delinquents to account, and therefore it is necessary that many should concur for that purpose : that so when their judgments are concealed, (as they may be by balloting) every man may give his opinion freely and in security. It may serve also, during your lives, as a check upon the Eight, and make them more careful in administering justice, as well as more diligent in expediting public affairs, lest they should be called before this Court. But that it may not be obliged to assemble upon every little frivolous occasion, it may be ordained that it shall not take cognizance of any matter of fraud not amounting to the sum of fifty ducats, nor of any act of violence where there is no effusion of blood, or maiming, or bone broken, or where the loss sustained is under the value of fifty ducats.

This model of a Commonwealth being duly considered, I think nothing will be wanting in it, even when your authority shall cease, as I have shew before at large : but if it be considered during your life and that of the Cardinal, it appears to be a Monarchy ; for you have the command of the Militia, the appointment of the Judges, and the Laws, in your own breast : so that I cannot see what further power any one can desire in a State ; nor can I conceive what any of your friends who are good and peaceable men, have to fear whilst the authority of your Holiness is so great, and they themselves

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fill the first employments in the Government ; nor yet do I see any reason why the common people should not be very well satisfied, when they find the distribution of Offices in part already restored to them, and the rest falling by degrees into their hands. For your Holiness may now and then suffer the Council of Two hundred to nominate one of the Sixty-five when there is a vacancy, and sometimes the great Council to appoint one of the Two hundred, and sometimes you may create them yourself, according to the circumstances of the times : and I am very certain that by the interposition of your Holiness's authority, every thing may be conducted in such a manner, that the second of these orders may at last be converted into the first, and the third into the second, &c. and that the whole body may be governed in peace, with perpetual glory to your Holiness ; since your power may very easily at all times remedy any inconveniency that shall happen.

For my own part, I am of opinion that the highest honour that can be attained to by any man is that which is voluntarily conferred on him by his Countrymen ; and that the greatest good he can do, as well as the most acceptable to God, is that which he does to his Country. Next to that, I think none are to be compared with those who have reformed Kingdoms and Commonwealths by wholesome Laws and Constitutions. These men have always held the next rank to those that have been deified for their great actions : but as there have been but few that have had an opportunity, and still fewer that knew how to do this, the number is very small that have done it. This kind of glory has always been so much coveted by such as made glory the sole end of their labours, that when they have not had power either to found or reform a state, they have left models and plans in writing to be executed by others that should have in future times ; as Plato, Aristotle, and many others, who have shewn the world that if they did not found free States themselves,

selves, like Solon and Lycurgus, it was not owing either to ignorance or want of good will to mankind, but to want of power.

Heaven then cannot bestow a nobler gift upon any man, nor point out of fairer road to true glory : and amongst all the blessings which God has been pleased to shower down upon your Holiness and your august family, the most considerable is, tha the has given you both power and opportunity of immortalizing your name, and of far surpassing all your Ancestors in the splendor of your actions. Let me entreat your Holiness therefore, to consider in the first place, that if you intend to let the Government of Florence continue upon the same bottom it is at present, many accidents must inevitably happen which will be attended with great danger ; and that before they happen, you will be teased and tutored in such a manner as would seem intolerable to any man, as you will be more particularly informed by the most Reverend Cardinal, who has resided for some months past at Florence. This is partly owing to the importunity of several Citizens, who indeed are much too presumptuous in their demands ; and partly to the fears of others, who think they do not live in security under the present establishment : so that they are continually crying out for a reformation, one desiring the Government may be settled upon a broader bottom, and another upon a narrower, whilst nobody pretends to point out the particular measures by which it may either be contracted or extended with safety ; for being puzzled and confused themselves, and at the same time terrified at the prospect of impending danger, they neither know how to prevent it themselves, nor will put any confidence in those that do : from whence it comes to pass that amidst such difference of opinions and variety of advice, the wisest and most able man in the world must live in continual doubt and distraction amongst them.

To remedy these inconveniences then, there are
but

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but two methods, viz. either to deny them audience, and give them no opportunity of mentioning these matters at any time whatsoever, except their opinion is asked, (as the late Duke of illustrious memory used to do) or to settle the Government at once upon such a footing that it may administer itself, and that now and then a little of your Holiness's inspection may suffice to keep it in a good order: by the latter of these methods you may be freed from all danger and trouble; by the former, from trouble and impertinence only. But to say something further of the dangers that must ensue if things continue as they are, I will venture to prophesy, that whenever any commotion or insurrection shall happen, either one or other of the following events, if not both, must certainly be the consequence; i.e. either some Head will be appointed in a sudden and tumultuary manner, who will rescue the state by violence and force of arms; or one part of the Citizens will immediately open the Council of a Thousand again, and sacrifice the other without mercy. In case either of these events should happen, (which God avert) your Holiness will be pleased to consider how many executions, how many banishments, and how many confiscations must of necessity ensue: a reflection which surely must shock the most hard-hearted man alive, much more a man of that remarkable humanity and tenderness which have always distinguished your Holiness. The only way then to prevent these evils, is to establish the several classes and ordinances of the Commonwealth in such a manner, that they may support themselves: and that they will always be able to do, when each rank has its due share in the administration, when every one knows his proper sphere of action, and whom he can confide in; and lastly, when no one has any occasion to wish for a change of Government, either because his ambition is not thoroughly gratified, or that he does not think himself sufficiently secure under such an Administration.

L E T.

LETTERS

WRITTEN TO

Several States and Persons, in the name of
the Republic of FLORENCE,

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State there in the years 1510 and 1511.

LETTER I.

To the Reverend Marco Priori, Vicar * to the
Bishop of Luca †, at Lower Castro Franco.

WE are informed that a certain priest, named Antonio, the Son of Simone da S. Pietro, has forcibly seized upon some goods and chattels

* The persons by whom the states of Italy used to govern small territories and dependencies were often styled Vicars, but they were Laymen: besides whom there were also Spiritual Vicars to inspect the manners of Ecclesiastics; and if an Ecclesiastic was guilty of any crime or misdemeanor which was cognizable by the Secular Magistrate, yet that Magistrate durst not cite, much less lay hands upon, the offender, till he had obtained Licence for so doing from the Spiritual Vicar, under whose jurisdiction he was, lest he should incur the Pope's displeasure, as appears from this and other instances in the course of these Letters: which has introduced that Solecism in Politics, Imperium in Imperio, into most Popish Governments.

† Not Lucca, but Luca, (as it is here spelt) a little territory in Tuscany.

in the Vicariate of Lari, which had been made over some months ago to Maria Tedda, widow to the late Pietro, Son of Simone da S. Pietro, according to the laws of Pisa : at which we are much displeased ; because we would not have the least violence used in our territories by any person whatsoever, much less by a Religious : but if he has any pretensions to those goods, or any part of them, let him have recourse to the laws, as every honest man ought to have. We therefore desire your reverence to send for the said Antonio, who is under your jurisdiction, and order him not only to desist from all further violence, but to give sufficient security to the widow and her tenants that he will not personally molest or annoy either her or any of them, upon this account : because, we hear, he goes continually armed for that purpose ; which is very unbecoming in a Religious. This you may do under such penalties as you think most proper ; and it will be acting in a manner that will be very agreeable to our most Serene Republic, and worthy of your Reverence. But if he is contumacious, and refuses to appear before you, be pleased to grant your Licence to our Vicar at Lari (where the premises lie) to take him into custody, and we will send him orders to do it ; that so he may be compelled to submit to your Reverence. Farewell, 13 July, 1510.

LETTER II.

To the Consuls of the Marine.

ONE M. Christofano da Marchio, a Portuguese Gentleman, and Student in the Canon Law, has been before us, and complains that as he was going to the University at Pisa, he was stopped at the gates of that city, and had not only all the cloaths and houshold furniture he brought with him,

him, but likewise all his money, taken from him, and was obliged to pay twelve Ducats in Gold, as Duty for the said money. Now, as he is no Trader, (according to his own report of the matter) but a Lawyer and a Gentleman in his own country, and carries such furniture and sums of money with him for his convenience and support, wherever he goes to study, he thinks he ought to be exempt from any such duty. We are of opinion, therefore, that the said twelve Ducats should be refunded to him; that so he may have no reason to complain of having suffered any violence in our Dominions, and that our Subjects may not be used in the same manner in Portugal. For in truth, if the money he had with him was only to support him in his Studies like a Gentleman, you ought to proceed with great caution and discretion in this matter, as we trust you will do. Farewell, 23 July, 1510.

LETTER III.

To Alamanno de Petrucci, chief Magistrate of Campiglia.

WE make no doubt but you must have heard that our Corn-harvest has not proved so plentiful a one as was expected: and that our people may not have any cause to fear a dearth, we will and command you, to take all possible care that no sort of corn or grain of any kind which grows in your neighbourhood, or elsewhere, upon the coast of Campiglia, may be conveyed out of those parts upon any account whatsoever. For which purpose, you are to punish all those that presume to disobey your orders in this respect, by seizing upon the grain only for the first offence; and for the second, by taking away their horses, or other beasts of burden, and carriages also. But all this

must

must be done with as little noise as possible : for as we have in general a tolerable sufficiency of all necessaries, we would not willingly occasion any disturbance, or have the people alarmed. You are a prudent man, and understand our meaning : act accordingly, as you are wont to do ; and if you hear, of any sort of grain that is upon the road to our City, don't stop it. Farewell, 14 August, 1510.

LETTER IV.

To the Vicar of Pisa and St. Miniato ; and also to the Magistrates of Buggiani and Fucecchio.

WE are informed that great quantities of Corn have been conveyed out of our Dominions from your District, and are much offended at it; for the harvest in these parts has not been so abundant as we hoped : and as we ought not to suffer our own subjects to be reduced to the want of bread, by letting it be transported out of our own territories into those of others, we will and command you to make it known either by Proclamation, or in some other public manner, that if any person, of what rank, estate, or condition soever he may be, shall be found transporting any sort of grain out of our territories, he shall be punished with the loss of his carriages, horses, and loading, without remedy or appeal. After this warning is published, you are to cause a strict watch to be kept night and day at all passes ; and to take care that all such as shall offend that way may be punished in the manner above prescribed. You are men of understanding, and now you know our pleasure, let it be your principal concern that it may be duly executed. Farewell, 23 August, 1510.

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LETTER V.

To Buonaccorso de Serragli, chief Magistrate of Palaia.

TOMASO, the Son of Antonio di Pagno, hath been before us, and humbly besought our pardon for his late offences. Wherefore, in pursuance of a Law made in favour of such inhabitants of that City as should return thither, we have granted him a free pardon: and it is our further pleasure that all the estates and goods he was possessed of before the year 1494, and since that time, which, he says, lie about Marti, and consist of houses, olive-yards, and vineyards, should be immediately restored to him. We therefore hereby will and command, as he is now returned to live peaceably and quietly at Pisa, that you not only cause all the said goods and estates to be restored to him, by ejecting the present occupiers of them; but that you likewise henceforth treat him in a friendly and amicable manner, as one who hath submitted to our Government in consequence of the aforesaid Law. Hereof you are not to fail. Farewell, 26 August, 1510.

LETTER VI.

To Francisco de Bramanti, Chief Magistrate of Cascina, in the territory of Pisa.

WE suppose you can be no stranger to the losses which the inhabitants of the country on this side Pisa sustained by the frequent depredations, murders, and other sorts of violence that were committed upon them during the war betwixt us

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and that City, before we became possessed of it, and must know that the greater part of them were thereby reduced to extreme poverty. We are informed, however, that the inhabitants of Cascina, in particular, are sued and distressed in such a manner at this time by the officers of your Courts, for debts which they had contracted before the year 1494, that if these proceedings are not dropped, they must either fly their Country, or lie in prison all the days of their life; which would give great uneasiness and offence to our most Serene Republic, as we would willingly keep these poor people at home, and in possession of their liberty. It is our pleasure, therefore, that whenever any of their creditors apply to your Courts to enforce the payment of such debts as were contracted before the year 1494, you enquire strictly into the nature and circumstances of those debts, and shew as much favour as you can consistently with common equity, to the Debtors, out of compassion to their sufferings, and to keep them if possible in their own country. Now you know your pleasure, let it be your endeavour to assist these miserable people according to their necessities, and with as much address as you can.
Farewell, 27 August, 1510.

LETTER VII.

To Certaldo Raphaele de Antinori.

CONSIDERING the circumstances of the times, though indeed there is no appearance of open war at present, yet for our own satisfaction, we have put a garrison into Poggio Imperiale. But there is still something further wanting to secure that fortress; and what we designed to have done in the space of a month or two for that purpose, we could now wish might be completed in five or six days, if possible. We therefore command you to repair imme-

immediately to Poggio, but without noise or bustle, under a pretence that you only came thither for a ride and a little recreation. But when you are there, you are not only to survey the walls as privately as you can, but to observe whether any Fosses are necessary for its present defence, whose houses must be pulled down, and what places levell-ed, in order to secure it against any force. If you shall have reason to think, however, that the inhabitants of that Vicariate, and especially those that live nearest to Castello Fiorentino, will readily concur with you in the matter, you are to use your utmost endeavours to put the town in a proper posture of defence in five or six days. For which purpose, it is necessary that you should leave some person there to inspect the works in your absence, and that you yourself should go thither once in two days till the whole is finished: but if you suspect there will be any great difficulty in the matter, and that the people will be much averse to it; say no-thing of it, but acquaint us with your proceedings, and what observations you have made there. Fare-well, 29 August, 1510.

LETTER VIII.

To the Commissioners and other Officers for inspecting the Ditches and Banks in the District of Pisa.

THERE are now two Deputies with us, one from the Parish of S. Cassiano, and another from S. Lorenzo; the latter of whom has also applied to the Courts at Cascina. They complain that you have ordered those Districts to send labourers to work at the Ditches and Banks in the territory of Pisa, and have laid several fines upon them for not sending any, though they are expressly exempted

ed from such labour by certain privileges granted them by this most Serene Republic, as you may see from the tenor of an instrument in writing drawn up for that purpose, and still in their possession: upon which account, they demand that a due regard should be paid to the contents of that instrument. Now as you know that the public faith given to Subjects ought always to be most religiously observed, it is our pleasure that you have recourse to the said instrument; and that if you find they are actually exempted from such duty by virtue of it, you should not only observe the purport of it inviolably yourself, but cause all others under your Jurisdiction to do the same, and remit the fines that have been laid upon them, as illegal and contrary to the tenor of the aforesaid instrument. You are to see that all this be duly executed without fail. Farewell, 29 August, 1510.

LETTER IX.

To Bernardino da Colle, Vicar of Monte Castello.

THREE have been two Deputies before us from the Community of S. Almazio, who have represented to us, that the river Pagone, running betwixt their District and that of Monte Castello, when the inhabitants of S. Almazio take their Cattle to water there, they are sued by the Cowkeepers of Monte Castello for damages, though the River is no more in one Liberty than another, and the Cattle never stray over it. On the contrary, the people of S. Almazio sue those of Monte Castello for the same sort of trespass. Now these frivolous and vexatious suits are daily multiplied by each side in such a manner, that both are miserably impoverished and almost ruined by them; though there does not appear any great reason for

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it on either : for certainly all men are at liberty to water their Cattle at any river, provided they do not injure another person by it ; which does not seem to have been the case in this matter. It is our will and command therefore, that upon the receipt of this, you immediately summon both parties to appear before you ; and that when you have thoroughly examined the nature of their grievances, you use your utmost endeavours to compose all differences betwixt them ; not by any violent or compulsive means, but in an amicable manner, as far as it can be done without prejudice to common honesty and justice ; which will be a piece of service that will merit our commendation. But if you should fail in these laudable endeavours, after you have tried all fair means, you are to refer the two parties to us, with an account of their several pretensions, and an exact draught of the water-course ; and after we have heard what each has to say for itself, we will take care that strict justice shall be done to both. Be sure then not only to give us speedy advice of your proceedings in this affair, for your own reputation, but at what time you heard the cause, and what you think of the matter yourself,

Farewell, 2 September, 1510.

LETTER X.

To the Consuls of the Marine.

THOUGH we could wish all the ditches and water-courses in the country might be scoured and cleansed with all possible expedition, as well for the plenty and improvement it would occasion, as for the health of the inhabitants : nevertheless, considering that many townships are exempted from labouring at such work by express articles ; and that others, who have no such exemption to

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plead, are reduced to such misery and poverty by the late devastations in the territories of Pisa, and the failure of their harvest this year, in which they had placed their last hope, that they say they are not able to give us the least assistance; it is our will and pleasure (to prevent their being driven to despair, and forced to fly their Country) that with regard to those who have such exemptions to shew, you should both strictly observe the tenor of those articles yourselves, and take care that all others do the same; because we would not have the faith that has been given by this most Serene Republic in the least violated upon any account whatsoever. As to others, who have no such exemptions to plead in their behalf, and therefore are liable to be compelled to this work, we would have you act with discretion (for the reasons above mentioned) and not be too hasty in punishing them if they do not appear; but to treat them in so mild and tender a manner, as may induce them to come voluntarily and without compulsion of any kind: for if the matter cannot be conveniently dispatched this year, it must be deferred till the next; because you must be sensible how much greater regard we have, and ought to have, to the circumstances of these poor people, than to expediting the present undertaking. Now you know our pleasure, we make no doubt but you will act with your usual prudence upon this occasion, and favour them as much as you can, lest they should be reduced to despair. Farewell, 5 September, 1510.

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LETTER XI.

To Philippo de Arigucci, Chief Magistrate of Terracolle.

A LESSANDRO di Mariano of your town has been committed to prison here by the worshipful Eight of the guard, and the Balia of this City, for abusing a Servant Girl of no more than eleven years of age, in such a manner that he has ruined her. Now the wife of Christofano Messo of your town, as well as the wife of one Lazzero a Black-smith, and another woman called Parvola, who afterwards met her at a well out of the Porta Passerina, where she was washing her cloaths, are fully acquainted it seems with all the circumstances of this affair. And as we are determined to take strict cognizance of the whole ourselves, we hereby enjoin you to send for the said three women and the Girl herself before you, and to cause them to be examined closely and separately upon oath by your Chief Justice, in the presence of a public Notary, but with all due regard to Decency and Modesty ; that so we may have full information of the matter. After they have been so examined, you are to send us a copy of their Depositions inclosed in a Letter, sealed with your own Seal, by the hands of a faithful Messenger. At the same time you are also to send the Girl herself hither, with a proper attendance to secure her person, and as speedily as possible, for your own credit ; giving us likewise a circumstantial account of all that is come to your knowledge in this businels, by the person who brings us the Depositions, and who is to come himself with the Girl. Farewell, 11 September, 1510.

LETTER XII.

To Tomaso Francisco de Caponsacchi, Chamberlain
of St. John's.

A Deputy from the Community of Lannolina has been with us, and represented to us, that all their corn, grapes, and chesnuts have been destroyed this Sealon by a dreadful storm, in such a manner that they cannot tell how to support themselves the rest of the year: upon which account they have humbly besought us to have pity on them; for if they are sent to prison for the tenths and other taxes arising from those fruits, they must inevitably perish there with hunger. And as it is our duty to have compassion upon the poor and miserable, you are hereby required to inquire into the matter, and if you find they have actually sustained these losses, you are to favour them in such a manner in remitting the aforesaid duties, as your discretion shall think necessary in so grievous a calamity. You are a prudent man, and now you know our disposition in this respect, you will behave yourself, we make no question, so as to deserve our approbation. Farewell, 5 October, 1510.

LETTER XIII.

To Giovanni Battista de Bartolini, Commissary and Chief Magistrate of Pisa.

WE find by your last Letters to the Council of Ten, that a certain Portuguese Physician, and some others of that nation are come to Pisa, under a safe-conduct from the late Council of Ten, but that they are thought to be either Heretics or Infidels;

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Infidels: upon which account, you say, you are resolved to send them elsewhere about their business. But for many reasons, and particularly because they came to Pisa under the sanction of the Public Faith, (though indeed that protection is now at an end) as well as because it is a very difficult matter to form a true judgment of men in points of Religious Faith, and that we are desirous to have your City as well filled with inhabitants as possible, it is our pleasure that you suffer the said Physician and his countrymen to stay amongst you for three or four months; during which time, by keeping a good watch upon their actions and behaviour, you will be able to guess pretty truly at their Principles: and if you find, at the end of that term, that their further stay will be of prejudice to the Community, you may then dismiss them. Farewell,
22 December, 1510.

LETTER XIV.

To the Same.

BY your last of the 24th instant, in answer to our commands concerning the reputed Heretics you mentioned in your former Letter, we were informed of what you had then observed with regard to their conduct and actions; and we commend you for your early and necessary advice. The intention of this therefore is to recommend to you that you still continue to keep a watchful eye upon those people, that you may be enabled to distinguish the good from the bad amongst them; and that you tolerate those that behave themselves well and like Christians, since they may be of service to the Community: but to dismiss such as shall demean themselves otherwise, and therefore cannot possibly do any good there, but much harm, and may excite

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the indignation of the people. These matters you will be able to judge better of upon the Spot, than we can possibly do here; and therefore you must act accordingly. As to bringing any distemper amongst you, you must diligently enquire into that ; and if you have sufficient proof that they came lately from an infected place, let them be immediately sent away, lest they should spread the Contagion in a City which at present is free from any thing of that kind. Farewell, 26 December, 1510.

L E T T E R X V.

To Giovanni de Serragli, Chief Magistrate of Peccioli.

YOU will find that, by virtue of a Law very seasonably made by the Legislature of your Republic in the month of August 1492, whoever shall afterwards come with their families to live in the territory of Pisa, shall be entirely exempt from all manner of taxes, both ordinary and extraordinary, for twenty years to come, as well in the territory of Florence as in that of Pisa ; excepting that they shall be obliged to contribute to the expence of repairing and keeping in good order the ditches, highways, and bridges in the respective districts where they live, in the same manner with the other inhabitants of those places, as you may see more fully by having recourse to the said Law. Now some people from the Community of Fabricia have been with us to complain in their own names, and those of several other strangers, who have come with their families to settle there, that you have laid some duties upon cloaths and other goods which they have, at the instance of that Community, in order to make them contribute to the expence of supporting Soldiers and other extraordinary charges;

from

from all which they plead an exemption in consequence of the aforesaid Law, and indeed demand it: for they solemnly declare they should never have gone to live there, but for the privileges granted by it. It is our pleasure therefore that, immediately upon the receipt of this, you summon the Representatives of Fabricia, as well as the strangers who have been so aggrieved, to appear before you; and that when you have read the said Law in their presence, you cause due regard to be paid to it, by restoring to them, and every one of them, the several sums that have been levied upon their goods in contempt of it, without putting them to any further expence. For we are determined it shall be inviolably observed for the space of twenty years, with regard to all such as have come to settle within the territories of Pisa for the sake of enjoying the privileges and immunities granted by it; in order to repeople that country as well, and as soon as we can. Take care then that these orders be duly put in execution, and Farewell, 18 February, 1510.

LETTER XVI:

To the Chief Magistrate and Commissary of the City of Pisa, and their Successors; and likewise to the Vicar of Lari, the Vicar of Vico Pisano, the Chief Magistrate of Campiglia, and their respective Successors.

WE are informed that great quantities of Myrtle, and other materials made use of in tanning and dressing Leather, have been transported out of our Dominions from your side: by which we are likely to suffer much inconvenience; as we shall not have a sufficient quantity of such materials left in our parts for the use of our own Tanners and

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and Leather-dressers. In order therefore to repair this loss, and to prevent foreigners being supplied with these things to your own prejudice, we command you, upon the receipt of this, to cause Proclamation to be made in all the public places of your several jurisdictions, that if any person, of what rank or condition soever he may be, shall henceforth presume either himself, or by the assistance of others, or under any pretence whatsoever, to transport or cause to be transported out of our Dominions, either by land or water, any such materials, he shall forfeit not only the loading, but the carriages and beasts that draw them, or the vessel in which they are freighted, if conveyed by water. After you have caused this Proclamation to be printed, and stuck up in the most frequented places of your respective Jurisdictions, that so nobody may pretend ignorance, you are likewise to exert your utmost activity and diligence in punishing all offenders in the aforesaid manner, as soon as they shall be convicted: for you must be very sensible yourselves how much we should suffer by a continuance of such practices. Let it be your principal endeavour therefore to prevent them. Farewell, 25 February, 1510.

LETTER XVII.

A Patent.

THE Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to the Chief Magistrate, Commissary, and Consuls of the City of Pisa, greeting. You are no strangers, we suppose, to the great pains that have been taken for a long time past by this Republic, and particularly by the officers of the Mint, to put a stop to the currency of all base and clipped coin in our Dominions; in which in

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deed they have in a great measure succeeded according to our wishes. But we have been lately informed that such sort of money has been again introduced into your City, and is commonly passed off from one to another without any fear or reserve; at which we cannot help being very much concerned: for you must be thoroughly sensible, we are assured, how prejudicial such a thing must be both to the Public and every Individual; especially as we have taken great care to circulate good and genuine coin of all denominations throughout almost every part of our Dominions, according to the usual custom and institutions of this Republic. As we are very desirous therefore to eradicate this evil, which is of the most pernicious tendency, we command you to assemble altogether upon the receipt of this, and to make such provisions as shall seem most proper and expedient, not only to prevent the currency of all bad money, but to clear our Dominions intirely of it, if possible. You are men of sense, and must know how detrimental the suffrance of it will be to every sort of people in the end. Let it be your busness to take all necessary measures to remedy so great an evil. Farewell, 15 March, 1510.

LETTER XVIII.

To Galeotto de Leoni, Chief Magistrate and Commissary of Burgi.

A N information hath been laid before us that Jacopo Venuto, Doctor of Law in your town, about four year ago married Madonna Giacopa, daughter of the late Christofano Picchi, a woman of good reputation and family. But that he keeps another woman in the house, by whom he has several children, under the very eyes of his wife, whom

whom he has abused in such a manner that she has been forced to quit the house, and return to her relations, for want of bread and other necessaries of life, whilst he and his Concubine are spending her fortune and inheritance. Now this being a matter of very bad example, and not only highly culpable, but likely to be attended with dangerous consequences, we have been humbly petitioned to take cognizance of it: upon which account, it is our pleasure, that on the receipt of this, you presently cite the said Jacopo Venuto to appear before you, together with his wife, or some of her nearest relations, that you may know the truth of the matter: and if you shall find it to be as it hath been represented to us, you are to reprimand the said Jacopo in a proper manner for his cruel behaviour to his wife, giving him to understand that such a conduct very ill becomes a person of his profession, and that if he persists in it, the Signiory of this Republic will take such a course with him as shall not fail to reclaim him, and make him sensible of his error. In the mean time, however, you are to take care that he provide her with a proper table, cloaths, and other conveniences suitable to her rank, and that he return her fortune immediately. These are our positive orders; act with your usual prudence in the execution of them, and endeavour to reduce the man to reason, for your own reputation: but if you find him obstinate and incorrigible, let us have a particular account of his behaviour; for we are determined to redress the poor woman's grievances in a proper manner. Farewell, 15 March, 1510.

LETTER XIX.

To Bartolomeo de Mancini, Vicar of Piscia.

WE are informed that the Community of Monte Catini are desirous to have a reform made in their Magistracy, now the time of chusing new Officers is at hand. For which purpose some private persons have been with us from that place, in their own names, and those of many others, who wish to have the Government altered for the better, and complain that their Community, which consists of about five hundred inhabitants, is entirely governed by thirty or forty persons, who never go out of office but they are succeeded either by their sons, or brothers, or some near relations; so that they are always in the Administration, and throw the power into whatsoever hands they please, without any regard to justice or merit. In this manner, they say, a few persons share all the honours amongst them, as well as the revenues of the Public, which annually amount to four thousand Ducats; and that though the expences of the Community never exceed two thousand, yet they constantly make up accounts at the end of the year, by which they bring the rest of their fellow-towns-men in their debt: for which reasons the complain, as we said before, of being ill governed by a little circle of Officers, who chuse each other by turns in such a manner, that when one of them goes out of power, another of them is sure to come in: a course of administration so iniquitous, that they think they cannot fall into worse hands upon any change whatsoever. It is our will, therefore, that either you yourself, or your Chief Justice, should repair directly to Monte Catini, and not only inform yourselves of the manner in which this Reform is to be conducted,

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conducted, but to take care that the Chief Magistrates and Council, who are to nominate the Reformers, may not appoint any relation of their own, even in the fourth degree, according to the tenor of their Laws; and that none of the old Circle (that is, of those who have been so long in office) may be elected; that so other people may have their turn in the Administration, and the Reform proceed with equity and impartiality, by distributing the honours and employments amongst those who have always behaved themselves well, and formerly used to have their share in them; as well as by excluding others who have forfeited all pretensions to them, either by having been outlawed, or otherwise rendered infamous by their actions. In short, if you cannot attend there yourself, you are to lay a strict injunction upon your Chief Justice, that he take particular care this Reform may be made with all due regard to justice and peace, and, if possible, with general satisfaction, by acting without passion or prejudice, and by considering the merits of every one, as their Laws expressly require. But if the Representatives of the Community shall think themselves in any wise aggrieved by the manner of proceeding we prescribe, they are at liberty to apply to our most August Signiory. Farewell,

26 March, 1511.

LETTER XX.

To Giovanni de Popoleschi, Chief Magistrate and
Commissary of the City of Pistoia.

SOME people from Pistoia (of both the Parties which divide that City) who came hither not long ago in your name, have been with us again, about the three Fellowships which are likely to be soon

soon vacant in your College ; the Panciatichi * complaining they have but few Graduates of their Party in the College, and much less interest there than they ought to have. Upon which account, having heard all that both Parties had to say for themselves upon this occasion at several times ; and lastly, having caused the Reverend Cardinal of Trano's will to be read to them, which prescribes the order that is to be followed in such Elections, we are of opinion that we cannot deviate from the said will, without incurring much scandal and censure. For this reason, we will and command that the order prescribed by it be punctually observed at the next Election : and if the Panciatichi have not so many Graduates as the other Party, you must exhort them to patience this time ; that so the Election may be conducted as it should be, and those only chosen who have the best right to be so according to the tenor of that will, without regard to any other consideration whatsoever ; because it is our pleasure that it should be duly observed in every respect. On the other hand, you must give both Parties to understand that we expect they should come to some compromise in these matters for the future, and that a provision be made that the Panciatichi may not be totally excluded by degrees ; as it was not the Cardinal's intention that either Party should have a larger share in his Donation than the other. This you are to see executed with the utmost impartiality, taking great care that every step may be avoided which may occasion any scandal or disturbance, and exhorting the Electors to behave themselves in such a manner upon this occasion, as may recommend them to the notice and favour of our August Signory. Farewell, 18 April, 1511.

* The name of one of the Parties.

LETTER XXI.

To Francisco de Pitti, Vicar and Commissary of St. Miniato.

WE are informed that on Sunday next, the eleventh of this month, the Chapter of the Minor Friars for the Province of Tuscany are to assemble at St. Miniato for the choice of a new Rector of their order, and that the Sienese Friars are determined to elect somebody of their own City into that office. Now as our City is the Head of Tuscany, we think it will be more honourable that some Friar of our own territories should be elected; and if they can be persuaded to think well that Francisco de Ghiaucci da Monte Varchi, a man of learning and good conduct, and their present Rector, should continue in his office, (which we understand would be very agreeable to their General) it would also be very pleasing to us, on account of his excellent character. We therefore will and command you hereby to give all manner of assistance (as far as is consistent with justice and decency) to our immediate Subject, the present Rector; taking all possible care to prevent any scandal or disturbance that may arise upon this occasion. You know our pleasure; endeavour to see it executed in a proper manner, without making it public, or violating your own Conscience. Farewell, 30 May, 1511.

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LETTER XXII.

To the Most Reverend Father Hieronimo de Pandolfini, Bishop of Pistoia.

SEVERAL persons belonging to the Church of S. Pietro Maggiore in Pistoia have been before our August Signiory, and assert that the Chapter of the said Church, by virtue of a Bull granted by Pope Eugenius in the year 1433, are Patrons of it, and all the beneficed Altars in it: and that your Reverence being desirous to see the Bull and some other writings relating to the Patronage of that Church, they were freely entrusted in your hands; but that you now refuse to return them: at which we cannot help being much concerned, as well as offended; because (not to mention the violence committed upon other people's rights) it seems to be a step, if their allegations are true, every way unworthy of your Reverence. Upon which accounts, we advise you to restore the said Bull and other writings, and to behave yourself with such modesty and justice in this affair, as may prevent all occasion of scandal in the City: and indeed we make no doubt but your Reverence will be much more ready to compose all disturbances than to excite and inflame them; as you must certainly know that when men are injured in their rights, they will take some means to shew their resentment. Your Reverence then, being a Prelate of great prudence and moderation, will suffer things, we dare say, to proceed in their usual course, and without encroaching upon the just claims of any; which will be very agreeable to us, and put an end to all further uneasiness in others. Farewell, 7 June, 1511.

LETTER XXIII.

To Matteo de Niccolini, Vicar of St. John's.

THE Church of S. Pietro at Presciano being now vacant by the death of the last Rector, and our August Signiory having the Patronage thereof, they have conferred that Benefice upon Francisco Fagioli, one of their own Citizens, and a very worthy Ecclesiastic : in consequence of which, they lately sent Dommoro di Domenico, their Bailiff, to enter and take possession of the premises for the said Francisco. But our Bailiff informs us by Letter, that some people there not only shut the doors upon him, and bid him go about his business (as they intended to keep possession of it themselves), but presented loaded Cross-bows, which they threatened to discharge at him. Upon which, in order to avoid raising any scandal or disturbance, he presently left the place, and retired to Castello di Presciano, to wait there for our further orders. Now as the honour of our August Signiory is concerned in the affair, we send one of our own officers express with this ; upon the receipt of which, we command you immediately to dispatch your Sheriff and his whole Posse, well armed, to the said Church, having first given notice thereof to our Bailiff at Castello di Presciano, that he may repair directly to him : after which, you are to use all means to put the said Bailiff in possession of it, which he is to keep in the name of our Signiory.

You are likewise to drive out all secular persons who have shut themselves up there, taking down their names and places of abode in writing, and to give us a particular account of the whole : but if you happen to find any Priests, or other Ecclesiastics of any kind, amongst them, you are to let them alone,

alone, and neither to say nor do any thing to them; for we have no business to put our Sickle into other people's corn *. In the next place, you are to cite the father of Ser Christofano of S. Leolino, a Priest in Valdambra (if he has one), together with his brothers, nephews, and some others of his nearest relations, to appear personally before us within two days after they receive the citation, on pain of having a fine of two hundred Ducats laid upon every one of them that does not appear at that time: after which, you are to give us immediate advice of what you have done, whom you have summoned, and upon what day. In all these several proceedings you are to act with all possible vigour and expedition; since, as we said before, the honour of our August Signiory is highly interested in this matter. Farewell, 25 June, 1511.

LETTER XXIV.

To the Same.

BY your dispatches of yesterday concerning the affair of the Church at Presciano, we are informed of the persons who forcibly kept possession of it, and the contempt they have shewn of our authority in their behaviour to our Bailiff and your Sheriff. Now as the honour of this Serene Republic is at stake, we will and command you, upon the receipt of this, to send your Sheriff with his Posse, and as many other armed men as you can suddenly raise in your Vicariate, to burn down and level to the ground the house of Matteo di Simone, commonly called the Finocchino † of the said Church; as also that of Fruosino da S. Leolino in your Vica-

* See Note * Letter I. p. 285.

† An officer somewhat of the nature of a collector or treasurer of the taxes.

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riate, both whom you make mention of in your last. After which, you are to order the said Matteo and Fruosino to appear personally before us on the twenty-ninth of this month without fail, on pain of being proclaimed Rebels, and having all their goods confiscated in case of disobedience to our commands. You are further to make diligent enquiry after all the rest who violently took possession of the said Church, and to take down their names in writing, as we instructed you in our former Letter: of which you must give us an immediate account. We send this by an express, because we are determined not to trifle any longer. Fail not therefore to execute these commands with vigour and dispatch. Farewell, 27 June, 1511.

LETTER XXV.

To the Commissary and Chief Magistrates of
Pistoia.

WE have been informed, to our great displeasure, that on the second of this month, people could not have bread for their money from the bakers in your City; at which we cannot help being very much surprized, since there has been so fine a harvest this year, that there can be no want of corn sufficient to occasion such an inconvenience: and we are still more surprized that you have not acquainted us with this matter before now, that so we might immediately have provided you with a proper supply. It is our pleasure therefore, that, after due consultation, you cause a speedy and diligent search to be made whether there be really a sufficient quantity of corn in and about the City; and if you find there is, that you force those that have it, to bring it to market, and sell it at a fair and reasonable price, as we should think they would naturally

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naturally be inclined to do for their own interest, after so plentiful a harvest. But if you find there is a real scarcity, you are to let us know directly, and we shall provide accordingly: for it is a shameful thing that people cannot have bread for their money in such a City, after so plentiful a harvest (as we said before), and that you should have suffered it to be sold at the rate of forty Soldi per Bushel*, since it will not fetch that price, or any thing like it, either in our City, or any other part of our Dominions. See that these orders be executed without fail, and farewell, 8 July, 1511.

LETTER XXVI.

To Leonardo de Rodolfi, Chief Magistrate of Pistoia.

THE Reverend Father Agostino Filippo, son of Antonio our Fellow-citizen, and Provincial Vicar of the order of Servites in our City, hath been before us, and says they have a Convent of the same order at Pistoia, in which there are some dissolute brethren, who refuse to pay due obedience to him and the established rules of the Society, with whose names he will acquaint you. And though he is desirous to reduce them to reason and obedience, as the duty of his office, and the discipline of the Convent, require, he has not sufficient power to effect it, and correct them in a proper manner: upon

* The original says "a Soldi 40 lo staio." An Italian Soldo is of the same value with a French Sou, twenty of which make a Livre: so that forty Soldi make about 1 s. 10 d. Sterling. This would be thought a very inconsiderable price for a Bushel of wheat at present, though it was looked upon as so exorbitant in Machiavel's time. But whoever considers how scarce money was in Europe about two hundred and fifty years ago, in comparison of what it is now, will easily account for this difference in the price of grain.

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which account he has petitioned the assistance of the secular Magistrate. It is our pleasure therefore, that when the said Provincial Vicar, or his Deputy, shall shew you sufficient licence and authority from their Superior to correct those Monks, and reduce them to obedience, and that he is thereby duly empowered to sollicit the interposition of the secular Magistrate, you shall give him all manner of proper assistance, as often as he shall require it, for the above mentioned purposes; taking great care, however, to prevent all frays and tumults, and scandal, that may arise upon this occasion. You are a discreet man, and know how we would have you behave in the affair: act therefore in such a manner as may deserve our commendation, by reducing the said brethren to their duty; considering, above all things, that the honour of Almighty God is here immediately concerned. Farewell, 20 July, 1511.

LETTER XXVII.

A Patent.

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to all our Governors and Magistrates, as well present as to come, and to every one of them in particular, to whom these our Letters Patent shall come, greeting.

WE herewith send you a Proclamation to be published, in order to notify the treaty of peace, friendship, and confederacy, concluded on the second of this month betwixt this August Republic and the Magnificent Community of Siena, which contains a mutual pardon and oblivion of all injuries and damages that have ever been committed by one upon the other, with several other such pacts and stipulations as are usually made in the like Conventions.

tions. We therefore will and command you all, and every one of you respectively, to cause the said Proclamation to be published throughout your several jurisdictions; that so from henceforth the citizens and subjects of both Republics may freely and securely pass out of the Dominions of one into those of the other, to traffick, negotiate, and transact all other such affairs as good friends and neighbours are wont to do together. Farewell, 9 August, 1511.

LETTER XXVIII.

To the Consuls of the Marine.

WE understand that this August Republic having some years ago taken a resolution to divert the stream of the river Arno in such a manner as to overflow the territories of Pisa, in order to reduce that State to its duty to our City; the work was actually begun, and several ditches cut for that purpose. So that ever since the river began to take a new course, it appears that all the lands belonging to the Community of Fagiana, have been so flooded and covered with mud, that no signs of any former boundaries or land-marks are now to be discovered; but all the meadows are disguised with roots of trees, mire, and sand to such a degree, that it is impossible for any man to distinguish his own from that of his neighbour. Now the owners of the said Lands being desirous to recover them (as it is natural to suppose they should be), and to make them turn to some account again when every man knows his own, (which cannot possibly be effected till that is ascertained by due authority) some of the most considerable of them have been before us, and petitioned that you may take all necessary and proper measures to have those lands

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surveyed

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surveyed in such a manner, that every man may have his own property restored to him with certainty, and reap the profits of it in due time. Now as this expectation is but just and reasonable, we command you to take the matter in hand immediately, and not only to send for the several owners of the said lands, but to search narrowly into the nature of every man's claim, and then to assign them such a portion of ground as they had there before; taking care at the same time to distinguish the several pieces by proper names, boundaries, and landmarks, and to have them specified and recorded in a writing, which any one may have recourse to hereafter for satisfaction upon occasion. Notwithstanding this division, however, it is our pleasure, that if any one of the proprietors shall think himself aggrieved by it, he shall have free appeal at all times to our August Signiory: for we would not upon any account deprive one person of his right, and give it to another that has none. Now you know our pleasure, take care to act with prudence and justice in it. Farewell, 19 August, 1511.

LETTER XXIX.

To Giovanni de Barducci, Chief Magistrate and Commissary of Fiviziani.

IT hath been represented to our August Signiory, that the Marquis Giovanni Lorenzo da Trespie, not only behaves with great rudeness and insolence to the Marquis of Morello, his near relation, but actually disturbs him by force and violence in the possession of his estate; which certainly is acting in a manner that little becomes a man of quality and a near relation. We command you therefore to go in person to the said Marquis Giovanni Lorenzo (taking care at the same time to keep up your dignity)

dignity in a proper manner) and give him to understand, that it is the pleasure of this August Signiory he should desist from all further violence and rudeness to his kinsman: for that if he persists in it, we shall take the Marquis of Morello under our immediate protection, and afford him all convenient assistance for his security, as he hath been well recommended to our care. For this purpose, you are to make use of such arguments and persuasions as shall seem good to your prudence: and if you find he is inclinable to peace, let him sue for justice in the ordinary way, in case he thinks he has been in any wise injured; that so the Marquis of Morello may likewise have an opportunity of justifying himself in a legal manner: for no private man ought to be permitted to right himself when he thinks he has suffered wrong. Farewell, 18 September, 1511.

LETTER XXX.

To the Consuls of the Marine.

BARTOLOMEO, the Son of Francisco Grasfolino, a citizen of Pisa, hath been before our August Signiory, and says, that about ten months ago he returned to live at Pisa after an abode of fifteen years at Rome; and that as his household goods and furniture were coming from Rome to Pisa by water some days ago (having been packed up and sent away by a particular friend at Rome) it seems about fifteen pounds of Salt had been inadvertently put amongst other kitchen necessaries by the care of his friend's wife, who had been very exact in sending every thing that might be of the least use in housekeeping, but without any ill design, or thoughts of offending against the Laws relating to the transportation of Salt. Now when the

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box where the Salt was came to be opened by the Customhouse officers, to see whether there were any contraband goods in it, they found it there amongst other things, and condemned the whole freight, according to the tenor of the Laws made for that purpose. The said Bartholomeo therefore hath humbly besought us to afford him some redress in this affair, as, he says, he had no intention of transgressing the Law, nor indeed knew any thing of the matter: so that, if what he says is true, it is a case that deserves commiseration. Upon which account, if you find things to be as he hath represented to us, it is our pleasure that you treat him with such clemency as ought to be shewn in so singular and unexpected a case. For though the Laws relating to Salt are very strict and severe, yet, upon such an occasion as this, they should be mitigated according to the circumstances of it. Proceed therefore with your usual prudence and lenity, now you know our pleasure, and farewell, 28 September, 1511.

LETTER XXXI.

To Pietro de Compagni, Vicar of Pisa.

WE suppose you, and all the people in your Vicariate, have heard of the Interdict which his Holiness the Pope * hath thundered out against us; though both we ourselves, and almost all the City, look upon it as vain and insignificant for many reasons; especially because his Holiness having been cited to appear before a General Council, could not publish such an Interdict according to the Canons of the Church, without leaving us at liberty to appeal to the said Council, or any other Tribunal where our cause could be formally and

* Julius II.

judiciale

judicially heard : for such an appeal is to be considered as self-defence, and that being allowed by the Laws of nature, cannot be refused or objected as a crime to any man. We might add, that this Interdict has been published by his Holiness without ever citing us to appear before him ; whereas a citation should always precede condemnation and punishment. God himself has given us an example of it in the case of Adam, by citing him after he had sinned, and saying, "Adam, Adam, ubi es ? Adam, Adam, where art thou * ?" before he drove him out of Paradise. Many other reasons might be alledged, but to avoid prolixity we shall not specify them here. That we may live like Christians therefore, and have Mass and other Divine Service duly celebrated, we oblige such Conventuals of our city to officiate, as always used to perform those Duties at our Palace, viz. the Servites, the order of S. Maria Novella, of Santa Croce, of Santo Spirito, the Carmelites, and the order of All Saints. As to the other Orders and the seculars, especially those of our Principal Church, we have given them leave to observe the Interdict if they please, lest they should be deprived of their benefices and revenues. This is all that we think necessary to say at present relating to the Interdict, and the manner in which we conduct ourselves upon this occasion ; and it is our pleasure that you communicate it to all our faithful subjects under your jurisdiction. Farewell,

1 October, 1511.

LETTER XXXII.

To the Same.

THHERE is no occasion for any further answer to yours of the 30th, than that you are to understand we do not look upon the present Inter-

• Gen. iii. 9.

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dict (as it is called) to be valid, for several reasons. In the first place, because the Pope has been cited some months ago to appear before a General Council: in the second, because we have appealed to that Council ourselves: thirdly, because we have had no citation from his Holiness, as is always usual upon such occasions: and for many other reasons which are not necessary to be mentioned at present. We therefore have caused the Conventuals who have no Benefices to lose, and have always been accustomed to celebrate Mass and other Divine Service in our Palace, to perform the same duties as usual, for the satisfaction and consolation of our city. But for the rest of our Clergy who are beneficed, we would not expose them to any inconvenience; because the Conventuals at present are sufficient to perform all the necessary duties, and we hope in God the matter will blow over in a few days. Now you know how we act here upon this occasion, we would have you conduct yourself accordingly, and with discretion. Farewell,
1 October, 1511.

LETTER XXXIII.

A Patent.

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to all and every one to whom these presents shall come, greeting.

WE hereby notify to you, that we, together with the Respectable Council of Eight for the maintenance of Liberty and Peace, the Council of Eighty, and the other Colleges of our city, according to the Ordinances thereof, have elected and appointed our trusty and well-beloved Fellow-citizen Giovanni de Rodolfi to be Governor over all the

the Province of Romagna, with full and ample power to provide for the security, good government, and welfare of the said Province. Wherefore, we will and command you all that you obey him in every thing in the same manner as if our August Signiory were actually present amongst you, and to behave yourselves towards him with such dutiful respect and submission, that you may merit our approbation for it. Farewell, 3 November, 1511.

LETTER XXXIV.

To the Reverend Donato de Chianni, Vicar to the Bishop of Arezzo.

WE have had information of an affair which cannot but give us great offence and displeasure, as the honour and dignity of our Governors (who are members of our August Signiory) is much impaired by it. It seems, one Gaspari, the Son of Meo di Cecco, and chaplain to the Church of Faltona, suffered himself to be so transported with choler, that on St. Simon's day last, he not only abused and vilified our trusty and well-beloved Fellow-citizen Carlo Macigni, Governor of Castello Focagnano, in the most opprobrious and contumelious terms, but actually came with arms in his hands to assault him; and how becoming that was in a Religious, we leave your Reverence (as you are a very prudent man) to judge yourself. Now as so grievous an indignity ought to be punished in the most exemplary manner, we earnestly exhort your Reverence to examine into the circumstances of the matter, and cause the offender to be chastised in such a manner, as may not only deter others from the like outrages for the future, but make sufficient restitution to the honour of our Republic, which has been so grievously insulted upon this occasion.

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occasion. But if your Reverence is backward in doing this, we shall be forced to take the affair into our own hands ; and then we shall make him sensible whom he has offended, and see due satisfaction rendered to our Republic. Confiding therefore in your prudence and justice, we make no doubt but you will cause the offender to be punished to our satisfaction for this, and several other crimes and delinquencies he has been guilty of.

Farewell, 8 November, 1511.

LETTER XXXV.

To Giovanni de Barducci, Commissary and Chief Magistrate of Fiviziani.

MERCATO, the son of Giacopo da Botignano, a little town and court in the jurisdiction of Fiviziano, about twelve years ago, as we are informed, obtained a safe-conduct from the Signiory of Lucca to drive a herd of Cattle through their territories towards the sea-coast and back again. But as he was returning from thence, and had got almost to the gates of Lucca with his Cattle, they were taken from him, it seems, by the Lucchese, to the value of three hundred Ducats and upwards. Seeing, therefore, they had violated their faith in this manner, and robbed him almost close to the gates of their city, he made complaint of it to our August Signiory ; who, taking the matter into consideration, came to a resolution that their subject should have proper satisfaction made him for his loss. For which purpose, they wrote a letter to their Commissary for the time being to seize upon some inhabitants in that part of the jurisdiction of Lucca which lies nearest the territory of Fiviziani, and to fine them in such a manner as might indemnify our said subject Mercato : which being execut-
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ed in some measure, he recovered about one hundred Ducats. But the Signiory of Lucca being informed of this, immediately caused three of the principal men that belonged to the territory of Fiviziani, and lived in their jurisdiction, to be outlawed, viz. Pietro del Maestro, Pietro Agnolo Berni, and Lazzerotto di Christofano, of whom the said Lazzerotto only is now alive, but still outlawed, and in daily apprehension of being seized, as they watch continually for him ; which he thinks is a very hard case, being in no fault at all himself. Having humbly besought us therefore to commiserate his condition, and to afford him some relief, we command you, upon the receipt of this, immediately to acquaint four of the principal inhabitants belonging to the Vicariate of Minuzzano, in the Jurisdiction of Lucca, (of whose names Lazzerotto will inform you) that if within twenty days after that notice, they do not effectually prevail upon the Signiory of Lucca (or whomsoever else it may belong to) to revoke and utterly cancel the outlawry against the said Lazzerotto, you will cause them to be served in the same manner that he has been. This is our pleasure : take care to execute it with your usual prudence and regard to justice ; that so Lazzerotto may at last be freed from all further danger and apprehension. Farewell, 27 November, 1511.

LETTER XXXVI.

To Bernardo de Vittori, Vicar and Commissary of Pescia.

FATHER Ludovico degli Onesti, Deputy from the Community of Pietra Buona, hath been before us ; and says, that in September last some flocks of goats belonging to the Lucchese peasants

having committed great trespass in the lands of the said Community, the tenants seized upon and delivered them into the hands of their respective landlords, that so those to whom they belonged might be obliged to make proper satisfaction for the damage they had done before they had them again: and further, that Pietro di Cante, your predecessor, had the several parties before him, and composed all differences betwixt them, as appears by a written instrument drawn up on that occasion. But we are informed that the Lucchese peasants having since represented the matter in a manner very different from truth to the Chief Magistrate of Lucca, in order to throw all the blame upon our Subjects the inhabitants of Pietra Buona, he has not only confiscated the goods of six of the most substantial people in the Lucchese territories who belong to that Community, but threatens to hang them, and has set a price upon their heads, promising a reward of fifty Ducats to any one who shall deliver them up to him either dead or alive: at all which proceedings we cannot help being greatly surprised, as those men have not been guilty of the least crime to merit such severity. As it ought to be resented therefore in a proper manner for the honour of our August Republic, we will and command you, upon the receipt of this, to treat twelve of the most substantial men and heads of the family of the Giusti at Castello di Medicini, who belong to the jurisdiction of Lucca, in the same manner that our subjects of Pietra Buona have been treated by the Magistracy of that City; that so by returning like for like, they may be made sensible of their error. Fail not execute these commands with vigour and expedition. Farewell, 16 December, 1511.

LETTER XXXVII.

To Lorenzo de Acciaiuoli, Chief Magistrate and
Commissary of Castro Caro.

WE understand by your Letter to his Excellency the Gonfalonier, that there is a quarrel of a dangerous nature in your town, betwixt the families of Casa Nuova and the Fabri on one side, and that of the Tassinari on the other, but that there is at present a sort of a tacit truce betwixt them. Now as these families are very numerous, and have many relations and dependants in the several streets where they live, we could wish, in order to prevent all further disturbances, the several families would come to some amicable accommodation amongst themselves, especially as there has been yet no-body killed on either side, and only some few people slightly wounded. For this purpose, we command you, upon the receipt of this, to send for the Heads of both parties to appear before you, and, with your usual prudence, to advise them in a friendly and gentle manner to be sincerely reconciled to each other for their mutual honour, satisfaction, and welfare. If you perceive them disposed to this, you are to commend their prudence and good nature, setting forth the sweets and advantages of good neighbourhood, as well as the many evils and inconveniences that always result from quarrels. But if you find that all fair and persuasive means are in vain; and there is no possibility of bringing about an accommodation betwixt them without some sort of compulsion, you are to order the Heads of that party which is most obstinate in rejecting all terms, to appear personally before us within four days at the furthest after such notice, without fail, and on pain of our displeasure; giving the Heads of the

other party notice likewise to appear at the same time, that we may settle all differences betwixt them, and make a proper distinction betwixt those that are refractory, and those that are desirous to live in peace. In this case you are to let us have immediate advice, and to acquaint us upon what day you gave them such orders, taking all possible care to prevent them from quarrelling upon the road as they come hither. Farewell, 11 February, 1511.

LETTER XXXVIII.

To Filippo de Lorini, Chief Magistrate and Commissary of Fiviziani.

THERE has been a dispute, it seems, for some time, which may at last very probably be attended with bad consequences, betwixt the Community of Vinca in your jurisdiction on one side, and the people of Fornole, who are subject to the Marquis of Massa, on the other, on account of Mount Rutaia; concerning which our Signiory has written many Letters, and lastly one to your predecessor Giovanni de Barducci, dated the nineteenth of January last, which perhaps may be registered in your Chancery. This dispute is not yet settled; which has not been owing to our subjects, we hear, but to the said Marquis, who has always prevaricated, and put off the matter without any seeming desire to come to an accommodation, whilst in the mean time his subjects of Fornole have come every day, and still do, to assert their right to the said Mount, by committing all sorts of violence upon the people of Vinca, such as beating them, entering their lands by force, and keeping possession of them by such means as seem neither just nor warrantable, nor becoming people that would be good neighbours.

neighbours. It is our duty, therefore, to afford these our subjects all manner of necessary assistance in the maintenance of their rights and properties ; especially as they have been at all times, and still are, remarkably loyal and faithful to our August Republic. But as it is our desire to proceed by fair and amicable means in compromising this matter, we hereby order you to acquaint the said Marquis as soon as possible, that you have a Commission from us to treat and confer with him in behalf of our subjects at Vinca, on the spot, concerning the lands in dispute, and after an ocular survey, and hearing the claims on both sides, to determine it in a summary way, taking good care at the same time, however, to support the just rights of our subjects in a proper manner. But if he still persists in shuffling and evading a fair accommodation, as usual, and will come to no reasonable composition in favour of his people, but suffers them to use force and violence, as they have hitherto been accustomed to do, you are then (since it is lawful to repel force by force) to send for Giannesino, Captain of the battalion di Castiglione, and employ the forces under his command to prevent our subjects at Vinca from having any further violence committed upon them, contrary to all justice and equity, taking heed to act rather upon the defensive than the offensive, and to support our people instead of attacking others. We would have you nevertheless, in the first place, to make use of all gentle and persuasive arguments, according to your usual prudence, in order to bring about a fair and amicable adjustment of this matter. Farewell, 7 March, 1511.

LETTER XXXIX.

A Patent.

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to Giuliano de Orlandini, Chief Magistrate of Prato; Pelegrino de Lorini, Commissary of Pistoia; and Bernardo de Vittori, Vicar and Commissary of Pescia, greeting.

WE have sent Pietro Paolo, the bearer of this, and an officer belonging to our August Signiory, with all expedition, to prepare magnificent lodgings at Prato for his Eminency, the most Reverend Legate from his most Christian Majesty to our August Signiory, who is returning according to his commission into France. It is our pleasure therefore, that his eminency, together with all his train and attendants, be honourably received and entertained by you and every one of you, as well as by your principal citizens; and that you provide him with magnificent lodgings, and such as are fitting for the Ambassador of so great a Prince. And if his Eminency has a mind to see the environs of Prato, you, the Chief Magistrate of the said town, are to take care that he be attended in a proper manner, and that all manner of honour and respect be shewn him, as he justly deserves, according to the instructions we have given to the bearer of this, which he will communicate more fully to you by word of mouth.
Farewell, 18 March, 1511.

We would not willingly deprive the Public of the following Letter, written by Machiavel, and transmitted to us by a person of learning in Italy, though it is upon a Subject very different from the rest.

LET-

LETTER XL.

Nicholas Machiavel to his excellent Friend Alamanno Salviato, greeting.

YOU may here read, since you desired it, my dear Alamanno, the sufferings of Italy during the course of ten years, and the fruits of my labours for fifteen days : but I know very well you will have no pleasure either in one or the other ; since you must be moved with compassion at the misfortunes of your Country, and entertain some pity for me who have attempted a recital of so many great events in so narrow a compass. Yet I am assured you will bear with both, as the former were owing to fatal necessity, and the latter to the shortness of those few intervals of leisure that fall to my share : and as you nobly support one of the chief members of your Country in its liberties, I hope you will also kindly vouchsafe your assistance to the reciter of its troubles, by polishing my verses in such a manner as may make them worthy of your acceptance, and the greatness of the subject. Farewell, 9 November, 154*.

* The original of this letter is in the Medicean Library at Florence, Cod. xiii. Membr. in 8o. Pl. xliv. It was written by Machiavel to Salviati, when he sent him his two Poems, called i Decennali ; the former of which begins in this manner,

Io canterò l'Italiche fatiche
Seguite già ne' duo passati lustri,
Sotto le Stelle all suo bene inimiche, &c.

The latter thus :

Gli accidenti e casi furiosi
Che in dieci anni seguenti sono stati,
Poiche tacendo la penna reposi ;
Le mutation de Regni, Imperii e Stati
Seguiti pur per l'Italico sito,
Dal consiglio divin predestinati,
Canterò io, &c.

THE END OF THE LETTERS.

A Copy of what is prefixed to the Register, in which all the Letters that were written by the Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence are preserved in the Chancery of that City *.

In Dei nomine Amen. Anno Domini nostri Jesu Christi ab ejus salutiferâ incarnatione millesimo quingentesimo undecimo, Indictione quartadecimâ †, diebus vero & mensibus infra scriptis.

In hoc sequenti chartarum numero præsentis Registri, scribentur omnes & singulæ Deliberationes pertinentes & expectantes ad officium secundæ Cancelleriæ Magnificorum Dominorum D. Priorum libertatis & Vexilliferi justitiæ perpetui Populi Florentini rogatæ & publicatæ per me Nicolaum Domini Bernard de Macclave lis unum ex Cancellariis præfatæ Dominationis existentibus de dictis Dominis,

Johanne Francisco Bartolomei	Pro Quart, ^{rio}
Francisci de Bramantibus	
Cino Hieronymi Cini Lucæ Cini	S. Spiritus.
Bernardo Hieronymi Matthæi de	
Morellis	Pro Quart, ^{rio}
Angelo Andreoli alterius Andreoli	
de Sacchettis	S. Crucis.
Alberto Cantis Johannis de Com-	
pagnis	Pro Quart, ^{rio}
Pieradovardo Hieronymi Ado-	
vardi de Giacchinottis	S. M. Nouvellæ.
Laetantio Francisci Papi de The-	
daldis	Pro Quart, ^{rio}
Johanne Philippi Johannis de	
Cappellis	S. Johannis.
Petro Domini Tommasii Laurentii de Soderinis	
Vexillifero justitiæ perpetuo Populi Florentini.	

* We cannot say much here in praise either of the elegance or intelligibility of Machiavel's Latin.

† The word Indictio signifies a period of fifteen years; a way of computing time introduced by Constantine the Great.

Here the following note is inserted in the Margin.

Filius justitiæ sub cuius umbrâ totum Imperium Florentinum felicissimum recubat.—

Existente eorum Notario Ser Juliano Johannis Antonii de Vaile—Cancell.—

Die primâ Novembris MDXI.

Præfati excelsi Domini in sufficienti numero congregati, per eorum solemne partitum missum inter eos ad fabas nigras & albas, & eo quidem obtento secundum ordinamenta Civitatis Florentiæ, deliberauerunt per præfatum eorum Cancellarium, solutis in primis debitîs taxis Communi Florentiæ, possint & debeant tradi Litteræ civibus Florentinis euntibus in Capitaneos, Vicarios, Potestates, & Castellanos; & pari modo Litteræ nostræ notificatoriæ, Revocationum Bullestinorum, ut moris est. Laus Deo.

It appears from the same Register, that the Priori and Notary were changed every two months; and that no Public officer was constantly employed in the Service of the Republic when these Letters were written, except Pietro Solderini, the Gonfalonier, and Niccoló Machiavelli, the Secretary of State.

F I N I S.

THE following letter having been printed in all the Editions of the old Translation, it is here given to the reader, though it certainly was not written by Machiavel; it bears date 1537, and his death is placed by all the best Historians in 1530. — There are besides in it many internal marks, which to the judicious will clearly prove it to be the work of some other writer, vainly endeavouring at the stile and manner of our excellent author. The letter is indeed a spirited and judicious defence of Machiavel and his writings, but it is written in a stile too inflated, and is utterly void of that elegance and precision which so much distinguish the works of the Florentine Secretary.

T H E
PUBLISHER to the READER,
CONCERNING
The following L E T T E R.

COURTEOUS READER,

I T hath been usual with most of those who have translated this Author into any Language, to spend much of their time and paper in taxing his impieties, and confuting his errors and false principles, as they are pleased to call them. If, upon perusal of his Writings, I had found him guilty of any thing that could deceive the simple, or prejudice the rest of mankind, I should not have put thee to the hazard of reading him in thy own Language; but rather have suffered him still to sleep in the obscurity of his own, than endanger the world; but being very well assured of the contrary, and that the Age will rather receive advantage than damage by this Publication, I did yet think that it was fit to say something in a Preface to vindicate our Author from those Slanders, which Priests and other biased Pens have laid upon him; but still I thought, that it might prove a bold and presumptuous undertaking, and might excite laughter, for a person of my small parts and abilities to apologize for one of the greatest Wits and profoundest Judgments that ever lived amongst the Moderns: in this perplexity, I had the good fortune to meet with this Letter of his own writing; which hath delivered me from those scruples, and furnished me with an opportunity of justifying this great person by his own pen. Receive then this choice Piece with benignity; it hath never before been published in any Language, but lurked for above 80 years, in the private Cabinets

nets of his own Kindred, and the Descendants of his own admirers in Florence, till in the beginning of the Pontificate of Urban VIII. it was procured by the Jesuits and other busy-bodies, and brought to Rome with an intention to divert that wise Pope from his design of making one of Nicholas Machiavelli's Name and Family Cardinal, as (notwithstanding all their opposition) he did, not long after. When it was gotten into that City, it wanted not those who had the judgment and curiosity to copy it, and so at length came to enjoy that privilege which all rare Pieces (even the sharpest Libels and Pasquils) challenge in that Court, which is to be sold to Strangers, one of which being a Gentleman of this Country, brought it over with him at his return from thence in the year 1645, and having translated it into English, did communicate it to divers of his friends, and by means of some of them, it hath been my good fortune to be capable of making thee a present of it; and let it serve as an Apology for our Author and his Writings, if thou thinkest he need any. I must confess I believe his Works require little, but rather praise and admiration; yet I wish I could as well justify one undertaking of his not long after the writing of this Letter; for we find in the Story of those times, that in the Month of August following, in the same year 1537, this Nicolo Machiavelli (except there were another of that name) was committed Prisoner to the Bargello, amongst those who were taken in Arms against Cosimo at the castle of Montemurli, notwithstanding all in his Compliments in this Letter to that Prince, and professed Obligations to him. If this be so, we must impute it to his too great zeal to concur with the desires of the universality at that time, in restoring the liberty of their Country, which hath so far dazzled the judgments even of great and wise men, that thou seest many grave Authors amongst the Ancients have even commended and deified the ingratitude and treachery of Brutus and Cassius.

But

But certainly this crime of his would have been much more unpardonable, if he had lived to see his own Prophecy fulfilled in the Persons and Descendants of this great Cosimo, for there was never any succession of Princes since the world began, in which all the Royal virtues and other qualities necessary to those who rule over men, were more eminently perspicuous than in every individual of this line; so that those people have as little cause as ever any had to lament the change of their Government; their great Dukes having been truly Fathers of their Country, and treated their Subjects like Children, though their power be above all limitation, above all fundamental Laws; but they, having no Law, are a Law to themselves. I cannot chuse but instance in some few of their benefits to their people; first, the making the River Arno navigable from Pisa to Florence in a year of dearth, that so the poor might be set on work and have bread, and the Traffick of both Cities infinitely facilitated; their making at their own charge a Canal from Livorne to Pisa; their erecting at Pisa a famous University, paying the Professors, who are eminent for Learning, and discharging all other incidencies out of their own Revenue, besides the raising stately Buildings for Schools and Libraries; their founding a renowned Order of Knighthood, and keeping the Chapter in the same City, and ordering a considerable number of Knights constantly to reside there, both which were intended and performed by them, to encrease the concourse, and restore the wealth to the once opulent Inhabitants of that place; their new building, fortifying and enfranchizing Livorne, that, even by the abolishing their own customs, they might enrich their Subjects, and make that Port (as it now is) the Magazine of all the Levant Trade; and lastly, their not having in 140 years ever levied any new Tax upon their people, excepting in the year 1642, to defend the Liberties of Italy against the Barbarini. These things

things would merit a Panegyric, if either my parts, or this short Advertisement, would admit it. I shall conclude then, after I have borne a just and dutiful testimony to the merits of the Prince who now governs that State, in whom (if all the princely virtues and endowments should be lost) they might be found restored again to the world; as some ingenious Artists in the last Age retrieved the Art of Sculpture by certain Bas Relievos remaining on some Pillars and Walls at Rome. The Prudence, Magnanimity, Charity, Liberality, and above all, the Humanity, Courtesy, and Affability of this Prince, though they exceed my expressions, yet they are sufficiently known, not only to his own Subjects (the constant objects of his care and goodness) but even to all Strangers, more particularly to our Nation, he having undertaken a troublesome Journey to visit this Kingdom, and to make it a witness and partaker of his transcendent generosity and bounty, which he hath continued ever since, as can be testified by all who have had the honour to wait upon him in his own Country, or the good fortune but to see him in ours. I myself, who have been so happy to be admitted into his presence, and have been honoured since in having his Highness my customer for many choice Books, to increase (not his knowledge, for that his beyond receiving any addition by Books) but his curiosity, and his Library, do think myself bound in Duty to take this poor opportunity of testifying my gratitude and devotion to this excellent Prince. As to this Letter, I have nothing more to say, but that thou mayest see how right this Author was set in Principles of Religion, before he could have the information, which we have had since from the Pens of most learned and rational Controversists in those points, and therefore thou mayest admire the sagacity of his Judgment. Read him then, and serve God, thy King, and thy Country, with the knowledge he will teach thee Farewell.

N I C H O.

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL's

L E T T E R

T O

ZANOBIUS BUONDELMONTIUS

I N

VINDICATION of himself and his WRITINGS.

THE Discourse we had lately (dear Zenobio) in the delightful Gardens of our old deceased Friend Cosimo Rucellai, and the pressing importunity of Giulio Salviati, that I would use some means to wipe off the many aspersions cast upon my Writings, gives you the present trouble of reading this Letter, and me the pleasure of writing it ; which last would be infinitely greater, if I were not at this day too old, and too inconsiderable, and by the change of our Government wholly incapable, of performing, either with my brain or my hand, any further service to my Country ; for it hath ever been my opinion, that whosoever goes about to make men publicly acquainted with his actions, or apologize to the world for imputations laid upon him, cannot be excused from vanity and impertinence, except his parts and opportunities be such, as may enable him to be instrumental for the good of others, and that he cannot achieve that excellent end, without justifying himself from having any indirect and base ones,
and

and procuring trust from men, by clearing the repute of his justice and integrity to them. But although this be far from my case ; yet I have yielded (you see) to the entreaty of Giulio and the rest of that Company, not only because I am sufficiently (both by the restraint of our Presb, and the discretion of the person I write to) assured that this Letter will never be made public ; but for that I esteem it a duty to clear that excellent Society from the scandal of having so dangerous and pernicious a person to be a member of their conversation ; for by reason of my Age, and since the Loss of our Liberty, and my sufferings under that Monster of lust and cruelty Alexander de Medici, set over us by the Divine vengeance for our sins, I can be capable of no other design or enjoyment, than to delight, and be delighted, in the company of so many choice and virtuous persons, who now assemble themselves with all security, under the happy and hopeful Reign of our new Prince, Cosimo ; and we may say, that though our Commonwealth be not restored, our slavery is at an end, and that he coming in by our own choice, may prove (if I have as good Skill in Propheſying as I have had formerly) Anceſtor to many renowned Princes, who will govern this State in great quietness, and with great clemency ; so that our Posterity is like to enjoy ease and security, though not that greatness, wealth, and glory, by which our City hath for ſome years past (even in the moſt factious and tumultuous times of our Democracy) given Law to Italy, and bridled the ambition of foreign Princes. But, that I may avoid the Loquacity incident to old men, I will come to the buſineſſ. If I remember well, the exceptions that are taken to these poor things I have published, are reducible to three.

First, That in all my Writings, I insinuate my great affection to the Democratical Government, even so much as to undervalue that of Monarchy in respect of it, which last I do, not obscurely, in many passages teach, and as it were, persuade the People to throw off.

Next, That in some places I vent very great impieties, slighting and villifying the Church, as Author of all the misgovernment in the world, and by such contempt make way for Atheism and Prophaneness.

And Lastly, that in my Book of the Prince I teach Monarchs all the execrable Villainies that can be invented, and instruct them how to break faith, and to oppress and enslave their Subjects.

I shall answer something to every one of these ; and that I may observe a right method, will begin with the first.

Having lived in an Age when our poor Country and Government have suffered more changes and revolutions, than ever did perhaps befall any people in so short a time, and having had, till the taking of Florence, my share in the managing of affairs, during almost all these alterations, sometimes in the quality of Secretary of our City, and sometimes employed in Embassages abroad, I set myself to read the Histories of Ancient and Modern times, that I might by that means find out whether there had not been in all Ages the like vicissitudes and accidents in State affairs, and to search out the causes of them ; and having in some sort satisfied myself therein, I could not abstain from scribbling something of the two chief kinds of Government, Monarchy and Democracy, of which all other forms are but mixtures ; and since neither my Parts nor Learning

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could arrive to follow the steps of the Ancients, by writing according to Method and Art, as Plato, Aristotle, and many others have done upon this Subject, I did content myself to make slight observations upon both; by giving a bare Character of a Prince, as to the Monarchical frame; and as to the Popular, chusing the perfectest and most successful of all Governments of that kind upon earth, and in my Discourses upon it, following the order of my Author, without ever taking upon me to argue problematically, much less to decide which of these two Governments is the best. If from my way of handling matters in my Discourses upon Livy, and from those incomparable virtues and great actions we read of in that History, and from the observations I make, men will conclude (which is, I must confess my opinion) that the excellency of those Counsels and Achievements, and the improvements which Mankind, and, if I may so say, human nature itself obtained amongst the Romans, did proceed naturally from their Government, and was but a plain effect and consequence of the perfection of their Commonwealth; I say, if Readers will thus judge, how can I in reason be accused for that? It would become those who lay this blame upon me to undeceive them whom my Papers have missed, and to shew the world to what other causes we may impute those admirable effects, those heroic qualities and performances, that integrity and purity of manners, that scorning of riches and life itself, when the public was concerned: If they please to do this, they will oblige my Readers, who will owe to such the rectifying their judgments, and not at all offend me, who have reasoned this matter impartially and without passion, nor have positively affirmed any thing. But what if this part of my accusation had been true? Why should I be condemned of Heresy or indiscretion for preferring a Commonwealth before a Monarchy? Was I not born,

born, bred, and employed in a City, which being at the time I writ, under that form of Government, did owe all wealth and greatness, and all prosperity to it? If I had not very designedly avoided all dogmaticalness in my observations (being not willing to imitate young Scholars in their Declamations) I might easily have concluded from the premises I lay down, that a Democracy, founded upon good order, is the best and most excellent Government, and this without the least fear of confutation; for I firmly believe, that there are none but Flatterers and Sophisters would oppose me, such as will wrest Aristotle, and even Plato himself, to make them write for Monarchy, by misapplying some loose passages in those great Authors: nay, they will tell their Readers, that what is most like the Government of the world by God is the best, which wholly depends upon his absolute power. To make this comparison run with four feet, these Sycophants must give the poor Prince they intend to deify, a better and superior Nature to humanity, must create a necessary dependance of all Creatures upon him, must endow him with infinite wisdom and goodness, and even with Omnipotency itself. It will be hard for any man to be misled in this Argument by proofs wrested from Theology, since whosoever reads attentively the Historical part of the Old Testament, shall find that God himself never made but one Government for men; that this Government was a Commonwealth (wherein the Sanhedrim or Senate, and the Congregation or popular Assembly, had their share) and that he manifested his high displeasure when the rebellious people would turn it into a Monarchy; but that I may not strike upon the rock I profess to shun, I shall pass to that which is indeed fit to be wiped off, and which if it were true, would not only justly expose me to the hatred and vengeance of God, and all good men, but even destroy the design and purpose of all my

Writings, which is to treat in some sort (as well as one of my small parts can hope to do) of the Politics ; and how can any man pretend to write concerning Policy, who destroys the most essential part of it, which is obedience to all Governments ? It will be very easy then for Giulio Salviati, or any other member of our Society, to believe the Protestation I make, that the animating of private men either directly or indirectly to disobey, much less to shake off, any Government, how despotical soever, was never in my Thoughts or Writings ; those who are unwilling to give credit to this, may take the pains to assign in any of my Books, the passages they imagine to tend that way, (for I can think of none myself) that so I may give such person more particular satisfaction. I must confess I have a discourse in one of my Books, to encourage the Italian Nation to assume their ancient valour, and to expel the Barbarians, meaning (as the ancient Romans used the word) all Strangers from amongst us ; but that was before the Kings of Spain had quiet possession of the Kingdom of Naples, or the Emperor of the Dutchy of Milan ; so that I could not be interpreted to mean that the people of those two Dominions should be stirred up to shake off their Princes, because they were Foreigners, since at that time Lodovic Sforza was in possession of the one, and K. Frederic restored to the other, both Natives of Italy ; but my design was to exhort our Countrymen not to suffer this Province to be the Scene of the arms and ambition of Charles the VIII. or K. Lewis his Successor, who when they had a mind to renew the old Title of the house of Anjou to the Kingdom of Naples, came with such force into Italy, that not only our Goods were plundered, and our Lands wasted, but even the liberty of our Cities and Governments endangered, but to unite and oppose them, and to keep this Province in the hands of Princes of our own Nation : this my intention is

so visible in the Chapter itself, that I need but refer you to it. Yet that I may not answer this imputation barely by denying, I shall assert in this place what my principles are in that which the world calls Rebellion, which I believe to be not only rising in Arms against any Government we live under, but to acknowledge that word to extend to all clandestine Conspiracies too, by which the peace and quiet of any Country may be interrupted, and by consequence the Lives and Estates of innocent persons endangered. Rebellion then, so described, I hold to be the greatest crime that can be committed amongst men, both against Policy, Morality, and in *foro Conscientiae*; but notwithstanding all this, it is an offence which will be committed whilst the world lasts, as often as Princes tyrannize, and by enslaving and oppressing their Subjects, make Magistracy, which was intended for the benefit of Mankind, prove a Plague and Destruction to it; for let the terror and the guilt be ever so great, it is impossible that human Nature, which consists of passion as well as virtue, can support with patience and submission the greatest cruelty and injustice, whenever either the weakness of their Princes, the unanimity of the people, or any other favourable accident, shall give them reasonable hopes to mend their condition, and provide better for their own interest by insurrection. So that Princes and States ought, in the Conduct of their Affairs, not only to consider what their people are bound to submit to, if they were inspired from Heaven, or were all Moral Philosophers, but to weigh likewise what is probable, *de facto*, to fall out in this corrupt age of the world, and to reflect upon those dangerous Tumults, which have happened frequently not only upon oppression, but even by reason of Malversation, and how some Monarchies have been wholly subverted and changed into Democracies by the Tyranny of their Princes, as we see (to say nothing

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of Rome) the powerful Canons of Swisserland brought by that means, a little before the last age, to a considerable Commonwealth, courted and sought to by all the Potentates in Christendom. If Princes will seriously consider this matter, I make no question but they will rule with Clemency and Moderation, and return to that excellent Maxim of the Ancients (almost exploded in this Age) that the interest of Kings and of their People is the same, which truth it hath been the whole design of my Writings to convince them of.

I am charged then, in the second place, with impiety, in villifying the Church, and so to make way for Atheism. I do not deny but that I have very frequently, in my Writings, laid the blame upon the Church of Rome, not only for all the misgovernment of Christendom, but even for the depravation and almost total destruction of the Christian Religion itself in this Province ; but that this Discourse of mine doth, or can tend to teach men impiety, or to make way for Atheism, I peremptorily deny : and although for proof of my innocence herein, I need but refer you and all others to my Papers themselves, as they are now published (where you will find all my reasons drawn from experience, and frequent examples cited, which is ever my way of arguing), yet since I am put upon it, I shall in a few lines make that matter possibly a little clearer ; and shall first make protestation, that as I do undoubtedly hope, by the merits of Christ, and by Faith in him, to attain eternal Salvation ; so I do firmly believe the Christian profession to be the only true Religion now in the world : next, I am fully persuaded, that all divine verities which God then designed to teach the world, are contained in the Books of Holy Scripture, as they are now extant and received amongst us. From them I understand that God created man in purity and innocence, and that the first of that Species, by
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their frailty, lost at once their integrity and their Paradise, and intailed sin and misery upon their posterity ; that Almighty God, to repair this loss, did out of his infinite mercy, and with unparalleled grace and goodness, send his only begotten Son into the world, to teach us new truths, to be a perfect example of virtue, goodness, and obedience, to restore true Religion, degenerated amongst the Jews into Superstition, Formality, and Hypocrisy, to die for the salvation of Mankind, and, in fine, to give to us the Holy Spirit, to regenerate our Hearts, support our Faith, and lead us unto all Truth. Now if it shall appear, that as the lusts of our first Parents did at that time disappoint the good intention of God, in making a pure world, and brought in by their disobedience the corruptions that are now in it ; so that since likewise the Bishops of Rome, by their insatiable ambition and avarice, have designedly, as much as in them lies, frustrated the merciful purpose he had, in the happy restoration he intended the world by his Son, and in the renewing and reforming of human Nature, and have wholly defaced and spoiled Christian Religion, and made it a worldly and a Heathenish thing ; and altogether incapable, as it is practised amongst them, either of directing the ways of its Professors to virtue and good life, or of saving their Souls hereafter. If, I say, this do appear, I know no reason why I, for detecting thus much, and for giving warning to the world to take heed of their ways, should be accused of Impiety or Atheism ; or why his Holiness should be so enraged against the poor Inhabitants of the Vallies in Savoy, and against the Albigesi, for calling him Antichrist ; but to find that this is an undoubted truth, I mean that the Popes have corrupted the Christian Religion, we need but read the New Testament (acknowledged by themselves to be of infallible truth), and there we shall see, that the Faith and Religion preached by Christ, and

settled afterwards by his Apostles, and cultivated by their Sacred Epistles, is so different a thing from the Christianity that is now professed and taught at Rome, that we should be convinced, that if those Holy men should be sent by God again into the world, they would take more pains to confute this Gallimaufry, than ever they did to preach down the Tradition of the Pharisees, or the Fables and Idolatry of the Gentiles ; and would in all probability suffer a new Martyrdom in that City under the Vicar of Christ, for the same Doctrine which once animated the Heathen Tyrants against them. Nay, we have something more to say against these sacrilegious pretenders to God's power ; for whereas all other false worships have been set up by some politic Legislators, for the support and preservation of Government, this false, this spurious Religion, brought in upon the ruins of Christianity by the Popes, hath deformed the face of Government in Europe, destroying all the good principles and Morality left us by the Heathens themselves, and introduced instead thereof, Sordid, Cowardly, and impolitic Notions, whereby they have subjected Mankind, and even great Princes and States, to their own Empire, and never suffered any Orders or Maxims to take place where they have power, that might make a Nation Wise, Honest, Great or Wealthy. This I have set down so plainly in those passages of my Book which are complained of, that I shall say nothing at all for the proof of it in this place, but refer you thither, and come to speak a little more particularly of my first assertion, that the Pope and his Clergy have depraved the Christian Religion. Upon this subject I could infinitely wish, now Letters begin to revive again, that some learned pen would employ itself, and that some person versed in the Chronology of the Church (as they call it) would deduce out of the Ecclesiastical Writers, the time and manner how these abuses crept in, and
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by what arts and steps this Babel that reaches at Heaven, was built by these Sons of the Earth: but this matter, as unsuitable to the brevity of a Letter, and indeed more to my small Parts and Learning, I shall not pretend to, being one who never hitherto studied or writ of Theology, further than it did naturally concern the Politics: therefore I shall only deal by the New Testament as I have done formerly by Titus Livius; that is, make observations or reflexions upon it, and leave you and Mr. Giulio, and the rest of our Society to make the judgment, not citing like Preachers, the Chapter or Verse; because the reading of Holy Scripture is little used, and indeed hardly permitted amongst us. To begin at the top, I would have any reasonable man tell me, whence this unmeasurable power, long claimed, and now possessed by the Bishop of Rome, is derived, first of being Christ's Vicar, and by that (as I may so say) pretending to a Monopoly of the Holy Spirit (which was promised and given to the whole Church; that is, to the Elect or Saints) as is plain by a Clause in St. Peter's Sermon, made the very same time that the miraculous gifts of the Spirit of God were first given to the Apostles, who says to the Jews and Gentiles; "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of Sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, for this promise is to you and to your Children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call." Next, to judge infallibly of Divine Truth, and to forgive Sins as Christ did. Then to be the Head of all Ecclesiastical persons and causes in the world; to be so far above Kings and Princes, as to judge, depose, and deprive them, and to have an absolute jurisdiction over all the Affairs in Christendom, in Ordine ad Spiritualia: yet all this the Canonists allow him, and he makes no scruple to assume, whilst it is plain that in the whole New Testament there is

is no description made of such an Officer to be at any time in the Church, except it be in the Prophecy of the Apocalypse, or in one of St. Paul's Epistles, where he says, "who is it that shall sit in the Temple of God, shewing himself that he is God." Christ tell us his Kingdom is not of this world; and if any will be the greatest amongst his Disciples, that he must be servant to the rest, which shews that his followers were to be great in sanctity and humility, and not in worldly power.

The Apostle Paul, writing to the Christians of those times, almost in every Epistle commands them to be obedient to the higher Powers, or Magistrates set over them; and St. Peter himself (from whom this extravagant Empire is pretended to be derived) in his first Epistle, bids us submit ourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the King, or, &c. and this is enjoined, although it is plain, that they who governed the world in those days, were both Heathens, Tyrants, and Usurpers; and in this submission there is no exception or proviso for Ecclesiastical immunity. The Practice as well as Precepts of these Holy men shew plainly that they had no intention to leave Successors, who should deprive Hereditary Princes from their right of Reigning for differing in Religion, who without all doubt are, by the appointment of the Apostle, and by the principles of Christianity, to be obeyed and submitted to (in things wherein the fundamental Laws of the Government give them power) though they were Jews or Gentiles. If I should tell you by what Texts in Scripture the Popes claim the Powers before mentioned, it would stir up your laughter, and prove too light for so serious a matter; yet because possibly you may never have heard so much of this Subject before, I shall instance in a few: they tell you therefore that the Jurisdiction they pretend over the Church, and the power of pardoning Sins, comes from Christ to

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St. Peter, and from him to them. "Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church. I will give thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven ; whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth," &c. From these two Texts ridiculously applied, comes this great Tree which hath with its Branches overspread the whole Earth, and killed all the good and wholesome Plants growing upon it ; the first text will never by any man of sense be understood to say more, than that the Preaching, Suffering, and Ministry of Peter, were like to be a great foundation and pillar of the Doctrine of Christ ; the other Text (as also another spoken by our Saviour to all his Apostles, "whose sins ye remit they are remitted, and whose sins ye retain they are retained") are by all the Primitive fathers interpreted in this manner ; wheresoever you shall effectually preach the Gospel, you shall carry with you Grace and Remission of Sins to them which shall follow your instructions ; but the people who shall not have these joyful Tidings communicated by you to them, shall remain in darkness, and in their Sins. But if any will contest, that by some of these last Texts, that Evangelical Excommunication, which was afterwards brought into the Church by the Apostles, was here presignified by our great Master, how unlike were those censures to those now thundered out (as he calls it) by the Pope ? These were for edification, and not destruction, to afflict the flesh for the salvation of the Soul ; that Apostolical ordinance was pronounced for some notorious Scandal or Apostacy from the Faith, and first decreed by the Church ; that is, the whole Congregation present, and then denounced by the Pastor, and reached only to debar such person from partaking of the Communion or fellowship of that Church, till repentance should re-admit him, but was followed by no other prosecution or chastisement, as is now practised.

ed. But suppose all these Texts had been as they would have them, how does this make for the Successors of St. Peter or the rest? or how can this prove the Bishops of Rome to have right to such succession? But I make haste from this subject, and shall urge but one Text more; which is, "The spiritual man judgeth all men, but is himself judged of none;" from whence is inferred by the Canonists, that first the Pope is the Spiritual man; and then, that he is to be Judge of all the world; and last, that he is never to be liable to any judgment himself; whereas it is obvious to the meanest understanding, St. Paul in this Text means to distinguish between a person inspired with the Spirit of God, and one remaining in the State of Nature, which latter, he says, cannot judge of those Heavenly gifts and graces, as he explains himself when he says, "The Natural man cannot discern the things of the Spirit, because they are foolishness unto him." To take my leave of this matter, wholly out of the way of my Studies, I shall beg of you, Zanobio, and of Giulio, and the rest of our Society, to read over carefully the New Testament, and then to see what ground there is for Purgatory (by which all the wealth and greatness hath accrued to these men) what colour for the Idolatrous worship of Saints, and their Images, and particularly for speaking in their hymns and prayers to a piece of wood (the Crofs I mean) "Salve Lignum," &c. and then "fac nos dignos beneficiorum Christi," as you may read in that Office; what colour or rather what excuse for that horrid, unchristian, and barbarous Engine called the Inquisition, brought in by the command and authority of the Pope, the Inventor of which, Peter a Dominican Friar having been slain amongst the Albigesi, as he well deserved, is now canonized for a Saint, and stiled San Pietro Martine. In the dreadful prisons of this Inquisition, many faithful and pious Christians (to say nothing of honest Moral

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Moors or Mahometans) are tormented and famished, or if they outlive their sufferings, burnt publicly to death, and that only for differing in Religion from the Pope, without having any crime, or the least misdemeanor proved or alledged against them ; and this is inflicted upon these poor Creatures by those who profess to believe the Scripture, which tell us, that faith is the gift of God, without whose special illumination no man can obtain it, and therefore is not in reason or humanity to be punished for wanting it : and Christ himself hath so clearly decided that point in bidding us let the tares and the wheat grow together till the Harvest, that I shall never make any difficulty to call him Antichrist, who shall use the least persecution whatsoever against any differing in matters of faith from himself, whether, the person so dissenting be Heretic, Jew, Gentile, or Mahometan : next, I beseech you to observe in reading that Holy Book (though Christian fasts are doubtless of Divine right) what ground there is for enjoining fish to be eaten (at least flesh to be abstained from) for one third part of the year, by which they put the poor to great hardship, who not having purses to buy wholesome fish, are subjected to all the miseries and diseases incident to a bad and unhealthful diet, whilst the rich, and chiefly themselves and their Cardinals, exceed Lucullus in their Luxury, of Oysters, Turbots, tender Crabs, and Capioni brought some hundreds of miles to feed their gluttony upon these penitential days of abstinence from Beef and Pork. It may be it will lie in the way of those who observe this, to inquire what St. Paul means, when he says, "That in the latter days some shall depart from the faith, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving ;" but all these things, and many other abuses brought in by these Perverters of Christianity, will I hope ere long be enquired into by some of the Disciples
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of that bold Friar, who the very same year in which I prophesied that the scourge of the Church was not far off, began to thunder against their Indulgencies, and since hath questioned many tenets long received and imposed upon the world. I shall conclude this discourse, after I have said a word of the most Hellish of all the innovations brought in by the Popes, which is the Clergy ; these are a sort of men under pretence of ministering to the people in holy things, set apart and separated from the rest of mankind (from whom they have a very distinct, and a very opposite interest) by a human Ceremony called by a divine name, viz. Ordination. These, wherever they are found (with the whole body of the Monks and Friars, who are called the regular Clergy) make a Band which may be called the Janizaries of the Papacy ; these have been the causers of all the Solescisms and immortalities in Government, and of all the impieties and abominations in Religion, and by consequence of all the disorder, villainy, and corruption we suffer under in this detestable Age ; these men, by the Bishop of Rome's help, have crept into all the Governments in Christendom, where there is any mixture of Monarchy, and made themselves a third estate ; that is, have by their temporalities (which are almost a third of all the Lands in Europe given them by the blind zeal, or rather folly, of the Northern people, who over-ran this part of the world) stept into the throne, and what they cannot perform by these secular helps, and by the dependency their vassals have upon them, they fail not to claim and to usurp by the power they pretend to have from God and his Vicegerent at Rome. They exempt themselves, their Lands and goods, from all secular jurisdiction ; that is, from all Courts of Justice and Magistracy, and will be Judges in their own Causes, as in matters of tythe, &c. and not content with this, will appoint Courts of their own to decide sovereignly in

in testamentary matters, and many other causes, and take upon them to be sole Punishers of many great Crimes, as Witchcraft, Sorcery, Adultery, and all uncleanness; to say nothing of the forementioned judicatory of the Inquisition: in these last cases they turn the offenders over to be punished (when they have given Sentence) by the secular arm, so they call the Magistrate, who is blindly to execute their decrees under pain of Hell fire; as if Christian Princes and Governors were appointed only by God to be their Bravoes or Hangmen. They give Protection and Sanctuary to all execrable Offenders, even to Murderers themselves (whom God commanded to be indispensably punished with death) if they come within their Churches, Cloysters, or any other place, which they will please to call Holy ground; and if the ordinary justice, nay, the Sovereign power, do proceed against such offender, they thunder out their Excommunication; that is, cut off from the body of Christ, not the Prince only, but the whole Nation and People, shutting the Church doors, and commanding divine offices to cease, and sometimes even authorizing the people to rise up in Arms, and constrain their Governors to a subinission, as happened to this poor City in the time of our Ancestors, when for but forbidding the servant of a poor Carmelite Friar (who had vowed poverty, and should have kept none) to go armed, and punishing his disobedience with imprisonment, our whole Senate with their Gonfalonier were constrained to go to Avignon for absolution, and in case of refusal, had been massacred by the people. It would almost astonish a wise man to imagine how these folks should acquire an Empire so deltructive to the Christian Religion, and so pernicious to the interests of men, but it will not seem so miraculous to them who shall seriously consider, that the Clergy hath been for more than this thousand years upon the catch, and a formed united corporation against

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the purity of Religion, and the interest of Mankind, and have not only wrested the Holy Scriptures to their own advantage (which they have kept from the laity in unknown languages, and by prohibiting the reading thereof) but made use likewise first of the blind devotion and ignorance of the Goths, Vandals, Huns, &c. and since of the ambition and avarice of Christian Princes, stirring them up one against another, and sending them upon foolish errands to the Holy Land, to lose their Lives, and to leave their Dominions, in the mean time, exposed to themselves and their Complices. They have besides kept Learning and Knowledge among themselves, stifling the light of the Gospel, crying down Moral virtues as splendid sins, defacing human policy, destroying the purity of the Christian faith and profession, and all that was virtuous, prudent, regular and orderly upon earth; so that whoever would do good, and good men service, get himself immortal honour in this life, and eternal glory in the next, would restore the good policy (I had almost said, with my Author Livy, the sanctity too) of the Heathens, with all their valour, and other glorious endowments; I say, whoever would do this, must make himself powerful enough to extirpate this cursed and apostate race out of the world; and that you may see this is lawful as well as necessary, I shall say but one word of their calling and original, and then leave this subject. The word Clergy is a term wholly unknown to the Scriptures, otherwise than in this sense; a peculiar People or God's lot, used often for the whole Jewish Nation, who are likewise called a Kingdom of Priests in some places. In the New Testament, the word Cleros is taken for the true Believers, who are also called the Elect, and often the Church, which is the Assembly of the faithful met together, as is easily seen by reading the beginning of most of St. Paul's Epistles, where writing to the Church or Churches,

Churches, he usually explains himself, “ To all the Saints in Christ; sometimes, To all who have obtained like faith with us; sometimes, To all who in all places call upon the Name of the Lord Jesus, &c.” by which it appears, that neither the word Church or Clergy was in those days ever appropriated to the Pastors or Elders of the flock; but did signify indifferently all the people assembled together; which is likewise the literal construction of the word Ecclesia, which is an assembly or meeting. In these Congregations or Churches was performed their Ordination, which properly signifies no more than a decree of such Assembly; but is particularly used for an Election of any into the Ministry. The manner was this, sometimes the Apostles themselves in their Perigrinations, and sometimes any other eminent Member of the Church, did propose to the Society (upon vacancy, or other necessity of a Pastor, Elder, or Deacon) some good Holy man to be Elected, which person, if he had parts or gifts, such as the Church could edify by, was chosen by the lifting up of hands, that is, by suffrage, and oftentimes hands were laid upon him, and Prayer made for him. These men, so set apart, did not pretend to any consecration, or sacredness, more than they had before, much less to become a distinct thing from the rest of mankind, as if they had been metamorphosed, but did attend to perform the several functions of their calling, as prophesying; that is, Preaching the Gospel, visiting the sick, &c. and never intermitted the ordinary business of their Trade or Profession, unless their Church or Congregation was very numerous, in which case they were maintained by alms or contribution, which was laid aside by every member, and collected the first day of the week by the Deacons. This was said to be given to the Church, and was employed by suffrage of the whole Collective Body to the poor, and to other incidencies; so

far was it from Sacrilege in those days to employ Church goods to Lay uses. From these words, Church, Clergy, Ordination, Pastor, (which last hath been translated of late years Bishop) you see what conclusions these men have deduced, and how immense a structure they have raised upon so little foundation, and how easily it will fall to the ground, when God shall inspire Christian Princes and States to redeem his truths, and his poor enslaved Members out of their Clutches, to bring back again into the world the true original Christian faith, with the Apostolical Churches, Pastors, and Ordination, so consistent with moral virtue and integrity, so helpful and conducing to the best and most prudent Policy, so fitted for obedience to Magistracy and Government, all which the world hath for many years been deprived of, by the execrable and innate ill quality which is inseparable from Priestcraft, and the conurbation or spell of their new invented ordination; by which they cry with the Poet,

*Jam furor humanum nostro de pectore sensum
Expulit & totum spirant præcordia Phœbum;*

which makes them so Sacred and Holy, that they have nothing of integrity, or indeed of humanity, left in them. I hope I shall not be thought impious any longer upon this point; I mean, for vindicating Christian Religion from the assaults of these men, who having the confidence to believe, or at least profess themselves the only instruments which God hath chosen, or can choose, to teach and reform the world (though they have neither Moral virtues, nor Natural parts equal to other men for the most part) have by this pretence prevailed so far upon the common sort of people, and upon some too of a better quality, that they are persuaded their salvation or eternal damnation depends upon believing or not believing what they say. I would not

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be understood to dissuade any from honouring the true Apostolical Teachers, when they shall be re-established amongst us, or from allowing them (even of right, and not of alms or courtesy) such emoluments as may enable them chearfully to perform the duties of their charge, to provide for their Children, and even to use hospitality as they are commanded by St. Paul. But this I will prophesy before I conclude, that if Princes shall perform this business by halves, and leave any root of this Clergy or Priestcraft, as it now is, in the ground; or if that famous reformer fled some years since out of Picardy to Geneva, who is of so great renown for learning and parts, and who promises us so perfect a reformation, shall not in his model wholly extirpate this sort of men, then I say I must foretel, that as well the Magistrate as this Workman, will find themselves deceived in their expeſtation, and that the least fibra of this plant will over-run again the whole Vineyard of the Lord, and turn to a diffusive Papacy in every Diocese, perhaps in every Parish: So that God in his mercy inspire them to cut out the core of the ulcer, and the bag of this impostume, that it may never ranckle or fester any more, nor break out hereafter, to diffuse new corruption and putrefaction through the body of Christ, which is his Holy Church, nor to vitiate and infect the good order and true policy of Government.

I come now to the last branch of my charge, which is, that I teach Princes villainy, and how to enslave and oppress their Subjects, in which accusation I am dealt with as poor Agnollo Canini was, who, as they report, being a very learned Practiser of the Laws, and left the only man of this profession (one Autumn) in our City, the rest of the Advocates being fled into the Country for fear of a contagious Disease which then reigned, was commanded by our Judges to assist with his Counsel both parties, and to draw Pleas as well for the Defendant

fendant as the Plaintiff, else the Court of Justice must have been shut up. In the same manner my accusers handle me, and make me first exhort and teach Subjects to throw off their Princes, and then to instruct Monarchs how to enslave and oppress them ; but I did not expect such ingratitude from mine own Citizens, or to be served as Moses was, when he was upbraided for killing the Egyptian, by one of his own people, for whose sake he had done it ; whereas he believed they would have understood by that action, that he was the person whom God intended to make use of in delivering them from the horrid slavery they were then under. If any man will read over my Book of the Prince with impartiality and ordinary charity, he will easily perceive, that it is not my intention therein to recommend that Government, or those men there described to the world ; much less to teach them to trample upon good men, and all that is sacred and venerable upon earth, Laws, Religion, Honesty, and what not ; if I have been a little too punctual in designing these Monsters, and drawn them to the life in all their lineaments and colours, I hope mankind will know them, the better to avoid them, my Treatise being both a Satire against them, and a true Character of them ; I speak nothing of great and honourable Princes, as the Kings of France, England, and others, who have the States and Orders of their Kingdoms with excellent Laws and Constitutions to found and maintain their Government, and who reign over the hearts as well as the persons of their subjects ; I treat only of those vermin bred out of the corruption of our own small Commonwealths and Cities, or engendered by the ill blasts that come from Rome, Olivareto da Fermo, Borgia, the Baglioni, the Bentivoglii, and a hundred others ; who having had neither right nor honourable means to bring them to their power, use it with more violence, rapine, and cruelty upon

the poor people, than those other renowned Princes shew to the Boars, the Wolves, the Foxes, and other savage beasts which are the objects of their chase and hunting. Whosoever in his Empire over men is tied to no other rules than those of his own will and lust, must either be a Saint to moderate his passions, or else a very Devil incarnate ; or if he be neither of these, both his life and reign are like to be very short ; for whosoever takes upon him so execrable an employment as to rule men against the Laws of nature and of reason, must turn all topsy-turvy, and never stick at any thing, for if once he halt, he will fall and never rise again. I hope after this I need say little to justify myself from the calumny of advising these Monsters to break their faith, since to keep it is to lose their Empire, faithfulness and sincerity being their mortal enemies. Ugucceone della Faggivola to one who upbraided him, that he never employed honest men, answered, " Honest men will cut my throat, let the King use honest men," meaning the King of Naples, who was established in his Throne, and had right to it. But that I may have occasion to justify myself against a little more than I am accused of, I will confess, that in a work where I desired to be a little more serious than I was in this Book of the Prince, I did affirm, that in what way soever men defended their Country, whether by breaking or keeping their faith, it was ever well defended, not meaning in a strict moral sense, or point of honour, but explaining myself that de facto the infamy of the breach of word would quickly be forgotten and pardoned by the world, which is very true : nay, what if I had said that good success in any enterprize (a far less consideration than Piety to our Country) would have cancelled the blame of such perfidy as Cæsar (whom I compare to Cataline) used towards his Fellow-citizens, not only not detested by posterity, but even crowned with renown and immortal fame ;

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insomuch as Princes to this day (as I have observed elsewhere) think it an honour to be compared to him, and the highest pitch of veneration their flatterers can arrive at, is to call them by the name of one who violated his faith, and enslaved his Country. I hope that in shewing as well these Tyrants as the poor people who are forced to live under them, their danger, that is, by laying before the former, the hellish and precipitous courses they must use to maintain their power, by representing to the latter what they must suffer, I may be instrumental, first, to deter private Citizens from attempting upon the liberties of their Country; or if they have done it, to make them lay down their ill gotten authority; and then to warn the rest of the Nobility and people from these factions and malignancies in their several Commonwealths and Governments, which might give hope and opportunity to those who are ambitious amongst them, to aspire to an Empire over them. However it prove, I hope I am no more to be blamed for my attempt, than that excellent Physician of our Nation is, who hath lately taken so much pains to compose an excellent Treatise, of that foul Disease which was, not long since, brought from the new world into these parts; wherein though he be forced to use such expressions as are almost able to nauseate his Readers, and talk of such Ulcers, Boils, Nodes, Blotches, Cankers, &c. that are scarce fit to be repeated, especially when he handles the causes of those effects, yet he did not intend to teach or exhort men to get this Disease; much less did he bring this lamentable infirmity into the world, but describes it faithfully as it is, to the end men may be bettered, and avoid the being infected with it, and may discern and cure it, whenever their incontinence and folly shall procure it them. I shall say no more in this matter; but to conclude all make a protestation, that as well in this Book, as in all my other Writings, my only

only scope and design is to promote the interest and welfare of mankind, and the peace and quiet of the world, both which, I am so vain as to believe, would be better obtained and provided for, if the principles I lay down were followed and observed by Princes and People, than they are like to be by those Maxims which are in this Age most in vogue. For myself, I shall only say (and call you all to witness for the truth of it) that as by my Birth I am a Gentleman, and of a Family which hath had many Gonfaloniers of Justice in it ; so I have been used in many employments of great trust, both in our City and abroad, and at this hour I am not in my Estate one penny the better for them all, nor should I have been, although I had never suffered any losses by the seizure of my Estate in the year 1531. For my carriage, it hath ever been void of faction and contention ; I never had any prejudice against the House of Medici, but honoured the persons of all those of that Family whom I knew, and the memory of such of them as lived before me, whom I acknowledge to have been excellent Patriots and Pillars of our City and Commonwealth. During the turbulent times of Piero, and after his expulsion out of Florence, though my employments were but Ministerial, my advice was asked in many grave matters, which I ever delivered with impartiality and indifference, not espousing the heady opinions of any, much less their passions and animosities ; I never sided with any Party further than that the Duty of my charge obliged me to serve the prevailing Party, when possessed of the Government of our City ; this I speak for those changes which happened between the flight of the said Piero de Medici, and the horrid Paricide committed by Clement VII. upon his indulgent Mother, joining with his greatest enemies, and uniting himself with thole who had used the most transcendent insolence to his own person, and the highest violence and fury the Sun

ever saw to his poor Courtiers and Subjects, that so accompanied he might sheath his Sword in the bowels of his own desolate Country. At that time, and during that whole Siege, I must confess I did break the confines of my Neutrality, and not only acted as I was commanded barely, but rouzed myself, and stirred up others, haranguing (in the Streets and places of the City) the People to defend with the last drop of blood, the Walls of their Country, and the Liberty of their Government; taking very hazardous Journies to Feruccio, and then into the Mugello and other parts, to bring in Succours and Provisions to our languishing City; and acting as a Soldier (which was a new profession to me) at the age of above sixty, when others are dispensed from it. For all which, I had so entire a satisfaction in my mind and conscience, that I am persuaded this cordial made me able to support the sufferings which befel me after our Catastrophe, and to rejoice in them so far, that all the malice and cruelty of our enemies could never draw one word from me unsuitable to the honour I thought I merited, and did in some sort enjoy, for being instrumental to defend (as long as it was possible) our Altars and our Hearths. But all that I have undergone, hath been abundantly recompenced to me by the favour and courtesy of the most excellent Signior Cosimo, who hath been pleased to offer me all the preferments the greatest ambition could aspire to, which I did not refuse out of any scruple to serve so incomparable a Prince, whose early years manifest so much Courage, Humanity, and Prudence, and so Fatherly a care of the public good, but because I was very desirous not to accept of a charge which I was not able to perform, my years and infirmities having now brought me to a condition in which I am fitter to live in a Cloyster than a Palace, and made me good for nothing but to talk of past times, the common vice of old Age: So that

that I did not think it just or grateful to reward this excellent person so ill for his kindness, as to give him a useless Servant, and to fill up the place of a far better. This is all I think fit to say of this matter, I chuse to address it to you, Zenobio, for the constant friendship I have ever entertained with you, and formerly with your deceased Father, the companion of my Studies, and ornament of our City. And so I bid you farewell.

The first of April, 1537.

To this Vindication of Machiavel, it has been thought necessary to subjoin the following satisfactory account of its Writer (which we have received since the Impression) extracted from a letter written by the right Reverend and most learned Bishop of Gloucester, and communicated by a Gentleman equally eminent for elegance and humanity.

THE anecdote you inquire after, I presume is this, and is at your Friend's service.

There is at the end of the English translation of Machiavel's works, printed in Folio, 1680, a translation of a pretended Letter of Machiavel, to Zanobius Buondelmontius, in vindication of himself and his Writings. I believe it has been generally understood to be a feigned thing, and has by some been given to Nevil, he who wrote, if I be not mistaken, the *Plato Redivivus*. But, many years ago a number of the famous Marquis of Wharton's papers [the Father of the Duke] were put into my hands. Amongst these was the press-copy (as appeared by the Printer's marks, where every page of the printed Letter begun and ended) of this remarkable Letter, in the Marquis's hand-writing, as I took it to be, compared with other papers of his. The person

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person who intrusted me with these papers, and who, I understood, had given them to me, called them back out of my hands.—This anecdote I communicated to the late Speaker: and at his desire wrote down the substance of what I here tell you, in his Book of the above Edition.

I am, dear Sir,

With the truest regard and affection,

Your most faithful, and

Affured Friend and humble Servant,

Prior Park,
May 17, 1762.



W. GLOUCESTER.

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Brunelleschi, Philip, a celebrated painter and architect of Florence, having reconnoitred the course of the river Serchio, and the situation of Lucca, informs the Council of Ten that he will undertake to lay the city under water, i. 268—convinces them so far of the practicability of his design, that they give him a commission to put it in execution, ibid.—his project, by occasioning great disorders among the Florentine troops, saves the city, ibid.

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Capponi, Neri, his speech to the Venetian senate, *i. 333*—his answer to count Poppi's address, *364.*

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Charlemagne, or *Charles the Great*, king of France, applied to by pope Theodore the First, for help against Desiderius, i. 25—passes the Alps, and shuts up Desiderius with his sons in Pavia, *ibid.*—takes them prisoners, and sends them to France, *ibid.*—pays a visit to the pope at Rome, *ibid.*—makes a very flattering declaration to him, *ibid.*—is unanimously made, in return for it, emperor, *ibid.*—new models Italy in the pontificate of Leo III. 26—makes his son Pepin king of Italy, *ibid.*

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Charles, duke of Burgundy, promises to assist pope Pius against the Turks in person, ii. 22—is appointed one of the generals, *ibid.*

Charles VII. king of France, receives an offer of the state of Genoa, from Pietro Fregoso, the doge, i. 439—readily accepts of it, and sends king Regnier's son, John of Anjou, to take possession of that city, *ibid.*—gains many a victory by pretending to be advised in every thing by a virgin sent from heaven, commonly called, *the Virgin of France*, iv. 146.

Charles, son to Robert king of Naples, and duke of Calabria, has the government of Florence offered him, on his undertaking to defend it, i. 127—sends Gaultier duke of Athens to the Florentines as his lieutenant, *ibid.*—comes in person to Florence, and makes his entry, *ibid.*—gives some check to Castruccio by his arrival, *ibid.*—prevents him from roving about the country, and plundering it without controul, as he had done before, *ibid.*—exacts four hundred thousand florins from the citizens in one year, in violation of the agreement made with him, *ibid.*—thinking the kingdom of Naples in no small danger, on the military progress of Lewis of Bavaria towards Rome, he returns thither, with all the forces he had brought with him, leaving Philip Saginetto his lieutenant at Florence, 128—dies, *ibid.*

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- Clefs*, chosen by the Lombards their king, i. 19—he rebuilds Imola, a town that had been demolished by Narsetes, *ibid.*—reduces Rimini, and almost all the country between that place and Rome, *ibid.*—dies in the midst of his victories, *ibid.*
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- Cacchi, Donato*, resolves to set up a balia without the concurrence of Cosimo de Medici, ii. 7—meets with a violent opposition, *ibid.*—is treated with so much scorn and derision that he becomes stark mad, *ibid.*
- Coglione, Bartolomeo*, appointed commander in chief of the Venetian forces against the Florentines, ii. 42—assembles an army with as much expedition as possible, *ibid.*—is joined by Hercules D'Este with some troops sent by Borso duke of Ferrara, 43—makes an attempt upon the Bourg of Doadola, *ibid.*—burns it, and commits ravages

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- Commissions*, free and discretionary ones given by the Romans to the commanders of their armies upon any expedition, *iii. 334.*
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- Conradine*, lawful king of Naples and Sicily, by his father's will, raises a good body of forces in Germany for the recovery of his right, *i. 47*—marches into Italy against Charles of Anjou the usurper, *ibid.*—is engaged by him, defeated, and taken, *ibid.*—killed afterwards while he is trying to make his escape disguised, *ibid.*
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- Corneto*, *Giovanni Vitelleschi da*, patriarch of Alexandria, appointed commander in chief of the pope's forces, *i. 344*—is entrusted with the sole management of all his affairs and undertakings in Tuscany, *ibid.*—suspected of betraying the pope, *345*—is imprisoned in the castle of St. Angelo, *346*—dies there, *ibid.*
- Corzano*, castle of, saved by Antonio Gualandi, native of Pisa, when it was on the point of being treacherously given to Puccio by Gambacorta, *i. 428.*
- Craesus*, makes use of camels with success against the enemy's horse, *iv. 134.*
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